地方政府投融资方式的选择与地方政府债务风险
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摘要
随着中国经济进入新常态,地方政府的融资方式也迈入了其自身的新常态,地方政府的投融资制度经历了前所未有的改革,土地财政随着房地产宏观调控而难以持续,政府对投融资平台融资逐步加强了风险防控,PPP模式获得了前所未有的重视和支持,新预算法的修改赋予了地方具有独立发债的权利,基础设施建设的融资渠道实际上发生了重大的变化。政府在面临融资方式的不同选择时,存在着融资方式的选择性偏好。笔者重点研究地方政府投融资方式的选择与地方政府债务风险的关系,首先分析了当前地方政府融资方式的供求关系及融资方式的优劣性,接着研究了各种融资方式的债务风险产生机制。从现实角度,考察了地方政府选择各种融资方式的实际情况及其形成的地方政府债务风险,并进一步通过实证回归的方式,论证了地方政府在面临地方政府债务风险的前提下进行融资方式优序安排的内在逻辑性。结论表明,在考察期内,城投债在一定程度上分担着政府提供公共服务的职责,城投债的有效转型有利于地方政府控制债务风险;在满足地方政府融资需求方面,PPP与地方发债具有同等功效,两者之间存在此消彼长的关联性;由于地方债券具有其独特的优势,是当前化解地方政府债务负担的重要渠道;由于在当前政策上已剥离了融资功能,城投债在举借债务时并未将地方政府债务风险作为其唯一的考虑因素。基于此,最后提出了对策建议。
As China' s economy enters a new normal stage,local government' s financing mode has also entered its own new normal stage. The local government' s investment and financing system has undergone unprecedented reform,that is to say,the land finance is unsustainable with the real estate macro-control measures,the government gradually strengthens the risk prevention and control of investment and financing platform financing,PPP model has received unprecedented attention and support,and the amendment of the new budget law gives the local government the right to issue its own bonds independently. In fact,the financing channels for infrastructure construction have undergone significant changes. In the face of different choices of financing methods,the government has a selective preference. This paper focuses on the relationship between the choice of local government investment and financing and the risk of local government debt.Firstly,this paper analyzes the supply-demand relationship and the advantages and disadvantages of the current local government financing methods,and then studies the debt-risk generation mechanism of various financing methods. On this basis,the paper further analyzes the actual situation of local government various financing methods and the corresponding debt risk. Based on this,this paper further demonstrates the inherent logic of local government' s preferential arrangement of financing methods under the premise of local government debt risk through empirical analysis,and draws conclusions that during the period the financing platform debt share the responsibility of the government to provide public services to a certain extent,and the effective transformation of the financing platform debt is conducive to local governments to control debt risks; PPP and local bond issuance have the same effect in meeting the financing needs of local governments,and there is a correlation between them; because of the unique advantages of local bonds,it is an important channel to relieve the burden of local government debt; stripped of financing function,financing platform debt does not take local government debt risk as its only consideration. Finally the article puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions.
As China' s economy enters a new normal stage,local government' s financing mode has also entered its own new normal stage. The local government' s investment and financing system has undergone unprecedented reform,that is to say,the land finance is unsustainable with the real estate macro-control measures,the government gradually strengthens the risk prevention and control of investment and financing platform financing,PPP model has received unprecedented attention and support,and the amendment of the new budget law gives the local government the right to issue its own bonds independently. In fact,the financing channels for infrastructure construction have undergone significant changes. In the face of different choices of financing methods,the government has a selective preference. This paper focuses on the relationship between the choice of local government investment and financing and the risk of local government debt.Firstly,this paper analyzes the supply-demand relationship and the advantages and disadvantages of the current local government financing methods,and then studies the debt-risk generation mechanism of various financing methods. On this basis,the paper further analyzes the actual situation of local government various financing methods and the corresponding debt risk. Based on this,this paper further demonstrates the inherent logic of local government' s preferential arrangement of financing methods under the premise of local government debt risk through empirical analysis,and draws conclusions that during the period the financing platform debt share the responsibility of the government to provide public services to a certain extent,and the effective transformation of the financing platform debt is conducive to local governments to control debt risks; PPP and local bond issuance have the same effect in meeting the financing needs of local governments,and there is a correlation between them; because of the unique advantages of local bonds,it is an important channel to relieve the burden of local government debt; stripped of financing function,financing platform debt does not take local government debt risk as its only consideration. Finally the article puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions.
引文
[1]庞保庆,陈硕.央地财政格局下的地方政府债务成因、规模及风险[J].经济社会体制比较,2015(5):45-57.
[2]郭平,江姗姗.财政分权视角下预算软约束对地方政府债务规模的影响[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017(5):76-85.
[3]马金华,杨娟,梁睿聪.博弈视角下的地方政府债务管理研究[J].经济与管理评论,2012(1):128-132.
[4]贾晓俊,顾莹博.我国各省份地方债风险及预警实证研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2017(3):16-24.
[5]张立承.基于融资平台公司的地方政府隐性债务变动趋势分析[J].财政科学,2018(5):49-54.
(1)现实中在PPP制度和监管严重缺位的情况下,往往被地方政府误解为一种融资方式。本文主要关注于PPP为基础设施提供融资的层面,因此也主要关注于PPP给地方融资层面所带来的债务风险问题。
(2)基础设施投资依然大有可为,详见:http://www. xinhuanet. com/politics/2016-07/24/c_129172836. htm。
(1)《国家发展改革委有关负责人就4万亿元投资计划执行情况答记者问》,http://www. ndrc. gov. cn/zcfb/jd/200910/t20091027_503286. html。
(1)本文关于PPP形成政府债务的研究,采取近似替代的做法,将PPP投资规模替代PPP引发的债务规模,但这是不严谨的,因为对于PPP是否形成政府债务,不能完全根据PPP自身的规模进行简单判断,因为PPP存在多种不同类型,从可能性看,主要是政府付费类和可行性缺口补助类PPP项目容易出现政府债务情况。
(2)之所以两者均包括在内,而不是单独考虑新增债,原因在于当年的债券发行规模是地方政府对包括新增债和置换债等在内的债务风险总体规模的把握情况后做出的权衡。
(1)截至2018年4月,非政府债券形式的存量政府债务为1. 34万亿元,这部分债务将在置换期结束之前兑换成政府债券,而在2018年8月之后到期的存量城投债为2. 33万亿元,说明其余近1万亿元债务将无法到期置换为政府债务。
[2]郭平,江姗姗.财政分权视角下预算软约束对地方政府债务规模的影响[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017(5):76-85.
[3]马金华,杨娟,梁睿聪.博弈视角下的地方政府债务管理研究[J].经济与管理评论,2012(1):128-132.
[4]贾晓俊,顾莹博.我国各省份地方债风险及预警实证研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2017(3):16-24.
[5]张立承.基于融资平台公司的地方政府隐性债务变动趋势分析[J].财政科学,2018(5):49-54.
(1)现实中在PPP制度和监管严重缺位的情况下,往往被地方政府误解为一种融资方式。本文主要关注于PPP为基础设施提供融资的层面,因此也主要关注于PPP给地方融资层面所带来的债务风险问题。
(2)基础设施投资依然大有可为,详见:http://www. xinhuanet. com/politics/2016-07/24/c_129172836. htm。
(1)《国家发展改革委有关负责人就4万亿元投资计划执行情况答记者问》,http://www. ndrc. gov. cn/zcfb/jd/200910/t20091027_503286. html。
(1)本文关于PPP形成政府债务的研究,采取近似替代的做法,将PPP投资规模替代PPP引发的债务规模,但这是不严谨的,因为对于PPP是否形成政府债务,不能完全根据PPP自身的规模进行简单判断,因为PPP存在多种不同类型,从可能性看,主要是政府付费类和可行性缺口补助类PPP项目容易出现政府债务情况。
(2)之所以两者均包括在内,而不是单独考虑新增债,原因在于当年的债券发行规模是地方政府对包括新增债和置换债等在内的债务风险总体规模的把握情况后做出的权衡。
(1)截至2018年4月,非政府债券形式的存量政府债务为1. 34万亿元,这部分债务将在置换期结束之前兑换成政府债券,而在2018年8月之后到期的存量城投债为2. 33万亿元,说明其余近1万亿元债务将无法到期置换为政府债务。