政治关联、特许经营权与经营业绩
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摘要
以2012～2016年全部深圳A股上市公司为样本,对政治关联与特许经营权进行研究。结果发现,企业积极建立政治关联有助于其获得政府授予的特许经营权,赢得较高毛利率以推动企业持续稳定发展。
This paper finds that firms with political connection do get more franchises than the counterparts using listed enterprises in Shenzhen A share market during 2012～2016 as samples.Furthermore,the franchises can help firms win high gross profit rates to promote the sustainable and stable development.
This paper finds that firms with political connection do get more franchises than the counterparts using listed enterprises in Shenzhen A share market during 2012～2016 as samples.Furthermore,the franchises can help firms win high gross profit rates to promote the sustainable and stable development.
引文
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[12]Charles J H,Scott L D,Parrino R.Chief Executive Officer Careers in Regulated Environments:Evidence from Electric and Gas Utilities[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2002,45:535-563.
[13]裴俊巍.PPP社会资本选择的三个鲜明特点[N].中国政府采购报,2016-4-5.
[14]Khwaja A I,Mian A.Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets[J].Annual Review of Economics,2011,3(3):579-600.
[15]Iyer G R.Comparative Marketing:An Interdisciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis[J].Journal of International Business Studies,1997,28(3):531-561.
[16]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖洁.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011,8:97-114.
[17]罗党论,刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,5:104-113.
[18]毛新述,周小伟.政治关联与公开债务融资[J].会计研究,2015,6:28-35.
[19]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].经济研究,2013,11:72-87.
[2]Allena F,Jun Q.Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[3]刘慧龙,张敏,王亚平.政治关联、薪酬激励与员工配置效率[J].经济研究,2010,9:110-122.
[4]潘越,戴亦一,李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(5):8-19.
[5]张敏,张胜,王成方.政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010,11:153-163.
[6]唐松,孙铮.政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效[J].管理世界,2014,5:93-105.
[7]Shaffer B.Firm-level Responses to Government Regulation:Theoretical and Research Approaches[J].Journal of Management,1995,21(3):495-514.
[8]张建君,张志学.中国民营企业家的政治战略[J].管理世界,2005,7:94-105.
[9]Bortolotti B,Faccio M.Government Control of Privatized Firms[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(8):2907-2939.
[10]Faccio M,Masulis R W.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[11]高鸿业.西方经济学(宏观部分·第六版)[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[12]Charles J H,Scott L D,Parrino R.Chief Executive Officer Careers in Regulated Environments:Evidence from Electric and Gas Utilities[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2002,45:535-563.
[13]裴俊巍.PPP社会资本选择的三个鲜明特点[N].中国政府采购报,2016-4-5.
[14]Khwaja A I,Mian A.Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets[J].Annual Review of Economics,2011,3(3):579-600.
[15]Iyer G R.Comparative Marketing:An Interdisciplinary Framework for Institutional Analysis[J].Journal of International Business Studies,1997,28(3):531-561.
[16]杜兴强,曾泉,杜颖洁.政治联系、过度投资与公司价值——基于国有上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2011,8:97-114.
[17]罗党论,刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,5:104-113.
[18]毛新述,周小伟.政治关联与公开债务融资[J].会计研究,2015,6:28-35.
[19]田利辉,张伟.政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应[J].经济研究,2013,11:72-87.