摘要
中国电力体制改革一直在探索新的道路，"厂网分开、竞价上网"的市场化改革正在进行。自20世纪80年代以来，电力市场化的浪潮席卷全球，2001年初美国加州电力危机引起了对电力市场化方向更多的思考，但是英国、阿根廷等发达国家依然坚持市场化改革，并取得了很好的效果。
国外的很多先进经验和运营模式非常值得我们借鉴，并且通过大量的国内外文献研究发现，对电力产业的产业组织分析较为欠缺。因此，进行中国电力市场化进程的产业组织分析和产业组织模式设计，对中国电力市场化改革具有较为重要的理论意义和实践价值。
在分析产业组织理论的发展动态的基础上，首先分别从生产规律特点和自然垄断的判定方法对电力产业进行自然垄断分析，研究了发电市场的垄断度的度量方法，依据成本劣可加性的定义对电力产业的自然垄断产出进行量化分析；同时按照产业组织理论的"S-C-P方法"分析了目前中国电力产业的市场结构。
其次，通过对交易成本、规模经济性和竞争性问题的研究，全面分析了中国电力产业的产业组织特征。应用科斯的交易成本分析框架对一体化管理模式下的内部交易成本进行分析，按照契约过程对市场化模式下的市场交易成本进行分析，并作了相应比较；按照规模经济的定义对电力产业的规模经济性进行了分析，提出改进的"适者生存法"来确定电力产业的最优经济规模，并运用纵向经济的观点解释"厂网分开"；应用可竞争性理论研究了电力产业的有效竞争方式的选择和实现，同时借鉴Stackelberg模型的动态博弈思想，构建了基于政府税收调控的电力市场寡头垄断竞争模型，通过对模型的分析说明了市场结构的演化和政府管制的必要性。
最后，基于非均衡论对全国联网作了理论分析，在全国联网的理论基础上，根据产业组织分析结果，设计了市场化初期以输、配电暂不分开为特征的过渡模式和全国联网实现后的输配完全分开的理想模式的产业组织模式，并分产业合理化政策和市场秩序政策提出了相应的产业组织政策建议。
The reform for Chinese Power System is probing into new way, which is now in the form of "separation of power plant from electric network, connection to the national network by price competition". Market is popular in the world electricity industry since 1980s. Electricity crisis arose more consideration for the electricity market, which happened in California of U.S.A in the early days of 2001,but some developed countries such as England and Argentine still stick to market reform and have acquired good benefit.
Many advanced experiences and operation models from foreign countries are worth using for reference for us, and we can find that there is lack of analysis for industrial organization of electricity industry after we made research on a lot of literature from domestic and foreign countries. Therefore industrial organization analysis and design for Chinese electricity industry based on the proceeding of market will have important theoretic signification and practical value for the market reform of Chinese electricity industry.
Firstly, on the basis of analysis for development of industrial organization theory, the paper analyzes natural monopoly for electricity industry respectively from produce rule and determinant method, studying measure methods for monopoly degree for electricity generation market, analyzing quantitatively for natural monopoly output on the terms of cost subadditivity and analyzing current market structure for Chinese electricity industry with "Structure-Conduct-Performance" method of industrial organization theory.
Secondly, it makes comprehensive analysis for industrial organization character of Chinese electricity industry by the research on transaction cost, economy of scale and competitiveness problem. The paper analyzes comparatively interior transaction cost of integrated model with analysis structure of R. H. Coase and market transaction cost of market model according to bargain proceeding; analyzing economy of scales for electricity industry on the terms of its definition coming up with an improved "survival of the fittest" method to find optimum economic scale and explaining "separation of power plant from electric network" with the view of vertical economy; studying selection and realization for valid competition of electricity industry with Theory of Contestable Market, while setting up a oligarch monopoly competition model for the electricity market based on tax control of government with the thought of dynamic game theory of
Stackelberg model, which illustrates the evolvement for market structure and necessity for government regulation.
Finally, it analyzes theoretically "connecting overall electricity network together" based on non-equilibrium theory and designs industry organization model on the basis of "connecting overall electricity network together" and the result of above-mentioned industrial organization analysis, which is divided into transition model and realistic model. In the transition model transmission and distribution is not separate while in the realistic model transmission and distribution is separate. At the end of the paper, it forwards corresponding suggestions for industrial organization policy respectively from industry reasonability and market discipline.
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① 据统计，我国电力项目综合工程造价“七五”时期为每千瓦1954元，“八五”时期上升为4780元，目前即将竣工的电力项目造价有些已超过7000元。
① 电力企业的产出量可以使用发电量、售电量、销售收入等指标来衡量。
①需要说明的是，只有当需求和边际成本曲线为线性时，它们才是正规的三角形和四边形。
①电力厂商目前主要包括发电商、电网公司等，相应的产出电量为发电量、售电量等；随着电力市场化程度的提高，还可能包括供电商、输电商、售电商等厂商，相应的产出电量为供电量、输电量、售电量等。
① 比较的数据均来自www.sp.com.cn