Redistricting and reapportionment: Reforming Texas district courts.

详细信息   

• 作者：Payne ; Michelle M.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2013
• 导师：Champagne, Anthony M.,eadvisorBrunell, Thomas L.ecommittee memberCamp Keith, Lindaecommittee memberLowry, Robert C.ecommittee member
• 毕业院校：The University of Texas
• Department：Political Science
• ISBN：9781303137051
• CBH：3564637
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：3686474
• Pages：207

文摘

The most common institution that comes to mind when referencing redistricting or apportionment issues is most likely Congress, and specifically, the House of Representatives. It is not as well known that beginning in 1990, Texas judicial districts, by constitutional mandate, also must be reapportioned consistent with the federal decennial census as part of judicial reform efforts instituted by the state legislature in 1985. It is even less well known that Texas has not complied with this constitutional mandate and as a matter of consequence, arguably leaves the district courts of Texas without constitutional grounding. This research explores the origin and purpose of the1985 constitutional judicial redistricting mandate and corresponding complexities of the Texas district court system, including county preservation districting requirements, subdistricts and alternative redistricting measures. Relevant legislative history, governmental actions, and Judicial District Board efforts consistent with the mandated decennial census time frames of 1990, 2000, and 2010 are examined. Particular attention is devoted to statewide and ad hoc judicial redistricting models. The role and influence of the Texas Judicial Council, district court judges and the impact of federal pre-clearance requirements of judicial districts is also examined. The research is divided into five substantive chapters, with chapter five comparing weighted caseload and population redistricting measures. The theory is posited that the legislature is first, unwilling to delegate apportionment authority to a non-legislative board, the Judicial Districts Board, and second, favors ad hoc judicial redistricting, and thus the mandate is unrealized. The premise for this theory is that legislators are politically predisposed to appoint that which benefits them, even if counter to stated policy goals. It is also posited that the manner in which district court judges are elected and the encumbrance of Texas covered state status confounds judicial redistricting.