顺水巧推舟:顶级财务顾问专业能力的并购市场证据
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摘要
本文证明了声誉较好的顶级财务顾问会根据不同的客户目标,因事制宜地发挥其专业能力。具体的,本文发现当机会主义客户追求完成并购计划以实施买壳上市,获得增发资格或保壳时,顶级财务顾问的作用主要体现在提升并购完成率方面;而当非机会主义客户追求更优的并购绩效时,顶级财务顾问的作用主要体现在提升并购绩效方面。本文的证据倾向于支持顶级财务顾问具有更为出色的专业能力,并发现客户目标会显著影响顶级财务顾问专业能力优势的发挥方向,从而为并购市场财务顾问能力问题的争论,提供一个统一性的解释可能。然而,站在社会福利的角度,顶级财务顾问帮助提高了机会主义并购的成功率,这会对社会资源的有效配置造成负面的影响。
This paper provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that top M&A financial advisors are very good at helping clients either perform better after M&A or enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction,depending on each client's specific requirement.We divide financial advisor's clients into opportunists and non-opportunists. The former seeks to get listed through reverse merger,obtain refinancing qualification or protect listed shell and they pay more attention to the certainty of completing a M&A transaction than to the post-M&A performance,while the latter prefers better post-M&A performance to higher certainty of completing a M&A transaction.Our evidence implies that top financial advisors of non-opportunists are more able to help clients perform better after M&A and help opportunist clients enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction. Therefore,we unify the existing debatable literature on the role of top financial advisors by introducing clients' requirement as a variable.
This paper provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that top M&A financial advisors are very good at helping clients either perform better after M&A or enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction,depending on each client's specific requirement.We divide financial advisor's clients into opportunists and non-opportunists. The former seeks to get listed through reverse merger,obtain refinancing qualification or protect listed shell and they pay more attention to the certainty of completing a M&A transaction than to the post-M&A performance,while the latter prefers better post-M&A performance to higher certainty of completing a M&A transaction.Our evidence implies that top financial advisors of non-opportunists are more able to help clients perform better after M&A and help opportunist clients enhance the certainty of completing a M&A transaction. Therefore,we unify the existing debatable literature on the role of top financial advisors by introducing clients' requirement as a variable.
引文
[1]Bowers H.M.,Miller R.E.Choice of Investment Banker and Shareholders’Wealth of Firms Involved in Acquisitions[J].Financial Management,1990,19(4):34-44
[2]Rau P.R.Investment Bank Market Share,Contingent Fee Payments,and the Performance of Acquiring Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,56(2):293-324
[3]Servaes H.,Zenner M.The Role of Investment Banks in Acquisitions[J].Review of Financial Studies,1996,9(3):787-815
[4]Ismail A.Are Good Financial Advisors Really Good?The Performance of Investment Banks in the M&A Market[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2010,35(4):411-429
[5]Mclaughlin R.M.Investment-Banking Contracts in Tender Offers:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,28(1-2):209-232
[6]Golubov A.,Petmezas D.,Travlos N.G.When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker:New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):271-312
[7]陈信元,叶鹏飞,陈冬华.机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J].经济研究,2003,(5):13-22
[8]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组---来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(1):95-105
[9]Chemmanur T.J.,Paolo F.Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation[J].Journal of Finance,1994,49(1):57-79
[10]Michel A.,Shaked I.,Lee Y.T.An Evaluation of Investment Banker Acquisition Advice:The Shareholders’Perspective[J].Financial Management,1991,20(2):40-49
[11]Bao J.,Edmans A.Do Investment Banks Matter For M&A Returns?[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(24):2286-2315
[12]Kale J.R.,Kini O.,Ryan H.E.Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(3):475-501
[13]Michaely R.,Shaw W.H.The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings:Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories[J].The Review of Financial Studies,1994,7(2):279-319
[14]Booth J.R.,Smith R.L.Capital Raising,Underwriting and the Certification Hypothesis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1986,15(1):261-281
[15]Hansen R.S.,Torregrosa P.Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring[J].The Journal of Finance,1992,47(4):1537-1555
[16]Jain B.A.,Kini O.On Investment Banker Monitoring in the New Issue Market[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1999,23(1):49-84
[17]原红旗,吴星宇.资产重组对财务业绩影响的实证研究[N].上海证券报,1998-8-26
[18]檀向球,提云涛,强立.上市公司报表性和实质性资产重组鉴别与分析[J].证券市场导报,1999,(6):49-54
[19]Malatesta P.H.The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of Merging Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1):155-181
[20]罗炜、饶品贵.盈余质量、制度环境与投行变更[J].管理世界,2010,(3):140-149
[21]饶品贵,岳衡,罗炜.投资银行政治联系与公司增发[J].金融研究,2013,(8):165-179
[22]Fuller K.,Netter J.,Stegemoller M.What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us?Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(4):1763-1793
[23]Morck R.,Shleifer A.,Vishny R.W.Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?[J]The Journal of Finance,1990,45(1):31-48
[24]Rosen R.J.Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment:The Stock Market Reaction to Merger Announcements[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(2):987-1017
[25]Moeller S.B.,Schlingemann F.P.,Stulz R.M.How Do Diversity of Opinion and Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?[J].Review of Financial Studies,2007,20(6):2047-2078
[26]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预,政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,4(4):41-53
[27]Dong M.,Hirshleifer D.,Richardson S.,et al.Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(2):725-762
[28]Jensen M.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329
[29]陈效东,周嘉南.非激励型高管股权激励、企业投资方式与控制人收益[J].管理评论,2016,28(5):161-174
[30]Lang L.H.P.,Stulz R.M.,Walkling R.A.A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis:The Case of Bidder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1991,29(2):315-335
[31]Luo Y.Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders?Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(4):1951-1982
[32]罗党论,刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效---来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,(5):97-106
[33]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010,(3):65-77
[34]Claessens S.,Feijen E.,Laeven L.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580
[35]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009,(3):134-142
[36]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖洁.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值-基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011,(8):93-110
[37]余汉,杨中仑,宋增基.国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效---基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(4):196-212
[38]Piotroski J.,Wong T.J.,Wu D.Government Intervention and the Development of China’s Financial Intermediaries:Efficiency or Political Opportunism[R].Working Paper,Stanford University(June),2012
[39]Chen D.,Guan Y.,Zhang T.,et al.Political Connection of Financial Intermediary:Evidence from China Initial Public Offering Market[R].Working Paper,Nanjing University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong,2011
(1)这里的非机会主义并购还包括了大股东通过并购掏空中小股东的可能[8]。但在掏空情况下,并购方也会看重并购的短期绩效。所以即使考虑掏空的情况也不影响我们对机会主义和非机会主义并购的分类。
(2)2014年10月24日证监会令[109号]发布的《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》提出自2014年11月23日起除借壳上市和发行股份之外,上市公司的重大资产重组不再需要经过证监会的行政许可,结束了长期以来所有重大资产重组均需要得到证监会的审批才能得以实施的状况。
(3)本文仅关注资本市场管制下的机会主义并购动机对财务顾问作用的影响。
(4)2006年证监会发布的《上市公司证券管理办法》规定增发新股的公司最近三年净资产收益率不得低于6%。根据我国上市公司特别处理与退市制度,如果上市公司经营连续两年亏损,将被特别处理(被ST),如果连续三年亏损则被暂停上市(被PT)。
(5)根据CSMAR数据库披露的2008-2014年重大资产重组数据,约32%的重组发生在上市公司与同一控股的非上市公司之间,涉及关联方的并购占52%。
(6)重大资产重组是指上市公司及其控股或者控制的公司在日常经营活动之外购买、出售资产或者通过其他方式进行资产交易达到规定的比例,导致上市公司的主营业务、资产、收入发生重大变化的资产交易行为。
(7)本文也分别以预案宣告前后一天的CAR(-1,+1)与BHAR(-1,+1),以及前后五天的CAR(-5,+5与BHAR(-5,+5),代替CAR(-2,+2)与BHAR(-2,+2)进行回归,发现结果没有发生实质性的改变。
(8)阅读每个重组样本的并购审核结果公告,如果通过审核Pass=1,如果被否决则Pass=0。
(9)引自杨兴坤2014年9月11日发表在东方早报·上海经济评论的报告《中国省部级官员腐败的现状、趋势与治理(1986-2014)》。
(10)数据整理自杨兴坤2014年9月11日发表在东方早报·上海经济评论的报告《中国省部级官员腐败的现状、趋势与治理(1986-2014)》。
[2]Rau P.R.Investment Bank Market Share,Contingent Fee Payments,and the Performance of Acquiring Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,56(2):293-324
[3]Servaes H.,Zenner M.The Role of Investment Banks in Acquisitions[J].Review of Financial Studies,1996,9(3):787-815
[4]Ismail A.Are Good Financial Advisors Really Good?The Performance of Investment Banks in the M&A Market[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2010,35(4):411-429
[5]Mclaughlin R.M.Investment-Banking Contracts in Tender Offers:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,28(1-2):209-232
[6]Golubov A.,Petmezas D.,Travlos N.G.When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker:New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):271-312
[7]陈信元,叶鹏飞,陈冬华.机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J].经济研究,2003,(5):13-22
[8]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组---来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(1):95-105
[9]Chemmanur T.J.,Paolo F.Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation[J].Journal of Finance,1994,49(1):57-79
[10]Michel A.,Shaked I.,Lee Y.T.An Evaluation of Investment Banker Acquisition Advice:The Shareholders’Perspective[J].Financial Management,1991,20(2):40-49
[11]Bao J.,Edmans A.Do Investment Banks Matter For M&A Returns?[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(24):2286-2315
[12]Kale J.R.,Kini O.,Ryan H.E.Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(3):475-501
[13]Michaely R.,Shaw W.H.The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings:Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories[J].The Review of Financial Studies,1994,7(2):279-319
[14]Booth J.R.,Smith R.L.Capital Raising,Underwriting and the Certification Hypothesis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1986,15(1):261-281
[15]Hansen R.S.,Torregrosa P.Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring[J].The Journal of Finance,1992,47(4):1537-1555
[16]Jain B.A.,Kini O.On Investment Banker Monitoring in the New Issue Market[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1999,23(1):49-84
[17]原红旗,吴星宇.资产重组对财务业绩影响的实证研究[N].上海证券报,1998-8-26
[18]檀向球,提云涛,强立.上市公司报表性和实质性资产重组鉴别与分析[J].证券市场导报,1999,(6):49-54
[19]Malatesta P.H.The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of Merging Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1):155-181
[20]罗炜、饶品贵.盈余质量、制度环境与投行变更[J].管理世界,2010,(3):140-149
[21]饶品贵,岳衡,罗炜.投资银行政治联系与公司增发[J].金融研究,2013,(8):165-179
[22]Fuller K.,Netter J.,Stegemoller M.What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us?Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(4):1763-1793
[23]Morck R.,Shleifer A.,Vishny R.W.Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?[J]The Journal of Finance,1990,45(1):31-48
[24]Rosen R.J.Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment:The Stock Market Reaction to Merger Announcements[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(2):987-1017
[25]Moeller S.B.,Schlingemann F.P.,Stulz R.M.How Do Diversity of Opinion and Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?[J].Review of Financial Studies,2007,20(6):2047-2078
[26]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预,政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,4(4):41-53
[27]Dong M.,Hirshleifer D.,Richardson S.,et al.Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(2):725-762
[28]Jensen M.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329
[29]陈效东,周嘉南.非激励型高管股权激励、企业投资方式与控制人收益[J].管理评论,2016,28(5):161-174
[30]Lang L.H.P.,Stulz R.M.,Walkling R.A.A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis:The Case of Bidder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1991,29(2):315-335
[31]Luo Y.Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders?Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(4):1951-1982
[32]罗党论,刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效---来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,(5):97-106
[33]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010,(3):65-77
[34]Claessens S.,Feijen E.,Laeven L.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):554-580
[35]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009,(3):134-142
[36]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖洁.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值-基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011,(8):93-110
[37]余汉,杨中仑,宋增基.国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效---基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(4):196-212
[38]Piotroski J.,Wong T.J.,Wu D.Government Intervention and the Development of China’s Financial Intermediaries:Efficiency or Political Opportunism[R].Working Paper,Stanford University(June),2012
[39]Chen D.,Guan Y.,Zhang T.,et al.Political Connection of Financial Intermediary:Evidence from China Initial Public Offering Market[R].Working Paper,Nanjing University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong,2011
(1)这里的非机会主义并购还包括了大股东通过并购掏空中小股东的可能[8]。但在掏空情况下,并购方也会看重并购的短期绩效。所以即使考虑掏空的情况也不影响我们对机会主义和非机会主义并购的分类。
(2)2014年10月24日证监会令[109号]发布的《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》提出自2014年11月23日起除借壳上市和发行股份之外,上市公司的重大资产重组不再需要经过证监会的行政许可,结束了长期以来所有重大资产重组均需要得到证监会的审批才能得以实施的状况。
(3)本文仅关注资本市场管制下的机会主义并购动机对财务顾问作用的影响。
(4)2006年证监会发布的《上市公司证券管理办法》规定增发新股的公司最近三年净资产收益率不得低于6%。根据我国上市公司特别处理与退市制度,如果上市公司经营连续两年亏损,将被特别处理(被ST),如果连续三年亏损则被暂停上市(被PT)。
(5)根据CSMAR数据库披露的2008-2014年重大资产重组数据,约32%的重组发生在上市公司与同一控股的非上市公司之间,涉及关联方的并购占52%。
(6)重大资产重组是指上市公司及其控股或者控制的公司在日常经营活动之外购买、出售资产或者通过其他方式进行资产交易达到规定的比例,导致上市公司的主营业务、资产、收入发生重大变化的资产交易行为。
(7)本文也分别以预案宣告前后一天的CAR(-1,+1)与BHAR(-1,+1),以及前后五天的CAR(-5,+5与BHAR(-5,+5),代替CAR(-2,+2)与BHAR(-2,+2)进行回归,发现结果没有发生实质性的改变。
(8)阅读每个重组样本的并购审核结果公告,如果通过审核Pass=1,如果被否决则Pass=0。
(9)引自杨兴坤2014年9月11日发表在东方早报·上海经济评论的报告《中国省部级官员腐败的现状、趋势与治理(1986-2014)》。
(10)数据整理自杨兴坤2014年9月11日发表在东方早报·上海经济评论的报告《中国省部级官员腐败的现状、趋势与治理(1986-2014)》。