管理层能力、激励与内部控制质量研究——基于沪深两市主板上市公司2012-2015年的样本分析
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摘要
企业复杂的内部控制决策要求管理层具备较高的管理能力,以有效设计和运行内部控制,而内部控制执行的效果则取决于高管的积极性和努力程度。本文以沪深两市主板上市公司2012-2015年数据为样本,从内部控制决策的制定与执行层面实证检验管理层能力、激励以及两者的交互作用对内部控制质量的影响。结果表明较高的管理层能力提高了内部控制质量,且上述作用在实施了适当管理层激励的上市公司中更加明显;有效的管理层激励有助于调动有效执行内部控制的积极性和努力程度、提高内部控制质量,且股权激励的效果更为突出;管理层能力与激励在提高内部控制质量方面存在协同作用,且股权激励能够更好地发挥与管理层能力在促进内部控制质量方面的正向交互作用。上述结论对于提升企业内部控制质量,从经理人的选择、公司内部控制及相关激励机制的设计等方面具有启示意义。
The complex decision about internal control requires the management to have high ability to design and operate the internal control effectively. The implementation effect of internal control also depends on the enthusiasm and efforts of management. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2012-2015 in Shenzhen and Shanghai markets, this paper empirically tests the relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality, management incentive and internal control quality, the interaction of managerial ability and management incentive to internal control quality. We find that higher management ability can improve the quality of internal control, and the above effect is more obvious in listed companies with appropriate management incentives;effective management incentive is helpful for mobilizing their enthusiasm and efforts to implement internal control and improving the quality of internal control, and equity incentive is more effective;there is a synergistic effect between management ability and incentive in improving the quality of internal control, and equity incentive can better play a positive interaction with management ability in promoting the quality of internal control. The above conclusions have important implications for improving the quality of enterprise internal control, recruitment of manager and the design of incentive mechanism related to internal control.
The complex decision about internal control requires the management to have high ability to design and operate the internal control effectively. The implementation effect of internal control also depends on the enthusiasm and efforts of management. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2012-2015 in Shenzhen and Shanghai markets, this paper empirically tests the relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality, management incentive and internal control quality, the interaction of managerial ability and management incentive to internal control quality. We find that higher management ability can improve the quality of internal control, and the above effect is more obvious in listed companies with appropriate management incentives;effective management incentive is helpful for mobilizing their enthusiasm and efforts to implement internal control and improving the quality of internal control, and equity incentive is more effective;there is a synergistic effect between management ability and incentive in improving the quality of internal control, and equity incentive can better play a positive interaction with management ability in promoting the quality of internal control. The above conclusions have important implications for improving the quality of enterprise internal control, recruitment of manager and the design of incentive mechanism related to internal control.
引文
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[2] Demerjian,P., Lev, B., McVay, S.Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests[J].Management Science, 2012,58(7):1229-1248.
[3] Steven Balsam, Wei Jiang, BoLu.Equity Incentives and Internal Control Weaknesses[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2014, 31(1):178-201.
[4] 赵息,苏秀花.企业内部控制经济合理性分析——基于企业风险和成本效益原则[J].审计与经济研究,2013(3): 58-64.
[5] 樊行健,肖光红.关于企业内部控制本质与概念的理论反思[J].会计研究,2014(2):4-11.
[6] 崔志娟.规范内部控制的思路与政策研究——基于内部控制信息披露“动机选择”视角的分析[J].会计研究,2011(11):52-56.
[7] 逯东,王运陈,付鹏.CEO 激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2014(6):66-72.
[8] 郑石桥,郑卓如.核心文化价值观和内部控制执行:一个制度协调理论架构[J].会计研究,2013(10):28-34.
[9] Kaplan S., B. A.Minton.How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly UneasyCEOs[R].NBER Working Paper,2006.
[10] 方军雄.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界,2012(11):144-155.
[11] 罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等. 政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究, 2014(1):42-48.
[12] Bergstresser D,Philippon T. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006, 80(3):511-529.
[13] 苏冬蔚,林大庞. 股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010(11):88-100.