税收集权、工业企业规模与发展偏好——来自地级市税收分成调整的经验证据
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摘要
本文利用2003-2011年省对地级市政府税收分成调整的数据,观察税收集权对地级城市工业企业规模产生的影响效应。研究表明:地级市政府面对税收集权,通过扩大本地工业企业产值规模来应对税收收入下降,并制定向内资企业倾斜的政策支持内资工业企业的发展,采用"引入效应"的发展方式扩大工业企业的数量来保证辖区内工业企业总产值规模的增长。
In this paper, we studied the effects of tax centralization on the scale of industrial enterprises in prefecture cities by using provincial tax-sharing variance data from 2003 to 2011. The research result shows that under the tax centralization, the prefecture governments increase the output of local industrial enterprises to slow down the decreasing of tax revenues. Moreover, the prefecture governments make the policy benefiting the domestic enterprises to promote their development. The development mode of Introducing Effects is also widely used to expand the amount of local industrial enterprises, which can ensure the growth of the gross output value of industrial enterprises.
In this paper, we studied the effects of tax centralization on the scale of industrial enterprises in prefecture cities by using provincial tax-sharing variance data from 2003 to 2011. The research result shows that under the tax centralization, the prefecture governments increase the output of local industrial enterprises to slow down the decreasing of tax revenues. Moreover, the prefecture governments make the policy benefiting the domestic enterprises to promote their development. The development mode of Introducing Effects is also widely used to expand the amount of local industrial enterprises, which can ensure the growth of the gross output value of industrial enterprises.
引文
[1]邓子基,唐文倩.我国财税改革与“顶层设计”—省以下分税制财政管理体制的深化改革[J].财政研究,2012(02):2-6.
[2]方红生,张军.财政集权的激励效应再评估:攫取之手还是援助之手?[J].管理世界,2014(02):21-31.
[3]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(03):4-12.
[4]郭庆旺,贾俊雪.财政分权、政府组织结构与地方政府支出规模[J].经济研究,2010(11):59-72.
[5]胡志勇,卢以恒.中国税收分权与地方政府规模的实证分析[J].财政研究,2015(06):46-50.
[6]吕冰洋.政府间税收分权的配置选择和财政影响[J].经济研究,2009(06):16-27.
[7]汤玉刚,苑程浩.不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长[J].经济学(季刊),2011(01):33-50.
[8]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,汪晖.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009(07):21-33.
[9]谢贞发,席鹏辉,黄思明.中国式税收分成激励的产业效应—基于省以下增值税、营业税分成改革实践的研究[J].财贸经济,2016(06):18-33.
[10]张军.分权与增长:中国的故事[J].经济学(季刊),2008(01):21-52.
[11]周黎安,吴敏.省以下多级政府间的税收分成:特征事实与解释[J].金融研究,2015(10):64-80.
[12]袁飞,陶然,徐志刚,刘明兴.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀[J].经济研究,2008,(05):70-80.
[13]黄思明.中国式地方税收分成制度的比较研究[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017,50(05):65-73.
[14]林毅夫,刘志强.中国的财政分权与经济增长[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000(04):5-17.
[15]陈抗,Arye L.Hillman,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化—从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(04):111-130.
[16]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):170-192.
[17]Jin,H.,Y.Qian and B.R.Weingast,2005.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style.Journal of Public Economics,Vol,89,pp.1719-1942.
[18]Qian,Y.and C.Xu,1993.Why China's Economic Reforms Differ:The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector.Economics of Transition,Vol.1,pp.135-170.
[19]Panizza,U.go.Political and Macroeconomic Institutions:A Study of Fiscal Centralization and the Links Between Income Distribution and Long-run Growth.John Hopkins University.Ph.D.Dissertation.1998.
(1)根据本文收集的各省省以下财政体制政革的文件,统计税收分成调整的省份,计算得到该数据。
[2]方红生,张军.财政集权的激励效应再评估:攫取之手还是援助之手?[J].管理世界,2014(02):21-31.
[3]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(03):4-12.
[4]郭庆旺,贾俊雪.财政分权、政府组织结构与地方政府支出规模[J].经济研究,2010(11):59-72.
[5]胡志勇,卢以恒.中国税收分权与地方政府规模的实证分析[J].财政研究,2015(06):46-50.
[6]吕冰洋.政府间税收分权的配置选择和财政影响[J].经济研究,2009(06):16-27.
[7]汤玉刚,苑程浩.不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长[J].经济学(季刊),2011(01):33-50.
[8]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,汪晖.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009(07):21-33.
[9]谢贞发,席鹏辉,黄思明.中国式税收分成激励的产业效应—基于省以下增值税、营业税分成改革实践的研究[J].财贸经济,2016(06):18-33.
[10]张军.分权与增长:中国的故事[J].经济学(季刊),2008(01):21-52.
[11]周黎安,吴敏.省以下多级政府间的税收分成:特征事实与解释[J].金融研究,2015(10):64-80.
[12]袁飞,陶然,徐志刚,刘明兴.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀[J].经济研究,2008,(05):70-80.
[13]黄思明.中国式地方税收分成制度的比较研究[J].江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017,50(05):65-73.
[14]林毅夫,刘志强.中国的财政分权与经济增长[J].北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000(04):5-17.
[15]陈抗,Arye L.Hillman,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化—从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(04):111-130.
[16]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017,40(10):170-192.
[17]Jin,H.,Y.Qian and B.R.Weingast,2005.Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism,Chinese Style.Journal of Public Economics,Vol,89,pp.1719-1942.
[18]Qian,Y.and C.Xu,1993.Why China's Economic Reforms Differ:The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector.Economics of Transition,Vol.1,pp.135-170.
[19]Panizza,U.go.Political and Macroeconomic Institutions:A Study of Fiscal Centralization and the Links Between Income Distribution and Long-run Growth.John Hopkins University.Ph.D.Dissertation.1998.
(1)根据本文收集的各省省以下财政体制政革的文件,统计税收分成调整的省份,计算得到该数据。