经济激励型环境政策对畜禽养殖废弃物减排影响机理分析
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摘要
畜禽养殖废弃物是农村环境重要污染源之一。养殖废弃物排放的外部性问题要求政府的政策干预,而在降低成本,促进农户减排积极性上又需要充分发挥市场作用。本研究首先通过建立理论分析模型,探讨废弃物排放权交易制度与废弃物减排奖励补贴对废弃物减排的影响机理。其次,在环境政策对养殖废弃物减排的影响机理研究基础上,分析比较废弃物排放权交易制度与废弃物减排奖励补贴两种政策对废弃物减排量的控制效果,及在实现等量废弃物减排下对社会福利的影响。结果表明,排放权交易价格和减排奖励金额与废弃物排放量成负相关,而社会福利会随着排放权交易价格和减排奖励金额不同而改变。就废弃物减排量而言,排放权交易制度对废弃物减排的控制效果较好;就社会福利而言,当不同政策达到等量减排时,减排奖励制度更有利于社会福利的增加。
Nowadays, the livestock waste has become an important pollution source in rural area. The externality of livestock waste discharge requires government policy intervention. However, the market mechanism, which is used to make up government failure, is also needed. The study, by contracting the efficiency-optimization model, to analyze how does the environment polices influence waste emissions and social welfare, respectively. Moreover, makes a comparative analysis of emissions trading scheme and abatement subsidy from emission control and social welfare effects. The study found that both policies are negatively correlated with emission. Furthermore, abatement subsidy emissions more waste than trading scheme.Abatement subsidy increases more social welfare than trading scheme.
Nowadays, the livestock waste has become an important pollution source in rural area. The externality of livestock waste discharge requires government policy intervention. However, the market mechanism, which is used to make up government failure, is also needed. The study, by contracting the efficiency-optimization model, to analyze how does the environment polices influence waste emissions and social welfare, respectively. Moreover, makes a comparative analysis of emissions trading scheme and abatement subsidy from emission control and social welfare effects. The study found that both policies are negatively correlated with emission. Furthermore, abatement subsidy emissions more waste than trading scheme.Abatement subsidy increases more social welfare than trading scheme.
引文
[1]孙良媛,刘涛,张乐.中国规模化畜禽养殖的现状及其对生态环境的影响[J].华南农业大学学报:社会科学版,2016,15(2):23-30
[2]林永生.不完全竞争行业中的环境工具有效性研究:一个理论框架[J].中国环境管理,2016,8(6):90-94
[3] Pigou AC. The Economics of Welfare[M].4th ed. London:Macmillan and Co, 1920:36
[4] Dales JH. Pollution, property and prices:an essay in policy-making and economics[M]. UK:Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002
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[9] Cason TN, Gangadharan L. Transactions Cost in Tradable Permit Markets:an Experimental Study of Pollution Market Designs[J]. Journal of Regulation Economics, 2003,23(2):145-165
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[13]张光岳,张红,王益谦.潍坊市农业源排污权交易体系研究[J].环境科学与管理,2014,39(10):24-28
[14]许士春.排污税与减排补贴的减排效应比较研究[J].上海经济研究,2012(7):14-21
[15] HoffmannAN.Imperfectcompetitionincomputablegeneralequilibriummodelsaprimer[J].EconomicModelling,2003,20(1):119-139
[16] Bao Q, Ling T, Zhang ZH. Impacts of border carbon adjustments on China’ sectorial emission:simulations with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model[J]. China Economic Review, 2013(24):77-94
[17]王韬,叶文奇.电力和天然气补贴对经济及产业结构的影响——基于CGE建模的分析[J].系统工程,2014,32(9):61-67
[18]程国强,朱满德.中国工业化中期阶段的农业补贴制度与政策选择[J].管理世界,2012(1):9-20
[19]于金娜,姚顺波.基于碳汇效益视角的最优退耕还林补贴标准研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2012,22(7):34-39
[20]宋英杰.基于成本收益分析的环境规制工具选择[J].广东工业大学学报:社会科学版,2006,6(3):29-31
[21] Roach F, Kolstad C, Allen V, et al. Alternative air quality policy options in the four corners region[J]. Southwest Review, 1981,1(2):22-28
[22] Cole DH, Grossman PZ. When is command—and—control efficient? Institutions, technology, and the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes forenvironmental protection[J]. Wisconsin Law Review, 1999(1):887-938
[23] Blackman A. Colombia’s discharge fee program:incentives for polluters or regulators?[J]. J. Environmental Management, 2009(1):201-210
[24] Kathuria V. Controlling water po1lution in developing and transition countries--Lessons from three successful cases[J].J. Envtl. Mgmt, 2006(78):342-351
[2]林永生.不完全竞争行业中的环境工具有效性研究:一个理论框架[J].中国环境管理,2016,8(6):90-94
[3] Pigou AC. The Economics of Welfare[M].4th ed. London:Macmillan and Co, 1920:36
[4] Dales JH. Pollution, property and prices:an essay in policy-making and economics[M]. UK:Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002
[5] Tietenberg TH. Economic instruments for environmental regulation, in economic policy towards the environment[J].Oxford Rev. Econ. Poly,1990,(6):17-33
[6] Burtraw D, Bohi D. SO2 allowance trading:how do expectations and experience measure up[J]. The Electricity Journal, 1997,10(7):67-75
[7]周纯,吴仁海.环境政策手段的比较分析[J].中山大学学报论丛,2003(3):216-219
[8]任艳红,周树勋.基于总量控制的排污权交易机制改革思路研究[J].环境科学与管理,2016(3):19-24
[9] Cason TN, Gangadharan L. Transactions Cost in Tradable Permit Markets:an Experimental Study of Pollution Market Designs[J]. Journal of Regulation Economics, 2003,23(2):145-165
[10]王金南,葛察忠,高树婷,等.中国独立型环境税方案设计研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2009,19(2):69-72
[11] Gangadharan L. Transaction Costs in Pollution Markets:an Empirical Study[J]. Land Economics, 2000,76(4):601-614
[12]李志勇,洪涛,王燕,等.排污权交易应用于农业面源污染控制研究[J].环境与可持续发展,2012,37(5):37-41
[13]张光岳,张红,王益谦.潍坊市农业源排污权交易体系研究[J].环境科学与管理,2014,39(10):24-28
[14]许士春.排污税与减排补贴的减排效应比较研究[J].上海经济研究,2012(7):14-21
[15] HoffmannAN.Imperfectcompetitionincomputablegeneralequilibriummodelsaprimer[J].EconomicModelling,2003,20(1):119-139
[16] Bao Q, Ling T, Zhang ZH. Impacts of border carbon adjustments on China’ sectorial emission:simulations with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model[J]. China Economic Review, 2013(24):77-94
[17]王韬,叶文奇.电力和天然气补贴对经济及产业结构的影响——基于CGE建模的分析[J].系统工程,2014,32(9):61-67
[18]程国强,朱满德.中国工业化中期阶段的农业补贴制度与政策选择[J].管理世界,2012(1):9-20
[19]于金娜,姚顺波.基于碳汇效益视角的最优退耕还林补贴标准研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2012,22(7):34-39
[20]宋英杰.基于成本收益分析的环境规制工具选择[J].广东工业大学学报:社会科学版,2006,6(3):29-31
[21] Roach F, Kolstad C, Allen V, et al. Alternative air quality policy options in the four corners region[J]. Southwest Review, 1981,1(2):22-28
[22] Cole DH, Grossman PZ. When is command—and—control efficient? Institutions, technology, and the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes forenvironmental protection[J]. Wisconsin Law Review, 1999(1):887-938
[23] Blackman A. Colombia’s discharge fee program:incentives for polluters or regulators?[J]. J. Environmental Management, 2009(1):201-210
[24] Kathuria V. Controlling water po1lution in developing and transition countries--Lessons from three successful cases[J].J. Envtl. Mgmt, 2006(78):342-351