基于前景理论的众包物流配送方行为决策演化博弈分析——基于发货方视角
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摘要
考虑个体有限理性特征,基于前景理论构建众包物流参与者感知收益博弈矩阵。从发货方视角,推理出众包物流配送方发挥较高努力水平的条件。通过引入保价制度,建立保价条件下配送方的行为决策模型,并运用数值仿真技术验证模型的有效性。结果发现:(1)配送方的努力成本、不努力的收入、处罚力度等指标直接影响其努力水平;(2)配送方努力工作的成本前景值要小于受到处罚与不努力收入前景值之和,同时要小于努力工作时所得的收益;(3)保价金额变动在一定条件下会影响配送方的努力水平,但是并不能达到完全控制的目的,甚至造成负面影响。因此在保价基础上,发货方可以通过增加监测力度或者加大处罚力度,有效保证配送方的努力水平。
Considering the bounded rationality of individuals,this paper constructs the perceived benefit game matrix based on the prospect theory and deduces the condition that makes the shippers play a higher level of effort from the view of consumers. The system of insured price is introduced to establish the decision-making model of the shipper's behavior and the numerical simulation is used to verify the effectiveness of the model. The results show that: firstly,the cost of the shippers,income without efforts and penalties directly affect the level of its efforts; secondly,the cost value for distribution efforts is less than the sum of the penalties and the unskilled income outlook,while less than the proceeds of hard work; thirdly,changes in the amount of insurance premiums will affect the level of shippers' efforts under certain conditions. However,it does not achieve the purpose of full control of it or even have a negative impact. Therefore,based on the insured price,consumers can ensure the effort level effectively by increasing process supervision or increasing intensifying punishment of shippers.
Considering the bounded rationality of individuals,this paper constructs the perceived benefit game matrix based on the prospect theory and deduces the condition that makes the shippers play a higher level of effort from the view of consumers. The system of insured price is introduced to establish the decision-making model of the shipper's behavior and the numerical simulation is used to verify the effectiveness of the model. The results show that: firstly,the cost of the shippers,income without efforts and penalties directly affect the level of its efforts; secondly,the cost value for distribution efforts is less than the sum of the penalties and the unskilled income outlook,while less than the proceeds of hard work; thirdly,changes in the amount of insurance premiums will affect the level of shippers' efforts under certain conditions. However,it does not achieve the purpose of full control of it or even have a negative impact. Therefore,based on the insured price,consumers can ensure the effort level effectively by increasing process supervision or increasing intensifying punishment of shippers.
引文
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[2] Lin J,Zhou W,Du L. Is on-demand same day package delivery service green?[J]. Transportation Research Part D Transport&Environment,2017,61:118-139.
[3] Shao B,Shi L,Xu B,et al. Factors affecting participation of solvers in crowdsourcing:an empirical study from China[J]. Electronic Markets,2012,22(2):73-83.
[4]孟韬,张媛,董大海.基于威客模式的众包参与行为影响因素研究[J].中国软科学,2014,12:112-123.
[5] Ye H,Kankanhalli A. Solvers’participation in crowdsourcing platforms:examining the impacts of trust,and benefit and cost factors[J]. Journal of Strategic Information Systems,2017,26(2):101-117.
[6] Baruch A,May A,Yu D. The motivations,enablers and barriers for voluntary participation in an online crowdsourcing platform[J]. Computers in Human Behavior,2016,64:923-931.
[7]刘戌峰,艾时钟. IT外包知识共享行为的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(5):82-90.
[8] Liu S,Xia F,Zhang J,et al. Exploring the trends,characteristic antecedents,and performance consequences of crowdsourcing project risks[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2016,34(8):1625-1637.
[9] Duan Z,Yan M,Cai Z,et al. Truthful incentive mechanisms for social cost minimization in mobile crowdsourcing systems[J]. Sensors,2016,16(4):481-494.
[10] Wang Y,Cai Z,et al. An incentive mechanism with privacy protection in mobile crowdsourcing systems[J].Computer Networks,2016,102:157-171.
[11]郝琳娜,侯文华,张李浩,刘猛.基于众包虚拟社区的诚信保障和信誉评价机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2837-2848.
[12] Punel A,Stathopoulos A. Modeling the acceptability of crowdsourced goods deliveries:Role of context and experience effects[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2017, 105:18-38.
[13]肖条军.博弈论及其应用[M].上海:上海三联书店,2004.
[14]石岿然,马胡杰,肖条军.供应链成员间信任关系形成与演化研究[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(11):1386-1394.
[15]张国华,张羽,李延来,赵国堂.基于前景理论的施工安全管理行为演化博弈[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(4):501-509.
[16]苑宏宪,王雪青.基于前景理论的注册建造师职业行为监管演化博弈分析——基于承包商视角[J].软科学,2014,28(4):140-144.