Three Essays on Gender Inequality,Dynamic Bargaining,and Technology Adoption in Subsistence Agriculture.

详细信息   

• 作者：Slootmaker ; Christopher.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2014
• 毕业院校：Colorado State University
• Department：Economics.
• ISBN：9781321168884
• CBH：3635678
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：1669629
• Pages：138

文摘

The dissertation presents three essays that build on each other to highlight the consequences of gender inequality in subsistence farming. Motivated by findings that unequal access to productive resources has indisputably serious implications for relative welfare between genders and relatedly hinders economic development of households,the project provides empirical and theoretical contributions to understanding these consequences. Together,the essays confront evidence that households engaged in agriculture do not behave as unitary decision makers but are instead sites of conflict and hierarchy. As dynamics of intrahousehold differences in capabilities,constraints,and control,bound individual agency,they define gender specific strategies. Such strategies necessarily determine individual well being and social equality between genders,as well as prospects for growth at the household level. These outcomes demand consideration from development policy by necessitating an understanding of power dynamics within the household and the role of social institutions in defining them. In unpacking the household to explore the dynamic links between men and women and the strategic behaviors they accordingly adopt,the dissertation is ultimately concerned with the power of social institutions to affect both equity and growth in the agricultural context. While feminist and bargaining literatures have developed thorough arguments in consideration of such institutions and their effects on relative welfare,theoretical models exploring the responses of agricultural households to development policies in a world of significant risk have not. The contribution of the project is therefore to examine the effects of intrahousehold inequality on agricultural production and develop relevant models of household behavior to consider such problems. The first essay leverages unique data from four villages in southern Ghana to test the hypothesis that resources are allocated efficiently between genders within households. Related work has rejected this hypothesis,concluding that gender inequality in this way is inefficient and offers significant gains from reallocating productive resources to women. The significant misallocation of land supports arguments in the development literature that improving womens access to and security over land is an important means to both equity and growth. Additionally,it suggests that households in this context do not act as benevolent planners but are instead political structures with conflict and power imbalances. Essays two and three build on the conclusion that unequal access to productive resources is a result of a gendered allocation process,and that this process generates Pareto-inferior outcomes at the household level. Each present two-stage bargaining models consistent with the inter temporal nature of the agricultural investment problem and the separate spheres system of subsistence production common to much of the developing world. By accommodating the relevant aspects of cooperation and conflict through bargaining,the essays contribute to the literature on separate spheres bargaining by developing dynamic frameworks where individual strategies are necessarily linked over time. While the models assume a relatively benign power structure,the decentralized setting in which investments are made results in potential Pareto-improvements described above. While the approach to the household problem is similar in the theoretical models,the focus is importantly different. Essay two highlights the role of expectations over spousal behavior on gender specific strategies. Specifically,as men and women look forward to a bargaining process determining transfers of harvest revenues,they accordingly adjust crop choices on their own farms. This dynamic leads to divergent outcomes for individuals and households as inequality increases. In exploring the strategies men and women adopt as a result of their access to resources and expectations over returns,this paper uncovers many sources of additional constraints to womens welfare and prospects for change. The third essay takes a similar approach to the dynamic savings problem but considers the interactions between intrahousehold bargaining and the adoption of new agricultural technologies. As crop choice in this context also represents a risk management strategy,the investment decisions women and men adopt take on additional importance regarding relative welfare and responses to socially determined capabilities. We find that households where women control fewer resources make net transfers from men to women,supporting the primary mechanism of strategic links between agents. Additionally,we find empirically that households which share productive assets more equally are better able to invest in the new technology on average,supporting the main prediction of the theoretical models. Furthermore,we conclude that gender inequality is an overarching constraint,beyond that from uncertainty from subsistence risk and unless approached proactively may continue to deter innovation,economic growth,and social change. Abstract shortened by UMI.).