基于激励相容视角的“毒跑道”事件安全监管分析
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摘要
针对校园"毒跑道"事件,从激励相容视角切入在分析学校跑道安全监管主要相关主体的性质及决策过程的基础上,分别构建地方政府和地方监管部门、地方监管部门和跑道建设企业的博弈模型;根据模型分析结果,对不同主体实现激励相容的关键要素和关键参数进行了识别和计算,得出针对地方监管部门和跑道建设企业的激励相容约束。结果表明,地方政府实现对地方监管部门激励相容的关键点在于奖惩力度;对跑道建设企业实现激励相容的关键在于学校寻求监管意愿以及地方监管部门的监管准确水平。最后对结论进行推广,从奖惩机制、监管意愿以及技术水平三个方面提出了产品安全监管激励相容设计的建议。
The toxic runway incident was the result of incentive incompatibility among local government,local regulators and runway construction companies. This paper analyzed the decision-making process of the campus runway safety supervision from the perspective of incentive compatibility. Based on this theory,the paper firstly built a three parties' supervision game model,then verified the incentive effects of the local regulators and runway construction companies according to the model,and figured out the reasons of the incentive incompatibility among the relevant stakeholders during the construction. The results suggest that the reward and punishment systems,schools' desire to seek regulation and technology level all have positive effects on the incentive compatibility. Based on the calculations,advices are promoted based on these three aspects.
The toxic runway incident was the result of incentive incompatibility among local government,local regulators and runway construction companies. This paper analyzed the decision-making process of the campus runway safety supervision from the perspective of incentive compatibility. Based on this theory,the paper firstly built a three parties' supervision game model,then verified the incentive effects of the local regulators and runway construction companies according to the model,and figured out the reasons of the incentive incompatibility among the relevant stakeholders during the construction. The results suggest that the reward and punishment systems,schools' desire to seek regulation and technology level all have positive effects on the incentive compatibility. Based on the calculations,advices are promoted based on these three aspects.
引文
[1]倪国华,郑风田.媒体监管的交易成本对食品安全监管效率的影响——一个制度体系模型及其均衡分析[J].经济学,2014,13(2):559-582.
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[9]LIU D H,XIAO X Z,LI H Y,et al. Historical evolution and benefit–cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision:An evolutionary game analysis framework[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2015,243(3):974-984.
[2]陈思,罗云波,江树人.激励相容:我国食品安全监管的现实选择[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,27(3):168-175.
[3]王常伟,顾海英.产业环境、监管力度与我国食品企业的诚信选择——基于激励相容约束的分析[J].商业经济与管理,2013(8):18-25.
[4]周应恒,宋玉兰,严斌剑.我国食品安全监管激励相容机制设计[J].商业研究,2013,55(1):4-11.
[5]全世文,曾寅初,朱勇.我国食品安全监管者激励失灵的原因——基于委托代理理论的解释[J].经济管理,2015(4):159-167.
[6]肖兴志,沈惠伟.政府与国有煤矿安全生产间激励相容机制的构建[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2010(2):48-53.
[7]李军林,姚东旻,李三希,等.分头监管还是合并监管:食品安全中的组织经济学[J].世界经济,2014(10):165-192.
[8]CHEN H,FENG Q,CAO J. Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the Chinese coal industry based on a tripartite game model[J]. Energy Policy,2014,72:140-145.
[9]LIU D H,XIAO X Z,LI H Y,et al. Historical evolution and benefit–cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision:An evolutionary game analysis framework[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2015,243(3):974-984.