产业共性技术扩散行为演化及动力机制
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摘要
本文从研发过程视角揭示共性技术扩散行为及其影响机理,据此运用演化博弈论分析共性技术扩散行为演化动态。研究表明:共性技术扩散是有潜在需求企业基于采纳与不采纳共性技术收益权衡的动态演化结果,共性技术预期市场收益、不采纳引致损失增加和替代收益降低及企业需求系数、市场前景系数、收益实现概率增加均利于共性技术扩散;知识产权保护程度越低越利于扩散,而较弱的分享意愿阻碍扩散;政府补贴和知识技术支持均有助于共性技术扩散,知识技术支持对共性技术扩散的作用受到技术转化系数的正向调节。根据上述结论,构建以共性技术供给及其收益为源动力、以企业采纳为牵引力、以政府支持为推动力及三种力量相互交织作用的共性技术扩散动力机制,并从源动力、牵引力和推动力的视角提出共性技术扩散动力机制有效运行的政策建议。
This paper firstly analyzes the diffusion mechanism of Industrial generic technology from the generic technology R&D process perspective. Then,it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolution dynamics of generic technology diffusion behavior. The results are as follows. Generic technology diffusion is the dynamic evolution result of enterprise R&D benefit tradeoff based on whether adopting generic technology or not. The expected revenue increases from generic technology,the losses increase from non-adopting generic technology and the reduction of substitution investment returns is good for generic technology diffusion. The demand coefficient of enterprise,the market prospect coefficient and the increases of income realization probability from generic technology also are good for diffusion. The lower the sharing level of generic technology intellectual property is,the more beneficial is it to diffusion,but the weaker sharing does willingness of supply enterprises hinder diffusion. Both Government finance and knowledge & technology supports are good for diffusion. The effect of knowledge & technology support on the diffusion is positively regulated by technology conversion coefficient. Based on the above conclusions,this paper constructs the motivation mechanism of generic technology diffusion which includes the driving force from government support,the traction power from enterprises adopting and the source force from generic technology supply and market returns. Finally,this paper proposes the policy suggestions to promote generic technology diffusion from the perspective of driving force,traction power and source force.
This paper firstly analyzes the diffusion mechanism of Industrial generic technology from the generic technology R&D process perspective. Then,it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolution dynamics of generic technology diffusion behavior. The results are as follows. Generic technology diffusion is the dynamic evolution result of enterprise R&D benefit tradeoff based on whether adopting generic technology or not. The expected revenue increases from generic technology,the losses increase from non-adopting generic technology and the reduction of substitution investment returns is good for generic technology diffusion. The demand coefficient of enterprise,the market prospect coefficient and the increases of income realization probability from generic technology also are good for diffusion. The lower the sharing level of generic technology intellectual property is,the more beneficial is it to diffusion,but the weaker sharing does willingness of supply enterprises hinder diffusion. Both Government finance and knowledge & technology supports are good for diffusion. The effect of knowledge & technology support on the diffusion is positively regulated by technology conversion coefficient. Based on the above conclusions,this paper constructs the motivation mechanism of generic technology diffusion which includes the driving force from government support,the traction power from enterprises adopting and the source force from generic technology supply and market returns. Finally,this paper proposes the policy suggestions to promote generic technology diffusion from the perspective of driving force,traction power and source force.
引文
[1]刘满凤,石光宁.产业共性技术“市场失灵”的经济学分析[J].科技进步与对策,2007(12):69-71.
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[10]张治栋,张淑欣.产业共性技术政府支持性研究[J].经济与管理,2013,27(3):92-96.
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[13]PILINKIENE V. R&D investment and competitiveness in the baltic states[J]. Procedia-social and behavioral sciences,2015(213):154-160.
[14]郑月龙,周立新,张卫国.产业共性技术研发政府支持合同[J].技术经济,2016,35(11):22-27.
[15]郑月龙,周立新,周继祥.考虑产业共性技术市场化的政府研发支持合同[J].科学学研究,2017,35(10):1483-1490.
[16]MAINE E,GARNSEY E. Commercializing generic technology:the case of advanced materials ventures[J].Research policy,2006,35(3):375-393.
[17]ZHOU J. Digitalization and intelligentization of manufacturing industry[J].Advances in manufacturing,2013,1(1):1-7.
[18]魏峰,周源,薛澜.“数控一代”示范工程引领和推动共性使能技术在中小企业推广应用[J].中国工程科学,2017,19(3):45-52.
[19]邹樵,吴丁佳宝,姜杰.共性技术扩散的网络与外溢效应[J].管理世界,2011(1):182-183.
[20]邓衢文.基于技术创新服务平台的共性技术扩散机制[D].北京:清华大学硕士论文,2010.
[21]YU Z H. Diffusion channel of generic technologies in equipment manufacturing industry[J]. Advanced materials research,2011(328-330):708-716.
[22]YU Z H. Diffusion modes of generic technologies of equipment manufacturing industry chain[J].Applied mechanics and materials,2012(152-154):1679-1684.
[23]郑月龙.企业共性技术合作研发形成机制研究——基于演化博弈论的视角[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2017.
[24]TAYLOR P D,JONKER L B. Evolutionary stable strategy and game dynamics[J].Mathematical biosciences,1978,40(1-2):145-156.
[25]RIECHMANN T. Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games[J]. Journal economic dynamics control,2001(25):1019-1037.
[26]郑月龙,周立新.供应商面向多制造商技术研发决策演化博弈[J].企业经济,2018,37(8):78-83.
[2]KOKSHAGINA O,GILLIER T,COGEZ P,et al. Using innovation contests to promote the development of generic technologies[J].Technological forecasting&social change,2017(114):152-164.
[3]陈静,唐五湘.共性技术的特性和失灵现象分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007(1):5-8.
[4]李纪珍,邓衢文.产业共性技术供给和扩散的多重失灵[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2011,32(7):5-10.
[5]THOMA G. Striving for a large market:evidence from a general purpose technology in action[J].Industrial and corporate change,2008,18(1):107-138.
[6]韩元建,陈强.共性技术扩散的影响因素分析及对策[J].中国科技论坛,2017(1):53-59.
[7]周源.制造范式升级期共性使能技术扩散的影响因素分析与实证研究[J].中国软科学,2018(1):19-32.
[8]邹樵.共性技术扩散中的政府行为[J].中国行政管理,2008(2):66-68.
[9]CZARNITZKI D,HANEL P,ROSA J M. Evaluating the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation:a microeconometric study on Canadian firms[J].Research policy,2011,40(2):217-229.
[10]张治栋,张淑欣.产业共性技术政府支持性研究[J].经济与管理,2013,27(3):92-96.
[11]SMIT M,LEIJTENS X,AMBROSIUS H,et al. An introduction to InP-based generic integration technology[J].Semiconductor science technology,2014,29(83001):1-41.
[12]马晓楠,耿殿贺.战略性新兴产业共性技术研发博弈与政府补贴[J].经济与管理研究,2014(1):73-78.
[13]PILINKIENE V. R&D investment and competitiveness in the baltic states[J]. Procedia-social and behavioral sciences,2015(213):154-160.
[14]郑月龙,周立新,张卫国.产业共性技术研发政府支持合同[J].技术经济,2016,35(11):22-27.
[15]郑月龙,周立新,周继祥.考虑产业共性技术市场化的政府研发支持合同[J].科学学研究,2017,35(10):1483-1490.
[16]MAINE E,GARNSEY E. Commercializing generic technology:the case of advanced materials ventures[J].Research policy,2006,35(3):375-393.
[17]ZHOU J. Digitalization and intelligentization of manufacturing industry[J].Advances in manufacturing,2013,1(1):1-7.
[18]魏峰,周源,薛澜.“数控一代”示范工程引领和推动共性使能技术在中小企业推广应用[J].中国工程科学,2017,19(3):45-52.
[19]邹樵,吴丁佳宝,姜杰.共性技术扩散的网络与外溢效应[J].管理世界,2011(1):182-183.
[20]邓衢文.基于技术创新服务平台的共性技术扩散机制[D].北京:清华大学硕士论文,2010.
[21]YU Z H. Diffusion channel of generic technologies in equipment manufacturing industry[J]. Advanced materials research,2011(328-330):708-716.
[22]YU Z H. Diffusion modes of generic technologies of equipment manufacturing industry chain[J].Applied mechanics and materials,2012(152-154):1679-1684.
[23]郑月龙.企业共性技术合作研发形成机制研究——基于演化博弈论的视角[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2017.
[24]TAYLOR P D,JONKER L B. Evolutionary stable strategy and game dynamics[J].Mathematical biosciences,1978,40(1-2):145-156.
[25]RIECHMANN T. Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games[J]. Journal economic dynamics control,2001(25):1019-1037.
[26]郑月龙,周立新.供应商面向多制造商技术研发决策演化博弈[J].企业经济,2018,37(8):78-83.