权力失衡下的退货策略优化研究
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摘要
研究权力失衡下占主导地位零售商与制造商的退货策略协调机制,分析零售商要求按照批发价格退货和采用退货策略退货两种情况。研究表明,1.零售商按照批发价格退货时,市场产量和总体收益均小于集中决策情况下的产量和收益,系统存在帕累托改进。2.零售商引入退货策略后,发现存在一个有效的退货价格使供应链成员零售商和制造商收益均得到提高,系统达到帕累托最优。
This paper studies on imbalance of power, the coordination mechanism of return policy between retailers and manufacturers, analyzes two situations of retailers' request to return goods according to wholesale price and using return policy.Research shows that 1. When retailers return goods at wholesale prices,the market output and total income are both smaller than those in the case of centralized decision-making. Pareto improvement exists in the system. 2. After the introduction of the return policy by the retailer, it is found that there is an effective return price, which improves the returns of both the retailer and the manufacturer in the supply chain,and the system reaches the Pareto Optimality.
This paper studies on imbalance of power, the coordination mechanism of return policy between retailers and manufacturers, analyzes two situations of retailers' request to return goods according to wholesale price and using return policy.Research shows that 1. When retailers return goods at wholesale prices,the market output and total income are both smaller than those in the case of centralized decision-making. Pareto improvement exists in the system. 2. After the introduction of the return policy by the retailer, it is found that there is an effective return price, which improves the returns of both the retailer and the manufacturer in the supply chain,and the system reaches the Pareto Optimality.
引文
[1]姚忠.退货策略在单周期产品供应链管理中的作用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003(6):69-73.
[2]刘家国,吴冲.基于报童模型的两级供应链回购契约协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(4):73-78.
[3]Pasternack B A.Optimal pricing and return policiesfor perishable commodities[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(1):133-140.
[4]苏尼尔·乔普拉,等.供应链管理[M].陈荣耿,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2017(6).
[5]李风琦.基于蜈蚣博弈的农产品供应链合作机理分析[J].怀化学院学报,2016,35(6):23-27.
[6]PadmanabhanV,PNG I P L.Manufacturer s returns policies and retail competition[J].Marketing Science,1997,16(1):81-94.
[7]Emmons H,Gilbert S M.The role of returns with contracts game between complementary supplies[J].Management Sciences,1998,44(2):276,283.
[8]姚忠.风险约束下退货合同对供应链的协调性分析[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(3):96-105.
[9]肖振伟,李华.基于退货策略的供应链合作研究[J].工业工程与管理,2005(5):52-60.
[10]邵艳.需求随机情况下供应商的最优退货策略[J].武汉理工大学学报,2017,39(2):232-235.
[2]刘家国,吴冲.基于报童模型的两级供应链回购契约协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(4):73-78.
[3]Pasternack B A.Optimal pricing and return policiesfor perishable commodities[J].Marketing Science,2008,27(1):133-140.
[4]苏尼尔·乔普拉,等.供应链管理[M].陈荣耿,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2017(6).
[5]李风琦.基于蜈蚣博弈的农产品供应链合作机理分析[J].怀化学院学报,2016,35(6):23-27.
[6]PadmanabhanV,PNG I P L.Manufacturer s returns policies and retail competition[J].Marketing Science,1997,16(1):81-94.
[7]Emmons H,Gilbert S M.The role of returns with contracts game between complementary supplies[J].Management Sciences,1998,44(2):276,283.
[8]姚忠.风险约束下退货合同对供应链的协调性分析[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(3):96-105.
[9]肖振伟,李华.基于退货策略的供应链合作研究[J].工业工程与管理,2005(5):52-60.
[10]邵艳.需求随机情况下供应商的最优退货策略[J].武汉理工大学学报,2017,39(2):232-235.