工程质量监控的博弈分析
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摘要
采用博弈论的方法对工程质量监控进行了分析。根据模型的不同假设前提,构造了单阶段和多阶段的博弈模型,得出博弈双方的均衡战略,以及某些关键因素(如监理单位对承包商的惩罚系数及监督成本,承包商的骗费额等)对博弈双方的影响,提出了减少工程质量事故发生的建议。
Engineering quality supervision is analyzed by using the game theory.Based on different hypothesis models of one-stage game and multistage games are established.And the equilibrium strategy is produced.Some key factors' impacting on the two parties including the mulct coefficient that supervision company punishes contractor,supervision cost and cheat amount are also discussed.Suggestions to reduce engineering quality accidents are made.
Engineering quality supervision is analyzed by using the game theory.Based on different hypothesis models of one-stage game and multistage games are established.And the equilibrium strategy is produced.Some key factors' impacting on the two parties including the mulct coefficient that supervision company punishes contractor,supervision cost and cheat amount are also discussed.Suggestions to reduce engineering quality accidents are made.
引文
犤1犦毛鹤琴.建设项目质量控制犤M犦.北京:地震出版社,1993.
犤2犦张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学犤M犦.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2000.
犤3犦Fudenberg,DrewandJeanTirole.GameTheory犤M犦.Chapter3-5.MITPress,1991.
犤4犦王艳,黄学军.工程建设监理的博弈分析犤C犦.中南工业大学学报,2001.176-178.
犤5犦王孟钧,王艳.建筑市场主体激励机制的博弈分析犤J犦.武汉理工大学学报,2001,(4):59-62.
犤2犦张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学犤M犦.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2000.
犤3犦Fudenberg,DrewandJeanTirole.GameTheory犤M犦.Chapter3-5.MITPress,1991.
犤4犦王艳,黄学军.工程建设监理的博弈分析犤C犦.中南工业大学学报,2001.176-178.
犤5犦王孟钧,王艳.建筑市场主体激励机制的博弈分析犤J犦.武汉理工大学学报,2001,(4):59-62.
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