摘要
在实践中,每个企业集团都有自己的一套规章制度,用以规范和约束母公司和子公司的行为。从理论上讲,母子公司应该“互相合作、共谋发展”。但事实上,母公司侵占子公司利益的行为比较普遍,子公司欺瞒母公司的现象也时有发生,集中体现为母公司的“隧道行为”与子公司的“机会主义行为”,母子公司关系并没有理想中的那么和谐。即使企业集团的规章制度再严格,双方之间的财务冲突行为依然存在。因此,对于母子公司财务关系与财务行为的研究,仅仅关注规章制度等显性因素是不够的,还应当注重双方之间的一些隐性因素。
母子公司之间的委托代理关系可以看作是一系列契约的耦合。而对于契约关系的构成,众多学者均指出契约关系是由显性契约与隐性契约共同构成的,而且两种契约具有互补性,共同发挥着约束与激励作用。所以,对于母子公司财务契约关系,隐性契约是其重要的组成部分。但以往研究较多关注于母子公司之间的股权结构、预算管理、业绩评价、财权配置等显性契约,对集团文化契约、相互信任契约、彼此忠诚契约等隐性契约关系的关注不够。这些隐性契约虽然没有明文规定,却无时无刻不隐性调节着母子公司行为,影响着显性契约的执行效率和效果。因此,在分析财务冲突的生成机理时应当从显性契约与隐性契约的双重契约视角进行探究,而不应当仅仅局限于显性契约的视角。
隐性契约所包含的内容非常庞杂,学术界目前对于其内涵与范围尚未达成统一共识。因此,本文试图寻找与总结隐性契约的共性,把握隐性契约的本质。通过探究隐性契约的生成机理,本文认为隐性契约在本质上起源于缔约者的心理加工过程,是由缔约者的心理期望所逐步衍生出的一系列“隐性规则”。而心理契约理论所研究的核心问题正是缔约者的心理期望,以及这种心理期望对缔约者行为与关系的影响机制。而且通过分析心理契约与文化契约、信任契约等隐性契约的关系,可以发现心理契约是隐性契约的核心组成部分,与其它隐性契约具有紧密的内在关联性,能够很好地体现出隐性契约的本质特征。因此本文以心理契约为代表,从双重契约视角剖析财务冲突的生成机理与协调机制。
将心理契约理论引入母子公司这种群体组织之间的关系,首先需要解决组织的“人格化”和组织的“心理”问题。对此,本文首先基于群体心理学理论论证了企业具有群体意识性与主体性,分析了母公司与子公司群体心理的生成机理；然后结合法学、经济学和管理学等多个理论视角进行分析,认为母子公司之间同样存在心理契约。基于双重契约视角,母子公司的财务契约关系可以看作是由显性财务契约与隐性心理财务契约所共同组成的双重契约关系。其中显性财务契约是指母子公司通过公司章程、法律合同等明文规定的形式对彼此的财务权利义务进行的约定,对行为的影响是显性与钢性的；而隐性心理财务契约是指母公司与子公司对彼此财务权利义务所拥有的心理期望,对行为的影响是隐性与柔性的。显性财务契约是隐性心理财务契约生成的基础,而隐性心理财务契约是显性财务契约的心理衍生。
母子公司的态度和行为受双重契约的共同影响,冲突的产生和双方关系的好坏也是两种财务契约共同影响的结果。由于显性财务契约可以划分为契约缔结与履行两个阶段,隐性心理财务契约也可以划分为两个方面：一是在契约缔结时双方对于财权配置的心理期望,集中体现为母子公司的“公平感”；二是在契约履行时对于对方履约行为的心理期望,集中体现为母子公司的“满意度”。显性财务契约的先天性不完备将导致母公司与子公司之间的剩余争夺,而隐性心理财务契约的违背也是冲突产生的重要起因。在契约缔结阶段,母公司与子公司任何一方隐性心理财务契约与显性财务契约的不对等将产生隐性心理财务契约的违背：在契约履行阶段,任何一方隐性心理财务契约与另一方财务行为的差距也会造成隐性心理财务契约的违背。
本文通过问卷设计与发放,共回收有效问卷142份。通过实证设计与检验,因素分析的结果表明隐性心理财务契约可划分为对决策权的心理期望、对执行权的心理期望、对监督权的心理期望三个维度。通过相依样本T检验以及回归分析,验证了显性财务契约对财务行为具有正向的约束作用；显性财务契约完备度的提高有助于减少财务行为偏离财务契约的约定；隐性心理财务契约衍生于显性财务契约并受到显性财务契约中权利约定大小的显著影响；隐性心理财务契约的期望值受到现实中母公司管理控制力度的影响,会随着财务契约的履约情况而调节；母公司行使权利超过显性契约约定是造成子公司配合度降低的重要原因；子公司隐性心理财务契约的违背对于母公司违约导致子公司配合度降低的过程起调节作用,其中缔约阶段隐性心理财务契约违背的调节作用达到显著性水平,履约阶段隐性心理财务契约违背的调节作用未达到显著性水平。
心理契约是维系、调节、控制、保障母子公司行为与双方关系的内在动力,因此隐性心理财务契约的维护可以成为调节双方财务冲突的有效途径。基于双重契约视角,财务冲突的起因可划分为显性财务契约的先天性不完善以及隐性心理财务契约的违背。而依据隐性心理财务契约的情况,母子公司的组合类型可划分为四种,各类组合下冲突的调节重点也有所不同。因此母子公司财务冲突的调节,应当首先辨析财务冲突的真正起因,并结合心理契约判断母子公司的组合类型,选择相应的调节策略。对此,本文构建了基于双重契约的冲突调节模型,分别提出了各起因及各组合下的冲突调节措施与重点。心理契约视角下,母子公司财务关系的协同不仅包括以往研究的各项显性财务契约的协同,还包括母公司与子公司隐性心理财务契约的协同,以及显性财务契约与隐性心理财务契约的协同。因此,为了更好地发挥母子公司财务协同效应,应当注重显性财务契约的优化、隐性心理财务契约的维护,以及隐性心理财务契约与显性财务契约的良性互动。
In practice, each enterprise group has its own set of rules and regulations to regulate and constraint the behavior of the parent company and subsidiaries. Theoretically, parent-subsidiary should be "mutual cooperation, mutual development". But, in fact, the behavior is very common that the parent company encroaches on the interests of the subsidiary and the phenomenon that subsidiary cheats parent company also happens from time to time. That concentrated embodied parent companies'"Tunneling" and subsidiaries'"opportunistic behavior", and parent-subsidiary relationship is not harmonious ideally. Even if the rules and regulations of the enterprise group are strict, financial conflict behaviors between them are still there. Therefore, in order to study financial relationship of parent-subsidiary and financial behavior of parent-subsidiary, it is not enough only to focus on dominant factors such as the rules and regulations, we should also pay attention to some hidden factors between the two parties.
The principal-agent relationship between the parent company and subsidiaries can be seen as couplings of a series of contracts. For the composition of contractual relationship, many scholars have pointed out that contractual relationship is composed of dominant contract and implicit contract. Two kinds of contracts are complementary, and play mutual restraint and incentive roles. Therefore, for financial contractual relationship of parent-subsidiary, implicit contracts are an important part of it. But previous research focused more on ownership structure, the budget management, performance evaluation, the financial right allocation between parent company and subsidiaries and other dominant contracts, and didn't pay enough attention to contract of group culture, mutual trust contract, mutual loyalty contract and other implicit contracts. Although there is no clear stipulation of implicit contracts, implicit contracts always regulate the parent-subsidiary behaviors, and affecting execution efficiency and effectiveness of dominant contracts. Therefore, when we analyze the generating mechanism of financial conflict, the analysis should be from the perspective of explicit contract and implicit contract, and should not be confined to the dominant contract.
It is so vast of the implicit contract content, and there is not a unified understanding of its scope and connotation in academic circles at present. Therefore, this paper tries to find and summarize the commonness of implicit contracts, and grasp the essence of implicit contracts. Through studying the generating mechanism of implicit contract, this paper argues that implicit contracts are from psychological process of framers in essence, and is from a series of "hidden rules" by the framers of psychological expectations. And the psychological expectations of the framers are the core issue of psychological contract theory study, as well as the mechanism of psychological expectations for the contracting behavior and relationship. And by analyzing the relationship of the cultural and psychological contract, trust contract and other implicit contracts, we can find that psychological contract is the core part of implicit contracts. And with close internal connection of rest of the implicit contracts, it can well reflect the essential characteristics of implicit contracts. Therefore, represented by the psychological contract, this paper analyzes formation mechanism and coordination mechanism of financial conflicts from the dual contract perspective.
Introducing psychological contract theory to the relationships of this group of the parent-subsidiary, we first need to solve the problem of the organization's "personification" and organization's "psychological". To this, first of all, based on the group psychology theory, this paper expounds on that the enterprise has the group consciousness and the subjectivity, and analyzed the generating mechanism of group psychology from; Then combining the theory of law, economics and management, and other angle of view to analyze that, this paper found the psychological contract also exists between the parent company and subsidiary.Based on dual contract perspective, the parent-subsidiary financial contractual relationship can be seen as double contractual relationship which is composed of the dominant financial contract and psychological financial contract.The dominant financial contract refers to that through the company's articles of association, the form of law such as contract, the parent-subsidiary company stipulate the rights and obligations of each other's financial, and impacts on behavior are dominant and rigidity; Financial and psychological contract refers to psychological expectations of the rights and obligations from parent-subsidiary companies, and the impacts on the behavior are implicit and flexible. Dominant financial contract is the basis of the generation of psychological financial contract, and psychological financial contract is derivative of dominant financial contract.
Parent-subsidiary's attitude and behavior are influenced by double contracts, and the generation of conflict and whether the relationship is good or bad between them are the results of the two kinds of financial contracts'mutual impacts. Because the dominant financial contracts can be divided into two stages of contracts concluded and performed, psychological financial contracts can be divided into two aspects:one is that the psychological expectations of the allocation of property rights are concentrated on parent-subsidiary "fairness" when concluding the contract; two is that psychological expectations of performance behavior are concentrated on parent-subsidiary "satisfaction". Congenital incomplete dominant financial contract will lead to competition of residual between parent company and subsidiary, and psychological financial contract violation is also the important cause of the conflicts. On contract concluding stage, if psychological financial contract is not equal with dominant financial contract, that will produce the breach of psychological financial contract; when the contract is being performing, the gap between any one's psychological financial contract and the other one's financial behavior can cause the violation of psychological financial contract violation.
In this article, through designing and issuing questionnaires, I recycle142effective questionnaire copies. Through empirical design and testing, the results of factor analysis showed that psychological financial contracts can be divided into three dimensions which are psychological expectations of decision-making authority, the enforcement of psychological expectations, and psychological expectations of supervision.By dependent samples T test and regression analysis, this paper verified the dominant financial contracts had positive constraints of financial behavior; Higher complete degree of dominant financial contracts helps to reduce the possibility of financial behavior deviating from the financial contract agreement; Psychological financial contracts were derivative from the dominant financial contracts and were influenced significantly by the size of dominant financial contract; The psychological expectations of financial contract are affected by the parent company management control in reality, and will adjust with the enforcement of financial contracts; Exercising rights over dominant contract by the parent company is the important cause of the reducing of subsidiaries'Compatibility; Subsidiary financial psychological contract violation plays regulating role to the process when the parent company's default results in the decrease of subsidiary cooperation degree, and in which the contracting stage psychological financial contract violation adjustment achieved significance level, and on the performance stage psychological financial contract violation of regulation has not reached significant level.
Psychological contract is the internal power to maintain, adjust, control, ensure the parent-subsidiary behavior and the relationship, so the psychological financial contract maintenance can be an effective way to regulate the financial conflicts. Based on dual contract perspective, the cause of the financial conflict can be divided into congenital incomplete of dominant financial contract and breach of financial contract. And according to the circumstances of the psychological financial contracts, the combination of the parent-subsidiary types can be divided into four kinds, and the regulation of conflict from various combinations is also different. Therefore the adjustment of the parent-subsidiary financial conflicts should first analyze the real cause of financial conflict, and judge parent-subsidiary combination type combining with psychological contract, and select the corresponding adjustment strategy. To this, this paper constructed the conflict regulation model based on double contracts, respectively, puts forward the cause and the adjustment measures and the key under the combination of conflict. Under the perspective of psychological contract, the parent-subsidiary financial relationship coordination not only includes the previous research of the dominant financial contract, but also includes the psychological financial contract synergy of parent and subsidiary companies, and the coordination of dominant financial contracts and psychological financial contracts. Therefore, in order to make the parent-subsidiary financial synergies better, we should pay attention to the optimization of dominant financial contracts, the maintenance of psychological financial contract, as well as the interaction between psychological financial contracts with dominant financial contracts.
引文
① 李晓娣.企业集团母子公司治理结构的博弈分析[J].北方经济,2008,(3)：73-74.
① Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117(1):39-84.
② 唐晓华,王丹.集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济,2005,(9)：19-25.
③ 陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3)：60-72.
④ Schmidt, K.M., Schnitzer, M.. The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts[J].Economics Letters,1995,(48):193-199.
⑤ Pearce, D.G., Stacchetti, E. The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1998,23(1):75-96.
① Sloof,R., Sonnemans,J. The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives:An Experiment[J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(2):573-594.
② 向光明.浅议企业集团中的母子公司关系[J].中南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004,24(2)：135-136.
③ Narayandas, D., Rangan V. K.. Building and Sustaining Buyer-Seller Relationships in Mature Industrial Markets[J]. Journal of Marketing,2004,68(3):63-77.
④ 郎国清.工会组织推动发展双重契约劳动关系的思考[J].中国工运,2011,(7)：38-39.
① 全裕吉.高新技术企业虚拟型学习团队的双重激励约束机制——经济契约与心理契约的互动[J].管理世界,2010(6)：179-181.
② 蔡蕾,邓福贤.角色的强制性安排与母子公司财务冲突[Jl.当代财经,2006,(10)：121-128.
③ 刘琮洁.母子公司财务冲突及其协调研究[J].财会研究,2012,(3)：49-50.
① 魏峰,张文贤.国外心理契约理论研究的新进展[J].外国经济与管理,2004,(2)：12-16.
② 王浩,罗军.心理契约研究综述与展望[J].科技进步与对策,2009,(9)：155-160.
① Argvris. C.. Understanding Organizational Behavior[M]. London:Tavistock Publications.1960. Health[m]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1962.
② Levinson,H., Price, C.R., Munden, K.J., Mandl, H.J., Solley,C. M.. Men, Management and Mental
③ Schein, E.. Organizational Psychology[M].NJ:Prentice Hall,1965.
④ Herriot, P., Pemberton, C.. New Deals:The Revolution in Managerial Careers [M]. Chichester and New York:J.Wiley,1995.
⑤ Rousseau, D. M.. Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations[J]. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal,1989, (2):121-139.
⑥ Morrison, E.W., Robinson, S.L.. When Employees Feel Betrayed:A Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops[J]. Academy of Management Review,1997,22(1):226-256.
① Blancero, D., Ellram, L.. Strategic Supplier Partnering:A Psychological Sontract Perspective[J]. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management,1997,27 (9/10):616-629.
① Guest, D.E.. Is the Psychological Contract Worth Taking Seriously?[J] Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19(7):649-664.
② Kingshott, R.P.J., Pecotich, A.. The Impact of Psychological Contracts on Trust and Commitment in Supplier-distributor Relationships[J]. European Journal of Marketing,2007,41(9/10):1053-1072.
③ Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., Perrone, V.. Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance[J].Organization Science,1998,9 (2):141-159.
④ 高维和,陈信康,江晓东.声誉、心理契约与企业间关系：基于在华外资企业采购视角的研究[J].管理世界,2009,(8)：2-12.
⑤ Narayandas, D., Rangan V. K.. Building and Sustaining Buyer-Seller Relationships in Mature Industrial Markets[J] Journal of Marketing,2004,68(3):63-77.
⑥ 高维和,陈信康.组织间关系演进：三维契约、路径和驱动机制研究[J].当代经济管理,2009,(8)：1-8.
① Haugen, Robert A.. The Inefficient Stock Market:What Pays Off and Why[M]. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,1999.
① Kahneman Daniel, Amos Tversky. Prospect theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-292.
② Shiller, R.J.. Irrational Exuberance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
③ Kahneman Daniel, Mark W. Riepe. Aspects of Investor Psychology[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management,1998,24(4):52-65.
④ Kahneman Daniel, Amos Tversky. On the Psychology of Prediction[J].Psychological Review,1973,80(4):237-251.
① Shiller, R. J.. Stock Prices and Social Dynamics[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1984,(2):457-510.
② Shleifer, A., Vishny,R.. The Limits to Arbitrage[J]. Journal of Finance,1997,52(1):35-55.
③ Shiller, R. J. Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System[J].Handbook of Macroeconomics,1999,1(c):1305-1340.
④ Shiller, R.J.. Irrational Exuberance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
⑤ Shiller, R.J.. Irrational Exuberance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
① Angner, Erik, George Loewenstein. "Behavioral Economics', to Appear in Uskali(Ed.), Philosophy of Economics, Dov Gabbay, Paul Thagard, and John Woods(Ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam:Elsevier,2007,(13).
① 陆丹丹,叶雅萍.对母子公司财务关系协调的探讨[J].华东经济管理,2007,(4)：91-93.
② 陈冬.浅谈企业集团母子公司财务关系的优化[J].企业导报,2013,(17)：90-91.
③ 赵晓葵.母子公司财务控制关系浅析[J].青海师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(1)：10-13.
① 李心合.财务理论范式革命与财务学的制度主义思考[J].会计研究,2002,(7)：3-10.
② 林钟高,徐虹.财务冲突及其纤解——一项基于契约理论的分析[J].会计研究,2006,(6)：8-14.
③ 高传富,谈坚.基于利益相关者的公司财务冲突与治理[J].现代管理科学,2006,(3)：39-40.
① 刘冬荣,贺勇.从利益相关者理论看财务契约与财务冲突[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2009,(6)：776-781.
② 雷新途,王敏.企业集团财权配置的契约结构分析[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(7)：55-59.
③ 蔡蕾,邓福贤.角色的强制性安排与母子公司财务冲突[J].当代财经,2006,(10)：121-128.
④ 李艳荣.内部资本市场、财务歧视和关联交易——对我国上市公司融投资行为的一个新解释[J].财贸经济,2007,(4)：67-72.
① Forsgren, M., Holm, U.. MNC Headquarters' role in Subsidiaries' value-creating Activities:A Problem of Rationality or Radical Uncertainty[J].Scandinavian Journal of Management,2010,(26): 421-430.
② Piotti, G.. An Institutional-cognitive Perspective on Headquarters-subsidiary Conflicts:The Case of German Companies in China[J]. Critical Perspectives on International Business,2012,8 (2):1742-2043.
③ 王菁华,张建国,雷新途.不完备契约理论下集团母子公司财务冲突与治理[J].财会月刊,2008,(5)：90-91.
④ 张凌燕.基于代理视角的企业集团财权配置研究[J].财会通讯,2009,(6)：68-69.
⑤ 林嘉兴.基于资源依赖理论的企业集团财权配置研究[J].财会通讯,2009,(7)：118-120.
⑥ Schotter, A., Beamish, P.W.. Performance Effects of MNC Headquarters-subsidiary Conflict and the Role of Boundary Spanners:The Case of Headquarter Initiative Rejection[J].Journal of International Management,2011,(17):243-259.
① 向光明.浅议企业集团中的母子公司关系[J].中南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004,24(2)：135-136.
② Brown,J.R., Cobb,A.T., Lusch,R.F。. The Roles Played by Interorganizational Contracts and Justice in Marketing Channel Relationships[J]. Journal of Business Research,2006,59(2):166-175.
③ 杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义——兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997,(1)：12-22.
④ 韵江,刘立,高杰.企业集团的价值创造与协同效应的实现机制[J].财经问题研究,2006,(4)：80-86.
⑤ Buzzell, R. D., Gale, B. T.. The PIMS Principles[M]. New York:Free Press,1987.
① 雷光勇.会计契约论[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004.
① Ang,J.S., Jung, M.J.. Explicit Versus Implicit Contracting in the Debt Market:The Case of Leasing[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,1998,7(2):153-169.
② Baker, G, Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117(1):39-84.
③ 陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3)：60-72.
① 唐晓华,王丹.集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济,2005,(9)：19-25.
② 王永钦.互联的关系型合约、内生的制度与经济发展[Jl.学术月刊,2006,(11)：78-82.
③ 杨晶.网络环境下企业危机公关及企业一媒体隐性契约关系研究[D].华中科技大学硕士学位论文,2010：7-9,43-54.
④ Casari, M., Cason, T.N..Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2012,(85):20-34.
⑤ Wang, E.T.G., Chen, J.H.F.. The Influence of Governance Equilibrium on ERP Project Success[J]. Decision Support Systems,2006,(41):708-727.
① 杨宏峰.银行公司治理中的隐性契约研究[D].山东大学博士学位论文,2010.
② Wang, E.T.G., Chen, J.H.F.. The Influence of Governance Equilibrium on ERP Project Success[J]. Decision Support Systems,2006,(41):708-727.
① 汪建康.企业集团子公司主导行为与公司治理评价[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
② 蔡蕾,邓福贤.角色的强制性安排与母子公司财务冲突[J].当代财经,2006,(10)：121-128.
③ Macaulay, Stewart. Non-Contractual Relations In Business:A Preliminary Study[J]. American Sociological Review,1963,28(1):55-67.
④ Narayandas, D., Rangan V. K... Building and Sustaining Buyer-Seller Relationships in Mature Industrial Markets[J].Journal of Marketing,2004,68(3):63-77.
⑤ 潘爱玲,李彬.合作网络视角下母子公司业绩评价指标体系的重构[J].中国工业经济,2011,(5)：99-108.
⑥ Piotti, G. An Institutional-cognitive Perspective on Headquarters-subsidiary Conflicts:The Case of German Companies in China[J]. Critical Perspectives on International Business,2012,8 (2):1742-2043.
① Ehrhart,M.G., Naumann,S.E. Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Work Groups:A Group Norms Approach[J]. Journal of Applied Pyschology,2004,(12):960-974.
① 江平,龙卫球.法人本质及其基本构造研究——为拟制说辩护[J].中国法学,1998,(3)：71-79.
② 秦莉.权利的博弈与制衡——母公司控制权的行使与公司集团成员间的利益平衡规则[D].中国政法大学,2005：57-59.
① 齐善鸿,戴斌.论企业的人格化特质与组织变革——关于企业改革的经济学思考[J].南开管理 评论,1999,(5)：56-59.
① 徐国亮,顾保国.人格化企业演进的经济学思考[J],山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(2)：132-136.
② Schein,E.H., Organizational Culture[J]. American Psychologist,1990,45(2):109-119.
③ 郭金山,芮明杰.论企业的心理边界[J].中国工业经济,2004,(3)：67-74.
④ 林钟高,王锴,章铁生.财务治理结构、机制与行为研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2004：8.
⑤ 孙连才.企业集团管控[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009：42.
① 潘爱玲,李彬.合作网络视角下母子公司业绩评价指标体系的重构[J].中国工业经济,2011,(5)：99-108.
① Weitz Barton, Sandy Jap. Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels[J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,1995,23(4):305-320.
② Cullinane, N., Dundon, T. The Psychological Contract:A Critical Review[J]. International Journal of Management Reviews,2006,8(2):113-129.
③ Hofstede,G. Cultures and Organizations:Software of the Mind[M]. Maidenhead:Mc Graw-Hill, 1991.
④ 周晔,胡汉辉,潘安成.心理契约与企业文化的关系研究[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,(9):27-30.
① Guset,D. On Meaning, Metaphor and the Psychological Contract:a Response to Rousseau[J].Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19(s1):673-677.
① Hill,J.A., Eckerd,s., Wilson,D.,Greer,B.. The Effect of Unethical Behavior on Trust in a Buyer-Supplier Relationship:The Mediating Role of Psychological Contract Violation[J].Journal of Operations Management,2009,27(4):281-293.
① 席彦群.集团公司集权式财务管理体制创新研究[J].经济管理,2003,(3)：65-68.
② 濮震玮,李真.论母子公司财务管理模式及其财权配置[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(1)：59-61.
③ 刘彩霞.企业集团财务控制行为——动因,测度及相关分析[M],北京：经济科学出版社,2009(12)：21.
④ 张兆国,张五新.试论企业财权配置[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(6)：790-794.
⑤ 伍中信.现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展[J],会计研究,2005(10)：13-18.
① 注：图3-2中“实线双向箭头”表示双方的委托代理关系,“实线单向箭头”表示双方的单向监督关系。
① Anderson,N. The Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect[J].Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19:637-647.
① Rousseau,D.M., Tijoriwala,S.A. What's a Good Reason to Change? Motivated Reasoning and Social Accounts in Promoting Organizational Change[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,1999,84(4):514-528.
② 魏光兴,刘文瑶.耦合劳动合同与心理契约的人力资源管理[J].软科学,2009,(12)：100-103.
① Piotti, G.. An Institutional-cognitive Perspective on Headquarters-subsidiary Conflicts:The Case of German Companies in China[J]. Critical Perspectives on International Business,2012,8 (2):1742-2043.
① Coase,R.H..The Nature of the Firm[J].Economics,1937,4(16):386-405.
② 谢德仁.企业的性质：要素使用权交易合约之履行过程[J].经济研究,2002,(4)：84-91.
① Alchian, Armen, Susan Woodward. The Firm is Dead, Long Live the Firm:A Review of Oliver E Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1988, 26(1):65-79.
② 雷新途.不完备财务契约缔结和履行机制研究[D].中南大学博士学位论文,2009.
③ 杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义——兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997,(1)：12-22.
① Grossman,S., O.Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory Vertical and Lateral Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
② 张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系——兼评崔之元及周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,(9)：3-15.
③ Milgrom Paul, John Roberts. Economics, Origination and Management[M]. Nem Jersey: Prentic-Hall International, Inc,1992.
① 李心合.利益相关者财务论[J].会计研究,2003,(10)：10-15.
② 雷新途.不完备财务契约缔结和履行机制研究[D].中南大学博士学位论文,2009.
① 易玄.不完备审计契约的缔结、履行与效率研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2012.
① Abrams D., Hogg, M. A. Metatheory:Lessons from Social Identity Research[J].Personality and Social Psychology Review,2004,8(2):98-106.
① 陈志军、闫维波.“组织相”探讨[J].山东社会科学,2010,(11)：98-102.
② Gaertner S.L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B.A. Rust M C. Reducing Intergroup Bias:The Common Ingroup Identity Model[J]. European Review of Social Psychology,1993,(4): 1-26.
③ 雷新途.不完备财务契约缔结和履行机制研究[D].中南大学博士学位论文,2009.
① 蔡蕾,邓福贤.角色的强制性安排与母子公司财务冲突[J].当代财经,2006,(10)：121-128.
② Piotti, G. An Institutional-cognitive Perspective on Headquarters-subsidiary Conflicts:The Case of German Companies in China[J]. Critical Perspectives on International Business,2012,8 (2):1742-2043.
① Morgan, R.M., Hunt S. D. The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing[J]. Journal of Marketing,1994,58(3):20-38.
② Palmatier. R. W, Rajiv P. Dant, Dhruv Grewal. A Comparative Longitudinal Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives of Interorganizational Relationship Performance[J]. Journal of Marketing, 2007,71(4):172-194.
③ Greenberg,J. Equity and Workplace Status:A Field Experiment[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology,1988,(11):606-618.
① Cannon, Joseph P., Ravi S. Achrol, Gregory T. Gundlach. Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form Governance[J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing science,2000,28(2):180-194.
② Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G., Lusch, R. F. Social Exchange in Supply Chain Relationships:the Resulting Benefits of Procedural and Distributive Justice[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2006,24(2):85-98.
③ Scheer, L. K., Kumar, N., Steenkamp, Jan E.M. Reactions to Perceived Inequity in U.S. and Dutch Interorganizational Relationships[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(3):303-316.
④ Cui, T. H., Raju, J. S., Zhang, Z. J. Fairness and Channel Coordination[J]. Management Science, 2007,53(8):1303-1314.
⑤ Kingshott, R.P.J.. The Impact of Psychological Contracts upon Trust and Commitment within Supplier-buyer Relationships:A Social Exchange View [J].Industrial Marketing Management,2006, 35 (6):724-739.
① Granovetter, Mark. The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19 (1):33-50.
② Paul A. Pavlou, David Gefen. Psychological Contract Violation in Online Marketplaces: Antecedents, Consequences, and Moderating Role[J]. Information Systems Research, 2005,16(4):372-399.
③ Robinson, S. L. Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(4):574-599.
④ Koh, C., Ang, S. and Straub, D.W. IT Outsourcing Success:A Psychological Contract Perspective[J]. Information Systems Research,2004,15 (4):356-373.
① Cui, T. H., Raju, J. S., Zhang, Z. J. Fairness and Channel Coordination[J]. Management Science, 2007,53(8):1303-1314.
① Aghion, P., Patrick,B.. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(3):473-494.
② Hansmann, H. The Ownership of Enterprise[M]. Cambridge, MA:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1996.
① 雷新途,李世辉.资产专用性、声誉与企业财务契约自我履行：一项实验研究[J].会计研究,2012,(9)：59-66.
② Palmatier. R. W, Rajiv P. Dant, Dhruv Grewal. A Comparative Longitudinal Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives of Interorganizational Relationship Performance[J].Journal of Marketing, 2007,71(4):172-194.
① 李文静.基于心理契约管理的核心员工忠诚度维护策略[J].技术与创新管理,2009,(3)：348-351.
① 潘爱玲,吴有红.基于网络范式的企业集团信息合作研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(6)：132-136.
② Tucker, L., Melewar, T. C. Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management:The Threat and Manageability of Anti-corporatism[J].Corporate Reputation Review,2005,7(4):377-387.
③ Telser,G. A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements[J]. Business,1980,22(1):27-44.
④ 王冰,顾远飞.簇群的知识共享机制和信任机制[J].外国经济与管理,2002,24(5)：2-7.
⑤ 高维和,陈信康.组织间关系演进：三维契约、路径和驱动机制研究[J].当代经济管理,2009,(8)：1-8.
⑥ 高维和,陈信康.企业间界面信任：从线索到购买[J].商业经济与管理,2010,(3)：88-96.
④ Shore, L. J., Barksdale, K. Examining Degree of Balance and Level of Obligation in the Employment Relationship:A Social Exchange Approach[J]. Journal of Organitional Behavior, 1998,19:731-744.
① Eric Fang, Robert W. Palmatier, Lisa K. Scheer, Ning Li. Trust at Different Organizational Levels[J]. Journal of Marketing,2008,72(2):80-98.
① 徐向艺、谢明亮.协调与合作视角下的企业集团治理框架研究[J].文史哲,2008(1)：151-157.
① Hill,J.A., Eckerd,s., Wilson,D.,Greer,B.. The Effect of Unethical Behavior on Trust in a Buyer-Supplier Relationship:The Mediating Role of Psychological Contract Violation[J].Journal of Operations Management,2009,27(4):281-293.
② 林钟高,徐虹.财务冲突及其纤解——一项基于契约理论的分析[J].会计研究,2006,(6)：8-14.
① Herriot, P., Pemberton, C.. New Deals:The Revolution in Managerial Careers [M]. Chichester and New York:J.Wiley,1995.
② 李心合.财务理论范式革命与财务学的制度主义思考[J].会计研究,2002,(7)：3-10.
① Barnhart C., Boland N.L., Clarke L.W., Johnson E.L.,Nemhauser G.L. and Shenoi R.G. Flight String Models for Aircraft Fleeting and Routing[J]. Transportation Science,1998,32(3):208-220.
② 张兆国,张五新.试论企业财权配置[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(6)：790-794.
③ 张栋,杨淑娥.论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：56-59.
① 高维和,陈信康.组织间关系演进：三维契约、路径和驱动机制研究[J].当代经济管理,2009,(8)：1-8.
② Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G., Lusch, R. F. Social Exchange in Supply Chain Relationships:the Resulting Benefits of Procedural and Distributive Justice[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2006,24(2):85-98.
③ Scheer, L. K., Kumar, N., Steenkamp, Jan E.M. Reactions to Perceived Inequity in U.S. and Dutch Interorganizational Relationships[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(3):303-316.
④ 翟森竞,黄沛,高维和.“组织间公民行为”及其发生机制：关系契约与心理契约的共同作用[J].上海管理科学,2012,34(3)：80-84.
① Telser,G. A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements[J]. Business,1980,22(1):27-44.
① Casari, M., Cason, T.N..Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2012,(85):20-34.
② 高维和,陈信康.组织间关系演进：三维契约、路径和驱动机制研究[J].当代经济管理,2009,(8)：1-8.
① Brown,J.R., Cobb,A.T., Lusch,R.F.. The Roles Played by Interorganizational Contracts and Justice in Marketing Channel Relationships[J]. Journal of Business Research,2006,59(2):166-175.
② Narayandas, D., Rangan V. K.. Building and Sustaining Buyer-Seller Relationships in Mature Industrial Markets[J] Journal of Marketing,2004,68(3):63-77.
③ Weitz Barton, Sandy Jap. Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels[J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,1995,23(4):305-320.
④ Sloof,R., Sonneman,J. The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives:An Experiment[J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(2):573-594.
⑤ Casari, M., Cason, T.N..Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2012,(85):20-34.
[1]Abrams D., Hogg, M. A. Metatheory:Lessons from Social Identity Research[J].Personality and Social Psychology Review,2004,8(2):98-106.
[2]Aghion, P., Patrick,B..An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(3):473-494.
[3]Alchian, Armen, Susan Woodward. The Firm is Dead, Long Live the Firm:A Review of Oliver E Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1988,26(1):65-79.
[4]Amna Kirmani, Akshay R. Rao. No Pain, No Gain:A Critical Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality [J] Journal of Marketing,2000, 64(2):66-79.
[5]Anderson,N. The Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect[J] Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19:637-647.
[6]Ang,J.S., Jung, M.J.. Explicit Versus Implicit Contracting in the Debt Market:The Case of Leasing[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,1998,7(2):153-169.
[7]Angner, Erik, George Loewenstein. "Behavioral Economies', to Appear in Uskali(Ed.), Philosophy of Economics, Dov Gabbay, Paul Thagard, and John Woods(Ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam:Elsevier,2007,(13).
[8]Argyris, C.. Understanding Organizational Behavior[M]. London:Tavistock Publications,1960.
[9]Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117(1):39-84.
[10]Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K. Murphy. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts[J]. Working Paper, Harvard Business School,1994, 109(4):1125-1156.
[11]Barberis Nicholas, Ming Huang. Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns[J].Forthcoming in Journal of Finance,2001,56(4):1247-1292.
[12]Barberis Nicholas, Shleifer,A., Vishny,R. A Model of Investor Sentiment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(3):307-343.
[13]Barnhart C., Boland N.L., Clarke L.W., Johnson E.L.,Nemhauser G.L. and Shenoi R.G. Flight String Models for Aircraft Fleeting and Routing[J]. Transportation Science, 1998,32(3):208-220.
[14]Bem, Dryl J.. An Experimental Analysis of Self-persuasion[J].Journal of Experimental Social,1965,1(3):199-218.
[15]Benartzi, S. and R. Thaler. Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,110(1):73-92.
[16]Bergolf, E.,Thadden,E.L.. Short-Term versus Long-term Interests:Capital Structure with Multiple Investors[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):1055-1084.
[17]Blancero, D. M., DelCampo, R. G, Marron, G. F.. Perception of Fairness in Psychological Contracts by Hispanic Business Professionals:An Empirical Study in the United States [J].International Journal of Management,2007,24(2):364-375.
[18]Blancero, D., Ellram, L.. Strategic Supplier Partnering:A Psychological Sontract Perspective [J]. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management,1997,27 (9/10):616-629.
[19]Brealey,R., Leland, H.E., Hayne,E., Pyle,D.H.. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation[J]. The Journal of Finance,1977,32(2):371-387.
[20]Brown,J.R., Cobb,A.T., Lusch,R.F.. The Roles Played by Interorganizational Contracts and Justice in Marketing Channel Relationships[J]. Journal of Business Research,2006,59(2):166-175.
[21]Buzzell, R. D., Gale, B. T.. The PIMS Principles[M]. New York:Free Press,1987.
[22]Camerer, C. Individual Decision Making[J]. Handbook of Experimental Economics. J. Kagel and A. E. Roth,Princeton University Press,1995:587-703.
[23]Cannon, Joseph P., Ravi S. Achrol, Gregory T. Gundlach. Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form Governance[J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing science, 2000,28(2):180-194.
[24]Casari, M., Cason, T.N..Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2012,(85):20-34.
[25]Chi-fai Chan, Neil Bruce Holbert. Marketing Home and Away:Perceptions of Managers in Headquarters and Subsidiaries[J].Journal of World Business,2001,3 6(2):205-221.
[26]Coase,R.H.. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economics,1937,4(16):386-405.
[27]Cui, T. H., Raju, J. S., Zhang, Z. J. Fairness and Channel Coordination[J]. Management Science,2007,53(8):1303-1314.
[28]Cullinane, N., Dundon, T. The Psychological Contract:A Critical Review[J]. International Journal of Management Reviews,2006,8(2):113-129.
[29]Cutler, D.M., Porterba, J.M., Summers, L.H.. Speculative Dynamics[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1991,58(3):529-546.
[30]Daniel Kahneman, Mark W. Riepe. Aspects of Investor Psychology [J]. Journal of Portfolio Management,1998,24(4):52-65.
[31]Daniel, Kent, D. Hirshleifer and A. Subrahmanyam. Investor Psychology and Security Market under-and Overreactions[J] Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1839-1886.
[32]David Hirshleifer. Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing[J]. Journal of Finance, 2001,56(4):1533-1597.
[33]De Bondt, W. F. M. A Portrait of the Individual Investor[J].European Economic Review,1998,42(3-5); 831-844.
[34]De Bondt, W. F. M., Thaler, R. H.. Does the Stock Market Overreact? [J].Journal of Finance,1985,40(3):793-805.
[35]Diamond, Douglas W.. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring[J]. Review of Economics Studies,1984,51(3):393-414.
[36]Edwards, Kimberley D.. Prospect Theory:A Literature Review[J].International Review of Financial Analysis,1996,5(1):19-38.
[37]Ehrhart,M.G, Naumann,S.E. Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Work Groups: A Group Norms Approach [J]. Journal of Applied Pyschology,2004,(12):960-974.
[38]Eric Fang, Robert W. Palmatier, Lisa K. Scheer, Ning Li. Trust at Different Organizational Levels[J]. Journal of Marketing,2008,72(2):80-98.
[39]Festinger, L.. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance[M]. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press,1957.
[40]Forsgren, M., Holm, U.. MNC Headquarters'role in Subsidiaries'value-creating Activities:A Problem of Rationality or Radical Uncertainty [J]. Scandinavian Journal of Management,10,(26):421-430.
[41]Gaertner S.L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B.A. Rust M C. Reducing Intergroup Bias:The Common Ingroup Identity Model[J]. European Review of Social Psychology,1993,(4):1-26.
[42]Gale Douglas, Hellwig Martin. Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts:The One-Period Problem[J]. Review of Economics Studies,1985,52(4):647-663.
[43]Goetzmann, W. N., Peles,N.. Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors [J].Working Paper, Yale School of Management,1995,(12).
[44]Granovetter, Mark. The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19 (1):33-50.
[45]Greenberg,J. Equity and Workplace Status:A Field Experiment[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology,1988,(11):606-618.
[46]Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G, Lusch, R. F. Social Exchange in Supply Chain Relationships:the Resulting Benefits of Procedural and Distributive Justice[J]. Journal of Operations Management,2006,24(2):85-98.
[47]Grossman,S., O.Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory Vertical and Lateral Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[48]Guest, D.E.. Is the Psychological Contract Worth Taking Seriously?[J] Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19(7):649-664.
[49]Guset,D. On Meaning, Metaphor and the Psychological Contract:a Response to Rousseau[J] Journal of Organizational Behavior,1998,19(s1):673-677.
[50]Hansmann, H. The Ownership of Enterprise[M]. Cambridge, MA:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1996.
[51]Hart, O and Moore. Default and Renegotiation:A Dynamic Model of Debt[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(1):1-41.
[52]Hart,O.. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure[M].Chicago:Oxford University Press,1995.
[53]Harts,M. Raviv,A.. Capital Structure and the Information Role of Debt[J]. Journal of Finance,1990,45(2):321-349.
[54]Harts,M. Raviv,A..The Design of Securities[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989,24(2):255-287.
[55]Harts,M., Raviv,A.. Corporate Governance:Voting Rights and Majority Rules[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:203-235.
[56]Haugen, Robert A.. The Inefficient Stock Market:What Pays Off and Why[M]. New Jersey:Prentice Hall,1999.
[57]Herriot, P., Pemberton, C. New Deals:The Revolution in Managerial Careers [M]. Chichester and New York:J.Wiley,1995.
[58]Hersh Shefrin, Meir Statman. Behavioral Portfolio Theory [J] Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,2000,35(2):127-151.
[59]Hill,J.A., Eckerd,s., Wilson,D.,Greer,B.. The Effect of Unethical Behavior on Trust in a Buyer-Supplier Relationship:The Mediating Role of Psychological Contract Violation[J].Journal of Operations Management,2009,27(4):281-293.
[60]Hofstede,G. Cultures and Organizations:Software of the Mind[M]. Maidenhead: Mc Graw-Hill,1991.
[61]Kahneman Daniel, Amos Tversky. On the Psychology of Prediction[J].Psychological Review,1973,80(4):237-251.
[62]Kahneman Daniel, Amos Tversky. Prospect theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-292.
[63]Kahneman Daniel, Mark W. Riepe. Aspects of Investor Psychology[J] Journal of Portfolio Management,1998,24(4):52-65.
[64]Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Richard Thaler. Fairness as a Aonstraint on Profit Seeking:Entitlements in the Market[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(4):728-741.
[65]Kendall Roth, Douglas Nigh. The Effectiveness of Headquarters-subsidiary Relationships:The Role of Coordination, Control, and Conflict Original Research Article[J]. Journal of Business Research,1992,25(4):277-301.
[66]Kingshott, R.P.J., Pecotich, A.. The Impact of Psychological Contracts on Trust and Commitment in Supplier-distributor Relationships [J]. European Journal of Marketing,2007,41(9/10):1053-1072.
[67]Kingshott, R.P.J.. The Impact of Psychological Contracts upon Trust and Commitment within Supplier-buyer Relationships:A Social Exchange View [J].Industrial Marketing Management,2006,35 (6):724-739.
[68]Koh, C, Ang, S. and Straub, D.W. IT Outsourcing Success:A Psychological Contract Perspective[J]. Information Systems Research,2004,15 (4):356-373.
[69]Kotter J P..The Psychological Contract [J]. California Management Review,1973, 15(3):91-99.
[70]Kumar, N., Scheer,L.K., Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict, E.M..Interdependence, Punitive Capability, and the Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in Channel Relationships [J]. Journal of Marketing Research,1998,35(2):225-235.
[71]La Porta, R.. Expectations and the Cross Section of Stock Returns[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(5):1715-1742.
[72]Leibenstein, Harvey. Beyond Economic Man:A New Foundation for Microeconomics[M].Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,1976.
[73]Levinson,H., Price, C.R., Munden, K.J., Mandl, H.J., Solley,C. M.. Men, Management and Mental Health[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1962.
[74]Lichtenstein, S.,Fischhoff,b., Philips,L.. Calibration of Probabilities:The State of the Art to 1980, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, ed.:Judgment Under Uncertainty [M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,1982.
[75]Lutz Kaufmann, Soenke Roessing. Managing Conflict of Interests between Headquarters and their Subsidiaries Regarding Technology Transfer to Emerging Markets—a Frame work [J]. Journal of World Business,2005,(40):235-253.
[76]Macaulay, Stewart. Non-Contractual Relations In Business:A Preliminary Study [J]. American Sociological Review,1963,28(1):55-67.
[77]Mathias, D., Jean,T.. A Theory of Debt and Equity. Diversity of Securities and Manager-share-holder Congruence [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994,109(4):1027-1054.
[78]Matthew Rabin. Psychology and Economics[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1988,36(1):11-46.
[79]Micthael Jensen, Meckling,W.H.. Theory of the firm:Maagerial of Behaviour, Agency Cost and Capital structure [J] Journal of Financial of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[80]Milgrom Paul, John Roberts. Economics, Origination and Management[M]. Nem Jersey:Prentic-Hall International, Inc,1992.
[81]Morgan, R.M., Hunt S. D. The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing[J]. Journal of Marketing,1994,58(3):20-38.
[82]Morrison, E.W., Robinson, S.L.. When Employees Feel Betrayed:A Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops[J]. Academy of Management Review, 1997,22(1):226-256.
[83]Myers, S.C.. The Capital Structure Puzzle[J]. The Journal of Finance,1984, 39(3):574-592.
[84]Narayandas, D., Rangan V. K.. Building and Sustaining Buyer-Seller Relationships in Mature Industrial Markets[J] Journal of Marketing,2004,68(3):63-77.
[85]Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang and Tano Santos. Prospect Theory and Asset Prices[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(1):1-53.
[86]O'Barr, William M., Conley,J. M.,Brancato,C.K.. Fortune and Folly:The Wealth and Power of Institutional Investing[M].Homewood:Business One Irwin,1992.
[87]Odean Terrance. Do Investors Trade too much?[J]. American Economic Review,1998,89:1279-1298.
[88]Palmatier. R. W, Rajiv P. Dant, Dhruv Grewal. A Comparative Longitudinal Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives of Interorganizational Relationship Performance[J].Journal of Marketing,2007,71(4):172-194.
[89]Paul A. Pavlou, David Gefen. Psychological Contract Violation in Online Marketplaces:Antecedents, Consequences, and Moderating Role[J]. Information Systems Research,2005,16(4):372-399.
[90]Pearce, D.G., Stacchetti, E. The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1998,23(1):75-96.
[91]Pennington, N., Hastie,R.. Explanation-based Decision Making:Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment[J]. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, and Cognition,1988,14 (3):521-533.
[92]Piotti, G. An Institutional-cognitive Perspective on Headquarters-subsidiary Conflicts:The Case of German Companies in China[J]. Critical Perspectives on International Business,2012,8 (2):1742-2043.
[93]Robert,A.H., Senbet, L.W.. New Perspectives on Information Asymmetry and Agency Relationship [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1979,(4):671-694.
[94]Robinson, S. L. Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,41(4):574-599.
[95]Robinson,S.,Kraatz, M.S., Rousseau, D.M.. Changing Obligations and the Psychological Contract:A Long Itudinal Staudy[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1994,(37):137-152.
[96]Ross, Stephen A.. Some Notes on Financial Incentive-Signaling Models, Activity Choice and Risk Preferences [J]. The Journal of Finance,1978,33(2):777-792.
[97]Ross, Stephen A.. The Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive Signaling Approach[J]. The Bell Journal of Economic,1977,8(1):23-40.
[98]Rousseau, D. M.. Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations[J]. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal,1989, (2):121-139.
[99]Rousseau,D.M., Tijoriwala,S.A. What's a Good Reason to Change? Motivated Reasoning and Social Accounts in Promoting Organizational Change[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,1999,84(4):514-528.
[100]Scheer, L. K., Kumar, N., Steenkamp, Jan E.M. Reactions to Perceived Inequity in U.S. and Dutch Interorganizational Relationships [J].Academy of Management Journal, 2003,46(3):303-316.
[101]Schein, E.. Organizational Psychology[M].NJ:Prentice Hall,1965.
[102]Schein,E.H., Organizational Culture[J]. American Psychologist,1990, 45(2):109-119.
[103]Schmidt, K.M., Schnitzer, M.. The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts[J].Economics Letters,1995,(48):193-199.
[104]Schotter, A., Beamish, P.W.. Performance Effects of MNC Headquarters-subsidiary Conflict and the Role of Boundary Spanners:The Case of Headquarter Initiative Rejection[J].Journal of International Management, 2011,(17):243-259.
[105]Sendhil Mullainathan, Richard H. Thaler. Behavioral Economics[J]. Forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences,2000,(7948).
[106]Shafir, E., P. Diamond, A. Tversky. On Money Illusion[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(2):341-374.
[107]Shefrin, H., Statman, M.. Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13(2):253-282.
[108]Shefrin, H., Statman,M. The Disposition to Sell Winners too Early and Ride Losers too Long:Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance,1985,40(3):777-790.
[109]Shiller, R. J. Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System[J].Handbook of Macroeconomics,1999, 1(c):1305-1340.
[110]Shiller, R. J.. Stock Prices and Social Dynamics[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1984,(2):457-510.
[111]Shiller, R.J.. Irrational Exuberance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.
[112]Shleifer, A., Vishny,R.. The Limits to Arbitrage[J]. Journal of Finance,1997, 52(1):35-55.
[113]Shore, L. J., Barksdale, K. Examining Degree of Balance and Level of Obligation in the Employment Relationship:A Social Exchange Approach[J]. Journal of Organitional Behavior,1998,19:731-744.
[114]Simon,H. Behavioural Economics, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman(eds.), The New Palgrave:A dictionary of economics,New York:Stockton Press,1987,(1):221-225.
[115]Sloof,R., Sonnemans,J. The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives:An Experiment[J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(2):573-594.
[116]Smith,C.W., Warner,J.B.. On Financial Contracting:An Analysis of Bond Convenants[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1979,7(2):117-161.
[117]Stulz, Rene.. Managerial Control of Voting Rights:Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control [J].Journal of Financial Economic,1988,20:25-54.
[118]Telser,G. A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements [J]. Business,1980,22(1):27-44.
[119]Terrance Odean. Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders are Above Average[J]. Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1887-1934.
[120]Thaler, R.H., Johnson,E. J. Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even:The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice[J]. Management Science,1990,36(6):643-660.
[121]Townsend,R.. Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verifications [J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1979,(71):417-425.
[122]Tucker, L., Melewar, T. C. Corporate Reputation and Crisis Management:The Threat and Manageability of Anti-corporatism[J].Corporate Reputation Review, 2005,7(4):377-387.
[123]Tvede, Lars. The Pschology of Finance[M].New York:John Wiley,1999.
[124]Tversky, A., Shafir,E.. The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty[J]. Psychological Science,1992,3(5):305-309.
[125]Wang, E.T.G., Chen, J.H.F.. The Influence of Governance Equilibrium on ERP Project Success[J]. Decision Support Systems,2006,(41):708-727.
[126]Weitz Barton, Sandy Jap. Relationship Marketing and Distribution Channels [J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,1995,23(4):305-320.
[127]Wittenbaum, G.M.,Moreland, R.L.. Small-group Research in Social Psychology: Topics and Trends over Time[J].Social and Personality Psychology Compass,2008,2(l):187-203.
[128]Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., Perrone, V.. Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance[J]. Organization Science,1998,9(2):141-159.
[129]蔡蕾,邓福贤.角色的强制性安排与母子公司财务冲突[J].当代财经,2006,(10)：121-128.
[130]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3)：60-72.
[131]陈加州,凌文辁,方俐洛.企业员工心理契约的结构维度[J].心理学报,2003,35(3)：404-410.
[132]陈加州,凌文辁,方俐洛.心理契约的内容、维度和类型[J].心理科学进展2003,11(4)：437-445.
[133]陈志军.母子公司管理控制研究[M].经济科学出版社,2006.
[134]陈志军.集团公司管理：基于三种管控模式[M].经济科学出版社,2010.
[135]陈志军、董青.母子公司文化控制与子公司效能研究[J].南开管理评论,2011,(01)：75-82.
[136]陈志军、闫维波.“组织相”探讨[J].山东社会科学,2010,(11)：98-102.
[137]代鹏、刘洪渭.基于协同理念的企业集团双重财务控制研究[J].东岳论丛,2014,(2)：154-158.
[138]代鹏、刘洪渭.心理契约视角下母子公司财务协同研究[J].山东社会科学,2013,(8)：159-163.
[139]程宏伟.隐性契约与企业财务政策研究[D].西南财经大学博士学位论文,2005.
[140]冯巧根.财务范式新论[M].上海：立信会计出版社,2001.
[141]付晓蓉,柳青.隐性契约下的信用问题研究[J].企业经济,2005,(3)：159-161.
[142]干胜道.所有者财务：一个全新的领域[J].会计研究,1995,(6)：17-19.
[143]高传富,谈坚.基于利益相关者的公司财务冲突与治理[J].现代管理科学,2006,(3)：39-40.
[144]高维和,陈信康,江晓东.声誉、心理契约与企业间关系：基于在华外资企业采购视角的研究[J].管理世界,2009,(8)：2-12.
[145]高维和,陈信康,任声策.企业声誉、两级信任与组织间关系[J].财贸研究,2010,(2)：130-138.
[146]高维和,陈信康.企业间界面信任：从线索到购买[J].商业经济与管理,2010,(3)：88-96.
[147]高维和,陈信康.组织间关系演进：三维契约、路径和驱动机制研究[J].当代经济管理,2009,(8)：1-8.
[148]龚会.心理契约及其与工作满意度的关系初探[J].社会心理科学,2006,(2)：197-201.
[149]郭金山,芮明杰.论企业的心理边界[J].中国工业经济,2004,(3)：67-74.
[150]侯云,周明刚.集团母子公司关系及财务控制研究[J].财政监督,2006,(2)：10-12.
[151]江平,龙卫球.法人本质及其基本构造研究——为拟制说辩护[J].中国法学,1998,(3)：71-79.
[152]蒋尧明,刘剑民.母子公司财务控制模式的内在机制[J].经济管理,2010(6)：73-77.
[153]雷光勇.会计契约论[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[154]雷新途,李世辉.不完备契约与财务目标的状态依存及其边际修正[J].会计研究,2007,(4)：47-53.
[155]雷新途,李世辉.资产专用性、声誉与企业财务契约自我履行：一项实验研究[J].会计研究,2012,(9)：59-66.
[156]雷新途,王敏.企业集团财权配置的契约结构分析[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(7)：55-59.
[157]雷新途.不完备财务契约缔结和履行机制研究[D].中南大学博士学位论文,2009.
[158]李连华.股权配置中心论.完善公司治理结构的新思路[J].会计研究,2002,(10)：43-47.
[159]李文静.基于心理契约管理的核心员工忠诚度维护策略[J].技术与创新管理,2009,(3)：348-351.
[160]李晓娣.企业集团母子公司治理结构的博弈分析[J].北方经济,2008,(3)：73-74.
[161]李心合.财务理论范式革命与财务学的制度主义思考[J].会计研究,2002,(7)：3-10.
[162]李心合.利益相关者财务论[J].会计研究,2003,(10)：10-15.
[163]李艳荣.内部资本市场、财务歧视和关联交易——对我国上市公司融投资行为的一个新解释[J].财贸经济,2007,(4)：67-72.
[164]李原,孙健敏.雇用关系中的心理契约：从组织与员工双重视角下考察契约中“组织责任”的认知差异[J].管理世界,2006,(11)：101-110.
[165]李原,郭德俊.员工心理契约的结构及其内部关系研究[J].社会学研究,2006,(5)：151-168.
[166]李原,郭德俊.组织中的心理契约[J].心理科学进展,2002,(1)：83-90.
[167]李志益.母子公司财务管控模式探讨[J].金融经济,2008,(10)：156-157.
[168]林嘉兴.基于资源依赖理论的企业集团财权配置研究[J].财会通讯,2009,(7)：118-120.
[169]林钟高,王锴,章铁生.财务治理结构、机制与行为研究[M].北京：经济管理 出版社,2004：8.
[170]林钟高,徐虹.财务冲突及其纤解——一项基于契约理论的分析[J].会计研究,2006,(6)：8-14.
[171]林钟高,叶德刚.财务治理结构：框架、核心和实现路径[J].财务与会计,2003,(4)：18-21.
[172]刘彩霞.企业集团财务控制行为——动因,测度及相关分析[M],北京：经济科学出版社,2009(12)：21.
[173]刘冬荣,贺勇.从利益相关者理论看财务契约与财务冲突[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2009,(6)：776-781.
[174]陆丹丹,叶雅萍.对母子公司财务关系协调的探讨[J].华东经济管理,2007,(4)：91-93.
[175]潘爱玲,代鹏.基于心理契约理论的母子公司财务冲突及其纾解策略研究[J].会计研究,2013(9)：51-57.
[176]潘爱玲,李彬.合作网络视角下母子公司业绩评价指标体系的重构[J].中国工业经济,2011,(5)：99-108.
[177]潘爱玲,吴有红.基于网络范式的企业集团信息合作研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(6)：132-136.
[178]濮震玮,李真.论母子公司财务管理模式及其财权配置[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(1)：59-61.
[179]齐善鸿,戴斌.论企业的人格化特质与组织变革——关于企业改革的经济学思考[J].南开管理评论,1999,(5)：56-59.
[180]秦莉.权利的博弈与制衡——母公司控制权的行使与公司集团成员间的利益平衡规则[D].中国政法大学,2005：57-59.
[181]全裕吉.高新技术企业虚拟型学习团队的双重激励约束机制——经济契约与心理契约的互动[J].管理世界,2010(6)：179-181.
[182]沈易峰.资本结构理论史[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1999.
[183]孙方远.基于心理契约的企业员工工作满意度和工作绩效的关系[D].西北大学硕士学位论文,2008.
[184]孙连才.企业集团管控[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009：42.
[185]汤谷良.经营者财务论——兼论现代企业财务分层管理架构[J].会计研究,1997,(5)：20-23.
[186]唐晓华,王丹.集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济,2005,(9)：19-25.
[187]汪建康.企业集团子公司主导行为与公司治理评价[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2010.
[188]王斌.现金流转说：财务经理的财务观点[J].会计研究,1997,(5)：30-34.
[189]王冰,顾远飞.簇群的知识共享机制和信任机制[J].外国经济与管理,2002,24(5)：2-7.
[190]王菁华,张建国,雷新途.不完备契约理论下集团母子公司财务冲突与治理[J].财会月刊,2008,(5)：90-91.
[191]王永钦.互联的关系型合约、内生的制度与经济发展[J].学术月刊,2006,(11)：78-82.
[192]韦庆旺,谢天.群体心理研究：群际关系为核心的变革[J].黑龙江社会科学,2012,(3)：96-100.
[193]魏光兴,刘文瑶.耦合劳动合同与心理契约的人力资源管理[J].软科学,2009,(12)：100-103.
[194]伍中信.财权流：财务本质的恰当表述[J].财政研究,1998,(2)：32-34.
[195]伍中信.现代公司财务治理理论的形成与发展[J],会计研究,2005(10)：13-18.
[196]席彦群.集团公司集权式财务管理体制创新研究[J].经济管理,2003,(3)：65-68.
[197]向光明.浅议企业集团中的母子公司关系[J].中南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004,24(2)：135-136.
[198]谢德仁.企业的性质：要素使用权交易合约之履行过程[J].经济研究,2002,(4)：84-91.
[199]谢志华.出资者财务论[J].会计研究,1997,(5)：24-29.
[200]徐国亮,顾保国.人格化企业演进的经济学思考[J],山东大学学报(哲学社 会科学版),2005,(2)：132-136.
[201]徐虹.心理契约在人力资源管理中的应用研究综述[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(2)：62-65.
[202]徐向艺、谢明亮.协调与合作视角下的企业集团治理框架研究[J].文史哲,2008(1)：151-157.
[203]杨宏峰.银行公司治理中的隐性契约研究[D].山东大学博士学位论文,2010.
[204]杨晶.网络环境下企业危机公关及企业—媒体隐性契约关系研究[D].华中科技大学硕士学位论文,2010：7-9,43-54.
[205]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义——兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997,(1)：12-22.
[206]杨淑娥,金帆.关于公司财务治理问题的思考[J].会计研究,2002,(12)：51-55.
[207]易宪荣.交易行为与合约选择[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1998.
[208]易玄.不完备审计契约的缔结、履行与效率研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2012.
[209]于海涛.企业员工心理契约与离职倾向的关系[D].河南大学硕士学位论文,2006.
[210]韵江,刘立,高杰.企业集团的价值创造与协同效应的实现机制[J].财经问题研究,2006,(4)：80-86.
[211]翟森竞,黄沛,高维和.“组织间公民行为”及其发生机制：关系契约与心理契约的共同作用[J].上海管理科学,2012,34(3)：80-84.
[212]张栋,杨淑娥.论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：56-59.
[213]张凌燕.基于代理视角的企业集团财权配置研究[J].财会通讯,2009,(6)：68-69.
[214]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1999：30-96.
[215]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系——兼评崔之元及周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,(9)：3-15.
[216]张兆国,张五新.试论企业财权配置[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2005,(6)：790-794.
[217]周翔.员工心理契约的形成机制以及企业文化的影响：对泰豪科技的实证研究[D].清华大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[218]周晔,胡汉辉,潘安成.心理契约与企业文化的关系研究[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,(9)：27-30.