证券交易所非处罚性监管与审计质量——基于年报问询函信息效应和监督效应的分析
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摘要
以2015—2017年A股上市公司为样本,借助中介效应的检验方法,发现交易所发放年报问询函显著降低了当年审计报告的激进性,提升了审计质量,且这种提升作用并不限于问询函中被"点名"的审计事务所;年报问询函分别通过信息效应和监督效应提升审计质量,但监督效应占主导。
Issuing inquiry letters about annual reports of the listed companies is an important means of non-penalty regulation which is conducted by the China's Stock Exchanges. Using the 2015—2017 A-share listed companies as samples and with the method of mediation effect,we find that the inquiry letters about annual reports issued by the stock exchanges significantly reduce the radicality of the audit report and enhance audit quality. Meanwhile this enhancing effect is not affected by whether the audit office is referred to or not in the inquiry letters. We further find that the inquiry letters enhance the audit quality through information effect and supervision effect,but the supervisory effect dominates.
Issuing inquiry letters about annual reports of the listed companies is an important means of non-penalty regulation which is conducted by the China's Stock Exchanges. Using the 2015—2017 A-share listed companies as samples and with the method of mediation effect,we find that the inquiry letters about annual reports issued by the stock exchanges significantly reduce the radicality of the audit report and enhance audit quality. Meanwhile this enhancing effect is not affected by whether the audit office is referred to or not in the inquiry letters. We further find that the inquiry letters enhance the audit quality through information effect and supervision effect,but the supervisory effect dominates.
引文
[1]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.非处罚性监管具有信息含量吗?———基于问询函的证据[J].金融研究,2018(4):155-171.
[2]Khurana I K,Raman K. Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of Big4 versus Non-Big4 audits:evidence from Angelo-American countries[J]. The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):473-495.
[3]辛清泉,黄曼丽,易浩然.上市公司虚假陈述与独立董事监管处罚———基于独立董事个体视角的分析[J].管理世界,2013(5):131-143+175.
[4]赵子夜.“从业权取缔”型审计监管的警示效应[J].财经研究,2012(7):101-111.
[5]吴伟荣,李晶晶,包晓岚.签字注册会计师过度自信、政府监管与审计质量研究[J].审计研究,2017(5):70-86.
[6]吴溪,杨育龙,张俊生.预防性监管伴随着更严格的审计结果吗?———来自中注协年报审计风险约谈的证据[J].审计研究,2014(4):63-71.
[7]黄益雄,李长爱.行业自律监管能改进审计质量吗?———基于中注协约谈的证据[J].会计研究,2016(11):84-91+96.
[8]李琳,张敦力,夏鹏.年报监管、内部人减持与市场反应———基于深交所年报问询函的研究[J].当代财经,2017(12):108-119.
[9]陈硕,张然,陈思.证券交易所年报问询函影响了审计收费吗?———基于沪深股市上市公司的经验证据[J].经济经纬,2018(4):158-164.
[10]王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度———来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2006(4):9-15.
[11]Knechel W R,Krishnan G V,Pevzner M,et al. Audit quality:insights from the academic literature[J]. Auditing,2013,32(1):385-421.
[12]De Angelo L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(3):183-199.
[13]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、注册会计师审计与盈余管理[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):3-13.
[14]雷光勇,张英,刘茉.投资者认知、审计质量与公司价值[J].审计与经济研究,2015(1):17-25.
[15]De Fond M L,Raghunandan K,Subramanyam K. R. Do non-audit services fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1247-1274.
[16]Gul F A,Wu D,Yang Z. Do individual auditors affect audit quality? Evidence form archival data[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1993-2023.
[17]张立民,彭雯,钟凯.“沪港通”开通提升了审计独立性吗?———基于持续经营审计意见的分析[J].审计与经济研究,2018(5):35-45.
[18]张宏亮,文挺.审计质量替代指标有效性检验与筛选[J].审计研究,2016(6):67-75.
[19]谭楚月,段宏.审计质量只能替代吗?———来自实证研究的结论分析[J].会计研究,2014(7):89-96.
[20]谭洪涛,张筱.非标准审计意见足以保护审计师吗?———基于证券执法的证据[J].审计研究,2015(3):91-99.
[21]翟胜宝,张雯,曹源等.分析师跟踪与审计意见购买[J].会计研究,2016(6):86-95.
[22]Ke B,Lennox C,Xin Q. The effect of China's weak institutional environment on the quality of big four audits[J]. The Accounting Review,2015,90(4):1591-1619.
[23]Chan K H,Wu D H. Aggregate quasi rents and auditor independence:evidence from audit firm mergers in China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(1):175-213.
[24]吴昊旻,吴春贤,杨兴全.惩戒风险、事务所规模与审计质量———来自中国审计市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2015(1):75-83.
[25]Ettredge M,Johnstone K,Stone M,et al. The effects of firm size,corporate governance quality,and bad news on disclosure compliance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16(4):866-889.
[26]Johnston R,Petacchi R. Regulatory oversight of financial reporting:securities and exchange commission comment letters[J]. Contemporary of Accounting Research,2017,34(2):1128-1155.
[27]Bozanic Z,Dietrich J R,Johoson B A. SEC comment letters and firm disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017a,36(5):337-357.
[28]王遥.注册会计师审计行为的影响因素分析———基于行为金融学的“非理性假定”[J].审计研究,2008(2):72-78.
[29]Gietzmann M B,Pettinicchio A K. External auditor reassessment of client business risk following the issuance of a comment letter by the SEC[J]. European Accounting Review,2014,23(1):57-85.
[30]Bozanic Z,Hoops J,Thormock J,et al. IRS attention[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2017b,55(1):79-114.
[31]温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
[32]于蔚,汪淼军,金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012(9):125-139.
[33]王营,曹廷求.董事网络和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2017(1):83-93+159.
[34]宋献中,胡珺,李四海.社会责任信息披露与股价崩盘风险———基于信息效应与声誉保险效应的路径分析[J].金融研究,2017(4):161-175.
[35]Amihud Y,Mendelson H,Lauterbach B. Market microstructure and securities values:evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,45(3):365-390.
[36]Amihud Y. Illiquidity and stock returns:cross-section and time-series effects[J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2002,5(1):31-56.
[37]Bharath S T,Pasquariello P,Wu G. Does asymmetric information drive capital structure decisions?[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8):3211-3243.
[38]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014(5):731-745.
[39]Cassell C A,Dreher L M,Myers L A. Reviewing the SEC's Review Process:10-K Comment Letters and the Cost of Remediation[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1875-1908.
(1)原证监会主席刘士余2017年在“证券交易所一线监管国际研讨会”中的致辞。
(1)经过统计,在2015年至2018年6月底两大交易所发放的1129封年报问询函中,有821封要求对应的审计机构就相关事项发表相应意见。
(2)2017年2月14日,深交所对负责审计*ST烯碳并出具“无法表示意见”的审计师下发了《关于对北京中证天通会计师事务所(特殊普通合伙)注册会计师杨高宇、魏丽红的监管函》。
(3)2017年2月28日,深交所向负责审计报喜鸟的立信会计师事务所表达关注,请其结合会计处理的合规性,切实做好报喜鸟2016年年报审计工作。
(4)相关表述在证监会历年年报审核总结报告中均有所体现。
(1)由于审计意见具有一定的持续性,需要控制滞后一期的审计意见,所以样本量缩减为5881个。
[2]Khurana I K,Raman K. Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of Big4 versus Non-Big4 audits:evidence from Angelo-American countries[J]. The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):473-495.
[3]辛清泉,黄曼丽,易浩然.上市公司虚假陈述与独立董事监管处罚———基于独立董事个体视角的分析[J].管理世界,2013(5):131-143+175.
[4]赵子夜.“从业权取缔”型审计监管的警示效应[J].财经研究,2012(7):101-111.
[5]吴伟荣,李晶晶,包晓岚.签字注册会计师过度自信、政府监管与审计质量研究[J].审计研究,2017(5):70-86.
[6]吴溪,杨育龙,张俊生.预防性监管伴随着更严格的审计结果吗?———来自中注协年报审计风险约谈的证据[J].审计研究,2014(4):63-71.
[7]黄益雄,李长爱.行业自律监管能改进审计质量吗?———基于中注协约谈的证据[J].会计研究,2016(11):84-91+96.
[8]李琳,张敦力,夏鹏.年报监管、内部人减持与市场反应———基于深交所年报问询函的研究[J].当代财经,2017(12):108-119.
[9]陈硕,张然,陈思.证券交易所年报问询函影响了审计收费吗?———基于沪深股市上市公司的经验证据[J].经济经纬,2018(4):158-164.
[10]王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度———来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2006(4):9-15.
[11]Knechel W R,Krishnan G V,Pevzner M,et al. Audit quality:insights from the academic literature[J]. Auditing,2013,32(1):385-421.
[12]De Angelo L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,3(3):183-199.
[13]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、注册会计师审计与盈余管理[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):3-13.
[14]雷光勇,张英,刘茉.投资者认知、审计质量与公司价值[J].审计与经济研究,2015(1):17-25.
[15]De Fond M L,Raghunandan K,Subramanyam K. R. Do non-audit services fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1247-1274.
[16]Gul F A,Wu D,Yang Z. Do individual auditors affect audit quality? Evidence form archival data[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1993-2023.
[17]张立民,彭雯,钟凯.“沪港通”开通提升了审计独立性吗?———基于持续经营审计意见的分析[J].审计与经济研究,2018(5):35-45.
[18]张宏亮,文挺.审计质量替代指标有效性检验与筛选[J].审计研究,2016(6):67-75.
[19]谭楚月,段宏.审计质量只能替代吗?———来自实证研究的结论分析[J].会计研究,2014(7):89-96.
[20]谭洪涛,张筱.非标准审计意见足以保护审计师吗?———基于证券执法的证据[J].审计研究,2015(3):91-99.
[21]翟胜宝,张雯,曹源等.分析师跟踪与审计意见购买[J].会计研究,2016(6):86-95.
[22]Ke B,Lennox C,Xin Q. The effect of China's weak institutional environment on the quality of big four audits[J]. The Accounting Review,2015,90(4):1591-1619.
[23]Chan K H,Wu D H. Aggregate quasi rents and auditor independence:evidence from audit firm mergers in China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(1):175-213.
[24]吴昊旻,吴春贤,杨兴全.惩戒风险、事务所规模与审计质量———来自中国审计市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2015(1):75-83.
[25]Ettredge M,Johnstone K,Stone M,et al. The effects of firm size,corporate governance quality,and bad news on disclosure compliance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2011,16(4):866-889.
[26]Johnston R,Petacchi R. Regulatory oversight of financial reporting:securities and exchange commission comment letters[J]. Contemporary of Accounting Research,2017,34(2):1128-1155.
[27]Bozanic Z,Dietrich J R,Johoson B A. SEC comment letters and firm disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2017a,36(5):337-357.
[28]王遥.注册会计师审计行为的影响因素分析———基于行为金融学的“非理性假定”[J].审计研究,2008(2):72-78.
[29]Gietzmann M B,Pettinicchio A K. External auditor reassessment of client business risk following the issuance of a comment letter by the SEC[J]. European Accounting Review,2014,23(1):57-85.
[30]Bozanic Z,Hoops J,Thormock J,et al. IRS attention[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2017b,55(1):79-114.
[31]温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
[32]于蔚,汪淼军,金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012(9):125-139.
[33]王营,曹廷求.董事网络和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2017(1):83-93+159.
[34]宋献中,胡珺,李四海.社会责任信息披露与股价崩盘风险———基于信息效应与声誉保险效应的路径分析[J].金融研究,2017(4):161-175.
[35]Amihud Y,Mendelson H,Lauterbach B. Market microstructure and securities values:evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997,45(3):365-390.
[36]Amihud Y. Illiquidity and stock returns:cross-section and time-series effects[J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2002,5(1):31-56.
[37]Bharath S T,Pasquariello P,Wu G. Does asymmetric information drive capital structure decisions?[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8):3211-3243.
[38]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014(5):731-745.
[39]Cassell C A,Dreher L M,Myers L A. Reviewing the SEC's Review Process:10-K Comment Letters and the Cost of Remediation[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1875-1908.
(1)原证监会主席刘士余2017年在“证券交易所一线监管国际研讨会”中的致辞。
(1)经过统计,在2015年至2018年6月底两大交易所发放的1129封年报问询函中,有821封要求对应的审计机构就相关事项发表相应意见。
(2)2017年2月14日,深交所对负责审计*ST烯碳并出具“无法表示意见”的审计师下发了《关于对北京中证天通会计师事务所(特殊普通合伙)注册会计师杨高宇、魏丽红的监管函》。
(3)2017年2月28日,深交所向负责审计报喜鸟的立信会计师事务所表达关注,请其结合会计处理的合规性,切实做好报喜鸟2016年年报审计工作。
(4)相关表述在证监会历年年报审核总结报告中均有所体现。
(1)由于审计意见具有一定的持续性,需要控制滞后一期的审计意见,所以样本量缩减为5881个。