摘要
近年来,以知识交互为主要特征的现代服务业无论是在美国等发达国家,还是在中国、印度等发展中国家,都得到了快速增长。但服务业的高效率并不容易实现。客户企业不仅限于购买和消费服务,而且还是服务提供商的业务伙伴。服务系统是一个价值共同创造和过程共同生产的系统。客户合作是服务设计中一个关键的考虑因素,合作关系对服务质量和服务绩效具有很大的影响。因此,研究服务提供商与客户企业的合作生产契约问题具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文以单服务提供商和单客户企业为代表,以博弈论为主要分析工具,运用信息经济学和产业经济学的方法,重点探讨在不同类型的服务合作生产环境中,在双方相对重要性、双方的相对知识粘性、双方合作程度等因素的影响下的服务契约选择问题。通过建立不同服务环境下的合作生产契约模型,为客户参与服务合作生产的契约决策提供依据。论文的主要研究内容如下：
(1)服务合作生产的本质与机理。
通过国内外相关文献综述：从概念上界定了客户参与服务合作生产的涵义；阐述了服务合作生产过程基于知识转移的本质特征,分析了在知识转移过程中知识粘性的存在及影响；回顾了相关契约理论,讨论了服务合作生产契约的研究现状。从而,提出了本文的研究问题、确立了本文的研究对象、选定了本文的研究视角和研究方法,并为本文模型的建立奠定了相应的概念及理论基础。
(2)服务合作生产关系的分类及特征。
在回顾了企业合作关系内涵的基础之上,基于服务合作生产的知识转移特征,提出了根据参与方的合作程度与参与方在合作关系中的控制地位两个维度进行服务合作生产关系分类的方式,包括：客户主导的咨询式服务合作生产关系、提供商主导的销售式服务合作生产关系、和双方协商的联盟式服务合作生产关系。并从合作程度、知识转移、组织控制等方面分别分析了三类基本服务关系的不同特征表现,为本文规范模型的建立提供参数设定的依据。
(3)服务合作生产Nash非合作博弈控制权分配模型。
服务合作生产的不完全契约治理需要首先确定剩余控制权结构。在考虑单方理性的情况下,首先给定合作生产程度,根据服务合作生产过程基于知识转移的本质特征,引入知识粘性概念,构建了Nash非合作博弈控制权分配模型,得出了非合作博弈情况下不考虑合作程度的影响时,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性共同影响剩余控制权分配的结论。然后,通过改进Xue-Field的服务合作生产Nash非合作动态博弈控制权分配模型,考察了合作程度变化对控制权结构的影响。结论表明,合作程度增加会使由参与方相对重要性、参与方相对知识粘性决定的最优控制权分配的条件得到放松,合作程度对合作关系具有正影响。因此,在非合作博弈情况下,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性、双方的合作程度共同影响剩余控制权的分配。
(4)服务合作生产Nash合作博弈控制权分配模型。
在考虑团队理性的情况下,首先给定合作生产程度,根据服务合作生产过程的知识转移特征,引入知识粘性的概念,构建了Nash合作博弈控制权分配模型,得出了合作博弈情况下不考虑合作程度的影响时,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性影响剩余控制权分配的结论。然后,在模型中改变合作程度的大小,以考察其对控制权分配的影响。结论表明,足够大的合作生产程度会使参与方相对重要性和相对知识粘性决定的控制权结构发生转移。因此,在合作博弈情况下,参与方的相对重要性、参与方的相对知识粘性、双方合作程度共同影响剩余控制权的分配。
(5)不同服务合作生产关系下的契约支付模型。
在总结了不同服务合作生产关系控制权分配特征的基础之上,建立了相应的委托——代理模型,研究了不同服务环境下客户企业对提供商的最优契约支付问题。结论表明,在客户主导的咨询式服务合作生产关系中,客户对提供商的最优支付为基于提供商努力成本补偿的低激励强度契约；在提供商主导的销售式服务合作生产关系中,客户对提供商的最优支付为基于提供商努力结果进行支付的高激励强度契约；在双方协商的联盟式服务合作生产关系中,基于提供商和客户将联合拥有剩余控制权的分析,建立了双边道德风险模型,论证了客户对提供商的最优支付为基于双方绩效的收益共享、风险共担的激励型契约。
In recent years, knowledge-based morden service business has been developed rapidly both in the developed countries, such as the United States, and the developing countries such as China and India. But the modern service industry is not easy to achieve high efficiency. Knowledge-based service business system is a system of value co-creation and joint production process because that client enterprise is not limited to the purchase and consumption of service, but also the service provider's business partner. Therefore, the client's cooperation is a key consideration in service design, and the collaborative relationship has great influences on service quality and service performance. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance to discuss the contract problem of co-production between service provider and client enterprise.
In this paper, with a service provider and a client enterprise as the representatives, we focus on contractual selection problems in different service co-production relations with the game theory as the main analysis tools and using information economics and industry economics. We will find that the contractual selection mechanism is influenced both by the relative importance, the knowledge stickiness in knowledge transferring processes, and the cooperation degree between the two sides. Through establishing game models of the different co-production relationships, the paper can provide decision-making assistance for the service practices. The main research contents are as follows:
(1) The essence and mechanism of client participation in production of service.
Through reviewing the related literature, the meaning of the client participating in service co-production is explained, the essence of knowledge transferring and the influence of knowledge stickiness during service co-production processes is stated, and the research status of service contract is analyzed after reviewing the contract related theories. Base on these, we propose our study problem, set up our study object, and select our study perspective and method. On the other hand, the conceptual and theoretical basises for the study models are established.
(2) The classification and characteristics of the different service co-production relationships.
By reviewing the meaning of business to business cooperation relationships and analyzing the essence of knowledge transferring between the sides, the two classification dementions on service co-production relations are proposed and the three types of basic co-production relations are presented, including the consulting relation controlled mainly by the client organization, the saling relation controlled mainly by the provider, and the alliance relation jointly controlled by the two sides. Then, the collaborative degree characteristics, the knowledge transferring characteristics, and the organization controlling characteristics are analyzed in the three types of service co-production relations seperativly to construct concept basises for the study models.
(3) The Nash non-cooperation game residual rights allocation model.
To select the contract of service co-production, the residual rights allocation problem is reguired to solve firstly. In consideration of the unilateral rational case and given collaborative degree, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced to the Nash non-cooperation game residual rights allocation model of service co-production according to the knowledge transferring characteristics of service co-production between the provider and the client. It is finded that under gven collaborative degree conditions, both the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness together influence the optimal residual rights allocation. Then, by changing the co-production degree in Xue-Field's service co-production pricing model, it is concluded that, except for the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness, the co-production degree of the parties involved can also affect the service pricing.
(4) The Nash cooperation game residual rights allocation model.
In the team rational case, given co-production degree firstly, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced to the Nash cooperation game residual rights allocation model of service co-production according to the knowledge transferring characteristics of service co-production between the provider and the client. It is finded that under gven co-production degree conditions, both the relative importance and the relative knowledge stickiness together influence the optimal residual rights allocation. Then, by changing the co-production degree in the Nash cooperative game residual rights allocation model, it is concluded that the co-production degree, the relative importance, and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants jointly affect the optimal residual rights allocation.
(5) The contractual payment models in different service co-production environment.
According to the parameters characteristics of different service co-production environment, the optimal contractual residual rights structure is determined and the relative principle-agent contractual payment models are constrcted to select the optimal transferring payment constrcat for diffirent service co-production relations. In the consulting service co-production relation controlled mainly by the client, it is concleded that the optimal payment pattern is a time and materials (TM) contract contigent on the provider's cost compensation which is low-powered incentives. Oppositely, in the saling service co-production relation controlled mainly by the provider, it has the conclusion of that the optimal payment pattern is a fixed-fee contract contigent on effort output (FF-O) which is high-powered incentives. As to the alliance service co-production relationship jointly controlled by the two sides and bilateral moral hazard is presented, the optimal payment pattern is proved to be a bilateral performace-based contract (PB) which revenue and risk is shared by the two sides according to their relative important parameters.
引文
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