摘要
中文摘要：对于正处于经济转型与体制转轨双重过程中的中国来讲,由各级政府充当经济与社会发展变化的初始发动机,几乎成为一个根深蒂固的思维传统。因为自1978年改革开放至今已30余年,由中国各级政府驱动改革进程仍然是绝大多数改革领域的主流推动力。这种政府作用全面体现在基础设施建设、扶持本地企业发展、吸引外来投资,甚至在改革早期阶段直接参与企业投资和管理等各个方面。可以说,中国地方政府的那种寻求一切可能的来源进行投资、采取各种手段推动地方经济的发展的热情在世界范围内都是不多见的。
对于政府行为研究而言,除了法治建设、宪政改革、权力制衡等方面之外,中央与地方政府间的关系一直是政治与经济等社会科学研究的重要课题,其中最有影响力的是财政分权理论。依托现有的分权理论与经验研究文献,本文立足于对中国式分权性质的判断,从政府竞争视角来阐释中国式分权与宏观经济绩效之间的内在关联,并在认清中国地方政府间竞争关系的表现形式以及中国分权式改革得失的基础上,尝试构建一个能够将中国式分权收益与成本进行统一分析的逻辑自洽的经济学模型,以努力寻找能够使地方公共服务走向均等化的力量,从而使地方政府间的竞争均衡能够避免出现"race to bottom"式的囚徒困境状态。本文对以上问题的研究对于深刻理解中国财政体制改革的历史以及辨别未来财政体制变革的基本方向具有重要意义。为了有效达到研究目标,本文在研究过程中始终秉承了历史分析与逻辑分析相统一、理论研究与经验研究相结合的研究范式,其中,在参数估计方法选择方面,根据研究内容的具体需要使用到了广义矩估计法(GMM)、工具变量法(2SLS)等。除了以上参数估计方法之外,本文还采用了一些其他数理方法,如数值模拟、核密度估计、基尼系数以及泰尔指数指标测算等。
本文所得出的关键结论有：(1)改革开放之后中国中央政府与地方政府间的分权性质更接近于分权一端,即归属于财政联邦主义理论框架。在这种框架中,地方政府的行为特征是倾向于通过经济增长竞争来尽量增加预算外收入以提升与中央政府讨价还价的力量,并实施地方保护政策追求地方财政利益最大化。同时,为了尽量较少地受到中央财政体制的限制,在财政收支安排上地方政府会倾向于减少财政收支差额比例。(2)中国中央与地方之间以及地方政府之间都存在显著的财政策略性行为。对于地方政府间的财政竞争效应而言,其策略性反应函数向右上方倾斜。具体来讲,除了在全国层面上呈现出显著的空间依赖性之外,中国东中西部省份之间存在着不同的性质的财政策略性反应,呈现出跨区差异与俱乐部效应。进一步，中国省级政府间的财政策略性行为显著表现为争夺流动性税基的税收竞争,而没有发现存在“自上而下的标尺竞争”的证据。(3)通过构建一个分权体制下地方政府资源配置的基准模型,本文刻画了地方政府依据代表性消费者效用函数对非生产性资本投入与生产性资本投入进行均衡配置的基本情形。在此基础上,通过具体设定生产函数与效用函数的经典形式,并采用数值模拟方法得出,随着生产函数曲率的下降以及地方政府公共偏好异质性的增强,伴随分权所产生的社会效用损失越来越大,即分权及其所带来的政府竞争行为负面成本也就越来越明显。依据中国改革开放以后30余年的发展现实,本文对数值模拟的结论进行了中国化解读,强调了中国式分权相伴随的社会成本,即城乡以及区域间收入差距的不断扩大、地区间的市场分割与结构趋同、地方政府的财政支出结构出现扭曲等三个方面成本对社会福利的损害。(4)在1985-1994年与1997-2006年两个时段中,中国各省份公共交通基础设施服务、公共卫生服务以及公共教育服务等三种社会公共服务提供水平虽然都在一定程度上实现了提升,但是省份间的差异却随着时间推移越来越大了。这种情形出现的原因仍然根植于独特的中国式分权体制。在认识到中央转移支付没有能够承载地方政府公共服务均等化职能的前提下,本文指出由于中央政府与中国式分权体制下利益相对独立化的地方政府之间天然存在着信息不对称、信息不完善与巨大的监督成本问题,中央政府在通过政治晋升机制对地方政府加以约束之外,也同样可能有着通过塑造并维持地方政府财政收支缺口来对其施加约束的政治考虑。从这个角度我们也可以更深刻地理解分税制改革没有涉及地方财政支出安排的内在逻辑。
从政策内涵层面讲,如果说我国改革开放的前30年中央政府已经实现了对地方政府的“做对激励”,从而充分实现了中国式分权的收益,那么,在改革开放以后的第二个30年以及更远的未来,如何缓解并最终消除伴随着分权而逐渐暴露的社会成本,就成为一个亟待解决的问题。本文认为,在“做对激励”之后,现阶段中央政府在进一步“做对激励”的前提下,应该更加重视“做对协调”与“做对考核”。对于“做对协调”而言,主要是指中央政府应该逐步打破财政分权体制下的各省份既得利益,真正发挥中央政府对经济发展全局的调控与平衡职能；而对于“做对考核”而言,逐步改变对地方政府的基于GDP增长率的一元化考核机制是关键的变革环节。
It is just in a dual-process of economic restructuring and transition for China. In this progress, each level of governments acts as an initial engine for economic and social development, and it almost becomes a deep-rooted thinking tradition to turn to governments for help. Since 1978, Chinese governments of all levels are the main driving force for most areas of reform during more than 30 years of reform and opening-up. We can find much evidence to reflect the important role of Chinese governments, such as local infrastructure construction, local business development and policy supporting, attracting foreign direct investment, and even directly involving in state business investment and management. It can be said that the enthusiasm of Chinese local governments to seek all possible sources for promoting GDP growth is seldom seen in the world.
For the research of government behavior, scholars often refer to building the rule of law, constitutional reform, and the balance of government power and so on. Besides those above-mention aspects, the relationship between central and local governments has always been an important issue for economic or political science, and the most influential theory is fiscal decentralization. On the base of existing decentralization theories and positive literatures, this dissertation gives a basic judgment about the essence of Chinese fiscal decentralization which is characterized by the interaction of fiscal decentralization and political centralization, and then it illustrates the internal relationship between decentralization of Chinese style and its macroeconomic performance. It's certainly very important to recognize the concrete manifestation of the remarkable interaction between Chinese local governments. This reorganization is imperative to go a step further to understand the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese decentralization. It's a pity for me to point out that we have not a bridge to ferry from decentralization gains to decentralization losses, and there is no doubt that to build a self-consistent economic framework between decentralization gains and losses is an urgent task. This dissertation tries to do this task mentioned before initially. One purpose of establishing the self-consistent economic framework is try to find the equalization power of local public services in China, and then to avoid the prisoner's dilemma when Chinese local governments race to bottom driving by radical economic and political competition. In a word, this dissertation will help us to understand the history and basic direction of Chinese financial reform deeply.
In order to achieve research objective of this dissertation, it always insists on two research paradigms, and they are the unity of historical analysis with logical analysis and the combination of theoretical research with empirical research. What deserves to indicate specially is that this dissertation adopts some fashionable parameter estimation method nowadays, such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), two-stage least-squares estimation (2SLS) and so on. Apart from the above estimation methods, this dissertation also uses a number of other mathematical methods, such as numerical simulation method, kernel density estimation, the Gini coefficient calculation, Theil index calculation and so on.
The key conclusions drawn from this dissertation are as follows:
(1) After bring the reform and opening-up policy into force, the intrinsic relationship between Chinese central and local governments is much closer to extreme point of decentralization than the period of planning economy, at least in the public financial area. With the condition of political centralism in China, we can group this kind of decentralized relationship under the jurisdiction of fiscal federalism. This dissertation gives the judgment mentioned above after strict econometric analysis. Under this judgment, we can give a reasonable comprehension for the phenomenon as follows:In China, the local governments are always inclined to increase the proportion of extra-budget revenues through GDP growth competition, and then they will implement local protectionism to protect the interests of their own jurisdiction. At the same time, the local governments have to scale the gap between public expenditures and local revenues down, and only by this they can avoid the constraint power coming from the central transfer payments system. The ultimate purpose of local governments to do like an independent kingdom is to enhance the bargaining power with central government.
(2) There exists remarkable strategic interactions between central and local governments, and what's more, the similar strategic behaviors appear among the Chinese provincial governments. At the same time, the strategic interactions of east, middle and west regions display different characteristics, namely cross-region effect and club effect. As two manifestations of strategic fiscal interaction, tax competition and yardstick competition have different policy connotation, so this dissertation also tries to recognize the concrete manifestation of the remarkable interaction by proposing two tentative hypotheses. The empirical results show that tax competition for the fluid tax base among Chinese provincial governments is the main manifestation of fiscal interaction, and it isn't remarkable that there exists top-down yardstick competition.
(3) By constructing a benchmark model about the balanced allocation for financial resources of local governments in a decentralized institutional environment, this dissertation gives an optimal equilibrium solution when the financial resources are classified into non-productive and productive investment. On the base of the benchmark model, this dissertation sets up the classical forms of production function and utility function, and then by making use of numerical simulation, it concludes that with the declining curvature of the production function and the increasing public preference heterogeneity of local governments, social utility function will suffer more and more losses, which means that the costs brought by extravagant competition among local governments become increasingly obvious. According to the economic reality after China's reform and opening-up policy, as well as the conclusions of numerical simulation, this dissertation stresses those social costs of Chinese fiscal decentralization, such as the income gap between urban and rural areas, the segmentation and structural similarity of regional market, and the structural distortion of local government's fiscal expenditure.
(4) This dissertation investigates the distribution characteristics of the three fundamental categories of local public services in two periods including 1985-1994 and 1997-2006, and it tells us that even though the public transport infrastructure services, public health services and public education services of Chinese provinces have achieved upgrade relatively to some extent, but the discrepancy of those three categories of local public services is increasing over time. This situation originates from the unique Chinese-style decentralization. The following question is that if the central transfer payments system of China can not able to endure the function of public services'equalization, so what is its real intention behind the scenes. According to the theory of asymmetric and imperfect information, this dissertation points out that the Chinese central government may have some kind of political consideration to tame the local governments when they need financial resources to fill in the gap between local revenue and expenditure.
About the policy implication, this dissertation indicates that the Chinese central government has established an effective motivation mechanism on the local governments during the first 30 years after the reform and opening-up policy, which we call "getting the incentive right". However, the problem deserving more attention at present is to eliminate the social costs accompanied with decentralization benefits. When referring to the Chinese central government, the connotation of this problem lies in the urgency to getting the coordination right when getting the incentive right, and only by this way it can break the vested interests of each province in China. In other words, the central government of China has no choice but to bring the overall regulation into the economic development. What's more, it has to get the assessment right if we want to rectify the structural distortion of fiscal function existing among the local governments, and the key step to do this is to change the singular assessment criterion of GDP growth to the local governments gradually.
引文
[62]Martinez-Vazquez,J. and McNab,R.M. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth[J].World Development,2003,31:1597-1616
[63]Bird,R. and Wallich,C. Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Relations in Transition Economies:Towards a Systematic Framework of Analysis. Policy Research Working Paper WPS 1122, Washington,D.C.:World Bank,1993
[64]Nolan,P. China's Rise, Russia's Fall:Politics, Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism[M].New York:St.Martin's Press,1995
[65]许成钢.中国经济改革的制度基础[J].世界经济文汇,2009,4：105-116
[66]Huang,Y.S. Managing Chinese Bureaucrats:An Institutional Economics Perspective[J].Political Studies,2002,50:61-79
[67]Mei,Ciqi. Rules of Political Game:Cadre Evaluation and Appointment System in China. Manuscript, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland,2007
[68]Tsui,Kai-Yuen and Wang,Youqiang. Decentralization with Political Trump:Vertical Control, Local Accountability and Regional Disparities in China [J].China Economic Review, 2008,19:18-31
[69]周黎安.中央和地方关系的“集权—分权”悖论[R].天则双周论坛,2007-08-31.http://www.unirule.org.cn/Secondweb/DWSummary.asp?DWID=371
[70]林毅夫,刘志强.中国的财政分权与经济增长[J].北京大学学报：哲学社会科学版,2000,4：5-17
[71]Davoodi,H. and Zou,H. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth`A Cross Country Study[J]. Journal of UrbanEconomics,1997,43:244-257
[72]王志刚,龚六堂.财政分权和地方政府非税收入：基于省级财政数据[J].世界经济文汇,2009,5：17-38
[73]Ebel,R.D. and Yilmaz,S. On the Measurement and Impact of Fiscal Decentralization [A]. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.2809,2002
[74]Li Lixing. The Incentive Role of Creating "Cities" in China[A]. MPRA Paper No. 8594,2008
[75]黄佩华,迪帕克等著,吴素萍,王桂娟等译.中国：国家发展与地方财政[M].北京：中信出版社,2003
[76]张军.分权与增长：中国的故事[J].经济学(季刊),2007,7(1)：21-52
[77]中国改革与发展报告专家组.透过历史的表象：中国改革20年回顾、反思与展望[M].上海：上海远东出版社，2000
[78]张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁[A].载于盛洪,张宇燕主编.从计划经济到市场经济[C].北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
[79]钟晓敏.政府间财政转移支付论[M].上海：立信会计出版社,1998
[80]李齐云.分级财政体制研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2003
[81]财政部预算管理司和IMF财政事务局.中国政府间财政关系[J].北京：中国经济出版社,1993：26-27
[82]张闫龙.财政分权与省以下政府间关系的演变——对20世纪80年代A省财政体制改革中政府间关系变迁的个案研究[J].社会学研究,2006,3：39-63
[83]黄佩华.21世纪的中国能转变经济发展模式吗?[J].比较,2005,18
[84]Chung,Jae Ho and Lam,Tao-chiu. China's City System in Flux:Explaining Post-Mao Administrative Changes[J].China Quarterly,2004,180:945-964
[85]Oi,J.C. The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy[J].China Quarterly,1995,144:1132-1149
[86]Walder,A. Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy[J].American Journal of Sociology,1995,101(2):263-301
[87]Peng Yusheng. Chinese Townships and Villages as Industrial Corporations: Ownership, Governance and Productivity [J].American Journal of Sociology,2001, 106:1338-1370
[88]Lampton,D.M. A Plum for a Peach:Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China[A].in K.Lieberthal and D.Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China[C].Berkeley:University of California Press,1992:33-58
[89]Shirk,Susan L. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China[M].Berkeley: University of California Press,1993
[90]Cai Hongbin and Daniel Treisman. State Corroding Federalism [J]. Journal of Public Economics,2004,88(3-4):819-843
[91]Li Hongbin and Zhou Li-an. Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Disciplinary Role of Personnel Control in China [J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005, 89:1743-1762
[92]Susan,H.Whiting. Growth, Governance and Institutions:The Internal Institutions of the Party-State in China[R].Produced for the World Bank Research Project on the Rise of China and India (Governance), Revised draft,2006 July 28
[93]Singh,Nirvikar. Fiscal Decentralization in China and India:Competitive, Cooperative or Market Preserving Federalism?[A] MPRA Paper No.1705,2007
[94]杨其静,聂辉华.保护市场的联邦主义及其批判：基于文献的一个思考[J].经济研究,2008,3：99-114
[95]He Canfei. Regional Decentralization and Location of Foreign Direct Investment in China[J]. Post-Communist Economies,2006,18(1):33-50
[96]徐现祥,陈小飞.经济特区：我国渐进改革开放的起点[J].世界经济文汇,2008,1：14-26
[97]Cai Hongbin and Daniel Treisman. Did Government Decentralization Cause China's Economic Miracle?[J] World Politics,2006,58(4):505-535
[98]曼瑟尔·奥尔森著,陈郁等译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1995
[99]Nee, Victor. Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition:Hybrid Forms, Property Rights and Mixed Economy in China [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1992,37:1-27
[100]Chen,K. The Chinese Economy in Transition [M].Singapore:Singapore University Press,1995
[101]Bai Chong-En,Tao Zhigang and Tong Yueting Sarah. Bureaucratic Integration and Regional Specialization in China [J].China Economic Review,2008,19:308-319
[102]黄赜琳,王敬云.地方保护与市场分割：来自中国的经验数据[J].中国工业经济,2006,2：60-67
[103]Naughton,B. How Much Can Regional Integration Do to Unify China's Markets?[R] Paper Presented for the Conference for Research on Economic Development and Policy Research, Stanford University,1999
[104]Li,S.T.,Liu,Y.Z. and Chen,B. Survey and Analysis of China's Domestic Local Protectionism:A Study Based on a Questionnaire Survey of Enterprises [J]. China Journal of Economics,2005,1:117-192
[105]Fan,C.S. and Wei,X. The Law of One Price:Evidence from the Transitional Economy of China [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,2006,88:682-697
[106]李俊霖.宏观税负、财政支出与经济增长[J].经济科学,2007,4：5-14
[107]Park,A.,Scott,R,Wong,C. and Ren,C. Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China[J]. China Quarterly,1996,147:751-778
[108]刘尚希.中国财政风险的制度特征：“风险大锅饭”[J].管理世界,2004,5：39-49
[109]Kalemli-Ozcan,S.,Sorensen,B. and Yosha,O. Risk sharing and Industrial Specialization:Regional and International Evidence[J]. American Economic Review,2003, 93:903-918
[110]Huang,Y.S. Inflation Investment Controls in China[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1996
[111]Arellano,M. and Bond,S. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1991,58:277-297
[112]Arellano,M. and Bover,O. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-components Models[J]. Journal of Econometrics,1995,68:29-51
[113]Blundell,R. and Bond,S. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models[J]. Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:115-143
[114]Bond Stephen,Anke Hoeffler and Jonathan Temple. GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models. CEPR discussion paper No.3048,2001
[115]Kelejian,H. and Prucha,I. A Generalized Spatial Two-stage Least Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive Disturbances [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,1998,17:99-121
[116]Bell,K.,Nancy,P. and Bockstael,E. Applying the Generalized-Moments Estimation Approach to Spatial Problems Involving Micro level Data[J].The Review of Economics and Statistics,2000,82(1):72-82
[117]Im,K.S.,Pesaran,M.H. and Shin,Y. Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels[J]. Journal of Econometrics,2003,115:53-74
[118]何虎生等.中华人民共和国职官志[M].北京：中国社会出版社,1993
[119]安立仁.资本驱动的中国经济增长：1952-2002[J].人文杂志,2003,6：44-54
[120]赵志耘,吕冰洋.政府生产性支出对产出-资本比的影响——基于中国经验的研 究[J].经济研究,2005,11：46-56
[121]张烨卿.资本形成、内生技术进步与中国经济持续增长——基于资本产出比视角的实证研究[J].经济科学,2006,6：31-40
[122]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,6：33-40
[123]王文剑等.财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应[J].管理世界,2007,3：13-22
[124]张晏.财政分权、FDI竞争与地方政府行为[J].世界经济文汇,2007,2：22-36
[125]Tiebout,Charles. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1956,64:416-424
[126]Revelli,F. Spatial Patterns in Local Taxation:Tax Mimicking or Error Mimicking?[J] Applied Economics,2001,33:1101-1107
[127]Bordignon,M.,Cerniglia,F. and Revelli,F. In Search of Yardstick Competition:A Spatial Analysis of Italian Municipality Property Tax[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2003, 54:199-217
[128]Karin Edmark and Hanna Agren. Identifying Strategic Interactions in Swedish Local Income Tax Policies[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2008,63:849-857
[129]Revelli,F. Reaction or Interaction? Spatial Process Identification in Multi-tiered Government Structures[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2003,53:29-53
[130]Baicker,K. The Spillover Effects of State Spending [J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005,89:529-544
[131]Brueckner,J.K. Testing for Strategic Interaction among Local Governments:The Case of Growth Controls[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1998,44:438-467
[132]Fredriksson,P.G. and Millimet,D.L. Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51:101-122
[133]Case,A.C.,Rosen,H.S. and Hines,J.R. Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy Interdependence:Evidence from the States[J]. Journal of Public Economics,1993,52:280-296
[134]Figlio,D.N.,Van,W. Kolpin and William Reid. Do States Play Welfare Games?[J] Journal of Urban Economics,1999,46(3):437-454
[135]Saavedra,L.A. A Model of Welfare Competition with Empirical Evidence from AFDC[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,2000,47(2):248-279
[136]Rainald Borck,Marco Caliendo and Viktor Steiner. Fiscal Competition and the Composition of Public Spending:Theory and Evidence [A]. The Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No.2428,2006
[137]Heyndels,B. and Vuchelen,J. Tax Mimicking among Belgian Municipalities[J]. National Tax Journal,1998,51:89-101
[138]Brueckner,J.K. and Saavedra,L. Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-tax Competition? [J] National Tax Journal,2001,54:203-229
[139]Bob Chirinko and Daniel Wilson. Tax Competition Among U.S. States:Racing to the Bottom or Riding on a Seesaw?[A] Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco working paper series,2008-03
[140]Brueckner,J.K. Strategic Interaction among Governments:An Overview of Empirical Studies[J]. International Regional Science Review,2003,26:175-188
[141]Salmon,P. Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme[J]. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,1987,3:24-43
[142]Besley,T. and Case,A. Incumbent Behavior:Vote-seeking, Tax-setting and Yardstick Competition[J]. American Economic Review,1995,85:25-45
[143]Schaltegger,C. and Kuttel,D. Exit,Voice and Mimicking Behavior:Evidence from Swiss Cantons[J]. Public Choice,2002,113:1-23
[144]Sole Olle,A. Electoral Accountability and Tax Mimicking:The Effects of Electoral Margins, Coalition Government and Ideology[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 2003,19:685-713
[145]Allers,M. and Elhorst,P. Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among Local Governments in the Netherlands[J]. International Tax and Public Finance,2005,12:493-513
[146]Bivand,R. and Szymanski,S. Spatial Dependence through Local Yardstick Competition:Theory and Testing[J]. Economics Letters,1997,55:257-265
[147]Bivand,R. and Szymanski,S. Modeling the Spatial Impact of the Introduction of Compulsive Competitive Tendering[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,2000, 30:203-219
[148]Revelli,F. Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2006,90:458-474
[149]Zodrow,G. and Mieszkowski,P. Pigeou,Tiebout,Property Taxation and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods[J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19:356-370
[150]Wilson,J.D. A theory of Interregional Tax Competition [J]. Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19:296～315
[151]Wilson,J.D. Theories of Tax Competition[J]. National Tax Journal,1999, 52:269-304
[152]Genser,B. and Wech-Hannemann,H. Fuel Taxation in EC Countries:A Politico-Economy Approach[M]. Konstanz:University of Konstanz,1993
[153]Driscoll,J.C. and Kraay,A.C. Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1998,80:549-60
[154]冯子标.中部塌陷原因及崛起途径探析[J].管理世界,2005,12：150-151
[155]杨胜刚,朱红.中部塌陷、金融弱化与中部崛起的金融支持[J].经济研究,2007,5：55-67
[156]Bucovetsky,S. and Smart,M. The Efficiency Consequences for Local Revenue Equalization:Tax Competition and Tax Distortions. CESifo Working paper Series No.767, 2002
[157]Kothenburger,M. Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization[J]. International Tax and Public Finance,2002,9:391-408
[158]Cai Hongbin and Daniel Treisman. Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments:Decentralization, Globalization and Public Policy[J]. American Economic Review,2005,95:817-830
[159]张恒龙,陈宪.财政竞争对地方公共支出结构的影响——以中国的招商引资竞争为例[J].经济社会体制比较,2006,6：57-64
[160]刘穷志.公共支出归宿：中国政府公共服务落实到贫困人口手中了吗?[J].管理世界,2007,4：60-67
[161]刘霞辉.为什么中国经济不是过冷就是过热?[J].经济研究,2004,11：58-67
[162]中国社会科学院经济研究所经济增长前沿课题组.财政政策的供给效应与经济发展[J].经济研究,2004,9：4-17
[163]经济增长前沿课题组.国际资本流动、经济扭曲与宏观稳定——当前经济增长 态势分析[J].经济研究,2005,4：4-16
[164]杨瑞龙,卢周来.正式契约的第三方实施与权力最优化——对农民工工资纠纷的契约论解释[J].经济研究,2004,5：4-12
[165]Treisman,D. Decentralization and the Quality of Government[A]. Working Paper, Los Angeles:University of California,2000-11
[166]沈坤荣,孙文杰.投资效率、资本形成与宏观经济波动——基于金融发展视角的实证研究[J].中国社会科学,2004,6：52-63
[167]Barzel,Y. Property Right and the Evolution of the State[J]. Economics of Governance,2000,1(1):25-51
[168]姚洋.中性政府：对转型期中国经济成功的一个解释[J].经济评论,2009,3：5-13
[169]Zhou Li-An. Career Concerns, Incentive Contracts, and Contract Renegotiation in the Chinese Political Economy[D]. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University,2002
[170]Oates,W.E. Fiscal Federalism[M]. New York:Harcourt Brace,1972
[171]Alesina,A. and Spoalore,E. On the Number and Size of Nations[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112:1027-1056
[172]Besley,T. and Coate,S. Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods:A Political Economy Analysis[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2003,87:2611-2637
[173]Amrita Dhillon,Myrna Wooders and Ben Zissimos. Tax Competition Reconsidered [J]. Journal of Public Economic Theory,2007,9(3):391-423
[174]Brulhart,Marius and Jametti,Mario. Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?[A] CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6512,2008
[175]Eckhard Janeba and Guttorm Schjelderup. The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered:Politicians and Political Institutions [J]. Economic Journal,2009, 119(539):1143-1161
[176]Wilson,J.D. Theories of Tax Competition[J]. National Tax Journal,2000, 52:269-304
[177]Zhang Xiaobo. Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: Implications for Regional Inequality [J]. Journal of Comparative Economic,2006, 34(4):713-726
[178]Yao,Yi. Equalizing or Not? Assessing the Intergovernmental Grants and Their Incentive Effects in China's Fiscal Reform[R].Working paper accepted by Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China,2006-07
[179]Chen,Aimin. Urbanization and Disparities in China:Challenges of Growth and Development [J]. China Economic Review,2002,13:407-411
[180]陆铭,陈钊.城市化、城市倾向的经济政策与城乡收入差距[J].经济研究,2004,6：50-58
[181]陆铭,陈钊,万广华.因患寡而患不均：中国的收入差距、投资、教育和增长的相互影响[J].经济研究,2005,12：4-14
[182]Lu Ming and Chen Zhao. Urbanization,Urban-Biased Policies and Urban-Rural Inequality in China:1987-2001 [J]. Chinese Economy,2006,39(3):42-63
[183]林毅夫,刘培林.中国的经济发展战略与地区收入差距[J].经济研究,2003,3：19-25
[184]陆铭,陈钊,严冀.收益递增、发展战略与区域经济的分割[J].经济研究,2004,1：54-63
[185]Brueckner,J.K. A Tiebout/tax-competition Model [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2000,77:285-306
[186]Henderson,J.V. Community Choice of Revenue Instruments [J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1994,24:159-183
[187]Henderson,J.V. Will Homeowners Impose Property Taxes? [J] Regional Science and Urban Economics,1995,25:153-181
[188]Keen,M.J. and Kotsogiannis,C. Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?[J] American Economic Review,2002,92:363-370
[189]Ian,W.H. Parry. How Large are the Welfare Costs of Tax Competition?[J] Journal of Urban Economics,2003,54:39-60
[190]Wilson,J.D. and Wildasin,D.E. Capital Tax Competition:Bane or Boon?[J] Journal of Public Economics,2004,88:1065-1091
[191]王小鲁,樊纲.中国经济增长的可持续性——跨世纪的回顾与展望[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2000
[192]王小鲁,樊纲,刘鹏.中国经济增长方式转换和增长可持续性[J].经济研究, 2009,1：4-16
[193]李京文,龚飞鸿,明安书.生产率与我国经济增长[A].李京文,钟学义.我国生产率分析前沿[C].北京：社会科学文献出版社,1998
[194]张军.增长、资本形成与技术选择：解释我国经济增长下降的长期因素[J].经济学(季刊),2002,1(2)：301-338
[195]徐现祥等.中国省区经济增长分布的演进(1978-1998)[J].经济学(季刊),2004,3(3)：619-638
[196]德怀特·帕金斯.从历史和国际的视角看中国的经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2005,4(4)：891-912
[197]卫兴华,侯为民.中国经济增长方式的选择与转换途径.经济研究,2007,7：15-21
[198]张其仔,郭朝先.中国工业增长的性质：资本驱动或资源驱动[J].中国工业经济,2008,3：14-22
[199]丁菊红,邓可斌.转型中的财政分权、地区增长差异与公共品供给[J]．南方经济,2009,3：32-50
[200]丁菊红,邓可斌.政府偏好、公共品供给与转型中的财政分权[J].经济研究,2008,7：78-89
[201]Boadway,Robin. How Well Is the Equalization System Reducing Fiscal Disparities?[A] Working Paper, Kingston:Queen's University,2004-10
[202]谷成.财政分权下中国政府问转移支付的优化路径[J].经济社会体制比较,2009,2：72-78
[203]曹俊文,罗良清.转移支付的财政均等化效果实证分析[J].统计研究,2006,1：43-45
[204]Tsui,K. Local Tax System, Intergovernmental Transfers and China's Local Fiscal Disparities[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2005,33:173-196
[205]尹恒,康琳琳,王丽娟.政府间转移支付的财力均等化效应[J].管理世界,2007,1：48-55
[206]Rosenblatt,M. Remarks on Some Nonparametric Estimator of a Density Function[J].Ann Math Statist,1956,27:832-837
[207]Parzen,E. On Estimation of a Probability Function and its Model [J].Ann Math Statist,1962,33:1065-1076
[208]Van Ryzin,J. On Strong Consistency of Density Estimation [J].Ann Math.Statist, 1969,40:1765-1772
[209]Silverman,B.W. Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis[M]. London:Chapman &Hill,1986
[210]张军,范子英.中国如何在平衡中牺牲了效率：转移支付的视角[A].2009,中国教育科研网
[211]Scott,A.D. The Evaluation of Federal Grants[J]. Econometric,1952,19:377-394
[212]Wilde James,A. Grants-in-aid:The Analytics of Design and Response[J]. National Tax Journal,1971,24:143-156
[213]贾俊雪,郭庆旺.中央财政转移支付与地方公共服务提供[J].世界经济,2008,9：74-84
[214]Romer,Paul. Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(5):1002-1037
[215]Lucas,R.E. On the Mechanism of Economic Development [J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1988,22(1):3-42
[216]袁飞,陶然等.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀[J].经济研究,2008,5：70-80
[217]方红生,张军.中国地方政府扩张偏向的财政行为：观察与解释[J].经济学(季刊),2009,8(3)：1065-1082