生态工业园企业排污行为选择及政府作用分析
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摘要
环境污染问题日趋严重,生态工业园区的发展是缓解环境问题的重要途径之一.首先,采用演化博弈理论工具,分别研究了生态工业园企业、非生态园工业园企业排污行为与政府审查行为的博弈演化规律.其次,探讨了生态工业园中,政府通过制定合适的排污上限,督促企业减少排污总量问题.最后,用算例进行验证.结论表明,根据企业和政府所处的不同初始状态,政府应制定不同的奖励和惩罚措施引导企业加入生态工业园;当政府审查企业排污量的成本与对企业的奖励支出之和大于零时,政府应结合地方实际情况,制定"宽松"或"严格"的排污上限督促企业减少排污量.
The problem of environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious. The development of eco-industrial park is one of the important ways to alleviate environmental problems. Firstly, using the evolutionary game theory tool, this paper studies the game evolvement rules of the sewage behavior and government censorship behavior in the ecoindustrial parks and non-eco-industrial parks respectively. Secondly, this paper explores how the government should urge enterprises to reduce the total discharge of pollutants in the ecoindustrial park. Finally, the numerical examples are used to verify. The conclusion shows that the government should adopt different incentives and punitive measures to guide enterprises to join the eco-industrial park according to the different initial state of the enterprises and the government. When the sum of the inspection cost of the government-examined enterprises and the rewards paid to the enterprises is greater than 0, The government should formulate a "loose" or "strict" ceiling on pollutants according to local conditions and urge enterprises to reduce their discharge of pollutants.
The problem of environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious. The development of eco-industrial park is one of the important ways to alleviate environmental problems. Firstly, using the evolutionary game theory tool, this paper studies the game evolvement rules of the sewage behavior and government censorship behavior in the ecoindustrial parks and non-eco-industrial parks respectively. Secondly, this paper explores how the government should urge enterprises to reduce the total discharge of pollutants in the ecoindustrial park. Finally, the numerical examples are used to verify. The conclusion shows that the government should adopt different incentives and punitive measures to guide enterprises to join the eco-industrial park according to the different initial state of the enterprises and the government. When the sum of the inspection cost of the government-examined enterprises and the rewards paid to the enterprises is greater than 0, The government should formulate a "loose" or "strict" ceiling on pollutants according to local conditions and urge enterprises to reduce their discharge of pollutants.
引文
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[17]林群丰,梁岩妍.排污权市场的制度缺陷与完善—以交易成本为分析框架[J].华南理工大学学报:社会科学版,2015, 17(6):76-82.
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[2]鲁成秀.生态工业园区规划建设理论与方法研究[D].东北师范大学,2003.
[3] Ehrenfeld J R, Gertler N. Industrial Ecology in Practice:The Evolution of Interdependence at Kalundborg[J]. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 1997, 1(1):67-79.
[4] Ceng Y, Cote R. Environmental management systems at the industrial park level China[J]. Environmental Management, 2003, 31(6):784-794.
[5] Zhang H Y, Hara K, Yabar H, et al. Comparative analysis of socio-economic and environmental performances for Chinese EIPs:case studies in Baotou, Suzhou, and Shanghai[J]. Sustainability Science, 2009, 4(2):264-279.
[6] Zhu Q, Lowe E A, Wei Y, et al. Industrial symbiosis in the australian minerals industry[J]. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2008, 11(1):31-42.
[7] Yune J H, Tian J, Liu W, et al. Greening Chinese chemical industrial park by implementing industrial ecology strategies:A case study[J]. Resources Conservation and Recycling, 2016, 112:54-64.
[8] Jacobsen N B. Industrial symbiosis in kalundborg, denmark:a quantitative assessment of economic and environmental aspects[J]. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2010, 10:239-255.
[9]宋叙言,沈江.基于主成分分析和集对分析的生态工业园区生态绩效评价研究一以山东省生态工业园区为例[J].资源科学,2015, 37(3):546-554.
[10] Zhao H, Zhao H, Guo S, et al. Evaluating the comprehensive benefit of eco-industrial parks by employing multi-criteria decision making approach for circular economy[J]. Journal of Cleaner Pro-duction, 2017, 142:2262-2276.
[11]梅林海张红红生态工业园企业间的利益博弈行为[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(03):53-58+154-155.
[12]田金平刘巍李星赖玢洁陈吕军中国生态工业园区发展模式研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2012, 22(07):60-66.
[13]董玉宽,张晓芬.基于改进Shapley模型的生态工业园区内企业间利益分配研究[J].科技管理研究,2015,35(14):181-184.
[14]殷志平,王先甲.不对称信息下的企业排污与政府管制分析[J].武汉理工大学学报:信息与管理工程版,2013(1):91-93.
[15]张伟,周根贵,曹柬.政府监管模式与企业污染排放演化博弈分析[J].中国人口资源与环境,2014, 24(S3):108-113.
[16]原毅军,耿殿贺.环境政策传导机制与中国环保产业发展—基于政府、排污企业与环保企业的博弈研究[J].中国工业经济,2010(10):65-74.
[17]林群丰,梁岩妍.排污权市场的制度缺陷与完善—以交易成本为分析框架[J].华南理工大学学报:社会科学版,2015, 17(6):76-82.
[18]涂正革,谌仁俊.排污权交易机制在中国能否实现波特效应?[J].经济研究,2015, 50(07):160-173.
[19]王洁方.总量控制下流域初始排污权分配的竞争性混合决策方法[J].中国人口资源与环境,2014, 24(05):88-92.
[20] Evans D. Thrifty, green or frugal:Reflections on sustainable consumption in a changing economic climate[J]. Geoforum, 2011, 42(5):550-557.
[21]曹柬,吴晓波,周根贵.制造企业绿色运营模式演化及政府作用分[J].科研管理,2013, 34(1):108-115.