环保财政支出竞争对环境污染的空间效应——基于支出规模的视角
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摘要
采用莫兰指数、局部莫兰指数和空间杜宾模型三种方法,实证检验中国大陆31个省市区政府间环保财政支出竞争对环境污染的空间效应。研究结果表明,地理相邻的地方政府在环境保护支出规模方面存在竞争,且大多数省份属于竞相向下的策略模仿行为;东中西部的环保财政支出规模呈趋同性走向,本地区的环保财政支出对本地区环境质量影响不显著,但加剧了相邻地区的环境污染程度;目前的环保财政支出没有起到应有的作用,环境治理在地区间存在"搭便车"现象。研究还发现,贸易开放度能够降低本地区环境污染水平。提出建立环保考核长效问责机制,加快地区产业结构升级,鼓励企业技术创新,探索地方政府环境污染区域协调治理机制等建议。
Based on the perspective of strategic interaction, this paper empirically examines the spatial effects of fiscal expenditure competition on environmental pollution among 30 provincial governments in mainland China by using three methods: Moran index, local Moran index and spatial Durbin model. The results show that there exits competition among local governments in the scale of environmental protection expenditure, which belongs to strategy imitation behavior; the scale of environmental protection fiscal expenditure in eastern, central and western regions tends to converge;the impact of environmental protection fiscal expenditure in this region on environmental quality is not significant, but it aggravates the degree of environmental pollution in adjacent regions.The current fiscal expenditure on environmental protection has not played its due role. There is a "free rider" phenomenon among the regions of environmental governance. The study also finds that trade openness can reduce the level of environmental pollution in the region. Therefore, we should establish a long-term accountability mechanism for environmental protection assessment, accelerate the upgrading of regional industrial structure, encourage technological innovation of enterprises, and explore the coordinated regional governance of local government environmental pollution.
Based on the perspective of strategic interaction, this paper empirically examines the spatial effects of fiscal expenditure competition on environmental pollution among 30 provincial governments in mainland China by using three methods: Moran index, local Moran index and spatial Durbin model. The results show that there exits competition among local governments in the scale of environmental protection expenditure, which belongs to strategy imitation behavior; the scale of environmental protection fiscal expenditure in eastern, central and western regions tends to converge;the impact of environmental protection fiscal expenditure in this region on environmental quality is not significant, but it aggravates the degree of environmental pollution in adjacent regions.The current fiscal expenditure on environmental protection has not played its due role. There is a "free rider" phenomenon among the regions of environmental governance. The study also finds that trade openness can reduce the level of environmental pollution in the region. Therefore, we should establish a long-term accountability mechanism for environmental protection assessment, accelerate the upgrading of regional industrial structure, encourage technological innovation of enterprises, and explore the coordinated regional governance of local government environmental pollution.
引文
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[13]周力,庞辰晨.中国对外直接投资的母国环境效应研究——基于区域差异的视角[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013,(8):131-139.
[14]杨仕辉,胥然,魏守道.碳排放配额政策的环境效应和贸易效应研究[J].产经评论,2012,(6):119-127.
[15]刘海英,李勉.财政分权下的环境污染效应研究[J].贵州省党校学报,2017,(5):23-31.
[16]罗能生,蒋雨晴.地方政府竞争及对外开放对环境污染的影响——以中国270个城市为例[J].城市问题,2017,(12):48-57.
[17]吴建祖,王蓉娟.环保约谈提高地方政府环境治理效率了吗——基于双重差分方法的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2019,(1):54-64.
[2]Bernauer T, Koubi V. Are bigger governments better providers of public goods? Evidence from air pollution[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2013, 156(3-4):593-609.
[3]余长林,杨惠珍.分权体制下中国地方政府支出对环境污染的影响——基于中国287个城市数据的实证分析[J].财政研究,2016,(7):46-58.
[4]王艺明,张佩,邓可斌.财政支出结构与环境污染:碳排放的视角[J].财政研究,2014,(9),27-30.
[5]臧传琴,陈蒙.财政环境保护支出效应分析——基于2007-2015年中国30个省份的面板数据[J].财经科学,2018,(6):68-79.
[6]田淑英,董玮,许文立.环保财政支出、政府环境偏好与政策效应——基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].经济问题探索,2016,(7):14-21.
[7]Cliff, A.C.and Ord, J.K. Spatial autocorrelation.[M].Pion Limited, London,1973,23-49.
[8]Anselin L. Local Indicators of Spatial Association—LISA[J].Geographical Analysis, 1995, 27(2):93-115.
[9]李涛,周业安.财政分权视角下的支出竞争和中国经济增长:基于中国省级面板数据的经验研究[J].世界经济,2008,(11):3-15.
[10]沙文兵,石涛.FDI的环境效应——基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析[J].世界经济研究2006,(6):76-81.
[11]薛钢,潘孝珍.财政分权对中国环境污染影响程度的实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,(1):83-89.
[12]李根生,韩民春.财政分权、空间外溢与中国城市雾霾污染:机理与证据[J].当代财经,2015,(6):26-34.
[13]周力,庞辰晨.中国对外直接投资的母国环境效应研究——基于区域差异的视角[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013,(8):131-139.
[14]杨仕辉,胥然,魏守道.碳排放配额政策的环境效应和贸易效应研究[J].产经评论,2012,(6):119-127.
[15]刘海英,李勉.财政分权下的环境污染效应研究[J].贵州省党校学报,2017,(5):23-31.
[16]罗能生,蒋雨晴.地方政府竞争及对外开放对环境污染的影响——以中国270个城市为例[J].城市问题,2017,(12):48-57.
[17]吴建祖,王蓉娟.环保约谈提高地方政府环境治理效率了吗——基于双重差分方法的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2019,(1):54-64.