税收分成激励能促进上市公司创新吗?
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摘要
分税制下的税收分享制度对地方政府具有较强激励作用。从税收分成率对地方政府的税收征收激励和税基保护激励的视角,利用2009-2016年A股和创业板上市公司的数据,研究税收分成率变化对企业创新的影响。由于上市公司对当地的经济发展具有重大意义,税收分成的税基保护激励作用更大。税收分成率的提高会增加企业专利申请和研发投入,整体上提高创新水平。异质性检验表明,税收分成率对规模更大企业的创新影响更大,当税收分成率增加,地方政府更愿意为了保护税基促进企业发展。中央在集中税权的同时,应当通过转移支付、绩效考核等补充制度,提高地方政府促进企业创新发展的激励,避免过度征税而损害企业创新。
As an important characteristic of the tax sharing system in China,the tax sharing has a strong incentive effect on the local governments. From the perspective of impact on tax levy and tax base protection incentives,using2009-2016 A shares and GEM listed company data,this paper empirically studies the influence of the change of tax sharing rate on enterprise innovation. Because listed companies play an important role in local economy,the incentive of tax sharing to tax base protection is more significant. The increase of tax sharing rate would enlarge enterprises' investment in patent application and R&D and improve the whole level of innovation.The heterogeneity test shows that the tax sharing rate imposes a bigger effect on large-scale enterprises. When the tax sharing rate rises,local governments prefer to promote the development of enterprises in order to protect tax base. Therefore,while implementing tax power centralization,the central government should increase incentives for local governments to promote enterprises' innovation and development by transfer payment and performance appraisal system,so as to avoid the damage of excessive taxation on business innovation.
As an important characteristic of the tax sharing system in China,the tax sharing has a strong incentive effect on the local governments. From the perspective of impact on tax levy and tax base protection incentives,using2009-2016 A shares and GEM listed company data,this paper empirically studies the influence of the change of tax sharing rate on enterprise innovation. Because listed companies play an important role in local economy,the incentive of tax sharing to tax base protection is more significant. The increase of tax sharing rate would enlarge enterprises' investment in patent application and R&D and improve the whole level of innovation.The heterogeneity test shows that the tax sharing rate imposes a bigger effect on large-scale enterprises. When the tax sharing rate rises,local governments prefer to promote the development of enterprises in order to protect tax base. Therefore,while implementing tax power centralization,the central government should increase incentives for local governments to promote enterprises' innovation and development by transfer payment and performance appraisal system,so as to avoid the damage of excessive taxation on business innovation.
引文
[1]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作———兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(06):33-40.
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[3]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(07):36-50.
[4]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J].经济研究,2007,(03):4-19.
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[6]姚洋,张牧扬.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛———来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究,2013,(01):137-150.
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[9]Qian Y,Weingast B R.Federalism as a commitment to perserving market incentives[J]. The Journal of Eco-nomic Perspectives,1997,11(4):83-92.
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[11]谢贞发,张玮.中国财政分权与经济增长———一个荟萃回归分析[J].经济学(季刊),2015,(02):435-452.
[12]吴延兵.中国式分权下的偏向性投资[J].经济研究,2017,(06):137-152.
[13]吕冰洋,马光荣,毛捷.分税与税率:从政府到企业[J].经济研究,2016,(07):13-28.
[14]吕冰洋.政府间税收分权的配置选择和财政影响[J].经济研究,2009,(06):16-27.
[15]周黎安,吴敏.省以下多级政府间的税收分成:特征事实与解释[J].金融研究,2015,(10):64-80.
[16]谢贞发,席鹏辉,黄思明.中国式税收分成激励的产业效应———基于省以下增值税、营业税分成改革实践的研究[J].财贸经济,2016,(06):18-34.
[17]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017,(10):170-192.
[18]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发,等.财政压力、产能过剩与供给侧改革[J].经济研究,2017,(09):86-102.
[19]Hall B,Reenen J V. How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A new review of the evidence[J]. Re-search Policy,2000,29(4):449-469.
[20]Bloom N,Griffith R,Reenen J V. Do R&D tax credits work? Evidence from a panel of countries 1979-1997[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2002,85(1):1-31.
[21]Czarnitzki D,Hanel P,Rosa J M. Evaluating the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation:A microecono-metric study on Canadian firms[J]. Research Policy,2011,40(2):217-229.
[22]李林木,汪冲.税费负担、创新能力与企业升级———来自“新三板”挂牌公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2017,(11):119-134.
[23]付明卫,叶静怡,孟俣希,等.国产化率保护对自主创新的影响———来自中国风电制造业的证据[J].经济研究,2015,(02):118-131.
[24]袁建国,后青松,程晨.企业政治资源的诅咒效应———基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察[J].管理世界,2015,(01):139-155.
[25]Jia N,Tian X,Zhang W. The real effects of tournament incentives:The case of firm innovation[J]. SocialScience Electronic Publishing,2016,17(1):16-21.
[26]余明桂,钟慧洁,范蕊.业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?[J].经济研究,2016,(12):104-117.
[27]吴超鹏,唐菂.知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效———来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2016,(11):125-139.
[28]谢贞发,范子英.中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争[J].经济研究,2015,(04):92-106.
[29]石丽静.研发强度与企业创新绩效———政府资源与知识产权保护的调节作用[J].经济与管理评论,2017,(06):144-152.
[30]骆世广,许珊珊,吴非.财政分权、区域金融发展与经济增长———基于广州市数据的经验证据[J].经济与管理评论,2016,(04):124-129.
[31]黄思明,王乔.税收集权、工业企业规模与发展偏好———来自地级市税收分成调整的经验证据[J].财政研究,2018,(05):75-85,98.
[2]张军.中国经济发展:为增长而竞争[J].世界经济文汇,2005,(Z1):101-105.
[3]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(07):36-50.
[4]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J].经济研究,2007,(03):4-19.
[5]徐现祥,王贤彬.晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据[J].世界经济,2010,(02):15-36.
[6]姚洋,张牧扬.官员绩效与晋升锦标赛———来自城市数据的证据[J].经济研究,2013,(01):137-150.
[7]乔坤元.我国官员晋升锦标赛机制:理论与证据[J].经济科学,2013,(01):88-98.
[8]Li H,Zhou L A.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in Chi-na[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9):1743-1762.
[9]Qian Y,Weingast B R.Federalism as a commitment to perserving market incentives[J]. The Journal of Eco-nomic Perspectives,1997,11(4):83-92.
[10]Qian Y,Roland G.Federalism and the soft budget constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[11]谢贞发,张玮.中国财政分权与经济增长———一个荟萃回归分析[J].经济学(季刊),2015,(02):435-452.
[12]吴延兵.中国式分权下的偏向性投资[J].经济研究,2017,(06):137-152.
[13]吕冰洋,马光荣,毛捷.分税与税率:从政府到企业[J].经济研究,2016,(07):13-28.
[14]吕冰洋.政府间税收分权的配置选择和财政影响[J].经济研究,2009,(06):16-27.
[15]周黎安,吴敏.省以下多级政府间的税收分成:特征事实与解释[J].金融研究,2015,(10):64-80.
[16]谢贞发,席鹏辉,黄思明.中国式税收分成激励的产业效应———基于省以下增值税、营业税分成改革实践的研究[J].财贸经济,2016,(06):18-34.
[17]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发.税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J].世界经济,2017,(10):170-192.
[18]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发,等.财政压力、产能过剩与供给侧改革[J].经济研究,2017,(09):86-102.
[19]Hall B,Reenen J V. How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A new review of the evidence[J]. Re-search Policy,2000,29(4):449-469.
[20]Bloom N,Griffith R,Reenen J V. Do R&D tax credits work? Evidence from a panel of countries 1979-1997[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2002,85(1):1-31.
[21]Czarnitzki D,Hanel P,Rosa J M. Evaluating the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation:A microecono-metric study on Canadian firms[J]. Research Policy,2011,40(2):217-229.
[22]李林木,汪冲.税费负担、创新能力与企业升级———来自“新三板”挂牌公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2017,(11):119-134.
[23]付明卫,叶静怡,孟俣希,等.国产化率保护对自主创新的影响———来自中国风电制造业的证据[J].经济研究,2015,(02):118-131.
[24]袁建国,后青松,程晨.企业政治资源的诅咒效应———基于政治关联与企业技术创新的考察[J].管理世界,2015,(01):139-155.
[25]Jia N,Tian X,Zhang W. The real effects of tournament incentives:The case of firm innovation[J]. SocialScience Electronic Publishing,2016,17(1):16-21.
[26]余明桂,钟慧洁,范蕊.业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?[J].经济研究,2016,(12):104-117.
[27]吴超鹏,唐菂.知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效———来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2016,(11):125-139.
[28]谢贞发,范子英.中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争[J].经济研究,2015,(04):92-106.
[29]石丽静.研发强度与企业创新绩效———政府资源与知识产权保护的调节作用[J].经济与管理评论,2017,(06):144-152.
[30]骆世广,许珊珊,吴非.财政分权、区域金融发展与经济增长———基于广州市数据的经验证据[J].经济与管理评论,2016,(04):124-129.
[31]黄思明,王乔.税收集权、工业企业规模与发展偏好———来自地级市税收分成调整的经验证据[J].财政研究,2018,(05):75-85,98.