管理层薪酬激励对企业创新水平的影响研究
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摘要
企业创新水平是衡量当今企业是否能在日益激烈的竞争环境中生存和发展的重要指标。以创新水平为出发点,以2012—2017年沪深A股非金融保险类上市公司为样本,考察管理层薪酬对企业创新水平的影响。研究发现,管理层薪酬激励对企业创新水平具有显著正向作用。以研发投入和研发产出分别作为企业创新水平衡量指标,结果表明管理层激励对两者都具有正向影响。进一步研究发现,不同的行业性质、产权性质对企业创新投入与创新产出的影响不存在显著差异,而管理层是否持股的差异使得管理层薪酬激励对企业创新水平的正向作用产生显著差异。
The enterprise innovation level is an important index to measure the corporate capability to survive and develop in an increasingly competitive environment. With 2012—2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial insurance listed companies as a sample, a study aiming at the investigation of innovation level has been carried out to examine the impact of management compensation on the level of innovation. The research shows that management compensation incentives have a significant positive effect on corporate innovation levels. Specifically, R&D investment and R&D output are respectively measured as indicators of corporate innovation levels, which results show that management incentives have a positive impact on both of them. Further research reveals that there is no significant difference between the impact of different industries and property rights on corporate innovation input and output,while the difference between managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership makes a significant difference in the positive effect of managerial incentive on corporate innovation levels.
The enterprise innovation level is an important index to measure the corporate capability to survive and develop in an increasingly competitive environment. With 2012—2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial insurance listed companies as a sample, a study aiming at the investigation of innovation level has been carried out to examine the impact of management compensation on the level of innovation. The research shows that management compensation incentives have a significant positive effect on corporate innovation levels. Specifically, R&D investment and R&D output are respectively measured as indicators of corporate innovation levels, which results show that management incentives have a positive impact on both of them. Further research reveals that there is no significant difference between the impact of different industries and property rights on corporate innovation input and output,while the difference between managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership makes a significant difference in the positive effect of managerial incentive on corporate innovation levels.
引文
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[15]余明桂,范蕊,钟慧洁.中国产业政策与企业技术创新[J].中国工业经济,2016(12):5-22.YU Minggui,FAN Rui,ZHONG Huijie.Chinese Industrial Policy and Corporate Technological Innovation[J].China Industrial Economics,2016(12):5-22.
[16]张玉娟,汤湘希.股权结构、高管激励与企业创新:基于不同产权性质A股上市公司的数据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(9):76-93.ZHANG Yujuan,TANG Xiangxi.Ownership Structure,Executive Incentive and Firm Innovation:Based on the Data of A-Share Listed Companies with Different Property Rights[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,2018,40(9):76-93.
[17]王满四,徐朝辉.银行债权、内部治理与企业创新:来自2006-2015年A股技术密集型上市公司的实证分析[J].会计研究,2018(3):42-49.WANG Mansi,XU Chaohui.The Bank Claims,Internal Governance and Corporate Innovation:Evidence from2006-2015 Technology Intensive a Listed Firms[J]Accounting Research,2018(3):42-49.
[18]姚立杰,周颖.管理层能力、创新水平与创新效率[J].会计研究,2018(6):70-77.YAO Lijie,ZHOU Ying.Managerial Ability,Innovation Ability and Innovation Efficiency[J].Accounting Research,2018(6):70-77.
[19]易靖韬,张修平,王化成,等.企业异质性、高管过度自信与企业创新绩效[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(6):101-112.YI Jingtao,ZHANG Xiuping,WANG Huacheng,et al.Firm Heterogeneity,Top Executives’Overconfidence,and Corporate Innovation Performance[J].Nankai Business Review,2015,18(6):101-112.
[20]杨兴龙,谢利.产品市场竞争、高管激励与创新投入[J].财会通讯,2018(30):69-72.YANG Xinglong,XIE Li.Product Market Competition Executive Incentive and Innovation Investment[J]Communication of Finance and Accounting,2018(30):69-72.
[21]张扬.产权性质、信贷歧视与企业融资的替代性约束[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016(5):66-72.ZHANG Yang.Property Nature,Credit Discrimination and Alternative Constraints of Corporate Finance[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2016(5):66-72.
[2]CANARELLA G,NOURAYI M M.Executive Compensation and Firm Performance:Adjustment Dynamics,Non-Linearity and Asymmetry[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,2008(4):121-130.
[3]黄志忠,郗群.薪酬制度考虑外部监管了吗:来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(1):49-56.HUANG Zhizhong,XI Qun.Do Compensational Schemes Consider External Monitoring?Evidence from Chinese Listed-Firms[J].Nankai Business Review,2009,12(1):49-56.
[4]刘绍娓,万大艳.高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究[J].中国软科学,2013(2):90-101.LIU Shaowei,WAN Dayan.Executive Compensation Affects Firm Performance:The Empirical Comparative Study on State-Owned and Non-State-Owned Enterprises[J].China Soft Science,2013(2):90-101.
[5]MAIN B G M.Top Executive Pay and Performance[J]Managerial and Decision Economics,1991,12(3):219-229.
[6]沈艺峰,李培功.政府限薪令与国有企业高管薪酬、业绩和运气关系的研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(11):130-139.SHEN Yifeng,LI Peigong.Empirical Research on the Impact of“Pay Ceiling Order”on the CEOCompensation and Pay-for-Luck Phenomenon[J].China Industrial Economics,2010(11):130-139.
[7]AGHION P,REENEE J V,ZINGALES L.Innovation and Institutional Ownership[J].American Economic Review,2013,103(1):277-304.
[8]CIFTCI M,CREADY W M.Scale Effects of R&Das Reflected in Earnings and Returns[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,52(1):62-80.
[9]王生年,尤明渊.管理层薪酬激励能提高信息披露质量吗?[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(4):22-29.WANG Shengnian,YOU Mingyuan.Does the Management Salary Incentive Improve the Quality of Enterprise Information Disclosure?[J].Journal of Audit&Economics,2015,30(4):22-29.
[10]赵飞,于美香,胡治平.管理层激励与企业绩效的相关性研究[J].改革与战略,2015,31(3):60-62,80.ZHAO Fei,YU Meixiang,HU Zhiping.Research on the Relationship Between Management Incentives and Corporate Performance:Comparison of State-Owned and Non-State-Owned Holding Listed Enterprises[J].Reformation&Strategy,2015,31(3):60-62,80.
[11]袁晓波.管理层激励、内部控制与公司绩效:来自中国沪市制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2014,16(6):494-498.YUAN Xiaobo.Management Incentive,Internal Control and Corporate Performance-Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies of Manufacturing Industries at Shanghai Stock Exchange[J].Journal of Tianjin University(Social Sciences),2014,16(6):494-498.
[12]何亚玲.甘肃省中小企业技术创新风险来源的实地调查与分析[J].湖南工业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,22(6):23-28.HE Yaling.Investigation and Analysis on the Risk Sources of Technological Innovation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Gansu Province[J].Journal of Hunan University of Technology(Social Science Edition),2017,22(6):23-28.
[13]谭庆美,刘楠,董小芳,等.CEO权力、产权性质与创新绩效[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2015,17(3):126-134.TAN Qingmei,LIU Nan,DONG Xiaofang,et al.CEO Power,Nature of Property Right and Innovation Performance[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2015,17(3):126-134.
[14]李苗苗,肖洪钧,傅吉新,等.财政政策、企业R&D投入与技术创新能力:基于战略性新兴产业上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2014,26(8):135-144.LI Miaomiao,XIAO Hongjun,FU Jixin,et al.Financial Policy,Enterprises’R&D Expenditure and Technological Innovation Capabilities:Empirical Study from the Listed Companies in China’s Strategic Emerging Industries[J].Management Review,2014,26(8):135-144.
[15]余明桂,范蕊,钟慧洁.中国产业政策与企业技术创新[J].中国工业经济,2016(12):5-22.YU Minggui,FAN Rui,ZHONG Huijie.Chinese Industrial Policy and Corporate Technological Innovation[J].China Industrial Economics,2016(12):5-22.
[16]张玉娟,汤湘希.股权结构、高管激励与企业创新:基于不同产权性质A股上市公司的数据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(9):76-93.ZHANG Yujuan,TANG Xiangxi.Ownership Structure,Executive Incentive and Firm Innovation:Based on the Data of A-Share Listed Companies with Different Property Rights[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,2018,40(9):76-93.
[17]王满四,徐朝辉.银行债权、内部治理与企业创新:来自2006-2015年A股技术密集型上市公司的实证分析[J].会计研究,2018(3):42-49.WANG Mansi,XU Chaohui.The Bank Claims,Internal Governance and Corporate Innovation:Evidence from2006-2015 Technology Intensive a Listed Firms[J]Accounting Research,2018(3):42-49.
[18]姚立杰,周颖.管理层能力、创新水平与创新效率[J].会计研究,2018(6):70-77.YAO Lijie,ZHOU Ying.Managerial Ability,Innovation Ability and Innovation Efficiency[J].Accounting Research,2018(6):70-77.
[19]易靖韬,张修平,王化成,等.企业异质性、高管过度自信与企业创新绩效[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(6):101-112.YI Jingtao,ZHANG Xiuping,WANG Huacheng,et al.Firm Heterogeneity,Top Executives’Overconfidence,and Corporate Innovation Performance[J].Nankai Business Review,2015,18(6):101-112.
[20]杨兴龙,谢利.产品市场竞争、高管激励与创新投入[J].财会通讯,2018(30):69-72.YANG Xinglong,XIE Li.Product Market Competition Executive Incentive and Innovation Investment[J]Communication of Finance and Accounting,2018(30):69-72.
[21]张扬.产权性质、信贷歧视与企业融资的替代性约束[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016(5):66-72.ZHANG Yang.Property Nature,Credit Discrimination and Alternative Constraints of Corporate Finance[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2016(5):66-72.