联保贷款中的策略性违约规避机制设计
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摘要
针对联保贷款的策略性违约问题,通过对其产生原因的分析以及对现有文献中解决措施的探讨,设计了一个弹性联保贷款合约。该合约的特点在于,随着企业愿意承担的连带责任的增加,企业可获得的期望收益也随之增加,旨在从正面激励企业主动为同伴承担还款责任,达到规避策略性违约的目的。通过数值分析验证了该弹性合约的特性以及适用范围。并进一步在两企业模式基础上进行拓展,讨论了多于两企业的情况下该弹性合约的适用条件。
In this paper, focusing on the problem of strategic default, by analyzing the causes of the problems and discussing the countermeasures presented by published documents, a flexible group lending contract is designed. The characteristics of this contract lie in the fact that the available expected utility of enterprises increases along with the increase of the joint liability which enterprises are willing to bear, aiming at positively motivating the enterprises to be liable for repayment of their companions actively, thus realizing the purpose of avoiding strategic defaults. By numerical analyses, the characteristics and scope of application of the flexible contract are tested and verified. Moreover, from discussion under the dual-company pattern, the application conditions of the flexible contract under multiple-company pattern are discussed.
In this paper, focusing on the problem of strategic default, by analyzing the causes of the problems and discussing the countermeasures presented by published documents, a flexible group lending contract is designed. The characteristics of this contract lie in the fact that the available expected utility of enterprises increases along with the increase of the joint liability which enterprises are willing to bear, aiming at positively motivating the enterprises to be liable for repayment of their companions actively, thus realizing the purpose of avoiding strategic defaults. By numerical analyses, the characteristics and scope of application of the flexible contract are tested and verified. Moreover, from discussion under the dual-company pattern, the application conditions of the flexible contract under multiple-company pattern are discussed.
引文
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[3] Bernasek A,Stainfield J R.The grameen bank as progressive institutional adjustment[J].Journal of Ecomomic Issues,1997,31(2):359-366.
[4] 唐红娟.农户联保贷款的制度优势与缺陷探析[J].特区经济,2008,235(8):78-79.
[5] 郝芳.农村信贷的思考——联保贷款的缺陷与创新[J].价值工程,2006,25(10):138-142.
[6] 江能,邹平,王泽丽.联保机制对贷款还款率的影响研究[J].统计与决策,2007,(5):68-70.
[7] Besley T,Coate S.Group lending,repayment incentives,and social collateral[J].Journal of Development Economics,1995,46(1):1-18.
[8] 唐曜华.互保联保放大贷款风险,银行加强风控多米诺效应[N].证券时报,2012-12-17.
[9] Park A,Shen M.Joint liability lending and the rise and fall of China’s township and village enterprises[J].Journal of Development Economics,2003,71(2):497-531.
[10] Doula A,Barua D.The poor always pay back——the grameen Ⅱ story[M] .Kumarian Press,2006.
[11] Aghion B.On the design of a credit with peer monitoring[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):79-104.
[12] Bhole B,Ogden S.Group lending and individual lending with strategic default[J].Journal of Development Economics,2010,91(2):348-363.
[13] Bolten P,Scharfstein D.A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting[J].American Economic Review,1990,80(1):93-106.
[14] Gine X,Karlan D.Group versus individual liability:a field experiment in philippines[R].Center for Global Development,Washington DC,2007,Working Paper 111.
[15] 江能,邹平,王泽丽.组员规模对联保贷款信贷风险的影响机制分析[J].统计与决策,2007,(23):42- 43.
[16] 金俊峰,付伟.对农户小额贷款多户联保模式的分析[J].农村金融研究,2009,(7):66- 69.
[2] Stiglitz J E.Peer monitoring and credit markets[J].The world bank economic review,1990,4(3):351-366.
[3] Bernasek A,Stainfield J R.The grameen bank as progressive institutional adjustment[J].Journal of Ecomomic Issues,1997,31(2):359-366.
[4] 唐红娟.农户联保贷款的制度优势与缺陷探析[J].特区经济,2008,235(8):78-79.
[5] 郝芳.农村信贷的思考——联保贷款的缺陷与创新[J].价值工程,2006,25(10):138-142.
[6] 江能,邹平,王泽丽.联保机制对贷款还款率的影响研究[J].统计与决策,2007,(5):68-70.
[7] Besley T,Coate S.Group lending,repayment incentives,and social collateral[J].Journal of Development Economics,1995,46(1):1-18.
[8] 唐曜华.互保联保放大贷款风险,银行加强风控多米诺效应[N].证券时报,2012-12-17.
[9] Park A,Shen M.Joint liability lending and the rise and fall of China’s township and village enterprises[J].Journal of Development Economics,2003,71(2):497-531.
[10] Doula A,Barua D.The poor always pay back——the grameen Ⅱ story[M] .Kumarian Press,2006.
[11] Aghion B.On the design of a credit with peer monitoring[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):79-104.
[12] Bhole B,Ogden S.Group lending and individual lending with strategic default[J].Journal of Development Economics,2010,91(2):348-363.
[13] Bolten P,Scharfstein D.A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting[J].American Economic Review,1990,80(1):93-106.
[14] Gine X,Karlan D.Group versus individual liability:a field experiment in philippines[R].Center for Global Development,Washington DC,2007,Working Paper 111.
[15] 江能,邹平,王泽丽.组员规模对联保贷款信贷风险的影响机制分析[J].统计与决策,2007,(23):42- 43.
[16] 金俊峰,付伟.对农户小额贷款多户联保模式的分析[J].农村金融研究,2009,(7):66- 69.