Doubting Assertion

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• 作者：Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
• 关键词：Assertion ; Knowledge account of assertion ; Moore’s Paradox
• 刊名：Philosophia
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：44
• 期：3
• 页码：745-757
• 全文大小：338 KB
• 刊物主题：Philosophy; Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1574-9274
• 卷排序：44

文摘

One main argument that has been offered in support of the Knowledge Account of Assertion is that it successfully makes sense of a variety of Moorean-paradoxical claims. David Sosa (2009) has objected to the Knowledge Account by arguing that it does not generalize satisfactorily to make sense of the oddity of iterated conjunctions of the form “p but I don’t know whether I know that p”. Recently, Martin Montminy (2013) has offered a defense of the Knowledge Account. In this paper, I show that both Montminy’s and Sosa’s arguments fail. First, I argue that Montminy does not offer a good reply to Sosa; then I show that Sosa’s objection actually does not constitute a real threat to the Knowledge Account.