异常审计收费与分类转移盈余管理——经济租金还是审计成本
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摘要
为了进一步厘清异常审计收费究竟代表了经济租金还是审计成本,本文采用2007～2017年度我国A股非金融类上市公司为样本,探索了异常审计收费与分类转移盈余管理的关系。研究发现:异常审计收费对分类转移盈余管理水平具有显著的正向影响;当企业被非"四大"事务所审计、操纵应计的能力受到限制或位于高法治水平地区时,上述正向影响更加显著。进一步研究显示,异常审计收费与分类转移盈余管理的正相关关系在应计盈余管理成本相对较高时更加明显。研究表明,随着异常审计收费的增加,审计师的独立性降低,为了维持与客户的关系,审计师会在一定程度上纵容风险较低且隐蔽性较强的分类转移盈余管理行为。总体来看,研究结果支持了异常审计收费代表了经济租金的观点。
To further clarify whether abnormal audit fees represent economic rents or audit costs, this paper examines the effect of abnormal audit fees on earnings management using classification shifting based on a sample of Chinese non-financial listed companies between 2007 and 2017. The result shows that abnormal audit fees have a significant positive impact on the level of earnings management using classification shifting. The above positive effect is even more pronounced when the client is audited by non-big 4 audit firms, when the ability of managers to manipulate accruals appears to be constrained or when the client is located in an area with sound legal environment. Further study indicates that the positive relation is more significant when the cost of accrued earnings management is relatively high. Our results demonstrate that an increase in abnormal audit fees could lead to a decrease in auditor independence. In order to maintain a good relationship with their clients, the auditors tend to allow for more classification shifting activities with strong concealment and low potential risks. Overall, our results support the notion that abnormal audit fees represent economic rents.
To further clarify whether abnormal audit fees represent economic rents or audit costs, this paper examines the effect of abnormal audit fees on earnings management using classification shifting based on a sample of Chinese non-financial listed companies between 2007 and 2017. The result shows that abnormal audit fees have a significant positive impact on the level of earnings management using classification shifting. The above positive effect is even more pronounced when the client is audited by non-big 4 audit firms, when the ability of managers to manipulate accruals appears to be constrained or when the client is located in an area with sound legal environment. Further study indicates that the positive relation is more significant when the cost of accrued earnings management is relatively high. Our results demonstrate that an increase in abnormal audit fees could lead to a decrease in auditor independence. In order to maintain a good relationship with their clients, the auditors tend to allow for more classification shifting activities with strong concealment and low potential risks. Overall, our results support the notion that abnormal audit fees represent economic rents.
引文
李晓溪,刘静,王克敏.2015.公开增发公司分类转移与核心盈余异象研究[J].会计研究(7):26-33.
刘宝华,罗宏,周微.2016.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].管理世界(11):141-155.
王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.2017.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社.
王永海,石青梅.2016.内部控制规范体系对公司风险承受是否具有抑制效应?——中国版“萨班斯”法案强制实施的风险后果分析[J].审计研究(3):90-97.
张友棠,熊毅. 2017.内部控制、产权性质与盈余管理方式选择——基于2007-2015年A股非金融类上市公司的实证研究[J].审计研究(3):105-112.
Blankley AI, Hurtt DN, MacGregor JE.2012.Abnormal Audit Fees and Restatements[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory, 31(1):79-96.
Bleibtreu C, Stefani U.2018.The Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Client Importance and Audit Industry Concentration[J]. The Accounting Review, 93(1):1-27.
Bronson SN, Ghosh AA, Hogan CE.2017. Audit Fee Differential, Audit Effort, and Litigation Risk:An Examination of ADR Firms[J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1):83-117.
Choi J-H, Kim J-B, Zang Y.2010.Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality?[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,29(2):115-140.
DeFond ML, Zhang J. 2014.A Review of Archival Auditing Research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economic, 58(2-3):275-326.
Doogar R, Sivadasan P, Solomon I.2015.Audit fee residuals:Costs or rents?[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(4):1247-1286.
Eshleman, Daniel J, Peng G.2014.Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality:The Importance of Considering Managerial Incentives in
Tests of Earnings Management[J]. AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory, 33(1):117-138.
Fan Y, Barua A, Cready WM, Thomas WB. 2010.Managing Earnings Using Classification Shifting:Evidence from Quarterly Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 85(4):1303-1323.
Francis JR, Michas PN, Yu MD.2013.Office Size of Big 4 Auditors and Client Restatements[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(4):1626-1661.
Huang H-W, Raghunandan K, Huang T-C, Chiou J-R.2015.Fee Discounting and Audit Quality Following Audit Firm and Audit Partner Changes:Chinese Evidence[J]. The Accounting Review, 90(4):1517-1546.
Joo JH, Chamberlain SL.2017.The Effects of Governance on Classification Shifting and Compensation Shielding[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(4):1779-1811.
McVay SE.2006.Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting:An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 81(3):501-531.
(1)囿于篇幅,本文并未呈现审计收费模型的估计结果,有需要的读者可以向作者索取。
刘宝华,罗宏,周微.2016.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].管理世界(11):141-155.
王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.2017.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社.
王永海,石青梅.2016.内部控制规范体系对公司风险承受是否具有抑制效应?——中国版“萨班斯”法案强制实施的风险后果分析[J].审计研究(3):90-97.
张友棠,熊毅. 2017.内部控制、产权性质与盈余管理方式选择——基于2007-2015年A股非金融类上市公司的实证研究[J].审计研究(3):105-112.
Blankley AI, Hurtt DN, MacGregor JE.2012.Abnormal Audit Fees and Restatements[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory, 31(1):79-96.
Bleibtreu C, Stefani U.2018.The Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Client Importance and Audit Industry Concentration[J]. The Accounting Review, 93(1):1-27.
Bronson SN, Ghosh AA, Hogan CE.2017. Audit Fee Differential, Audit Effort, and Litigation Risk:An Examination of ADR Firms[J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1):83-117.
Choi J-H, Kim J-B, Zang Y.2010.Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality?[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,29(2):115-140.
DeFond ML, Zhang J. 2014.A Review of Archival Auditing Research[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economic, 58(2-3):275-326.
Doogar R, Sivadasan P, Solomon I.2015.Audit fee residuals:Costs or rents?[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(4):1247-1286.
Eshleman, Daniel J, Peng G.2014.Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality:The Importance of Considering Managerial Incentives in
Tests of Earnings Management[J]. AUDITING:A Journal of Practice&Theory, 33(1):117-138.
Fan Y, Barua A, Cready WM, Thomas WB. 2010.Managing Earnings Using Classification Shifting:Evidence from Quarterly Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 85(4):1303-1323.
Francis JR, Michas PN, Yu MD.2013.Office Size of Big 4 Auditors and Client Restatements[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(4):1626-1661.
Huang H-W, Raghunandan K, Huang T-C, Chiou J-R.2015.Fee Discounting and Audit Quality Following Audit Firm and Audit Partner Changes:Chinese Evidence[J]. The Accounting Review, 90(4):1517-1546.
Joo JH, Chamberlain SL.2017.The Effects of Governance on Classification Shifting and Compensation Shielding[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(4):1779-1811.
McVay SE.2006.Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting:An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items[J]. The Accounting Review, 81(3):501-531.
(1)囿于篇幅,本文并未呈现审计收费模型的估计结果,有需要的读者可以向作者索取。