长期人力资本积累的历史根源:制度差异、儒家文化传播与国家能力塑造
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摘要
理解国家能力对人力资本积累的长期影响至关重要,但由于数据限制与识别困难等原因,确认二者间的因果推断则变得格外困难。但中国历史上曾存在的土司制度却作为天然的自然实验,为本文探究制度差异下中央王朝对地方所展现出的不同国家能力及其长期影响提供了便利条件。由于中原王朝势力在西南边陲难以企及,则默许地方首领对当地实施有别于郡县制外的土司制度,因此四川历史中曾长期存在土司制与郡县制并存的现象,而本文则利用独特的四川省181个县级历史数据集估计了这种不同制度下国家能力差异对人力资本积累的长期影响。结果发现,土司制下的地方治理模式显著阻碍了长期人力资本积累,并随割据状态延续时间的增长,这种抑制效应具有边际递增倾向。本文认为,这种长期人力资本培养的欠缺主要来自两个方面:其一,郡县制中儒家文化传承的代际优势对人力资本积累具有丰富的解释力度;其二,政府能力的塑造也是解释人力资本在历史发展中分流的重要影响机制。
Among the many factors that determine social and economic development and human progress, the important role played by state capacity cannot be ignored. The long-term influences of state capacity on regional economic development, public goods provision, and government credibility have attracted research attention. In general, the effects of state capacity on long-term regional development are mainly exerted through four mechanisms: regional stability and prosperity, cultural concept shaping, formal institutional norms, and official selection and elite training. However, little is known about the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital accumulation. Exploring this issue is significant because of the central role that human capital plays in the progress of modern civilization and social development.However, any efforts to understand the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital faces two types of difficulties. First, it requires long-term data, and unfortunately there is a lack of historical data. Second, in empirical analysis, it is difficult to identify the strength of state capacity, given that state capacity within a country is essentially uniform and transnational research cannot guarantee the similarity of other control conditions. However, the Tusi System(TS) that historically existed in China provides us the chance to potentially identify the long-term effect of state capacity differences on human capital accumulation.The eastern region of Sichuan has been directly controlled by the central government since ancient times. Due to the weak control of the Central Plains dynasties, however, the western region of Sichuan was historically controlled by the TS. For the purpose of our research, this historical fact offers a way to observe the long-term effect of state capacity. We use a manual database of 181 counties in Sichuan to examine the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital. We find that the TS significantly hinders long-term human capital accumulation, and the effect gradually strengthens as the decentralization time increases. The causal inference is still established after investigating omitted variable bias, using the instrumental variable method, and conducting a series of robustness tests. We also analyze the mechanisms of this long-term effect and find that the inheritance of confucian culture and government capacity play an important role in the accumulation of human capital. The above conclusions can help guide the implementation of contemporary policies. In particular, strong state capacity and government construction can be effective in cultivating long-term human capital, thus creating an institutional advantage in terms of educational development. This advantage is reflected not only in the long-term influence of confucian culture and spiritual internalization, but also in the cultivation and construction of government capacity. Therefore, promoting state capacity improvement, enhancing government prestige, and improving government service quality are critical for the development of education and long-term economic growth in China. In addition to promoting the overall progress of economic and educational development, it is important to strengthen the coordination and balance of inter-regional growth, optimize the allocation of educational resources, and create a good environment for personnel training, thus gradually forming a new pattern of human capital cultivation.The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, studies on state capacity and human capital—both of which play important roles in societal development and long-term economic growth—are of great value, and this paper fills a research void by examining the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital accumulation. Second, based on an historical perspective, this paper examines the long-term mechanism of human capital-influencing factors. Few previous studies have adopted historical perspectives to examine factors that contribute to the cultivation of human capital. Third, the paper is a useful supplement to the literature on Chinese Tusi. The findings provide a new perspective on Tusi and suggest some avenues for further research.
Among the many factors that determine social and economic development and human progress, the important role played by state capacity cannot be ignored. The long-term influences of state capacity on regional economic development, public goods provision, and government credibility have attracted research attention. In general, the effects of state capacity on long-term regional development are mainly exerted through four mechanisms: regional stability and prosperity, cultural concept shaping, formal institutional norms, and official selection and elite training. However, little is known about the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital accumulation. Exploring this issue is significant because of the central role that human capital plays in the progress of modern civilization and social development.However, any efforts to understand the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital faces two types of difficulties. First, it requires long-term data, and unfortunately there is a lack of historical data. Second, in empirical analysis, it is difficult to identify the strength of state capacity, given that state capacity within a country is essentially uniform and transnational research cannot guarantee the similarity of other control conditions. However, the Tusi System(TS) that historically existed in China provides us the chance to potentially identify the long-term effect of state capacity differences on human capital accumulation.The eastern region of Sichuan has been directly controlled by the central government since ancient times. Due to the weak control of the Central Plains dynasties, however, the western region of Sichuan was historically controlled by the TS. For the purpose of our research, this historical fact offers a way to observe the long-term effect of state capacity. We use a manual database of 181 counties in Sichuan to examine the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital. We find that the TS significantly hinders long-term human capital accumulation, and the effect gradually strengthens as the decentralization time increases. The causal inference is still established after investigating omitted variable bias, using the instrumental variable method, and conducting a series of robustness tests. We also analyze the mechanisms of this long-term effect and find that the inheritance of confucian culture and government capacity play an important role in the accumulation of human capital. The above conclusions can help guide the implementation of contemporary policies. In particular, strong state capacity and government construction can be effective in cultivating long-term human capital, thus creating an institutional advantage in terms of educational development. This advantage is reflected not only in the long-term influence of confucian culture and spiritual internalization, but also in the cultivation and construction of government capacity. Therefore, promoting state capacity improvement, enhancing government prestige, and improving government service quality are critical for the development of education and long-term economic growth in China. In addition to promoting the overall progress of economic and educational development, it is important to strengthen the coordination and balance of inter-regional growth, optimize the allocation of educational resources, and create a good environment for personnel training, thus gradually forming a new pattern of human capital cultivation.The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, studies on state capacity and human capital—both of which play important roles in societal development and long-term economic growth—are of great value, and this paper fills a research void by examining the long-term impact of state capacity on human capital accumulation. Second, based on an historical perspective, this paper examines the long-term mechanism of human capital-influencing factors. Few previous studies have adopted historical perspectives to examine factors that contribute to the cultivation of human capital. Third, the paper is a useful supplement to the literature on Chinese Tusi. The findings provide a new perspective on Tusi and suggest some avenues for further research.
引文
陈倩,2015:《试论清代四川盐税制度的变革》,《贵州社会科学》第1期。
曹正汉,2017:《中国的集权与分权:“风险论”与历史证据》,《社会》第3期。
李旭,2012:《茶马古道:横断山脉、喜马拉雅文化带民族走廊研究》,中国社会科学出版社。
李楠、林友宏,2016:《管治方式转变与经济发展——基于清代西南地区“改土归流”历史经验的考察》,《经济研究》第7期。
李世愉,1998:《清代土司制度论考》,中国社会科学出版社。
任新建,2008:《茶马古道的历史变迁与现代功能》,《中华文化论坛》第12期。
徐现祥、刘毓芸、肖泽凯,2015:《方言与经济增长》,《经济学报》第2期。
佐伯富、顾南、顾学稼,1993:《清代盐政之研究》,《盐业史研究》第2期。
Acemoglu,D.,C.Garcia-Jimeno,and J.A.Robinson,2015,“State Capacity and Economic Development:A Network Approach”,American Economic Review,105(8),2364—2409.
Acemoglu,D.,S.Johnson,and J.A.Robinson,2001,“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:An Empirical Investigation”,American Economic Review,91(5),1369—1401.
Ben-Porath,Y.,1967,“The Production of Human Capital and the Life-cycle of Earnings”,Journal of Political Economy,75(4),352—365.
Barro,R.,1991,“Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,106(2),407—433.
Belloc,M.,F.Drago,and R.Galbiati,2016,“Earthquakes,Religion,and Transition to Self-government in Italian Cities”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,131(4),1875—1926.
Bai,Y.,and R.Jia,2016,“Elite Recruitment and Political Stability:the Impact of the Abolition of China's Civil Service Exam”,Econometrica,84(2),677—733.
Bils,M.,and P.J.Klenow,2000,“Does Schooling Cause Growth?”,American Economic Review,90(5),1160—1183.
Bai,Y.,and K.S.Kung,2011,“Climate Shocks and Sino-nomadic Conflict”,Review of Economics & Statistics,93(3),970—981.
Benhabib,J.,and M.M.Spiegel,1994,“The Role of Human-capital in Economic-development Evidence from Aggregate Cross-country Data”,Journal of Monetary Economics,34(2),143—173.
Chen,Y.,Z.Y.Fan,X.M.Gu,and L.A.Zhou,2018,“Arrival of Young Talents:Send-down Movement and Rural Education in China”,SSRN Working Paper.
Cavalcanti,T.V.,and C.Giannitsarou,2017,“Growth and Human Capital:A Network Approach”,Economic Journal,127(603),1279—1317.
Ciccone,A.,and P.Giovanni,2006,“Identifying Human-capital Externalities:Theory with Applications”,Review of Economic Studies,73(2),381—412.
Dell,M.,2010,“The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita”,Econometrica,78(6),1863—1903.
Duncan,B.,and S.J.Trejo,2011,“Intermarriage and the Intergenerational Transmission of Ethnic Identity and Human Capital for Mexican Americans”,Journal of Urban Economics,29(2),195—227.
Geys,B.,2017,“Political Dynasties,Electoral Institutions and Politicians' Human Capital”,Economic Journal,127(605),474—494.
Iyer,L.,2010,“Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India:Long-term Consequences”,Review of Economics & Statistics,92(4),693—713.
Johnson,N.D.,and M.Koyama,2017,“States and Economic Growth Capacity and Constraints”,Explorations in Economic History,64,1—20.
Kahn,M.E.,2005,“The Death Toll from Natural Disasters:The Role of Income,Geography,and Institutions”,Review of Economics & Statistics,87(2),271—284.
Kung,K.S.,and C.Ma,2014,“Can Cultural Norms Reduce Conflicts?Confucianism and Peasant Rebellions in Qing China”,Journal of Development Economics,111,132—149.
Migdal,J.S.,1988,Strong Societies and Weak States:State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,New York:Cambridge University Press.
Moretti,E.,2004a,“Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education:Evidence from Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-sectional Data”,Journal of Econometrics,121(1),175—212.
Moretti,E.,2004b,“Human Capital Externalities in Cities”,Handbook of regional and Urban Economics,4,2243—2291.
Mattingly,D.C.,2017,“Colonial Legacies and State Institutions in China:Evidence from a Natural Experiment”,Comparative Political Studies,50(4),434—463.
Michalopoulos,S.,and E.Papaioannou,2013a,“Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”,Econometrica,81(1),113—152.
Michalopoulos,S.,and E.Papaioannou,2013b,“National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,129(1),151—213.
Mamuneas,T.P.,A.Savvides,and T.Stengos,2006,“Economic Development and the Return to Human Capital:A Smooth Coefficient Semiparametric Approach”,Journal of Applied Econometrics,21(1),111—132.
Rauch,J.E.,1993,“Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital:Evidence from the Cities”,Journal of Urban Economics,34(3),380—400.
Stantcheva,S.,2017,“Optimal Taxation and Human Capital Policies Over the Life Cycle”,Journal of Political Economy,125(6),1931—1990.
(1)由于2008年四川地区发生了汶川大地震,因此2008年以后样本可能更多地受到此次地震的短期影响,从而使得对长期影响的估计产生偏误。
(2)本文所使用的《四川通志》主要来自公元1733年(雍正十一年)由黄廷桂等修撰的刻本。《四川通志》是记载有关四川边防、田赋、土司、兵制、选举、官宦等政治、经济、文化、军事各方面的通志类著作。
(3)川东地区平均海拔为500米左右,而川西高原平均海拔可达3000—4500米,而四川省甘孜州贡嘎山作为四川地区的地理制高点,其海拔达到7556米。
(4)具体名单详见官网:http://www.seac.gov.cn/col/col121/index.html。
(5)有关盐税占政府征收总税收的比例可详见佐伯富(1993)所列举的出自《宋史·食货志》、《元典章》等史书记载的相关数字。在元代、明代、清代时,盐税基本可占国家财政收入的50%左右,而在宋代时,这一比例甚至可上升至70%。
(6)这里的“忠义”人数是指在对外战争、抵御流寇与农民起义、忠于君王、保卫朝廷等被中央政府主流思想所认可的行为上有所展示并被记录在册的人员个数。
(7)由于篇幅所限,在这里仅列出儒学学堂建造时长变量的回归结果,其他未列出结果与此基本一致。
(8)“义学”即指地方士绅为家境清寒子弟提供的免费入学场所。
(9)在(4)—(9)列中分别考察了儒家文化和土司本地文化对于小学生和中学生的影响,基本结论不变,限于篇幅,未在文中报告。
(10)《四川通志》中仅提供了盐引税收的额度。所谓盐引税收指的是盐在运销环节中流经各地由当地政府所收税收,主要分为“陆引”与“水引”两类,其中陆引每张配盐四包,每张课银基本为二钱七分二厘四毫;水引每张配盐五十包,课银三两四钱三分(陈倩,2015),本文根据《四川通志》中所提供各县陆引与水引数目,计算可得各县征盐税数目。
(11)这类记录主要包括:其一,在四川地区从事武装活动与镇压地方冲突的军事人员(如秦司马错、东汉岑彭、吴汉、明傅友德、周德兴等);其二,因承父荫而得以做官并被记录的人员(如诸葛亮之侄诸葛乔、严挺之子严武等);其三,因皇亲国戚身份而在四川为官人员(如武则天曾侄孙武元衡等)。
(12)由于《四川通志》记载的是包括历代所有具有四川籍贯,但在政治、经济、文化、军事方面都有突出贡献的人员,因此我们必须对非政治官员的相关记录进行一一剔除(如司马相如、扬雄、任玠等),从而只保留政治精英记录。
(13)其中教师数据同样来自《四川统计年鉴》。
(14)由于篇幅所限,在此只展示了教师数量对外地政治精英的回归结果,本地政治精英结果与此基本一致。
(15)例如宋元四川战争、明末张献忠入川以及农民军与清军在川的一系列战争都有可能造成人员损失。
(16)根据《四川通志》所记载的“蜀自汉唐以来,生齿颇繁,烟火相望。及明末兵燹之后,丁口稀若晨星”可见一斑。
(17)而且在加入控制变量后,第(2)—(4)列回归中的一阶段估计系数分别为0.5153、0.6076与0.6077,且都在1%的置信水平上显著成立,这说明势力更迭的频率与是否为土司制控制息息相关,且F值均大于10,工具变量选择基本成立,以上结果限于篇幅,未在正文报告。
(18)由于古代县(区)的城墙数据来自《四川通志》,而该书又于雍正年间编撰,因此保守而言该面积至少反映了清中期的各县(区)的占地面积;另外,由于古今丈量单位的不统一,我们在计算前先统一了计算单位,俱以平方千米(km2)计算。
(19)篇幅所限,未做报告。
(20)除使用势力更迭次数作为工具变量之外,还利用《四川通志》和县志手动搜集了土司与中原王朝在《四川通志》成书前(公元1733年)所爆发的武装冲突次数,并以此作为土司虚拟变量的工具变量,对以上结果全部进行了重新检验,所得结论依然不变,但限于篇幅,有关武装冲突的2SLS检验结果未作报告。
(21)根据中国1987年国家教委公布的《普通高等学校招生暂行条例》第三十七条规定,边疆、山区、牧区、少数民族聚居地的少数民族考生,可根据当地的实际情况,适当降低分数,择优录取。
(22)另外,根据《普通高等学校招生暂行条例》规定,民族自治地方用本民族语文授课的高等学校或系(科)招生,由自治区或省招生委员会另行命题,组织考试。因此事实上,少数民族考生与汉族考生在考试方式上区别较大,也不存在可比性,剔除样本对于估计结果的准确性具有很大帮助。
(23)根据2012年公布的四川省一本上线人数统计,全省一本上线人数共计33230人,仅绵阳中学一所学校一本上线人数就高达3104人(9.34%);南山中学上线人数1754人(5.28%);南充高中910人(2.74%);石室中学547人(1.65%);树德中学534人(1.61%)。仅这五所高中一本上线人数就已经占全省一本上线人数的五分之一(20.62%)。
(24)以上估计皆采用2SLS估计所得。
(25)其中郡县制一侧距分界线距离以正数表示,土司制一侧则以负数表示。
曹正汉,2017:《中国的集权与分权:“风险论”与历史证据》,《社会》第3期。
李旭,2012:《茶马古道:横断山脉、喜马拉雅文化带民族走廊研究》,中国社会科学出版社。
李楠、林友宏,2016:《管治方式转变与经济发展——基于清代西南地区“改土归流”历史经验的考察》,《经济研究》第7期。
李世愉,1998:《清代土司制度论考》,中国社会科学出版社。
任新建,2008:《茶马古道的历史变迁与现代功能》,《中华文化论坛》第12期。
徐现祥、刘毓芸、肖泽凯,2015:《方言与经济增长》,《经济学报》第2期。
佐伯富、顾南、顾学稼,1993:《清代盐政之研究》,《盐业史研究》第2期。
Acemoglu,D.,C.Garcia-Jimeno,and J.A.Robinson,2015,“State Capacity and Economic Development:A Network Approach”,American Economic Review,105(8),2364—2409.
Acemoglu,D.,S.Johnson,and J.A.Robinson,2001,“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:An Empirical Investigation”,American Economic Review,91(5),1369—1401.
Ben-Porath,Y.,1967,“The Production of Human Capital and the Life-cycle of Earnings”,Journal of Political Economy,75(4),352—365.
Barro,R.,1991,“Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,106(2),407—433.
Belloc,M.,F.Drago,and R.Galbiati,2016,“Earthquakes,Religion,and Transition to Self-government in Italian Cities”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,131(4),1875—1926.
Bai,Y.,and R.Jia,2016,“Elite Recruitment and Political Stability:the Impact of the Abolition of China's Civil Service Exam”,Econometrica,84(2),677—733.
Bils,M.,and P.J.Klenow,2000,“Does Schooling Cause Growth?”,American Economic Review,90(5),1160—1183.
Bai,Y.,and K.S.Kung,2011,“Climate Shocks and Sino-nomadic Conflict”,Review of Economics & Statistics,93(3),970—981.
Benhabib,J.,and M.M.Spiegel,1994,“The Role of Human-capital in Economic-development Evidence from Aggregate Cross-country Data”,Journal of Monetary Economics,34(2),143—173.
Chen,Y.,Z.Y.Fan,X.M.Gu,and L.A.Zhou,2018,“Arrival of Young Talents:Send-down Movement and Rural Education in China”,SSRN Working Paper.
Cavalcanti,T.V.,and C.Giannitsarou,2017,“Growth and Human Capital:A Network Approach”,Economic Journal,127(603),1279—1317.
Ciccone,A.,and P.Giovanni,2006,“Identifying Human-capital Externalities:Theory with Applications”,Review of Economic Studies,73(2),381—412.
Dell,M.,2010,“The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita”,Econometrica,78(6),1863—1903.
Duncan,B.,and S.J.Trejo,2011,“Intermarriage and the Intergenerational Transmission of Ethnic Identity and Human Capital for Mexican Americans”,Journal of Urban Economics,29(2),195—227.
Geys,B.,2017,“Political Dynasties,Electoral Institutions and Politicians' Human Capital”,Economic Journal,127(605),474—494.
Iyer,L.,2010,“Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India:Long-term Consequences”,Review of Economics & Statistics,92(4),693—713.
Johnson,N.D.,and M.Koyama,2017,“States and Economic Growth Capacity and Constraints”,Explorations in Economic History,64,1—20.
Kahn,M.E.,2005,“The Death Toll from Natural Disasters:The Role of Income,Geography,and Institutions”,Review of Economics & Statistics,87(2),271—284.
Kung,K.S.,and C.Ma,2014,“Can Cultural Norms Reduce Conflicts?Confucianism and Peasant Rebellions in Qing China”,Journal of Development Economics,111,132—149.
Migdal,J.S.,1988,Strong Societies and Weak States:State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,New York:Cambridge University Press.
Moretti,E.,2004a,“Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education:Evidence from Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-sectional Data”,Journal of Econometrics,121(1),175—212.
Moretti,E.,2004b,“Human Capital Externalities in Cities”,Handbook of regional and Urban Economics,4,2243—2291.
Mattingly,D.C.,2017,“Colonial Legacies and State Institutions in China:Evidence from a Natural Experiment”,Comparative Political Studies,50(4),434—463.
Michalopoulos,S.,and E.Papaioannou,2013a,“Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”,Econometrica,81(1),113—152.
Michalopoulos,S.,and E.Papaioannou,2013b,“National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,129(1),151—213.
Mamuneas,T.P.,A.Savvides,and T.Stengos,2006,“Economic Development and the Return to Human Capital:A Smooth Coefficient Semiparametric Approach”,Journal of Applied Econometrics,21(1),111—132.
Rauch,J.E.,1993,“Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital:Evidence from the Cities”,Journal of Urban Economics,34(3),380—400.
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(1)由于2008年四川地区发生了汶川大地震,因此2008年以后样本可能更多地受到此次地震的短期影响,从而使得对长期影响的估计产生偏误。
(2)本文所使用的《四川通志》主要来自公元1733年(雍正十一年)由黄廷桂等修撰的刻本。《四川通志》是记载有关四川边防、田赋、土司、兵制、选举、官宦等政治、经济、文化、军事各方面的通志类著作。
(3)川东地区平均海拔为500米左右,而川西高原平均海拔可达3000—4500米,而四川省甘孜州贡嘎山作为四川地区的地理制高点,其海拔达到7556米。
(4)具体名单详见官网:http://www.seac.gov.cn/col/col121/index.html。
(5)有关盐税占政府征收总税收的比例可详见佐伯富(1993)所列举的出自《宋史·食货志》、《元典章》等史书记载的相关数字。在元代、明代、清代时,盐税基本可占国家财政收入的50%左右,而在宋代时,这一比例甚至可上升至70%。
(6)这里的“忠义”人数是指在对外战争、抵御流寇与农民起义、忠于君王、保卫朝廷等被中央政府主流思想所认可的行为上有所展示并被记录在册的人员个数。
(7)由于篇幅所限,在这里仅列出儒学学堂建造时长变量的回归结果,其他未列出结果与此基本一致。
(8)“义学”即指地方士绅为家境清寒子弟提供的免费入学场所。
(9)在(4)—(9)列中分别考察了儒家文化和土司本地文化对于小学生和中学生的影响,基本结论不变,限于篇幅,未在文中报告。
(10)《四川通志》中仅提供了盐引税收的额度。所谓盐引税收指的是盐在运销环节中流经各地由当地政府所收税收,主要分为“陆引”与“水引”两类,其中陆引每张配盐四包,每张课银基本为二钱七分二厘四毫;水引每张配盐五十包,课银三两四钱三分(陈倩,2015),本文根据《四川通志》中所提供各县陆引与水引数目,计算可得各县征盐税数目。
(11)这类记录主要包括:其一,在四川地区从事武装活动与镇压地方冲突的军事人员(如秦司马错、东汉岑彭、吴汉、明傅友德、周德兴等);其二,因承父荫而得以做官并被记录的人员(如诸葛亮之侄诸葛乔、严挺之子严武等);其三,因皇亲国戚身份而在四川为官人员(如武则天曾侄孙武元衡等)。
(12)由于《四川通志》记载的是包括历代所有具有四川籍贯,但在政治、经济、文化、军事方面都有突出贡献的人员,因此我们必须对非政治官员的相关记录进行一一剔除(如司马相如、扬雄、任玠等),从而只保留政治精英记录。
(13)其中教师数据同样来自《四川统计年鉴》。
(14)由于篇幅所限,在此只展示了教师数量对外地政治精英的回归结果,本地政治精英结果与此基本一致。
(15)例如宋元四川战争、明末张献忠入川以及农民军与清军在川的一系列战争都有可能造成人员损失。
(16)根据《四川通志》所记载的“蜀自汉唐以来,生齿颇繁,烟火相望。及明末兵燹之后,丁口稀若晨星”可见一斑。
(17)而且在加入控制变量后,第(2)—(4)列回归中的一阶段估计系数分别为0.5153、0.6076与0.6077,且都在1%的置信水平上显著成立,这说明势力更迭的频率与是否为土司制控制息息相关,且F值均大于10,工具变量选择基本成立,以上结果限于篇幅,未在正文报告。
(18)由于古代县(区)的城墙数据来自《四川通志》,而该书又于雍正年间编撰,因此保守而言该面积至少反映了清中期的各县(区)的占地面积;另外,由于古今丈量单位的不统一,我们在计算前先统一了计算单位,俱以平方千米(km2)计算。
(19)篇幅所限,未做报告。
(20)除使用势力更迭次数作为工具变量之外,还利用《四川通志》和县志手动搜集了土司与中原王朝在《四川通志》成书前(公元1733年)所爆发的武装冲突次数,并以此作为土司虚拟变量的工具变量,对以上结果全部进行了重新检验,所得结论依然不变,但限于篇幅,有关武装冲突的2SLS检验结果未作报告。
(21)根据中国1987年国家教委公布的《普通高等学校招生暂行条例》第三十七条规定,边疆、山区、牧区、少数民族聚居地的少数民族考生,可根据当地的实际情况,适当降低分数,择优录取。
(22)另外,根据《普通高等学校招生暂行条例》规定,民族自治地方用本民族语文授课的高等学校或系(科)招生,由自治区或省招生委员会另行命题,组织考试。因此事实上,少数民族考生与汉族考生在考试方式上区别较大,也不存在可比性,剔除样本对于估计结果的准确性具有很大帮助。
(23)根据2012年公布的四川省一本上线人数统计,全省一本上线人数共计33230人,仅绵阳中学一所学校一本上线人数就高达3104人(9.34%);南山中学上线人数1754人(5.28%);南充高中910人(2.74%);石室中学547人(1.65%);树德中学534人(1.61%)。仅这五所高中一本上线人数就已经占全省一本上线人数的五分之一(20.62%)。
(24)以上估计皆采用2SLS估计所得。
(25)其中郡县制一侧距分界线距离以正数表示,土司制一侧则以负数表示。