Such an approach ignores the political economy of the state, especially when dealing with 鈥渇ragile鈥?or even 鈥渇ailing鈥?states facing severe but chronicle institutional crises, which are often ruled by 鈥済overnments with private agendas鈥?fuelling corruption. Two assumptions underlying the REDD proposal are particularly critical: (i) the idea that the government of such a state is in a position to make a decision to shift its development pathway on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that anticipates financial rewards, and (ii) the idea that, once such a decision has been made, the 鈥渇ragile鈥?state is capable, thanks to the financial rewards, to implement and enforce the appropriate policies and measures which could translate into deforestation reduction.
The first sections of the article discuss the pertinence of applying such a REDD version of the theory of incentives to Governments, and particularly to Governments in fragile states, with respect to the historical patterns and the practical way those states work. The last sections discuss the possibility of alternative architecture for REDD, focusing on policies and measures targeting the drivers of deforestation, and investments for intensifying agriculture, reforming land tenure and enhancing the functioning of the judicial system. We will show why incentive mechanisms should be used at another scale, for the benefits of local economic agents (companies, rural households, communities, etc.), and how a scaling down is likely to alleviate some of the constraints faced by incentives when dealing at Government level.