摘要
针对认证加密算法在设计中出现的一些不足,尤其是近年兴起的CAESAR竞赛征集算法,介绍了两种伪造攻击的手段,通过破坏密文的完整性达到欺骗认证者的目的。以LAC候选算法为例,通过伪造攻击的方法对其内部结构、认证机制和攻击原理进行了分析和描述,并对其原有结构进行了改进,使其能够有效地抵抗现有的伪造攻击。通过对其安全性进行分析,表明LAC算法改进方案能够有效抵抗伪造攻击。
The shortcomings of the design in authenticated encryption algorithm make the algorithm vulnerable to attack,especially to the CAESAR algorithm in recent years.Forgery attack is an effective measures to deal with the authenticated encryption algorithm.The measures of forgery attack can also be applied to the LAC authentication encryption algorithm which is one of the CAESAR competition candidate algorithm.Through the analysis of the LAC algorithm's internal structure,authentication mechanism and attack method,this paper put forward the improved scheme.Through the analysis of its security,it shows that the LAC improvement scheme can effectively resist forgery attacks.
引文
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