董事会秘书声誉与信息披露可读性——基于沪深A股公司年报文本挖掘的证据
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摘要
董事会秘书作为联结上市公司与外界利益相关者的桥梁,其最为重要的职能是负责信息披露。本文实证检验了董秘出于声誉考虑能否提高文本信息披露质量,研究综合运用文本挖掘、问卷调查、Monte Carlo-AHP与灰色关联度等方法对可读性进行综合测度,同时,手工整理董秘获奖数据,并重点控制少数民族语言的影响。基于语言偏差理论的实证研究发现:董秘声誉越高,年报可读性越好,且具有社会影响的董秘会明显降低专业词汇和被动句的使用,而任期时间较长的董秘会降低复杂词汇的使用。在引入董秘违规处罚与倾向得分匹配,采用外生事件冲击控制内生性,以及更换解释变量与被解释变量进行稳健性检验后,本文结论依然成立。在此基础上,本文从外部法律保护和董秘晋升机会的角度检验了其中的作用机制,结果表明:在法律水平较差的区域,声誉的替代保护作用会有所加强;无论是内部晋升机会还是政治晋升机会,都对声誉提高可读性具有一定的促进作用。本文丰富了中国上市公司信息披露可读性的研究,为董秘声誉研究提供了一个新的视角。
Unfolded with the development and improvement of the board secretary, varieties of empirical evidences shed light on that the board secretary affects information disclosure directly.It empirically examines the mechanism of the board secretaries' reputation on the annual report readability that is measured above.Board secretaries' reputation are consisted of social impact,tenure and violation.It also controls the influence of minority languages on Chinese readability.In order to regulate endogeneity and improve robust,we bring to violation and Propensity Score Matching together and replace explanatory variables and explained variables.In addition,this paper also examines the mechanism from the perspective of external legal protection and promotion opportunities.The study concludes that: Firstly,the board secretaries' reputation which helps the board secretaries to better perform information disclosure duties is significantly positively correlated with the annual report readability,thus improving the quality of textual narrative.Furthermore,prize-winning board secretaries use fewer professional words and passive sentences in the annual reports,and their preference for complex words tends to fade as their tenure extends.In particular,minority language differences are also a key factor in readability.If the registered location of the company adopts to non-mandarin,the annual report readability will suffer severe negative effects.Secondly,the board secretaries' reputation and legal protection will play the substitution role at the same time on the readability of textual narrative.Compared with the areas where the legal governance is relatively weak,the board secretaries' reputation will present a low impact on the annual report readability in the areas where the quality of legal protection is better.On the contrary,due to inadequate legal protection and poor quality of information disclosure,investors can rely on board secretaries' reputation largely as the substitution effect of legal safeguard to improve the annual report readability.Obviously,it can be seen that the board secretaries' reputation has been in a key position effectively in the supervision and governance to improve the quality of textual narrative in regions where legal environment is relatively defective.In the last place,reputation incentive and career promotion opportunity are supplement each other.Especially for professional board secretaries,reputation incentive plays an even stronger role in improving the annual report readability when career promotion opportunities arise,because reputation has always been an important cornerstone of career development.However,the opportunity of political promotion fails to play a consistent role,due to the current cadre selection mechanism of China probably,which the older you are,the less opportunity of political you get that become an inflexible constraint.Therefore,it only discoveries that the opportunities of political promotion will assist to strengthen the function of star board secretaries in improving the quality of textual narrative.The limitations of the research are mainly reflected in the following aspects: on the one hand,the measurement of reputation is relatively independent,and it remains to be explored whether social influence and tenure can produce cross-influence at the same time; On the other hand,companies may whitewash their strategies and key technologies for the sake of information confidentiality among the highly competitive industry resulting in lower quality of annual report readability,which will be another focus for the further research.In order to mitigate information asymmetry with the help of improving the annual report readability,it suggests: Firstly,it should further strengthen the protection of the quality of information disclosure,especially to build excellent established legal system aiming at the quality of readability.Secondly,so as to establish the sense of ownership,it is recommended to expand the participations of the board secretaries among the daily operation and management activities of the company,thus cultivating their sense of responsibility for information disclosure.Lastly,in addition to reputation and promotion incentive mechanism,more incentive methods should be set up to enhance more effort of the board secretaries,thereby improving the quality of textual narrative.
Unfolded with the development and improvement of the board secretary, varieties of empirical evidences shed light on that the board secretary affects information disclosure directly.It empirically examines the mechanism of the board secretaries' reputation on the annual report readability that is measured above.Board secretaries' reputation are consisted of social impact,tenure and violation.It also controls the influence of minority languages on Chinese readability.In order to regulate endogeneity and improve robust,we bring to violation and Propensity Score Matching together and replace explanatory variables and explained variables.In addition,this paper also examines the mechanism from the perspective of external legal protection and promotion opportunities.The study concludes that: Firstly,the board secretaries' reputation which helps the board secretaries to better perform information disclosure duties is significantly positively correlated with the annual report readability,thus improving the quality of textual narrative.Furthermore,prize-winning board secretaries use fewer professional words and passive sentences in the annual reports,and their preference for complex words tends to fade as their tenure extends.In particular,minority language differences are also a key factor in readability.If the registered location of the company adopts to non-mandarin,the annual report readability will suffer severe negative effects.Secondly,the board secretaries' reputation and legal protection will play the substitution role at the same time on the readability of textual narrative.Compared with the areas where the legal governance is relatively weak,the board secretaries' reputation will present a low impact on the annual report readability in the areas where the quality of legal protection is better.On the contrary,due to inadequate legal protection and poor quality of information disclosure,investors can rely on board secretaries' reputation largely as the substitution effect of legal safeguard to improve the annual report readability.Obviously,it can be seen that the board secretaries' reputation has been in a key position effectively in the supervision and governance to improve the quality of textual narrative in regions where legal environment is relatively defective.In the last place,reputation incentive and career promotion opportunity are supplement each other.Especially for professional board secretaries,reputation incentive plays an even stronger role in improving the annual report readability when career promotion opportunities arise,because reputation has always been an important cornerstone of career development.However,the opportunity of political promotion fails to play a consistent role,due to the current cadre selection mechanism of China probably,which the older you are,the less opportunity of political you get that become an inflexible constraint.Therefore,it only discoveries that the opportunities of political promotion will assist to strengthen the function of star board secretaries in improving the quality of textual narrative.The limitations of the research are mainly reflected in the following aspects: on the one hand,the measurement of reputation is relatively independent,and it remains to be explored whether social influence and tenure can produce cross-influence at the same time; On the other hand,companies may whitewash their strategies and key technologies for the sake of information confidentiality among the highly competitive industry resulting in lower quality of annual report readability,which will be another focus for the further research.In order to mitigate information asymmetry with the help of improving the annual report readability,it suggests: Firstly,it should further strengthen the protection of the quality of information disclosure,especially to build excellent established legal system aiming at the quality of readability.Secondly,so as to establish the sense of ownership,it is recommended to expand the participations of the board secretaries among the daily operation and management activities of the company,thus cultivating their sense of responsibility for information disclosure.Lastly,in addition to reputation and promotion incentive mechanism,more incentive methods should be set up to enhance more effort of the board secretaries,thereby improving the quality of textual narrative.
引文
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(1)模糊假说(Obfuscation)与本体假说(Ontology)是目前解释年报可读性降低的主要理论。针对业绩不佳的坏消息,前者认为,上市公司管理者为了掩饰,会刻意将文本信息写得较为复杂;后者则指出,为了与外界有效沟通,上市公司需要进行额外的解释与说明。因此,二者均可能降低年报可读性。
(2)职业董秘一般指具有其他公司董秘、会计师事务所、律师事务所或券商等IPO中介机构任职经验的董事会秘书(全怡,2018)[3],其通常会在帮助一家公司上市后,“跳槽”到另一家公司继续从事IPO工作。
(3)上海上市公司协会(2013)发布的《上市公司董秘制度研究与履职情况分析》与《新财富》(2017)发布的《中国上市公司董事会秘书生存状态调查报告》显示,董秘日常工作中信息披露的重要性和花费时间均占第一位。
(4)国内董秘评选主要源自《新财富》榜单,该评选由广东省新闻出版局信息中心主办,具有一定的官方性和权威性。该评选是大陆地区最早针对境内上市公司董秘所开展的公开评选,评选对象为“境内股票市场上公开挂牌交易的上市公司董事会秘书”,评选主体为“相关监管机构(上市公司所在地区监管部门、上市公司协会、深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所)、证券分析师、机构投资者(公募基金、其他机构投资者)、个人投资者、各大财经媒体等”。评选标准包括监管、公共关系管理和投资者关系管理三维度,测算分数及模型未包含信息披露维度,即董秘获奖并不是因其信息披露的突出贡献,因此,二者间并不存在严格意义的相关性。
(5)Fog指数,即Gunning Fog Score,以平均句长(总单词数量除以总句子数量)与复杂单词比例(三个以上音节单词数量除以总单词数量)测算可读性。
(6)根据黄伯荣和廖序东(2007)《现代汉语》与马庆株(2010)《现代汉语》,长句是指形体较长、词语较多、修饰成分较多、结构比较复杂的句子,主要特点为包含较多联合结构及分句中层次结构较多。相反,短句通常词汇较少,结构简单,形体短小。从阅读者角度来看,理解长句费时费力,而短句则较为容易理解,且较多分句所形成的复杂句式结构更容易影响可读性。据此,本文采用复杂长句衡量文本中的句子复杂程度,具体测度采用平均句子层次结构表示,即复句包含分句的平均程度。
(7)Asay等(2018)[53]研究指出,在信息披露中使用被动语态不仅可以降低可读性,而且还可以分离自身与所描述信息之间的关系。针对中文语言环境下的被动句特征,国内学者(张金桥和莫雷,2006)[54]也指出,被动句比主动句更难理解。
(8)采用Fog指数测度可读性的核心问题在于确定复杂词汇,英文情境下的复杂词通常指所含音节数量在三个以上的单词。不过,中文语言情境对于复杂词的界定还未形成统一认识,也缺乏权威界定。仅有国家汉语水平考试委员会颁布的《汉语水平词汇与汉字等级大纲》对词汇进行了等级区分,已有研究也大多参考这一标准开展研究(左虹和朱勇,2014)[55]。本文同样依据《汉语水平词汇与汉字等级大纲》,并借鉴Fog指数,选取三个以上语素构成的丙级词和丁级词作为复杂词。
(9)根据国务院办公厅《关于进一步加强资本市场中小投资者合法权益保护工作的意见》,中小投资者是我国现阶段资本市场的主要参与群体,但处于信息弱势地位,相较于机构等专业投资者,其对信息可读性的要求更高,因此,研究面向中小投资者发放匿名问卷200份,成功回收113份,有效问卷98份,有效率86.73%。
(10)语言学没有对中文可读性进行绝对值测算,缺少统一标准和分级,需要计量公司间的相对差异对可读性进行评价。作为几何处理范畴内相对性排序分析和动态过程发展态势量化分析的主要工具,灰色关联度最适宜比较评价对象优劣顺序,可以有效处理可读性差异化和相对性的问题。
(11)本文所指少数民族仅指蒙古族、壮族、藏族和维吾尔族。
(12)2012年9月19日,证监会在《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号——年度报告的内容与格式》中修订有关条款为“公司编制年度报告时可以图文并茂,采用柱状图、饼状图等统计图表,以及必要的产品、服务和业务活动图片进行辅助说明,提高报告的可读性”。
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(1)模糊假说(Obfuscation)与本体假说(Ontology)是目前解释年报可读性降低的主要理论。针对业绩不佳的坏消息,前者认为,上市公司管理者为了掩饰,会刻意将文本信息写得较为复杂;后者则指出,为了与外界有效沟通,上市公司需要进行额外的解释与说明。因此,二者均可能降低年报可读性。
(2)职业董秘一般指具有其他公司董秘、会计师事务所、律师事务所或券商等IPO中介机构任职经验的董事会秘书(全怡,2018)[3],其通常会在帮助一家公司上市后,“跳槽”到另一家公司继续从事IPO工作。
(3)上海上市公司协会(2013)发布的《上市公司董秘制度研究与履职情况分析》与《新财富》(2017)发布的《中国上市公司董事会秘书生存状态调查报告》显示,董秘日常工作中信息披露的重要性和花费时间均占第一位。
(4)国内董秘评选主要源自《新财富》榜单,该评选由广东省新闻出版局信息中心主办,具有一定的官方性和权威性。该评选是大陆地区最早针对境内上市公司董秘所开展的公开评选,评选对象为“境内股票市场上公开挂牌交易的上市公司董事会秘书”,评选主体为“相关监管机构(上市公司所在地区监管部门、上市公司协会、深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所)、证券分析师、机构投资者(公募基金、其他机构投资者)、个人投资者、各大财经媒体等”。评选标准包括监管、公共关系管理和投资者关系管理三维度,测算分数及模型未包含信息披露维度,即董秘获奖并不是因其信息披露的突出贡献,因此,二者间并不存在严格意义的相关性。
(5)Fog指数,即Gunning Fog Score,以平均句长(总单词数量除以总句子数量)与复杂单词比例(三个以上音节单词数量除以总单词数量)测算可读性。
(6)根据黄伯荣和廖序东(2007)《现代汉语》与马庆株(2010)《现代汉语》,长句是指形体较长、词语较多、修饰成分较多、结构比较复杂的句子,主要特点为包含较多联合结构及分句中层次结构较多。相反,短句通常词汇较少,结构简单,形体短小。从阅读者角度来看,理解长句费时费力,而短句则较为容易理解,且较多分句所形成的复杂句式结构更容易影响可读性。据此,本文采用复杂长句衡量文本中的句子复杂程度,具体测度采用平均句子层次结构表示,即复句包含分句的平均程度。
(7)Asay等(2018)[53]研究指出,在信息披露中使用被动语态不仅可以降低可读性,而且还可以分离自身与所描述信息之间的关系。针对中文语言环境下的被动句特征,国内学者(张金桥和莫雷,2006)[54]也指出,被动句比主动句更难理解。
(8)采用Fog指数测度可读性的核心问题在于确定复杂词汇,英文情境下的复杂词通常指所含音节数量在三个以上的单词。不过,中文语言情境对于复杂词的界定还未形成统一认识,也缺乏权威界定。仅有国家汉语水平考试委员会颁布的《汉语水平词汇与汉字等级大纲》对词汇进行了等级区分,已有研究也大多参考这一标准开展研究(左虹和朱勇,2014)[55]。本文同样依据《汉语水平词汇与汉字等级大纲》,并借鉴Fog指数,选取三个以上语素构成的丙级词和丁级词作为复杂词。
(9)根据国务院办公厅《关于进一步加强资本市场中小投资者合法权益保护工作的意见》,中小投资者是我国现阶段资本市场的主要参与群体,但处于信息弱势地位,相较于机构等专业投资者,其对信息可读性的要求更高,因此,研究面向中小投资者发放匿名问卷200份,成功回收113份,有效问卷98份,有效率86.73%。
(10)语言学没有对中文可读性进行绝对值测算,缺少统一标准和分级,需要计量公司间的相对差异对可读性进行评价。作为几何处理范畴内相对性排序分析和动态过程发展态势量化分析的主要工具,灰色关联度最适宜比较评价对象优劣顺序,可以有效处理可读性差异化和相对性的问题。
(11)本文所指少数民族仅指蒙古族、壮族、藏族和维吾尔族。
(12)2012年9月19日,证监会在《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号——年度报告的内容与格式》中修订有关条款为“公司编制年度报告时可以图文并茂,采用柱状图、饼状图等统计图表,以及必要的产品、服务和业务活动图片进行辅助说明,提高报告的可读性”。