Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games

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• 作者：Toshiji Kawagoe^a ; ^{kawagoe@fun.ac.jp} ; Hirokazu Takizawa^b ; ¹ ; ^{taki@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp}
• 关键词：C72 ; C92 ; D82
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：36_01672681
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：May, 2012
• 卷：82
• 期：2-3
• 页码：548-566
• 文件大小：713 K

摘要

As one of the best-known examples of the paradox of backward induction, centipede games have prompted a host of studies with various approaches and explanations (). Focusing on initial plays observed in experiments, this paper attempts to offer another explanation based on thorough study of level-k models as applied to these games. Borrowing ideas from the cognitive hierarchy model (), the authors constructed a group of models based on levels of rationality, and also tested for various assumptions on the play of the most na茂ve player type in these models. It was found that level-k models generally perform better than the agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE) model and its variant with altruistic player types for increasing-pie centipede games, while the AQRE model with altruistic player types performs better in constant-pie games.