“一带一路”倡议下投资争端解决机制的构建
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摘要
随着"一带一路"倡议的实施,我国与沿线国家的投资往来日益频繁,考虑到沿线国家的投资风险问题,投资争端解决机制的构建很有必要。建议在依托现有双多边、区域安排的基础上,构建强制磋商、自愿性调解、仲裁和诉讼相互衔接的多元化争端解决机制;同时扩大可提交仲裁的争议范围,针对不同争端解决程序设计分类化透明度标准,优化仲裁员、调解员选任及其道德准则。我国作为"一带一路"倡议的发起国,也应主动应对相关问题,具体包括完善国内仲裁立法和对外签署的双边投资协定,以对接"一带一路"争端解决需求,确保投资仲裁裁决与和解协议的顺利有效执行等。
With the implementation of "The Belt and Road" Initiative,mutual investment becomes increasingly frequent between countries along the route and China. While considering the high investment risks in countries along the route, it is necessary to construct the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Based on current bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements, this paper suggests a multiple dispute settlement mechanism containing compulsory consultations, voluntary mediation, arbitration and litigation. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to broaden the scope of disputes accessible to arbitration, design diverse transparency standards for varied dispute settlement procedures and optimize the designation and ethical standards of arbitrators or mediators. As the initiator of "The Belt and Road" Initiative, China should also take active response,which may involve improving Chinese Arbitration Law and BITs signed with countries along the route to satisfy the need of dispute settlement in "The Belt and Road" Initiative, and ensuring the effective enforcement of arbitral awards and settlement agreements as well.
With the implementation of "The Belt and Road" Initiative,mutual investment becomes increasingly frequent between countries along the route and China. While considering the high investment risks in countries along the route, it is necessary to construct the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Based on current bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements, this paper suggests a multiple dispute settlement mechanism containing compulsory consultations, voluntary mediation, arbitration and litigation. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to broaden the scope of disputes accessible to arbitration, design diverse transparency standards for varied dispute settlement procedures and optimize the designation and ethical standards of arbitrators or mediators. As the initiator of "The Belt and Road" Initiative, China should also take active response,which may involve improving Chinese Arbitration Law and BITs signed with countries along the route to satisfy the need of dispute settlement in "The Belt and Road" Initiative, and ensuring the effective enforcement of arbitral awards and settlement agreements as well.
引文
(1)2017年,我国企业对“一带一路”沿线59个国家非金融类直接投资143.6亿美元。并购项目方面,对“一带一路”沿线国家实施并购62起,投资额88亿美元,同比增长32.5%。对外承包工程方面,我国企业在“一带一路”沿线61个国家新签对外承包工程项目合同7217份,新签合同额1443.2亿美元,占同期我国对外承包工程新签合同额的54.4%,同比增长14 .5%。参见商务部:《2017年我对“一带一路”沿线国家投资合作情况》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao/dgzz/201801/20180102699459.shtml,2018年2月10日访问。
(1)“一带一路”沿线国家的政治风险评分、经济基础和偿债能力低于世界范围内平均水平。在35个“一带一路”沿线样本国家中,低风险级别仅有新加坡1个;中等风险级别占绝大多数;高风险级别包括8个国家。参见中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所国际投资研究室:《中国海外投资国家风险评级(2017)》,第35-36、39页,http://www.iwep.org.cn/xscg/xscg_lwybg/201701/W020170119382503152689.pdf,2018年1月5日访问。
(2)本文“投资争端解决机制”特指投资者与东道国之间的争端解决机制,不包括平等主体间的投资合同商事争端解决机制。
(3)投资仲裁案件平均耗时3年以上,案件平均费用超过800万美元,其中,律师和专家费用约占82%。See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 19,71(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on9 December 2017.
(4)See UNCTAD,Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement:In Search of a Roadmap,IIA Issues Note 3-4(2013),http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf,visited on 9 December 2017.
(5)See Stephan W.Schill,Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy:Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach,52 Virginia Journal of International Law 66-67(2011).
(6)Susan D.Franck,The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions,73 Fordham Law Review 1586(2005).
(1)参见曾文革、党庶枫:《“一带一路”战略下的国际经济规则创新》,《国际商务研究》2016年第3期,第32页;张超、张晓明:《“一带一路”战略的国际争端解决机制研究》,《南洋问题研究》2017年第2期,第31页。
(2)参见王贵国:《“一带一路”战略争端解决机制》,《中国法律评论》2016年第2期,第36-37页;张晓君、陈喆:《“一带一路”区域投资争端解决机制的构建》,《学术论坛》2017年第3期,第54-55页;鲁洋:《论“一带一路”国际投资争端解决机构的创建》,《国际法研究》2017年第4期,第92页。
(3)参见曾文革、党庶枫:《“一带一路”战略下的国际经济规则创新》,《国际商务研究》2016年第3期,第32页。
(4)参见国家发展改革委、外交部、商务部《推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动》。
(5)投资仲裁耗时长、成本高在一定程度上是由案件本身的复杂性、投资保护条款的碎片化、案件所争议的法律问题尚无定论以及对先前裁决或其他法律资料进行研究的需求等造成的。UNCITRAL Working Group III,Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS),Note by the Secretariat,Thirty-fourth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142,18 September 2017,para.24.而在磋商和调解中,对于条约解释、违约事实认定等方面的要求并没有仲裁那么严格,这就决定了磋商、调解可以高效率、低成本地解决争端。
(6)Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2552(2014).
(1)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 23-24(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(2)See Rebecca Golbert,The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution,11 Nevada Law Journal 509(2011).
(3)参见国家发展改革委、外交部、商务部《推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动》。
(4)Joachim Pohl&Kekeletso Mashigo et al.,Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements:A Large Sample Survey,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 17(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en,visited on 20 December 2017.
(5)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 41(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(6)我国与“一带一路”沿线国家签署的BITs大多仅有“缔约国一方的投资者与缔约国另一方之间就在缔约国另一方领土内的投资产生的争端应尽量由当事方友好协商解决”一句原则性规定。
(7)See Susan D.Franck,Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design,92 Minnesota Law Review 198(2007).
(1)See CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Article 8.19.
(2)根据DSU第4.3、4.7条,被诉方应在收到磋商请求后10日内答复,并在30日内启动磋商,如果60日内争端未解决,可申请成立专家组;根据CETA第8.19、8.22条,提交磋商请求后60日内须启动磋商,若180日内争端未解决,可提交仲裁。
(3)例如,在WTO争端解决机制中,大多数通过磋商解决的争端均未在60日磋商时限内完成。See Olin L.Wethington,Commentary on the Consultation Mechanism under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding during Its First Five Years,31 Law&Policy in International Business 585(2000).
(4)CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Articles 8.19.4,8.19.5.
(1)See Gary N.Horlick,The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution:A Private Practitioner’s View,32 International Lawyer 692(1998).
(2)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 160-162(2007).
(3)Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2546(2014).
(4)例如,在提交ICSID的667个案件中,适用ICSID调解规则及其附加便利规则的案件只有10个。See ICSID,Case Database,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx,visited on 7 March 2018.
(5)See Susan D.Franck,Challenges Facing Investment Disputes:Reconsidering Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements,in Karl P.Sauvant&Michael Chiswick-Patterson,Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 172(Oxford University Press 2008).
(1)例如我国与希腊、以色列、印度等国家签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 15 January 2018.
(2)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 46(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(3)我国与“一带一路”沿线国家所签署的BITs中,只有中国—乌兹别克斯坦BIT明示“友好协商”包括调解的适用,其他均未明示。
(4)仲裁程序中当事人有调解意愿,直接由仲裁庭进行调解,调解不成,则继续进行仲裁程序。参见CIETAC投资仲裁规则第43条。
(1)参见王贵国:《“一带一路”战略争端解决机制》,《中国法律评论》2016年第2期,第37页。
(2)See Singapore SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol,Articles 5,8,http://simc.com.sg/siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol/,visited on 6 February 2018.
(3)根据UNCTAD网站公布的基于条约的投资争端案件,约60%的争端案件提交ICSID仲裁,约30%的案件则适用UNCITRAL仲裁规则进行仲裁。See UNCTAD,Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Filter By Rules And Institution,visited on 15 December 2017.
(4)See ICSID,Amendment of ICSID’s Rules and Regulations,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx,visited on 20 December2017.
(5)ICSID,The ICSID Rules Amendment Process,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/ICSID%20Rules%20Amendment%20Process-ENG.pdf,visited on 20 December2017.
(1)ICSID,The ICSID Caseload-Statistics(Issue 2018-1),p.9,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-1(English).pdf,visited on 10March 2018.
(2)其中,我国与约旦、文莱签署的BITs尚未生效。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(3)我国与土耳其、希腊、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、以色列、塞尔维亚、沙特阿拉伯、马其顿、也门、巴林、文莱、塞浦路斯、约旦、缅甸、波黑、拉脱维亚、捷克、俄罗斯、印度、乌兹别克斯坦签署的BITs,引入了ICSID仲裁机制。其中,我国与土耳其、希腊、文莱签署的BITs提前声明:当双方都成为ICSID公约成员国时可将争端提交ICSID。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(4)未签署ICSID公约的国家是缅甸、老挝、越南、伊朗、巴勒斯坦、印度、马尔代夫、不丹、塔吉克斯坦和波兰。已签署ICSID公约但是尚未交存批准文件的有吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯和泰国。See ICSID,Database of ICSID Member States,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx,visited on 16 December 2017.
(5)引入UNCITRAL仲裁的为我国与土耳其、希腊、黎巴嫩、约旦、捷克、俄罗斯、印度和乌兹别克斯坦所签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(1)参见中国—乌兹别克斯坦BIT第12条第2款;中国—俄罗斯BIT第9条第2款。
(2)See Joachim Pohl&Kekeletso Mashigo et al.,Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements:A Large Sample Survey,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 12(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en,visited on 20December 2017.
(3)我国早期BITs中的“岔路口条款”多表现出单向性,即如果已将争端诉诸内国法院,投资仲裁则不再适用,至于提交投资仲裁后是否还可诉诸内国法院则没有明示。近期签署的BITs则开始采用双向“岔路口条款”,即当事人对于争端解决程序的选择是终局的,选定其一后即不得随意变更。
(4)Susan D.Franck,Challenges Facing Investment Disputes:Reconsidering Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements,in Karl P.Sauvant&Michael Chiswick-Patterson,Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 159(Oxford University Press 2008).
(1)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 146-147(2007).
(2)漆彤、鲍怡婕:《“一带一路”投资争议处理体系的构建》,《人民法治》2018年第2期,第22页。
(3)漆彤、鲍怡婕:《“一带一路”投资争议处理体系的构建》,《人民法治》2018年第2期,第22页。
(4)中国—土库曼斯坦BIT仅规定,当缔约双方成为ICSID公约成员时,可以签订关于提请ICSID解决相应争端的补充协定,但是该BIT至今尚未签订。
(1)此类BITs为我国与科威特、马来西亚、斯洛伐克、希腊、菲律宾、阿联酋、立陶宛、也门签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(2)此类BITs为我国与土耳其、罗马尼亚、伊朗、文莱、塞浦路斯、约旦、缅甸、波黑、拉脱维亚、捷克、俄罗斯、印度、乌兹别克斯坦签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(3)Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,para.329.
(4)See Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,paras.332,333.
(5)Beijing Urban Construction Group Co.Ltd.v.Republic of Yemen,ICSID Case No.ARB/14/30,Decision on Jurisdiction,para.87.
(6)Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,para.358.
(1)See Plama Consortium Limited v.Republic of Bulgaria,ICSID Case No.ARB/03/24,Decision on Jurisdiction,paras.208,219.
(2)该案仲裁庭认为,如果最惠国待遇可以适用于实质性保护条款,那么没有理由在包括仲裁条款的程序性事项中拒绝适用,程序性事项和实体性待遇同样值得保护。虽然最惠国待遇的适用突破了基础BIT对仲裁的限制,但这也是最惠国待遇适用的自然结果,因为其特色和宗旨正是通过引入其他条约中的更优保护来扩大基础BIT所未能提供的保护。RosInvest Co UK Ltd.v.The Russian Federation,SCC Case No.Arbitration V 079/2005,Award on Jurisdiction,paras.131,132.
(3)Ros Invest Co UK Ltd.v.The Russian Federation,SCC Case No.Arbitration V079/2005,Award on Jurisdiction,para.139.
(4)Kate M.Supnik,Making Amends:Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests in International Investment Law,59 Duke Law Journal 351-352(2009).
(5)Sergio Puig,Emergence&Dynamism in International Organizations:ICSID,Investor-State Arbitration&International Investment Law,44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 567(2013).
(1)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 140(2007).
(2)Emilie M.Hafner-Burton&Sergio Puig et al.,Against Secrecy:The Social Cost of International Dispute Settlement,42 Yale Journal of International Law 283(2017).
(3)See J.Anthony Van Duzer,Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation,52 Mc Gill Law Journal685(2007).
(4)See Aurélia Antonietti,The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules,21 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal445-446,448(2006).
(1)根据《透明度公约》第1、2条,除非缔约国作出相关保留,《透明度规则》适用于缔约国与另一缔约国投资者之间的仲裁,或者缔约国与同意适用《透明度规则》的非缔约国投资者之间的仲裁,不论仲裁所依据的投资协定是否在《透明度规则》生效之后签署,也不论仲裁是否依据UNCITRAL仲裁规则提起。
(2)参见肖建华、唐玉富:《论法院调解保密原则》,《法律科学》2011年第4期,第140页。
(3)See Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2557(2014).
(4)也有观点从争端解决机制的长久运行和仲裁员、调解员塑造良好声誉以获得多次指定机会的角度,认为仲裁员、调解员会坚持行为的中立性。这两种观点孰是孰非尚无定论,但是需要承认的是,违反中立性的风险是存在的。See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 45-48(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on 9 December 2017.
(1)ICSID仲裁员、调解员和专设委员会成员有68%来自西欧和北美(加拿大、墨西哥和美国)。See ICSID,The ICSID Caseload-Statistics(Issue 2018-1),p.19,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-1(English).pdf,visited on10 March 2018.
(2)See CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Article 8.27.欧盟所推行的常设仲裁庭模式固定仲裁员名册和任期,随机指派每个案件的仲裁员。该模式设立上诉机制,上诉小组由3 人组成且同样采用随机抽选方式,审查权限涵盖法律适用、事实认定和程序事项。CETA还表达了未来构建多边争端解决机制的意愿。
(3)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 160-161(2007).
(1)UNCITRAL,Settlement of Commercial Disputes:Possible Future Work on Ethics in International Arbitration,Note by the Secretariat,Forty-ninth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/880,29 April 2016,para.4.
(2)See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 49(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on 9 December2017.
(3)See UNCITRAL,Possible Future Work in the Field of Dispute Settlement:Ethics in International Arbitration,Note by the Secretariat,Fiftieth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/916,13 April 2017.
(4)参见赵骏:《全球治理视野下的国际法治与国内法治》,《中国社会科学》2014年第10期,第85页。
(1)根据UNCTAD网站公布的基于条约的投资争端案件,提交PCA的有110件,提交ICC的有13件,提交SCC的有41件。See UNCTAD,Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Filter By Rules And Institution,visited on 6 March2018.ICC、SCC一般适用其自身仲裁规则处理投资争端案件,而提交PCA的案件多适用UNCITRAL仲裁规则,PCA在此类案件中主要提供指定仲裁员、案件登记等管理性服务。
(2)CIETAC:关于《中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会国际投资争端仲裁规则(试行)》的说明,http://www.cietac.org.cn/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=14469,2018年1月20日访问。
(3)参见张昕:《“一带一路”项目协议中的仲裁机构选择:以东南亚地区为例》,(作者保存内部会议材料)。
(4)参见SCIA仲裁规则第2条第2款。
(5)参见CIETAC投资仲裁规则第27、28、32、43、44、55条。
(6)参见SCIA仲裁规则第3条第5款。
(7)参见SCIA指引第3条。
(8)参见《仲裁法》第2、40条。
(1)根据《仲裁法》第16、18条,仲裁协议应选定仲裁委员会,当事人没有约定仲裁委员会且未达成补充协议的,仲裁协议无效。
(2)参见浙江逸盛石化有限公司与英威达技术有限公司申请确认仲裁协议效力案,[2012]浙甬仲确字第4号民事裁定。该裁定认为:从当事人约定可以推出选定的仲裁机构为CIETAC,进而驳回确认仲裁协议无效的申请。
(3)最高人民法院已承认自贸区企业间临时仲裁协议的效力。参见最高人民法院《关于为自由贸易试验区建设提供司法保障的意见》(法发[2016]34号)第9条。
(1)UNCTAD,World Investment Report 2017,p.126,http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/wir2017_en.pdf,visited on 12 January 2018.
(2)BITs更新换代包括比利时—卢森堡经济联盟、德国、法国、芬兰、荷兰、瑞士、葡萄牙、西班牙等欧洲国家,另外还有韩国、尼日利亚、古巴。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 15 January 2018.
(3)参见邓婷婷、张美玉:《“一带一路”倡议下中国海外投资的条约保护》,《中南大学学报》2016年第6期,第38页。
(4)这是从中国平安诉比利时案中吸取的教训。中国—比利时新版BIT明确:新版BIT生效之前,已进入司法仲裁程序的争端适用旧约,生效之后发生的争端适用新约,但是未涵盖争端在新版BIT生效之前已通知但是尚未进入司法仲裁程序的情形,这也是中国平安诉比利时案遇到的情况,仲裁庭称之为“仲裁漏洞”(“black hole”or“arbitration gap”),最终否认对该案的管辖权。See Ping An Life Insurance Company of China,Limited and Ping An Insurance(Group)Company of China,Limited v.Kingdom of Belgium,ICSID Case No.ARB/12/29,Award,paras.207,233.
(1)See ICSID Convention,Chapter IV(Arbitration),Articles 53-55.
(2)参见1986年全国人民代表大会常务委员会《关于我国加入〈承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约〉的决定》第2条。
(3)参见1987年最高人民法院《关于执行我国加入的〈承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约〉的通知》第2条。
(4)我国将国际仲裁裁决分为外国仲裁裁决和涉外仲裁裁决。对于我国仲裁机构作出的涉外仲裁裁决,依据《民事诉讼法》第273、274条的规定执行;对于外国仲裁裁决,则依据国际条约或互惠原则执行。
(5)参见肖芳:《国际投资仲裁裁决在中国的承认与执行》,《法学家》2011年第6期,第106页。
(6)Rebecca Golbert,The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution,11 Nevada Law Journal 510(2011).
(1)SCC Mediation Rules 2014,Article 14.
(2)UNCITRAL,Report of Working Group II(Dispute Settlement)on the Work of Its Sixty-fifth Session,Fiftieth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/896,30 September 2016,para.62.
(3)See UNCITRAL,Report of Working Group II(Dispute Settlement)on the Work of Its Sixty-seventh Session,Fifty-first Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/929,11 October 2017,paras.103,104.
(4)王贵国:《“一带一路”争端解决制度研究》,《中国法学》2017年第6期,第66页。
(5)See Jacob A.Kuipers,Too Big to Nail:How Investor-State Arbitration Lacks an Appropriate Execution Mechanism for the Largest Awards,39 Boston College International&Comparative Law Review 420(2016).
(1)参见刘威:《“一带一路”倡议与中国参与国际经贸规则重塑》,《学习与实践》2017年第9期,第5页。
(1)“一带一路”沿线国家的政治风险评分、经济基础和偿债能力低于世界范围内平均水平。在35个“一带一路”沿线样本国家中,低风险级别仅有新加坡1个;中等风险级别占绝大多数;高风险级别包括8个国家。参见中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所国际投资研究室:《中国海外投资国家风险评级(2017)》,第35-36、39页,http://www.iwep.org.cn/xscg/xscg_lwybg/201701/W020170119382503152689.pdf,2018年1月5日访问。
(2)本文“投资争端解决机制”特指投资者与东道国之间的争端解决机制,不包括平等主体间的投资合同商事争端解决机制。
(3)投资仲裁案件平均耗时3年以上,案件平均费用超过800万美元,其中,律师和专家费用约占82%。See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 19,71(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on9 December 2017.
(4)See UNCTAD,Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement:In Search of a Roadmap,IIA Issues Note 3-4(2013),http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf,visited on 9 December 2017.
(5)See Stephan W.Schill,Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy:Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach,52 Virginia Journal of International Law 66-67(2011).
(6)Susan D.Franck,The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions,73 Fordham Law Review 1586(2005).
(1)参见曾文革、党庶枫:《“一带一路”战略下的国际经济规则创新》,《国际商务研究》2016年第3期,第32页;张超、张晓明:《“一带一路”战略的国际争端解决机制研究》,《南洋问题研究》2017年第2期,第31页。
(2)参见王贵国:《“一带一路”战略争端解决机制》,《中国法律评论》2016年第2期,第36-37页;张晓君、陈喆:《“一带一路”区域投资争端解决机制的构建》,《学术论坛》2017年第3期,第54-55页;鲁洋:《论“一带一路”国际投资争端解决机构的创建》,《国际法研究》2017年第4期,第92页。
(3)参见曾文革、党庶枫:《“一带一路”战略下的国际经济规则创新》,《国际商务研究》2016年第3期,第32页。
(4)参见国家发展改革委、外交部、商务部《推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动》。
(5)投资仲裁耗时长、成本高在一定程度上是由案件本身的复杂性、投资保护条款的碎片化、案件所争议的法律问题尚无定论以及对先前裁决或其他法律资料进行研究的需求等造成的。UNCITRAL Working Group III,Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS),Note by the Secretariat,Thirty-fourth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142,18 September 2017,para.24.而在磋商和调解中,对于条约解释、违约事实认定等方面的要求并没有仲裁那么严格,这就决定了磋商、调解可以高效率、低成本地解决争端。
(6)Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2552(2014).
(1)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 23-24(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(2)See Rebecca Golbert,The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution,11 Nevada Law Journal 509(2011).
(3)参见国家发展改革委、外交部、商务部《推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动》。
(4)Joachim Pohl&Kekeletso Mashigo et al.,Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements:A Large Sample Survey,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 17(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en,visited on 20 December 2017.
(5)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 41(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(6)我国与“一带一路”沿线国家签署的BITs大多仅有“缔约国一方的投资者与缔约国另一方之间就在缔约国另一方领土内的投资产生的争端应尽量由当事方友好协商解决”一句原则性规定。
(7)See Susan D.Franck,Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design,92 Minnesota Law Review 198(2007).
(1)See CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Article 8.19.
(2)根据DSU第4.3、4.7条,被诉方应在收到磋商请求后10日内答复,并在30日内启动磋商,如果60日内争端未解决,可申请成立专家组;根据CETA第8.19、8.22条,提交磋商请求后60日内须启动磋商,若180日内争端未解决,可提交仲裁。
(3)例如,在WTO争端解决机制中,大多数通过磋商解决的争端均未在60日磋商时限内完成。See Olin L.Wethington,Commentary on the Consultation Mechanism under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding during Its First Five Years,31 Law&Policy in International Business 585(2000).
(4)CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Articles 8.19.4,8.19.5.
(1)See Gary N.Horlick,The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution:A Private Practitioner’s View,32 International Lawyer 692(1998).
(2)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 160-162(2007).
(3)Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2546(2014).
(4)例如,在提交ICSID的667个案件中,适用ICSID调解规则及其附加便利规则的案件只有10个。See ICSID,Case Database,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx,visited on 7 March 2018.
(5)See Susan D.Franck,Challenges Facing Investment Disputes:Reconsidering Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements,in Karl P.Sauvant&Michael Chiswick-Patterson,Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 172(Oxford University Press 2008).
(1)例如我国与希腊、以色列、印度等国家签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 15 January 2018.
(2)UNCTAD,Investor-State Disputes:Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration,UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development 46(2010),http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf,visited on 1 February 2018.
(3)我国与“一带一路”沿线国家所签署的BITs中,只有中国—乌兹别克斯坦BIT明示“友好协商”包括调解的适用,其他均未明示。
(4)仲裁程序中当事人有调解意愿,直接由仲裁庭进行调解,调解不成,则继续进行仲裁程序。参见CIETAC投资仲裁规则第43条。
(1)参见王贵国:《“一带一路”战略争端解决机制》,《中国法律评论》2016年第2期,第37页。
(2)See Singapore SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol,Articles 5,8,http://simc.com.sg/siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol/,visited on 6 February 2018.
(3)根据UNCTAD网站公布的基于条约的投资争端案件,约60%的争端案件提交ICSID仲裁,约30%的案件则适用UNCITRAL仲裁规则进行仲裁。See UNCTAD,Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Filter By Rules And Institution,visited on 15 December 2017.
(4)See ICSID,Amendment of ICSID’s Rules and Regulations,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx,visited on 20 December2017.
(5)ICSID,The ICSID Rules Amendment Process,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/ICSID%20Rules%20Amendment%20Process-ENG.pdf,visited on 20 December2017.
(1)ICSID,The ICSID Caseload-Statistics(Issue 2018-1),p.9,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-1(English).pdf,visited on 10March 2018.
(2)其中,我国与约旦、文莱签署的BITs尚未生效。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(3)我国与土耳其、希腊、立陶宛、罗马尼亚、以色列、塞尔维亚、沙特阿拉伯、马其顿、也门、巴林、文莱、塞浦路斯、约旦、缅甸、波黑、拉脱维亚、捷克、俄罗斯、印度、乌兹别克斯坦签署的BITs,引入了ICSID仲裁机制。其中,我国与土耳其、希腊、文莱签署的BITs提前声明:当双方都成为ICSID公约成员国时可将争端提交ICSID。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(4)未签署ICSID公约的国家是缅甸、老挝、越南、伊朗、巴勒斯坦、印度、马尔代夫、不丹、塔吉克斯坦和波兰。已签署ICSID公约但是尚未交存批准文件的有吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯和泰国。See ICSID,Database of ICSID Member States,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx,visited on 16 December 2017.
(5)引入UNCITRAL仲裁的为我国与土耳其、希腊、黎巴嫩、约旦、捷克、俄罗斯、印度和乌兹别克斯坦所签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(1)参见中国—乌兹别克斯坦BIT第12条第2款;中国—俄罗斯BIT第9条第2款。
(2)See Joachim Pohl&Kekeletso Mashigo et al.,Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements:A Large Sample Survey,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 12(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en,visited on 20December 2017.
(3)我国早期BITs中的“岔路口条款”多表现出单向性,即如果已将争端诉诸内国法院,投资仲裁则不再适用,至于提交投资仲裁后是否还可诉诸内国法院则没有明示。近期签署的BITs则开始采用双向“岔路口条款”,即当事人对于争端解决程序的选择是终局的,选定其一后即不得随意变更。
(4)Susan D.Franck,Challenges Facing Investment Disputes:Reconsidering Dispute Resolution in International Investment Agreements,in Karl P.Sauvant&Michael Chiswick-Patterson,Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 159(Oxford University Press 2008).
(1)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 146-147(2007).
(2)漆彤、鲍怡婕:《“一带一路”投资争议处理体系的构建》,《人民法治》2018年第2期,第22页。
(3)漆彤、鲍怡婕:《“一带一路”投资争议处理体系的构建》,《人民法治》2018年第2期,第22页。
(4)中国—土库曼斯坦BIT仅规定,当缔约双方成为ICSID公约成员时,可以签订关于提请ICSID解决相应争端的补充协定,但是该BIT至今尚未签订。
(1)此类BITs为我国与科威特、马来西亚、斯洛伐克、希腊、菲律宾、阿联酋、立陶宛、也门签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia Inner Menu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(2)此类BITs为我国与土耳其、罗马尼亚、伊朗、文莱、塞浦路斯、约旦、缅甸、波黑、拉脱维亚、捷克、俄罗斯、印度、乌兹别克斯坦签署的BITs。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 1 December 2017.
(3)Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,para.329.
(4)See Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,paras.332,333.
(5)Beijing Urban Construction Group Co.Ltd.v.Republic of Yemen,ICSID Case No.ARB/14/30,Decision on Jurisdiction,para.87.
(6)Sanum Investments Limited v.The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,PCA Case No.2013-13,Award on Jurisdiction,para.358.
(1)See Plama Consortium Limited v.Republic of Bulgaria,ICSID Case No.ARB/03/24,Decision on Jurisdiction,paras.208,219.
(2)该案仲裁庭认为,如果最惠国待遇可以适用于实质性保护条款,那么没有理由在包括仲裁条款的程序性事项中拒绝适用,程序性事项和实体性待遇同样值得保护。虽然最惠国待遇的适用突破了基础BIT对仲裁的限制,但这也是最惠国待遇适用的自然结果,因为其特色和宗旨正是通过引入其他条约中的更优保护来扩大基础BIT所未能提供的保护。RosInvest Co UK Ltd.v.The Russian Federation,SCC Case No.Arbitration V 079/2005,Award on Jurisdiction,paras.131,132.
(3)Ros Invest Co UK Ltd.v.The Russian Federation,SCC Case No.Arbitration V079/2005,Award on Jurisdiction,para.139.
(4)Kate M.Supnik,Making Amends:Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests in International Investment Law,59 Duke Law Journal 351-352(2009).
(5)Sergio Puig,Emergence&Dynamism in International Organizations:ICSID,Investor-State Arbitration&International Investment Law,44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 567(2013).
(1)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 140(2007).
(2)Emilie M.Hafner-Burton&Sergio Puig et al.,Against Secrecy:The Social Cost of International Dispute Settlement,42 Yale Journal of International Law 283(2017).
(3)See J.Anthony Van Duzer,Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation,52 Mc Gill Law Journal685(2007).
(4)See Aurélia Antonietti,The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules,21 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal445-446,448(2006).
(1)根据《透明度公约》第1、2条,除非缔约国作出相关保留,《透明度规则》适用于缔约国与另一缔约国投资者之间的仲裁,或者缔约国与同意适用《透明度规则》的非缔约国投资者之间的仲裁,不论仲裁所依据的投资协定是否在《透明度规则》生效之后签署,也不论仲裁是否依据UNCITRAL仲裁规则提起。
(2)参见肖建华、唐玉富:《论法院调解保密原则》,《法律科学》2011年第4期,第140页。
(3)See Note,Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts,127 Harvard Law Review 2557(2014).
(4)也有观点从争端解决机制的长久运行和仲裁员、调解员塑造良好声誉以获得多次指定机会的角度,认为仲裁员、调解员会坚持行为的中立性。这两种观点孰是孰非尚无定论,但是需要承认的是,违反中立性的风险是存在的。See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 45-48(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on 9 December 2017.
(1)ICSID仲裁员、调解员和专设委员会成员有68%来自西欧和北美(加拿大、墨西哥和美国)。See ICSID,The ICSID Caseload-Statistics(Issue 2018-1),p.19,https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-1(English).pdf,visited on10 March 2018.
(2)See CETA Chapter Eight(Investment),Article 8.27.欧盟所推行的常设仲裁庭模式固定仲裁员名册和任期,随机指派每个案件的仲裁员。该模式设立上诉机制,上诉小组由3 人组成且同样采用随机抽选方式,审查权限涵盖法律适用、事实认定和程序事项。CETA还表达了未来构建多边争端解决机制的意愿。
(3)See Jeswald W.Salacuse,Is There a Better Way?Alternative Methods of Treaty-based,Investor-State Dispute Resolution,31 Fordham International Law Journal 160-161(2007).
(1)UNCITRAL,Settlement of Commercial Disputes:Possible Future Work on Ethics in International Arbitration,Note by the Secretariat,Forty-ninth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/880,29 April 2016,para.4.
(2)See David Gaukrodger&Kathryn Gordon,Investor-State Dispute Settlement:A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community,OECD Working Papers on International Investment 49(2012),http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en,visited on 9 December2017.
(3)See UNCITRAL,Possible Future Work in the Field of Dispute Settlement:Ethics in International Arbitration,Note by the Secretariat,Fiftieth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/916,13 April 2017.
(4)参见赵骏:《全球治理视野下的国际法治与国内法治》,《中国社会科学》2014年第10期,第85页。
(1)根据UNCTAD网站公布的基于条约的投资争端案件,提交PCA的有110件,提交ICC的有13件,提交SCC的有41件。See UNCTAD,Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Filter By Rules And Institution,visited on 6 March2018.ICC、SCC一般适用其自身仲裁规则处理投资争端案件,而提交PCA的案件多适用UNCITRAL仲裁规则,PCA在此类案件中主要提供指定仲裁员、案件登记等管理性服务。
(2)CIETAC:关于《中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会国际投资争端仲裁规则(试行)》的说明,http://www.cietac.org.cn/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=14469,2018年1月20日访问。
(3)参见张昕:《“一带一路”项目协议中的仲裁机构选择:以东南亚地区为例》,(作者保存内部会议材料)。
(4)参见SCIA仲裁规则第2条第2款。
(5)参见CIETAC投资仲裁规则第27、28、32、43、44、55条。
(6)参见SCIA仲裁规则第3条第5款。
(7)参见SCIA指引第3条。
(8)参见《仲裁法》第2、40条。
(1)根据《仲裁法》第16、18条,仲裁协议应选定仲裁委员会,当事人没有约定仲裁委员会且未达成补充协议的,仲裁协议无效。
(2)参见浙江逸盛石化有限公司与英威达技术有限公司申请确认仲裁协议效力案,[2012]浙甬仲确字第4号民事裁定。该裁定认为:从当事人约定可以推出选定的仲裁机构为CIETAC,进而驳回确认仲裁协议无效的申请。
(3)最高人民法院已承认自贸区企业间临时仲裁协议的效力。参见最高人民法院《关于为自由贸易试验区建设提供司法保障的意见》(法发[2016]34号)第9条。
(1)UNCTAD,World Investment Report 2017,p.126,http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/wir2017_en.pdf,visited on 12 January 2018.
(2)BITs更新换代包括比利时—卢森堡经济联盟、德国、法国、芬兰、荷兰、瑞士、葡萄牙、西班牙等欧洲国家,另外还有韩国、尼日利亚、古巴。See UNCTAD,International Investment Agreements Navigator,http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country Bits/42#iia InnerMenu,visited on 15 January 2018.
(3)参见邓婷婷、张美玉:《“一带一路”倡议下中国海外投资的条约保护》,《中南大学学报》2016年第6期,第38页。
(4)这是从中国平安诉比利时案中吸取的教训。中国—比利时新版BIT明确:新版BIT生效之前,已进入司法仲裁程序的争端适用旧约,生效之后发生的争端适用新约,但是未涵盖争端在新版BIT生效之前已通知但是尚未进入司法仲裁程序的情形,这也是中国平安诉比利时案遇到的情况,仲裁庭称之为“仲裁漏洞”(“black hole”or“arbitration gap”),最终否认对该案的管辖权。See Ping An Life Insurance Company of China,Limited and Ping An Insurance(Group)Company of China,Limited v.Kingdom of Belgium,ICSID Case No.ARB/12/29,Award,paras.207,233.
(1)See ICSID Convention,Chapter IV(Arbitration),Articles 53-55.
(2)参见1986年全国人民代表大会常务委员会《关于我国加入〈承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约〉的决定》第2条。
(3)参见1987年最高人民法院《关于执行我国加入的〈承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约〉的通知》第2条。
(4)我国将国际仲裁裁决分为外国仲裁裁决和涉外仲裁裁决。对于我国仲裁机构作出的涉外仲裁裁决,依据《民事诉讼法》第273、274条的规定执行;对于外国仲裁裁决,则依据国际条约或互惠原则执行。
(5)参见肖芳:《国际投资仲裁裁决在中国的承认与执行》,《法学家》2011年第6期,第106页。
(6)Rebecca Golbert,The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution,11 Nevada Law Journal 510(2011).
(1)SCC Mediation Rules 2014,Article 14.
(2)UNCITRAL,Report of Working Group II(Dispute Settlement)on the Work of Its Sixty-fifth Session,Fiftieth Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/896,30 September 2016,para.62.
(3)See UNCITRAL,Report of Working Group II(Dispute Settlement)on the Work of Its Sixty-seventh Session,Fifty-first Session,UN,Doc.A/CN.9/929,11 October 2017,paras.103,104.
(4)王贵国:《“一带一路”争端解决制度研究》,《中国法学》2017年第6期,第66页。
(5)See Jacob A.Kuipers,Too Big to Nail:How Investor-State Arbitration Lacks an Appropriate Execution Mechanism for the Largest Awards,39 Boston College International&Comparative Law Review 420(2016).
(1)参见刘威:《“一带一路”倡议与中国参与国际经贸规则重塑》,《学习与实践》2017年第9期,第5页。