基于博弈论的监理人水利工程施工阶段质量控制

英文篇名：Quality control of water conservancy projects by supervisors during construction stage based on game theory
中文刊名：水利经济
英文刊名：Journal of Economics of Water Resources
作者：王国强 ; 周书杰 ; 李鹏 ; 宋力
英文作者：WANG Guo-qiang ; et al (Structural Research Center ; Hydraulic Institute of Jiangsu Province ; Yangzhou 225002 ; China)
中文关键词：博弈论 ; 利益均衡 ; 水利工程 ; 质量控制
英文关键词：game analysis ; benefit balance ; water conservancy project ; quality control
出版日期：2010-03-30
机构：江苏省水利科学研究院材料结构研究室;东台市水务工程有限公司;金坛市建筑安装工程公司;
年：2010
期：02
出版单位：水利经济

摘要

从博弈论角度研究当前水利工程施工阶段监理人质量控制的效果,应用博弈论中的完全信息静态博弈假设,建立监理人与承包人之间的博弈模型,通过单阶段和多阶段博弈分析,得出混合战略纳什均衡解。认为监理人质量控制采用加大处罚力度、突出监控重点和减少监控成本是减少承包人施工违规行为的有效对策。
The effectiveness of the quality control of the current water conservancy projects by supervisors during the construction stage was studied from the perspective of the game theory. A game model for the supervisors and contractors was established by use of the static assumption of complete information in the game theory. Based on single-stage and multi-stage game analyses, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution was derived. A conclusion is drawn that for the quality control of water conservancy projects by supervisors during the construction stage, the effective measures to reduce the contractors’ irregular construction behavior are to increase the penalty strength, to highlight the key monitoring items and to reduce the monitoring cost.

引文

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