独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制研究
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- 英文论文题名：Study of the Pollution Control Mechanism for Local Governments on the Dictatorship and Non Dictatorship
- 论文作者：吴振信 ; 王娇 ; 张雪峰
- 英文论文作者：WU Zhen-xin ; WANG Jiao ; ZHANG Xue-feng ; School of Economics & Business Administration ; North China University of Technology
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：北方工业大学经济管理学院;
- 论文关键词：独裁 ; 污染联控 ; 机制设计
- 英文论文关键词：dictatorship ; joint control of pollution ; mechanism design
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：X321
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：6
- 文件大小：462k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
污染联控问题的解决是区域间环境保护、经济发展的关键问题,本文从中央政府角度出发,设计了不完全信息下独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制。研究发现:若中央政府不监管,地方政府不能实现污染联控;独裁地方政府存在的必要条件是,独裁地方政府对社会福利的贡献程度大于其他地方政府对社会福利贡献程度的总和;非独裁和独裁地方政府污染联控机制都是占优策略可执行的,且独裁时的社会福利大于非独裁时的社会福利。建议中央政府在区域污染联控机制设计中,利用一些省市的区位优势,发挥具有独裁特性的地方政府在污染联控中的作用,实现区域社会福利最优。
The solution to the problem of pollution control is the key problem of the regional environmental protection and economic development.Dictatorial and non-dictatorial pollution control mechanism for Local Governments are designed under incomplete information.The conclusion shows that:The local government can not achieve the joint control under the condition of non-supervision.The condition of the existence of dictatorship is that the contribution of the dictatorial local government to the social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of others to the social welfare.The pollution control mechanism under the condition of the dictatorship and the dictatorship are both implementable in dominant strategy,but the social welfare of the dictatorship is greater than that of the non dictatorship.In the design of regional joint control mechanism of pollution,the central government should take advantage of the regional advantages of some provinces and cities,and guide some dictatorial local government to play a role in the regional pollution control,so as to achieve the best overall social welfare.
The solution to the problem of pollution control is the key problem of the regional environmental protection and economic development.Dictatorial and non-dictatorial pollution control mechanism for Local Governments are designed under incomplete information.The conclusion shows that:The local government can not achieve the joint control under the condition of non-supervision.The condition of the existence of dictatorship is that the contribution of the dictatorial local government to the social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of others to the social welfare.The pollution control mechanism under the condition of the dictatorship and the dictatorship are both implementable in dominant strategy,but the social welfare of the dictatorship is greater than that of the non dictatorship.In the design of regional joint control mechanism of pollution,the central government should take advantage of the regional advantages of some provinces and cities,and guide some dictatorial local government to play a role in the regional pollution control,so as to achieve the best overall social welfare.
引文
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[2]欧元明,周少甫.基于空间面板STIRPAT模型的省域碳排放研究[J].工业技术经济,2015,(3):58-65.
[3]薛俭,谢婉林,李常敏.京津冀大气污染治理省际合作博弈模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):810-816.
[4]Dilip A,Arunava S.Virtual implementation in nash equilibrium[J].Econometrica,2008,(59):997-1021.
[5]Jon H,Ivar A.Enforcing the climate regime:Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords[J].International Environmental Agreements:Politics,Law and Economics,2004,4(1):1-26.
[6]张雪峰,王娇,吴振信.污染联控的机制设计[J].中国管理科学,2015,23,(SI):749-754.
[7]Sandeep B,Eric M.Mechanism design for the environment[J].Handbook of Environmental Economics,2002,(1):305-324.
[8]Finus M.Game theory and international environmental co-operation[M].Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd,2000.
[9]高红贵.中国绿色经济发展中的诸方博弈研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(4):13-18.
[10]刘传江,赵晓梦.新型城镇化背景下环境污染的博弈分析[J].经济问题,2014,(7):1-5.
[11]刘倩,丁慧平,侯海伟.供应链环境成本内部化利益相关者行为抉择博弈探析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):72-76.
[12]张汉江,张佳雨,赖明勇.低碳背景下政府行为及供应链合作研发博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(10):57-66.
[13]郑君君,闫龙,张好雨,等.基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制[J].中国管理科学,2015.23(8):168-176.
[14]Palestini A,Poggio I.A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics[J].International Review of Economics,2015,62(1):23-39.
[15]Cherry T L.Cotten S J.Kroll S.Heterogeneity,coordination and the provision of best-shot public goods[J].Experimental Economics,2013,16(4):497-510.
[16]Fischbacher U,Schudy S,Teyssier S.Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods[J].Social Choice and Welfare,2014,43(1).195-217.
[17]de Oliveira A C M.Croson R T A,Eckel C.One bad apple?Heterogeneity and information in public good provision[J].Experimental Economics,2015,18(1):116-135.
[18]Lars-G S,Par T.Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods[J].Social Choice Welfare,2008,30(2):181-196.
[19]Diego M,Maria J M.Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods[J].Economic Theory,2013,52(1):315-336.
[20]Ugur O.Sanver M R.Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation[J].Social Choice Welfare,2007,28(1):61-76,
[21]John W H.Strategy-proof.efficient,and nonbossy quota allocations[J].Social Choice Welfare,2009,33(1):505-515.
[22]赵志君.收入分配与社会福利函数[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2011,(9):61-74.
[23]夏良杰,赵道致,李友东.考虑碳交易的政府及双寡头企业减排合作与竞争博弈[J].统计与决策,2013,(9):44-48.
[24]欧阳葵,王国成.社会福利函数与收入不平等的度量[J].经济研究,2014,(2):87-100.