Asset sale, debt restructuring, and liquidation

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• 作者：Michi Nishihara^a ; ^{nishihara@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Takashi Shibata^b ; ¹ ; ^{tshibata@tmu.ac.jp" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：C73 ; G31 ; G33
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：June 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：67
• 期：Complete
• 页码：73-92
• 全文大小：805 K

文摘

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.