强制或是自愿?重要性原则在信息披露决策中的作用——以上市公司业绩预告为例
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摘要
自愿性信息披露理论认为,只有当披露带来的收益超过成本时,管理者才会自愿披露该信息。然而,基于重要性原则的考虑却对公司的自愿披露行为提供了另一种解释。与美国的自愿披露原则不相似的是,对我国业绩预告行为的研究,要考虑三个方面的因素,即强制披露的门槛,重要性原则和自愿性动机。本文剖析了上市公司信息披露的决策过程,以深沪A股上市公司2013-2015年业绩预告的情况为例,分组进行logistic回归分析,研究了上述三因素对公司业绩预告行为的影响。发现强制性披露要求对上市公司业绩预告有重大约束,重要性因素和自愿性动机中的反映披露收益的变量随净利润变动程度的增加边际效应递减,而即便有强制披露要求,激烈的产品市场竞争也会对上市公司业绩预告形成重大抑制。
According to the theory of voluntary disclosure, managers will disclose the information voluntarily only if the benefits of the disclosure exceeds the cost of disclosure.However, the principle of Materiality offers another explanation for the company's voluntary disclosure. Unlike the United States' Voluntary disclosure, the China securities regulatory commission sets the threshold of the mandatory disclosure for Listed Companies' Earnings Forecast. So there are three main factors must be considered in the study of Chinese Listed Companies' Earnings Forecast, such as: mandatory provisions, materiality principle and voluntary motives. In order to study the impact of above three factors on these behavior of earnings forecast, this paper analyzes decision making process on Listed Companies' disclosure and builds logistic regression model with the statistics of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies ' Earnings Forecast in 2008-2010. Found that the mandatory requirements has significant constraints,marginal effects of materiality and benefits of the disclosure on listed companies' earnings forecast decrease with the increase of changes in net profit. Even with mandatory disclosure requirements, intense product market competition will pose a significant inhibition to companies' earnings forecast.
According to the theory of voluntary disclosure, managers will disclose the information voluntarily only if the benefits of the disclosure exceeds the cost of disclosure.However, the principle of Materiality offers another explanation for the company's voluntary disclosure. Unlike the United States' Voluntary disclosure, the China securities regulatory commission sets the threshold of the mandatory disclosure for Listed Companies' Earnings Forecast. So there are three main factors must be considered in the study of Chinese Listed Companies' Earnings Forecast, such as: mandatory provisions, materiality principle and voluntary motives. In order to study the impact of above three factors on these behavior of earnings forecast, this paper analyzes decision making process on Listed Companies' disclosure and builds logistic regression model with the statistics of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies ' Earnings Forecast in 2008-2010. Found that the mandatory requirements has significant constraints,marginal effects of materiality and benefits of the disclosure on listed companies' earnings forecast decrease with the increase of changes in net profit. Even with mandatory disclosure requirements, intense product market competition will pose a significant inhibition to companies' earnings forecast.
引文
[1]宋云玲等:《从业绩预告违规看中国证券监管的处罚效果》,《金融研究》2011年第6期。
[2]张然、张鹏:《中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究》,《中国会计评论》2011年第1期。
[3]伊志宏等:《产品市场竞争、公司治理与信息披露质量》,《管理世界》2010年第1期。
[4]王雄元等:《产品市场竞争、信息透明度与公司价值——来自2005年深市上市公司的经验数据》,《财贸经济》2009年第10期。
[5]罗炜、朱春艳:《代理成本与公司自愿性披露》,《经济研究》2010年第10期。
[6]Beyer,A.,Cohen,D.A.,Lys,T.Z.,&Walther,B.R.The Financial Reporting Environment:Review of Recent Literature.Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010.
[7]Heitzman.,Wasley,C.,Zimmerman,J.The Joint Effects of Materiality Thresholds and Voluntary Disclosure Incentives on Firms Disclosure Decisions.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010.
[8]Kin Lo.Materiality and Voluntary Disclosures.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010.
[9]Verrecchia R E.Essays on Disclosure.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001(1).
[10]Verrecchia R E,Weber J.Redacted Disclosure.Journal of Accounting Research,2006(4).
[11]Gordon S.Accountants and the Securities Act.Journal of Accountancy,1933.
[12]Edgley C.A Genealogy of Accounting Materiality.Critical Perspectives on Accounting,2014(3).
[13]Pinsker R,Pitre T J,Daigle R.An Investigation of Nonprofessional Investors’Qualitative Materiality Judgments Incorporating SEC Listed vs.Non-listed Events.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009(5).
[14]Lambert R,Leuz C,Verrecchia R E.Accounting Information,Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital.Journal of Accounting Research,2007(2).
[15]Raquel Alexander,Mike Ettredge,Mary Stone,Lili Sun.Are Mandatory Disclosure Decisions Made Strategically?Research in Accounting Regulation,2011(2).
[16]Beatty A,Weber J.Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates:An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments.Journal of Accounting Research,2006(2).
[17]Lennox C S,Park C W.The Informativeness of Earnings and Management's Issuance of Earnings Forecasts.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006(3).
[18]Botosan C A,Stanford M.Managers'Motives to Withhold Segment Disclosures and the Effect of SFAS No.131on Analysts'Information Environment.The Accounting Review,2005(3).
[19]Nagar V,Nanda D,Wysocki P.Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003(1).
[20]Campbell J Y,Ramadorai T,Schwartz A.Caught on Tape:Institutional Trading,Stock Returns,and Earnings Announcements.Journal of Financial Economics,2009(1).
[21]Rogers J L,Stocken P C.Credibility of Management Forecasts.The Accounting Review,2005(4).
[22]Miller G S,Piotroski J D.Forward-looking Earnings Statements:Determinants and Market Response.Available at SSRN 238593,2000.
[2]张然、张鹏:《中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究》,《中国会计评论》2011年第1期。
[3]伊志宏等:《产品市场竞争、公司治理与信息披露质量》,《管理世界》2010年第1期。
[4]王雄元等:《产品市场竞争、信息透明度与公司价值——来自2005年深市上市公司的经验数据》,《财贸经济》2009年第10期。
[5]罗炜、朱春艳:《代理成本与公司自愿性披露》,《经济研究》2010年第10期。
[6]Beyer,A.,Cohen,D.A.,Lys,T.Z.,&Walther,B.R.The Financial Reporting Environment:Review of Recent Literature.Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010.
[7]Heitzman.,Wasley,C.,Zimmerman,J.The Joint Effects of Materiality Thresholds and Voluntary Disclosure Incentives on Firms Disclosure Decisions.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010.
[8]Kin Lo.Materiality and Voluntary Disclosures.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010.
[9]Verrecchia R E.Essays on Disclosure.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001(1).
[10]Verrecchia R E,Weber J.Redacted Disclosure.Journal of Accounting Research,2006(4).
[11]Gordon S.Accountants and the Securities Act.Journal of Accountancy,1933.
[12]Edgley C.A Genealogy of Accounting Materiality.Critical Perspectives on Accounting,2014(3).
[13]Pinsker R,Pitre T J,Daigle R.An Investigation of Nonprofessional Investors’Qualitative Materiality Judgments Incorporating SEC Listed vs.Non-listed Events.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009(5).
[14]Lambert R,Leuz C,Verrecchia R E.Accounting Information,Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital.Journal of Accounting Research,2007(2).
[15]Raquel Alexander,Mike Ettredge,Mary Stone,Lili Sun.Are Mandatory Disclosure Decisions Made Strategically?Research in Accounting Regulation,2011(2).
[16]Beatty A,Weber J.Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates:An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments.Journal of Accounting Research,2006(2).
[17]Lennox C S,Park C W.The Informativeness of Earnings and Management's Issuance of Earnings Forecasts.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006(3).
[18]Botosan C A,Stanford M.Managers'Motives to Withhold Segment Disclosures and the Effect of SFAS No.131on Analysts'Information Environment.The Accounting Review,2005(3).
[19]Nagar V,Nanda D,Wysocki P.Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003(1).
[20]Campbell J Y,Ramadorai T,Schwartz A.Caught on Tape:Institutional Trading,Stock Returns,and Earnings Announcements.Journal of Financial Economics,2009(1).
[21]Rogers J L,Stocken P C.Credibility of Management Forecasts.The Accounting Review,2005(4).
[22]Miller G S,Piotroski J D.Forward-looking Earnings Statements:Determinants and Market Response.Available at SSRN 238593,2000.