行政审批制度改革如何缓解企业规模分布扭曲?
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摘要
企业规模分布变异是经济运行扭曲的重要表现,其分布状态变动是观测行政审批制度改革效果的重要视角。本文以2001年前后的行政审批中心大范围设立作为自然实验,考察行政审批制度改革对企业规模分布的影响。研究发现,在中国企业规模分布帕累托指数普遍偏低的情况下,行政审批制度改革显著提高了企业规模分布帕累托指数,缓解了经济扭曲。但这一影响在不同区域存在较大差异,东西部地区存在显著的优化效应,中部地区的影响并不显著。机制研究表明,行政审批中心的设立一方面通过降低市场准入门槛和改善营商环境,促进了中小企业进入市场;另一方面普遍降低企业的制度性交易成本,且相较于大企业,中小企业获得的"降成本红利"更为明显,从而使得企业规模分布的扭曲得以改善。
The variation of size distribution of enterprises is a significant sign of economic distortion. Its change in distribution state is an important perspective to observe the effect of administrative approval reform. This paper sets the extensive establishment of administrative approval center around 2001 as a natural experiment,examines the impact of the reform on size distribution of enterprises. It finds that if Pareto index of size distribution of Chinese enterprises is generally on the low side,the administrative approval reform can significantly increase the Pareto index and relieve economic distortion. However,this effect is quite different in different regions. In eastern and western regions,the optimization effect is significant,but it is insignificant in central regions. Mechanism research shows that,on the one hand,the establishment of administrative approval center promotes the entry of SMEs by clearing market entry barriers and improving business environment. On the other hand,it generally reduces the institutional transaction costs of enterprises. Compared with large enterprises,SMEs obtain more "cost reduction bonus",which leads to an improvement of size distribution of enterprises.
The variation of size distribution of enterprises is a significant sign of economic distortion. Its change in distribution state is an important perspective to observe the effect of administrative approval reform. This paper sets the extensive establishment of administrative approval center around 2001 as a natural experiment,examines the impact of the reform on size distribution of enterprises. It finds that if Pareto index of size distribution of Chinese enterprises is generally on the low side,the administrative approval reform can significantly increase the Pareto index and relieve economic distortion. However,this effect is quite different in different regions. In eastern and western regions,the optimization effect is significant,but it is insignificant in central regions. Mechanism research shows that,on the one hand,the establishment of administrative approval center promotes the entry of SMEs by clearing market entry barriers and improving business environment. On the other hand,it generally reduces the institutional transaction costs of enterprises. Compared with large enterprises,SMEs obtain more "cost reduction bonus",which leads to an improvement of size distribution of enterprises.
引文
1.毕青苗、陈希路、徐现祥、李书娟,2018:《行政审批改革与企业进入》,《经济研究》第2期。
2 .方明月、聂辉华,2010:《中国工业企业规模分布的特征事实:齐夫定律的视角》,《产业经济评论》第2期。
3 .冯笑、王永进、刘灿雷,2018:《行政审批效率与中国制造业出口———基于行政审批中心建立的“准自然实验”》,《财经研究》第10期。
4 .高凌云、屈小博、贾鹏,2014:《中国工业企业规模与生产率的异质性》,《世界经济》第6期。
5 .刘斌、袁其刚、商辉,2015:《融资约束、歧视与企业规模分布———基于中国工业企业数据的分析》,《财贸经济》第3期。
6 .邵传林、裴志强,2015:《制度环境对企业规模非线性影响效应的测度———来自中国工业企业的证据》,《产经评论》第1期。
7 .盛斌、毛其淋,2015:《贸易自由化、企业成长和规模分布》,《世界经济》第2期。
8 .孙学敏、王杰,2014:《环境规制对中国企业规模分布的影响》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
9 .万华林、陈信元,2010:《治理环境、企业寻租与交易成本———基于中国上市公司非生产性支出的经验证据》,《经济学(季刊)》第9卷第2期。
10 .夏杰长、刘诚,2017:《行政审批改革、交易费用与中国经济增长》,《管理世界》第4期。
11 .杨其静、李小斌、方明月,2010:《市场、政府与企业规模分布———一个经验研究》,《世界经济文汇》第1期。
12 .章韬、孙楚仁,2012:《贸易开放、生产率形态与企业规模》,《世界经济》第8期。
13 .周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
14 .Ang,J. S.,R. A. Cole,and J. W. Lin. 2000.“Agency Cost and Ownership Structure.”Journal of Finance55(1):81-106.
15 .Axtell,R.L. 2001.“Zipf Distribution of U.S. Frim Sizes.”Science 239(5536):1818-1820.
16 .Brouwer,A. E.,I. Mariotti,and J. N. van Ommeren. 2004.“The Firm Relocation Decision:An Empirical Investigation.”Annals of Regional Science 38(2):335-347.
17 .Fujiwara,Y.,D. Guilmi,H. Aoyama,M. Gallegati,and W. Souma.2004.“Do Pareto-Zipf and Gibrat Laws Hold True? An Analysis with European Firms.”Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and Its Application 335(1-2):197-216.
18 .Gabaix,X.,and A. Landier.2008.“Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?”Quarterly Journal of Economics123(1):49-100.
19 .Gabaix,X.,and R. Ibragimov. 2011.“Rank-1/2:A Simple Way to Improve the OLS Estimation of Tail Exponents.”Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29(1):24-39.
20 .Garicano,L.,C. Lelarge,and J. Van Reenen.2016.“Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution:Evidence from France.”The American Economic Review 106(11):3439-3479.
21 .Gibrat,R. 1931. Les inégalitséconomiques. Paris:Librairie du Recueil Sirey.
22 . Luttmer,E. G. J. 2007.“Selection,Growth,and the Size Distribution of Firms.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3):1103-1144.
23 .Mansfield,E. 1961.“Entry,Gibrat’s Law,Innovation,and the Growth of Firms.”Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 52(2):369-370.
24 .Mooney,C. Z. 2001.“Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion.”Political Research Quarterly 54(1):103-124.
25 .Pareto,V. 1897. Le Cours d'conomie Politique. Vol. 1.Paris:Librairie Droz.
26 .Zipf,G. K. 1949. Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. Oxford,England:Addison-Wesley Press.
(1)《2019年全球营商环境报告》把上海和北京作为样本城市,其中上海权重为55%,北京为45%。报告来源参见:http://chinese.doingbusiness.org/zh/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2019。
(1)根据国家统计局的划分标准,将年销售额大于等于30 000万元的企业识别为大企业,其余企业划入为中小企业。
(1)“中间迷失”问题指中等规模企业比重相对偏低。
2 .方明月、聂辉华,2010:《中国工业企业规模分布的特征事实:齐夫定律的视角》,《产业经济评论》第2期。
3 .冯笑、王永进、刘灿雷,2018:《行政审批效率与中国制造业出口———基于行政审批中心建立的“准自然实验”》,《财经研究》第10期。
4 .高凌云、屈小博、贾鹏,2014:《中国工业企业规模与生产率的异质性》,《世界经济》第6期。
5 .刘斌、袁其刚、商辉,2015:《融资约束、歧视与企业规模分布———基于中国工业企业数据的分析》,《财贸经济》第3期。
6 .邵传林、裴志强,2015:《制度环境对企业规模非线性影响效应的测度———来自中国工业企业的证据》,《产经评论》第1期。
7 .盛斌、毛其淋,2015:《贸易自由化、企业成长和规模分布》,《世界经济》第2期。
8 .孙学敏、王杰,2014:《环境规制对中国企业规模分布的影响》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
9 .万华林、陈信元,2010:《治理环境、企业寻租与交易成本———基于中国上市公司非生产性支出的经验证据》,《经济学(季刊)》第9卷第2期。
10 .夏杰长、刘诚,2017:《行政审批改革、交易费用与中国经济增长》,《管理世界》第4期。
11 .杨其静、李小斌、方明月,2010:《市场、政府与企业规模分布———一个经验研究》,《世界经济文汇》第1期。
12 .章韬、孙楚仁,2012:《贸易开放、生产率形态与企业规模》,《世界经济》第8期。
13 .周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
14 .Ang,J. S.,R. A. Cole,and J. W. Lin. 2000.“Agency Cost and Ownership Structure.”Journal of Finance55(1):81-106.
15 .Axtell,R.L. 2001.“Zipf Distribution of U.S. Frim Sizes.”Science 239(5536):1818-1820.
16 .Brouwer,A. E.,I. Mariotti,and J. N. van Ommeren. 2004.“The Firm Relocation Decision:An Empirical Investigation.”Annals of Regional Science 38(2):335-347.
17 .Fujiwara,Y.,D. Guilmi,H. Aoyama,M. Gallegati,and W. Souma.2004.“Do Pareto-Zipf and Gibrat Laws Hold True? An Analysis with European Firms.”Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and Its Application 335(1-2):197-216.
18 .Gabaix,X.,and A. Landier.2008.“Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?”Quarterly Journal of Economics123(1):49-100.
19 .Gabaix,X.,and R. Ibragimov. 2011.“Rank-1/2:A Simple Way to Improve the OLS Estimation of Tail Exponents.”Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29(1):24-39.
20 .Garicano,L.,C. Lelarge,and J. Van Reenen.2016.“Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution:Evidence from France.”The American Economic Review 106(11):3439-3479.
21 .Gibrat,R. 1931. Les inégalitséconomiques. Paris:Librairie du Recueil Sirey.
22 . Luttmer,E. G. J. 2007.“Selection,Growth,and the Size Distribution of Firms.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3):1103-1144.
23 .Mansfield,E. 1961.“Entry,Gibrat’s Law,Innovation,and the Growth of Firms.”Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 52(2):369-370.
24 .Mooney,C. Z. 2001.“Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion.”Political Research Quarterly 54(1):103-124.
25 .Pareto,V. 1897. Le Cours d'conomie Politique. Vol. 1.Paris:Librairie Droz.
26 .Zipf,G. K. 1949. Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. Oxford,England:Addison-Wesley Press.
(1)《2019年全球营商环境报告》把上海和北京作为样本城市,其中上海权重为55%,北京为45%。报告来源参见:http://chinese.doingbusiness.org/zh/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2019。
(1)根据国家统计局的划分标准,将年销售额大于等于30 000万元的企业识别为大企业,其余企业划入为中小企业。
(1)“中间迷失”问题指中等规模企业比重相对偏低。