中国农村低保制度的政治社会效应——基于CFPS面板数据的实证研究
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摘要
本文基于2012年和2014年中国家庭追踪调查农村样本构成的面板数据,使用PSM-DID识别策略,严格评估了农村低保对受助者政府信任、社会信任和社会问题主观感受的影响效应。研究发现:(1)农村低保能够有效提升受助者尤其是贫困受助者对地方政府的信任水平;(2)获得低保可以改善贫困受助者对邻居的信任程度,但同时也会削弱其对父母的信任程度;(3)农村低保能够有效降低受助者对贫富差距、医疗、社会保障问题严重程度的主观感受,且该效应在贫困群体中更为突出;(4)在改善政治信任和社会信任以及缓解社会问题严重程度的主观感受方面,农村低保在西部地区的作用不如在东中部地区。
Using national longitudinal survey data from the CFPS in 2012 and 2014 and a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods,this article rigorously evaluates the effects of rural Dibao on recipients' trust in local government,social trust and perception on severity of major social issues. The study finds that: rural Dibao participation can significantly increase recipients',especially poor recipients',trust in local government; Poor Dibao recipients are more likely to trust their neighbors,but less likely to trust their parents; Receiving rural Dibao is effective in alleviating individuals' perception on severity of economic inequality,health care problem,and social security problem. These effects are greater in poor group than in non-poor group; Political and social effects of rural Dibao are greater in eastern and central regions than in western region.
Using national longitudinal survey data from the CFPS in 2012 and 2014 and a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences methods,this article rigorously evaluates the effects of rural Dibao on recipients' trust in local government,social trust and perception on severity of major social issues. The study finds that: rural Dibao participation can significantly increase recipients',especially poor recipients',trust in local government; Poor Dibao recipients are more likely to trust their neighbors,but less likely to trust their parents; Receiving rural Dibao is effective in alleviating individuals' perception on severity of economic inequality,health care problem,and social security problem. These effects are greater in poor group than in non-poor group; Political and social effects of rural Dibao are greater in eastern and central regions than in western region.
引文
1.Attanasio O,Pellerano L,Reyes S P.Building Trust?Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Social Capital.Fiscal Studies,2009,30(2):139~177
2.Camacho L.The Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Social Engagement and Trust in Institutions:Evidence from Peru's Juntos Programme.German Development Institute Discussion Paper 24,2014
3.Cameron L,Shah M.Can Mistargeting Destroy Social Capital and Stimulate Crime?Evidence from a Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia.Economic Development and Cultural Change,2013,62(2):381~415
4.Chong A,Nopo H,Rios V.Do Welfare Programs Damage Interpersonal Trust?Experimental Evidence from Representative Samples for Four Latin American Cities.Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 668,2009
5.Evans D,Holtemeyer B,Kosec K.Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government.World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8333,2018
6.Golan J,Sicular T,Umapathi N.Unconditional Cash Transfers in China:Who Benefits from the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee(Dibao)Program?World Development,2017,93:316~336
7.Hunter W,Sugiyama N B.Transforming Subjects into Citizens:Insights from Brazil's Bolsa Família.Perspectives on Politics,2014,12(4):829~845
8.Kakwani N,Li S,Wang X,Zhu M.Evaluating the effectiveness of the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee(Dibao)program in China.China Economic Review,2018,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.07.010
9.Leites M,Pereira G,Rius A,Salas G,Vigorito A.Protocol:The effect of Cash Transfers on Social Solidarity:A Systematic Review.The Campbell Collaboration Report 2017-06-16,2017
10.Li M,Walker R.Shame,Stigma and the Take-up of Social Assistance:Insights from Rural China.International Journal of Social Welfare,2017,26(3):230~238
11.Mac Auslan I,Riemenschneider N.Richer but Resented:What do Cash Transfers Do to Social Relations?IDS Bulletin,2011,42(6):60~66
12.Mansuri G,Rao V.Localizing Development:Does Participation Work?Washington,D.C:World Bank,2013
13.Oduro R.Beyond Poverty Reduction:Conditional Cash Transfers and Citizenship in Ghana.International Journal of Social Welfare,2015,24(1):27~36
14.Samuels F,Stavropoulou M.‘Being Able to Breathe Again’:The Effects of Cash Transfer Programmes on Psychosocial Wellbeing.The Journal of Development Studies,2016,52(8):1099~1114
15.Woolcock M.Social Capital and Economic Development:Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.Theory and society,1998,27(2):151~208
16.Ugo G,Maddalena H,Ruslan Y.The State of Social Safety Nets 2014.Washington,D.C:World Bank,2014
17.Zhao L,Guo Y,Shao T.Can the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee Scheme Enable the Poor to Escape the Poverty Trap in Rural China?International Journal of Social Welfare,2017,26(4):314~328
18.韩华为.农村低保户瞄准中的偏误和精英俘获:基于社区瞄准机制的分析.经济学动态,2018(2):49~64
19.韩华为,高琴.中国农村低保制度的保护效果研究:来自中国家庭追踪调查的经验证据.公共管理学报,2017(2):81~96
20.韩华为,高琴.代理家计调查与农村低保瞄准效果:基于CHIP数据的分析.中国人口科学,2018(3):73~84
21.贺雪峰.农村低保实践中存在的若干问题.广东社会科学,2017(3):173~180
22.梁晓敏,汪三贵.农村低保对农户家庭支出的影响分析.农业技术经济,2015(11):24~36
23.刘丽娟.我国城乡低保家庭基本状况分析:基于2016年中国城乡困难家庭社会政策支持系统建设项目的调查.中国民政,2017(21):49~51
24.仇叶,贺雪峰.泛福利化:农村低保制度的政策目标偏移及其解释.政治学研究,2017(3):63~74
25.谢治菊.农村最低生活保障制度与农民对政府信任的关系研究:来自两次延续性的调查.中国行政管理,2013(6):122~127
**本文中的公共救助项目特指贫困瞄准型救助项目
*本文将匹配前的非低保样本称为对照组,而将匹配后的非低保样本称为控制组
*CFPS的信任板块通过6个问题(N10021-N10026),要求受访者依次对父母、邻居、美国人、陌生人、地方干部以及医生的信任程度做出评价。考虑到大多数中国农民实际生活中与外国人交往很少,所以本文在社会信任的考察中去掉了对美国人的信任,而仅保留了对父母、邻居、陌生人和医生的信任
**CFPS的社会问题主观感受板块通过8个问题(N6011-N6018),要求受访者依次对政府廉政、环境保护、贫富差距、教育、医疗、就业、住房和社会保障问题的严重程度做出主观评价。考虑到低保对贫富差距、教育、医疗、就业、住房和社会保障问题严重程度的主观感受方面有更直接的影响,本文仅选择了这6个方面的变量
*篇幅所限,未给出完整回归结果。如需要,请向作者索取
*农村官方贫困线调整为2014年不变价2800元/人年
**分组后,基于k最近邻匹配获得的控制组样本过少,这会降低PSM的估计效率。基于核匹配与基于半径匹配的估计结果基本一致。因此,表4仅汇报了基于半径匹配的估计结果
2.Camacho L.The Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Social Engagement and Trust in Institutions:Evidence from Peru's Juntos Programme.German Development Institute Discussion Paper 24,2014
3.Cameron L,Shah M.Can Mistargeting Destroy Social Capital and Stimulate Crime?Evidence from a Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia.Economic Development and Cultural Change,2013,62(2):381~415
4.Chong A,Nopo H,Rios V.Do Welfare Programs Damage Interpersonal Trust?Experimental Evidence from Representative Samples for Four Latin American Cities.Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 668,2009
5.Evans D,Holtemeyer B,Kosec K.Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government.World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8333,2018
6.Golan J,Sicular T,Umapathi N.Unconditional Cash Transfers in China:Who Benefits from the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee(Dibao)Program?World Development,2017,93:316~336
7.Hunter W,Sugiyama N B.Transforming Subjects into Citizens:Insights from Brazil's Bolsa Família.Perspectives on Politics,2014,12(4):829~845
8.Kakwani N,Li S,Wang X,Zhu M.Evaluating the effectiveness of the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee(Dibao)program in China.China Economic Review,2018,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.07.010
9.Leites M,Pereira G,Rius A,Salas G,Vigorito A.Protocol:The effect of Cash Transfers on Social Solidarity:A Systematic Review.The Campbell Collaboration Report 2017-06-16,2017
10.Li M,Walker R.Shame,Stigma and the Take-up of Social Assistance:Insights from Rural China.International Journal of Social Welfare,2017,26(3):230~238
11.Mac Auslan I,Riemenschneider N.Richer but Resented:What do Cash Transfers Do to Social Relations?IDS Bulletin,2011,42(6):60~66
12.Mansuri G,Rao V.Localizing Development:Does Participation Work?Washington,D.C:World Bank,2013
13.Oduro R.Beyond Poverty Reduction:Conditional Cash Transfers and Citizenship in Ghana.International Journal of Social Welfare,2015,24(1):27~36
14.Samuels F,Stavropoulou M.‘Being Able to Breathe Again’:The Effects of Cash Transfer Programmes on Psychosocial Wellbeing.The Journal of Development Studies,2016,52(8):1099~1114
15.Woolcock M.Social Capital and Economic Development:Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.Theory and society,1998,27(2):151~208
16.Ugo G,Maddalena H,Ruslan Y.The State of Social Safety Nets 2014.Washington,D.C:World Bank,2014
17.Zhao L,Guo Y,Shao T.Can the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee Scheme Enable the Poor to Escape the Poverty Trap in Rural China?International Journal of Social Welfare,2017,26(4):314~328
18.韩华为.农村低保户瞄准中的偏误和精英俘获:基于社区瞄准机制的分析.经济学动态,2018(2):49~64
19.韩华为,高琴.中国农村低保制度的保护效果研究:来自中国家庭追踪调查的经验证据.公共管理学报,2017(2):81~96
20.韩华为,高琴.代理家计调查与农村低保瞄准效果:基于CHIP数据的分析.中国人口科学,2018(3):73~84
21.贺雪峰.农村低保实践中存在的若干问题.广东社会科学,2017(3):173~180
22.梁晓敏,汪三贵.农村低保对农户家庭支出的影响分析.农业技术经济,2015(11):24~36
23.刘丽娟.我国城乡低保家庭基本状况分析:基于2016年中国城乡困难家庭社会政策支持系统建设项目的调查.中国民政,2017(21):49~51
24.仇叶,贺雪峰.泛福利化:农村低保制度的政策目标偏移及其解释.政治学研究,2017(3):63~74
25.谢治菊.农村最低生活保障制度与农民对政府信任的关系研究:来自两次延续性的调查.中国行政管理,2013(6):122~127
**本文中的公共救助项目特指贫困瞄准型救助项目
*本文将匹配前的非低保样本称为对照组,而将匹配后的非低保样本称为控制组
*CFPS的信任板块通过6个问题(N10021-N10026),要求受访者依次对父母、邻居、美国人、陌生人、地方干部以及医生的信任程度做出评价。考虑到大多数中国农民实际生活中与外国人交往很少,所以本文在社会信任的考察中去掉了对美国人的信任,而仅保留了对父母、邻居、陌生人和医生的信任
**CFPS的社会问题主观感受板块通过8个问题(N6011-N6018),要求受访者依次对政府廉政、环境保护、贫富差距、教育、医疗、就业、住房和社会保障问题的严重程度做出主观评价。考虑到低保对贫富差距、教育、医疗、就业、住房和社会保障问题严重程度的主观感受方面有更直接的影响,本文仅选择了这6个方面的变量
*篇幅所限,未给出完整回归结果。如需要,请向作者索取
*农村官方贫困线调整为2014年不变价2800元/人年
**分组后,基于k最近邻匹配获得的控制组样本过少,这会降低PSM的估计效率。基于核匹配与基于半径匹配的估计结果基本一致。因此,表4仅汇报了基于半径匹配的估计结果