摘要
终极控制的主要目的之一是攫取终极控制私有收益,这种排斥中小股东的掏空行为引起非经常性损益盈余管理,非经常性损益盈余管理掩饰终极控制私有收益。以农业上市公司为例实证研究这些问题并提出治理建议有益于我国农业上市公司和证券市场的健康、持续发展,具有重要的理论价值及实践意义。
本文在阐述终极控制、盈余管理和非经常性损益相关理论的基础上,分析中国农业上市公司盈余管理及非经常性损益的存在性、终极控制人特征及终极控制下盈余管理的目的——终极控制私有收益,并实证分析农业上市公司终极控制人特征对非经常性损益盈余管理的影响,并提出终极控制下非经常性损益盈余管理的审计治理对策。具体包括:
首先,分析终极控制及非经常性损益盈余管理的相关理论。从产权的含义入手分析终极产权下终极控制的主要特征、盈余管理的含义、方式、负面效应及动机以及非经常性损益的实现途径。
其次,分析农业上市公司盈余管理及非经常性损益存在性。从总体上分析农业上市公司的概况及财务五力的基础上,剖析农业上市公司的盈余管理的存在性和非经常性损益对会计盈余的贡献度。
第三,分析农业上市公司终极控制人特征。基于前述理论研究,对中国农业上市公司终极产权、终极控制方式、终极控制的所有权和控制权背离等终极控制的主要特征进行定量分析;并在此基础上分析终极控制下盈余管理的动机——终极控制私有收益。
第四,实证分析农业上市公司终极控制人特征对非经常性损益盈余管理的影响。采用多元回归分析法,提出假设,构建模型,对中国农业上市公司终极控制的控制权比例、所有权比例及两权背离程度等对非经常性损益盈余管理影响进行深入分析,得出相关结论。
最后,基于实证分析的结果,提出终极控制主导下非经常性损益盈余管理的审计治理对策,从而加强对上市公司的监管,维护市场的公平和效率,保持我国资本市场的可持续健康发展。
One of the main purposes of ultimate control is to seize private interests of ultimate control rights, the tunneling behavior excludeing the benefit of minority shareholders causes non-recurring gains and losses earnings management, non-recurring gains and losses earnings management covers up private interests of ultimate control rights. Empirical study of these problems of agricultural listed companies putting forward suggestions benefit the healthy and persistent development of agricultural listed companies and China's securities market, and they have theoretical value and practical significance. On the basis of presenting the theories of the ultimate control, earnings management and non-recurring gains and losses, this paper analyzes the existence of earnings management, non-recurring gains and losses, the ultimate controller features of agricultural listed companies, the basic purpose of earnings management under the ultimate control—private interests of ultimate control rights, and analyze empirically relationship between the ultimate controller features and non-recurring gains and losses earnings management of agricultural listed companies, finally raises proposals for the audit governance.
Firstly, this paper analyzes theorically for ultimate control and non-recurring gains and losses earnings management, including the main features of the ultimate control, the meaning, methods, negative effects and motivation of earnings management, non-recurring gains and losses to define and approach.
Secondly, the existence of earnings management non-recurring gains and losses of agricultural listed companies are analyzed.Based on analysis of the profile of agricultural listed companies and five financial forces, existence of earnings management and non-recurring gain or loss on the contribution of earnings of agricultural listed companies are dissectted.
Thirdly, the feature of ultimate control of agricultural listed companies is analyzed. On the basis of the above theory, main characteristic e.g.ultimate ownership right, style of ultimate control, sepration of ownership right and control right of agricultural listed companies are quantitatively analyzed. Then,the motivation of earnings management under the ultimate control—private interests of ultimate control rights is set forth.
Fourthly, the impact of the feature of the feature of ultimate control of agricultural listed companies on non-recurring gains and losses earnings management are empirically studied.This paper analyzes in-depth affection of control right ratio,ownership and the degree of their sepration on non-recurring gains and losses earnings management by multiple regression analysis, a hypothesis, building model, then draws conclusions.
Finally, based on the empirical results, it is pointed out that audit measures control non-recurring gains and losses earnings management under the ultimate control in order to strengthen the supervision of listed companies, to maintain fair and efficient of capital marketand and to maintain it sustainable and healthy development.
引文
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