管理者过度自信、分析师关注与并购溢价
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摘要
以2004—2017年沪深A股上市公司中发生并购重组且重组类型为股权转让的主并方上市公司为研究对象,分析了管理者过度自信对并购溢价的影响。研究发现,管理者过度自信与并购溢价呈现显著的正相关关系。进一步的研究显示,分析师关注能够弱化管理者过度自信与并购溢价水平的正向关联。该结论不仅丰富了管理者行为与并购溢价的相关研究,而且明确了分析师在资本市场中的作用,可以为投资者的决策提供指引。
The paper studied the impact of managerial overconfidence on M&A premium through the analysis of merger listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2017, and research subjects mainly referred to the buyout firms with equity transfer. The results show a significant positive correlation between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium. And the further research reveals that, analyst coverage can effectively weaken above positive correlation. The findings not only enrich related research area, but also identify the role of analysts in capital market, which both help investors make sound decisions.
The paper studied the impact of managerial overconfidence on M&A premium through the analysis of merger listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2017, and research subjects mainly referred to the buyout firms with equity transfer. The results show a significant positive correlation between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium. And the further research reveals that, analyst coverage can effectively weaken above positive correlation. The findings not only enrich related research area, but also identify the role of analysts in capital market, which both help investors make sound decisions.
引文
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[2]Haunschild P R.Interorganizational Imitation:The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[3]Baker M,Pan X,Wurgler J.The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(1):49-71.
[4]Varaiya N P,Ferris K R.Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers:The Winner's Curse[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1987,43(3):64-70.
[5]Mandelker G.Risk and Return:The Case of Merging Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1974,1(4):303-335.
[6]李云鹤,李湛.管理者代理行为、公司过度投资与公司治理---基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(7):117-131.
[7]王培林,靳云汇,贾昌杰.从并购行为剖析中国上市公司代理成本问题[J].金融研究,2007(4):171-177.
[8]李善民,毛雅娟,赵晶晶.高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为[J].管理科学,2009(6):2-12.
[9]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):152-160.
[10]余明桂,夏新平,邹振松.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为[J].管理世界,2006(8):104-112.
[11]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[12]孙光国,赵健宇.产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性[J].会计研究,2014(5):52-58.
[13]潘爱玲,刘文楷,王雪.管理者过度自信、债务容量与并购溢价[J].南开管理评论,2018,21(3):35-45.
[14]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C.Do Analysts Matter for Governance?Evidence from Natural Experiments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(2):383-410.
[15]Fich E M,Juergens J L,Officer M S.Analyst Coverage and Acquisition Returns:Evidence from Natural Experiments[R].Working Paper,2017.
[16]Roll R.The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J].Journal of Business,1986,59(2):197-216.
[17]Malmendier U,Tate G.Who Makes Acquisitions?CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction[J].Journal of Finance Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[18]Heaton J B.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance[J].Financial Management,2002,31(2):33-45.
[19]汪德华,周晓艳.管理者过度自信与企业投资扭曲[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,29(4):56-61.
[20]Lin Y,Hu S,Chen M.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan[J].PacificBasin Finance Journal,2005,13(5):523-546.
[21]李婉丽,谢桂林,郝佳蕴.管理者过度自信对企业过度投资影响的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2014,36(10):76-86.
[22]吕兆德,徐晓薇.董事会过度自信与过度投资---兼论公司治理的调节效应[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(3):68-78.
[23]沈红波,潘飞.证券分析师盈利预测与企业海外上市溢价---来自A股市场信息环境的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(4):84-89.
[24]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[25]Fama E.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[26]Moyer R C,Chatfield R E,Sisneros P M.Security Analyst Monitoring Activity:Agency Costs and Information Demands[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989,24(4):503-512.
[27]Miller G S.The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(5):1001-1033.
[28]Dyck A,Morse A,Zingales L.Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?[J].Journal of Finance,2010,65(6):2213-2253.
[29]Yu F.Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):245-271.
[30]Hong Y,Huseynov F,Zhang W.Earnings Management and Analyst Following:A Simultaneous Equations Analysis[J].Financial Management,2014,43(2):355-390.
[31]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014(7):124-139.
[32]Derrien F,Kecskés A,Mansi S A.Information Asymmetry,the Cost of Debt,and Credit Events:Evidence from QuasiRandom Analyst Disappearances[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,39:295-311.
[33]游家兴,张哲远.财务分析师公司治理角色研究---文献综述与研究展望[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(5):128-136.
[34]赵玉洁.法律环境、分析师跟进与盈余管理[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,35(1):73-83.
[35]肖虹,李少轩.其他综合收益的分析师预测效应---基于会计信息环境特征及分析师认知能力视角的分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2017,39(12):100-113.
[36]黄波,王满.分析师跟踪影响了商业信用融资吗---基于我国上市公司的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(8):42-55.
[37]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(4):44-50.
[38]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[2]Haunschild P R.Interorganizational Imitation:The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[3]Baker M,Pan X,Wurgler J.The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,106(1):49-71.
[4]Varaiya N P,Ferris K R.Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers:The Winner's Curse[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1987,43(3):64-70.
[5]Mandelker G.Risk and Return:The Case of Merging Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1974,1(4):303-335.
[6]李云鹤,李湛.管理者代理行为、公司过度投资与公司治理---基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(7):117-131.
[7]王培林,靳云汇,贾昌杰.从并购行为剖析中国上市公司代理成本问题[J].金融研究,2007(4):171-177.
[8]李善民,毛雅娟,赵晶晶.高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为[J].管理科学,2009(6):2-12.
[9]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):152-160.
[10]余明桂,夏新平,邹振松.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为[J].管理世界,2006(8):104-112.
[11]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J].金融研究,2013(1):149-163.
[12]孙光国,赵健宇.产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性[J].会计研究,2014(5):52-58.
[13]潘爱玲,刘文楷,王雪.管理者过度自信、债务容量与并购溢价[J].南开管理评论,2018,21(3):35-45.
[14]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C.Do Analysts Matter for Governance?Evidence from Natural Experiments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(2):383-410.
[15]Fich E M,Juergens J L,Officer M S.Analyst Coverage and Acquisition Returns:Evidence from Natural Experiments[R].Working Paper,2017.
[16]Roll R.The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J].Journal of Business,1986,59(2):197-216.
[17]Malmendier U,Tate G.Who Makes Acquisitions?CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction[J].Journal of Finance Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[18]Heaton J B.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance[J].Financial Management,2002,31(2):33-45.
[19]汪德华,周晓艳.管理者过度自信与企业投资扭曲[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,29(4):56-61.
[20]Lin Y,Hu S,Chen M.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan[J].PacificBasin Finance Journal,2005,13(5):523-546.
[21]李婉丽,谢桂林,郝佳蕴.管理者过度自信对企业过度投资影响的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2014,36(10):76-86.
[22]吕兆德,徐晓薇.董事会过度自信与过度投资---兼论公司治理的调节效应[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(3):68-78.
[23]沈红波,潘飞.证券分析师盈利预测与企业海外上市溢价---来自A股市场信息环境的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(4):84-89.
[24]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[25]Fama E.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[26]Moyer R C,Chatfield R E,Sisneros P M.Security Analyst Monitoring Activity:Agency Costs and Information Demands[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989,24(4):503-512.
[27]Miller G S.The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(5):1001-1033.
[28]Dyck A,Morse A,Zingales L.Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?[J].Journal of Finance,2010,65(6):2213-2253.
[29]Yu F.Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(2):245-271.
[30]Hong Y,Huseynov F,Zhang W.Earnings Management and Analyst Following:A Simultaneous Equations Analysis[J].Financial Management,2014,43(2):355-390.
[31]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014(7):124-139.
[32]Derrien F,Kecskés A,Mansi S A.Information Asymmetry,the Cost of Debt,and Credit Events:Evidence from QuasiRandom Analyst Disappearances[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,39:295-311.
[33]游家兴,张哲远.财务分析师公司治理角色研究---文献综述与研究展望[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(5):128-136.
[34]赵玉洁.法律环境、分析师跟进与盈余管理[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,35(1):73-83.
[35]肖虹,李少轩.其他综合收益的分析师预测效应---基于会计信息环境特征及分析师认知能力视角的分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2017,39(12):100-113.
[36]黄波,王满.分析师跟踪影响了商业信用融资吗---基于我国上市公司的实证分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(8):42-55.
[37]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(4):44-50.
[38]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.