内部薪酬差距与公司价值——基于生命周期理论的新探索
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摘要
本文以我国2005-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了公司生命周期对内部薪酬差距与公司价值关系的影响。结果发现:(1)总体上,公司内部薪酬差距有利于公司价值,支持了锦标赛理论;(2)结合生命周期考察,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用在成长期最强,在衰退期最弱,即随着公司生命周期的推移,内部薪酬差距对公司价值的提升作用逐渐减弱;(3)进一步的作用机制分析显示,管理层对于经营绩效影响的重要性以及员工对于公平感的需求是生命周期产生影响的重要机制。在综合得分判别法、留存收益率判别法、企业-行业增长率判别法等多项生命周期度量方法下,上述结论保持稳定。本文的研究为理解内部薪酬差距对公司价值的作用提供了一个崭新视角,也为不同生命周期阶段公司薪酬计划的制定提供了一定理论基础。
Firm operating efficiency is important to the whole economy,and clarification of the compensation distribution relationship between managers and ordinary employees under given resources has become an important issue.There are two opposing theories on the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value:tournament theory holds that expanding the internal pay gap is conducive to improved organizational performance (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986),whereas behavioral theory holds that this pay gap is not fully conducive to cooperation,and thus reduces organizational performance (Cowherd and Levine 1992; Carpenter and Sanders 2004). Arguments against and evidence for these two views appear in various studies (Pfeffer and Langton 1993; Williams et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2003; Zhang 2008; Liu and Sun 2010; Zhao 2012; Li and Hu2012). This controversy prompts us to consider whether it is partly due to heterogeneous effects of the internal pay gap in different situations.With this in mind,this study explores the question from the perspective of the firm life cycle. The life cycle is an important characteristic of a firm,and studies show that it greatly affects a firm's investments,financing,distribution,and other behavior (Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Bens et al. 2002; DeA ngelo et al. 2006; DeA ngelo et al. 2010; Hribar and Yehuda 2015). At different life cycle stages,managers and employees face different responsibilities and pressures; therefore,the same internal pay gap may produce different results.Using a sample of A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges from 2005 to 2014,we study the impact of firm life cycle on the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value. We find that (1) the internal pay gap is conducive to overall firm value,which is consistent with tournament theory, (2) the promotion effect is strongest in the growing stage and weakens as the life cycle progresses,and (3) the main mechanisms are the importance of managers to firm performance and employee demand for equity. The above findings remain stable with other life cycle measurements.The study makes three contributions. First,it shifts our understanding of the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value from a static to a dynamic perspective. While examination of the internal pay gap and firm value has a long history,the literature has mainly taken a static approach (Zhang 2008,etc.),and ignored the dynamic impact of the internal pay gap at different stages of development. Based on the life cycle theory,this study predicts and finds that the internal pay gap has heterogeneous effects on firm value at different stages of the life cycle. It effectively links tournament theory and behavioral theory through the life cycle theory,placing them within a consistent discussion framework,with additional exploration of the mechanisms involved.Second,although scholars have studied manager incentives in depth,this study emphasizes the importance of ordinary employees,who have received little attention in the past. Firm performance is a function of the productivity of both managers and ordinary employees,and the role of the ordinary employee should also be considered (Chen et al. 2015). Our findings show that in the actual compensation formulation,especially for mature firms and those in recession,the interests of ordinary employees need to be considered,and setting a reasonable pay gap is conducive to improved firm value. For the large number of firms newly listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board and Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in China,managers should also be given sufficient reward for their efforts. Thus the findings of this study provide some theoretical references for the reform of income distribution.Third,this study provides some guidance for research methods in future research. Unlike previous studies that rely on a single life cycle measurement method (Zhao and Sun 2005; Cao et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011; Li and Li 2012; Dong and Mao 2013; Luo and Li 2015),this study uses several life cycle measurement methods,including the comprehensive scoring method,retained earnings method,and enterprise-industry growth method,allowing for more stable conclusions and opening opportunities for future research in this field.
Firm operating efficiency is important to the whole economy,and clarification of the compensation distribution relationship between managers and ordinary employees under given resources has become an important issue.There are two opposing theories on the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value:tournament theory holds that expanding the internal pay gap is conducive to improved organizational performance (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986),whereas behavioral theory holds that this pay gap is not fully conducive to cooperation,and thus reduces organizational performance (Cowherd and Levine 1992; Carpenter and Sanders 2004). Arguments against and evidence for these two views appear in various studies (Pfeffer and Langton 1993; Williams et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2003; Zhang 2008; Liu and Sun 2010; Zhao 2012; Li and Hu2012). This controversy prompts us to consider whether it is partly due to heterogeneous effects of the internal pay gap in different situations.With this in mind,this study explores the question from the perspective of the firm life cycle. The life cycle is an important characteristic of a firm,and studies show that it greatly affects a firm's investments,financing,distribution,and other behavior (Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Bens et al. 2002; DeA ngelo et al. 2006; DeA ngelo et al. 2010; Hribar and Yehuda 2015). At different life cycle stages,managers and employees face different responsibilities and pressures; therefore,the same internal pay gap may produce different results.Using a sample of A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges from 2005 to 2014,we study the impact of firm life cycle on the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value. We find that (1) the internal pay gap is conducive to overall firm value,which is consistent with tournament theory, (2) the promotion effect is strongest in the growing stage and weakens as the life cycle progresses,and (3) the main mechanisms are the importance of managers to firm performance and employee demand for equity. The above findings remain stable with other life cycle measurements.The study makes three contributions. First,it shifts our understanding of the relationship between the internal pay gap and firm value from a static to a dynamic perspective. While examination of the internal pay gap and firm value has a long history,the literature has mainly taken a static approach (Zhang 2008,etc.),and ignored the dynamic impact of the internal pay gap at different stages of development. Based on the life cycle theory,this study predicts and finds that the internal pay gap has heterogeneous effects on firm value at different stages of the life cycle. It effectively links tournament theory and behavioral theory through the life cycle theory,placing them within a consistent discussion framework,with additional exploration of the mechanisms involved.Second,although scholars have studied manager incentives in depth,this study emphasizes the importance of ordinary employees,who have received little attention in the past. Firm performance is a function of the productivity of both managers and ordinary employees,and the role of the ordinary employee should also be considered (Chen et al. 2015). Our findings show that in the actual compensation formulation,especially for mature firms and those in recession,the interests of ordinary employees need to be considered,and setting a reasonable pay gap is conducive to improved firm value. For the large number of firms newly listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board and Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in China,managers should also be given sufficient reward for their efforts. Thus the findings of this study provide some theoretical references for the reform of income distribution.Third,this study provides some guidance for research methods in future research. Unlike previous studies that rely on a single life cycle measurement method (Zhao and Sun 2005; Cao et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011; Li and Li 2012; Dong and Mao 2013; Luo and Li 2015),this study uses several life cycle measurement methods,including the comprehensive scoring method,retained earnings method,and enterprise-industry growth method,allowing for more stable conclusions and opening opportunities for future research in this field.
引文
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1比如研究样本中是否包括ST公司、是否包括创业板公司等等。本文的结论意味着,随着发行上市公司特征的结构性变化(创新成长公司的比例越来越高),未来内部薪酬差距与公司绩效、公司价值的研究,将越来越倾向于发现正面影响。
2尤其对于国有企业,管理层的薪酬管制应适当打破,进行分类管理。
1曹裕等(2010)、李云鹤等(2011)指出,按照我国目前证券市场的现状,上市公司中一般不包括初创期公司。
1公司最终的业绩表现是管理层和普通员工共同努力的结果。因此薪酬差距变化对管理层和普通员工的影响都应该加以讨论。但一方面,锦标赛理论和行为理论都主要从普通员工展开;另一方面,对管理层的影响和对普通员工的影响是相对的,比如薪酬差距的加大会增加普通员工的不公平感,而对于管理层而言则是“公平的”。
2并且相对于管理技能而言,普通员工的技能更为单一,再就业的难度更大。
1此处未采用会计业绩指标衡量,主要有两方面原因:一是当期的会计业绩指标(如ROA、ROE)一般是较为短期的财务指标;二是这类指标更容易受到避亏、再融资、利润平滑等目的盈余操纵的影响(赵睿,2012)。
2管理层平均薪酬为管理层薪酬总额比上管理层人数,普通员工平均薪酬为普通员工薪酬总额比上普通员工人数。其中对于普通员工薪酬,参考黎文靖和胡玉明(2012)以及陆正飞等(2012)以现金流量表中的“支付给职工以及为职工所支付的现金”减去管理层薪酬总额进行衡量。
3李云鹤等(2011)指出,以销售收入增长率、留存收益率以及资本支出率衡量公司的生命周期具有财务学含义,而公司年龄与生命周期有着密切的相关关系,另外这一方法也会减轻单一指标受到某些特殊制度背景的影响,较为全面。本文的稳健性测试针对留存收益率判别法、企业-行业增长率判别法也进行了检验,结果一致。
4李云鹤等(2011)对打分过程进行了较为详细的描述。同时,考虑到一般情况下成熟期企业相对其他两期企业更多,将得分中间的1/2界定为成熟期企业。
1限于篇幅,后续检验仅报告模型(1)的回归结果,模型(2)的结果保持一致;且不再报告控制变量的回归结果,均未见异常。
1本文参考Gorodnichenko and Roland(2011),使用世界价值观调查(World Value Survey)的问题“收入应该尽可能均等(1分)---应该加大收入差距、以鼓励个人努力工作(10分)”得分来度量中国各省份地区居民对于公平感的注重程度。该问题首次出现于2005年调查,因此本文计算2005年、2010年两次调查问卷各省的均分,标准化后平均排序,分值较低的省份定义为注重均等强地区,分值较高的省份定义为注重均等弱地区。
2参考古志辉(2015),本文手工收集并确认了全国各地区的儒家官方学校及孔庙共3963处。随后根据省份儒家官方学校及孔庙数量是否高于中位数,将各省份分为儒家文化传统强地区(高于中位数)与儒家文化传统弱地区(低于中位数)。
3限于篇幅,此处结果均未报告,留存备索。
[2]陈冬华、范从来和沈永建,2015,《高管与员工:激励有效性之比较与互动》,《管理世界》第5期,第160~171页。
[3]陈冬华、梁上坤和蒋德权,2010,《不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费》,《会计研究》第11期,第56~64页。
[4]董理和茅宁,2013,《公司成熟度、剩余负债能力与现金股利政策---基于财务柔性视角的实证研究》,《财经研究》第11期,第59~68页。
[5]方芳和李实,2015,《中国企业高管薪酬差距研究》,《中国社会科学》第8期,第47~67页。
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1比如研究样本中是否包括ST公司、是否包括创业板公司等等。本文的结论意味着,随着发行上市公司特征的结构性变化(创新成长公司的比例越来越高),未来内部薪酬差距与公司绩效、公司价值的研究,将越来越倾向于发现正面影响。
2尤其对于国有企业,管理层的薪酬管制应适当打破,进行分类管理。
1曹裕等(2010)、李云鹤等(2011)指出,按照我国目前证券市场的现状,上市公司中一般不包括初创期公司。
1公司最终的业绩表现是管理层和普通员工共同努力的结果。因此薪酬差距变化对管理层和普通员工的影响都应该加以讨论。但一方面,锦标赛理论和行为理论都主要从普通员工展开;另一方面,对管理层的影响和对普通员工的影响是相对的,比如薪酬差距的加大会增加普通员工的不公平感,而对于管理层而言则是“公平的”。
2并且相对于管理技能而言,普通员工的技能更为单一,再就业的难度更大。
1此处未采用会计业绩指标衡量,主要有两方面原因:一是当期的会计业绩指标(如ROA、ROE)一般是较为短期的财务指标;二是这类指标更容易受到避亏、再融资、利润平滑等目的盈余操纵的影响(赵睿,2012)。
2管理层平均薪酬为管理层薪酬总额比上管理层人数,普通员工平均薪酬为普通员工薪酬总额比上普通员工人数。其中对于普通员工薪酬,参考黎文靖和胡玉明(2012)以及陆正飞等(2012)以现金流量表中的“支付给职工以及为职工所支付的现金”减去管理层薪酬总额进行衡量。
3李云鹤等(2011)指出,以销售收入增长率、留存收益率以及资本支出率衡量公司的生命周期具有财务学含义,而公司年龄与生命周期有着密切的相关关系,另外这一方法也会减轻单一指标受到某些特殊制度背景的影响,较为全面。本文的稳健性测试针对留存收益率判别法、企业-行业增长率判别法也进行了检验,结果一致。
4李云鹤等(2011)对打分过程进行了较为详细的描述。同时,考虑到一般情况下成熟期企业相对其他两期企业更多,将得分中间的1/2界定为成熟期企业。
1限于篇幅,后续检验仅报告模型(1)的回归结果,模型(2)的结果保持一致;且不再报告控制变量的回归结果,均未见异常。
1本文参考Gorodnichenko and Roland(2011),使用世界价值观调查(World Value Survey)的问题“收入应该尽可能均等(1分)---应该加大收入差距、以鼓励个人努力工作(10分)”得分来度量中国各省份地区居民对于公平感的注重程度。该问题首次出现于2005年调查,因此本文计算2005年、2010年两次调查问卷各省的均分,标准化后平均排序,分值较低的省份定义为注重均等强地区,分值较高的省份定义为注重均等弱地区。
2参考古志辉(2015),本文手工收集并确认了全国各地区的儒家官方学校及孔庙共3963处。随后根据省份儒家官方学校及孔庙数量是否高于中位数,将各省份分为儒家文化传统强地区(高于中位数)与儒家文化传统弱地区(低于中位数)。
3限于篇幅,此处结果均未报告,留存备索。