摘要
高级管理人员的更换是公司治理的一项重要内容,是公司内外部治理机制共同作用的结果。正如Jensen & Warner(1988)所说,公司高管变更既是“理解约束经理人力量的关键变量,也是衡量公司治理机制效率的重要指标”。有效的公司治理机制能眵及时更换掉经营业绩低劣的高级管理者,而代之以具有更高经营管理才能的经理人。近些年来随着我国证券市场规模的增大,处于经济转型期的中国上市公司涌现出了大量高管人员变更的事件。频繁发生的高管变更事件引起了社会各界的广泛关注,尤其是关注高管变更的原因及其带给上市公司的影响。而我国上市公司多由国有企业改制而成,具有许多独特的属性,如委托代理链超长、最终产权主体虚置等。虽然经历了十几年的制度改革,但是公司治理的内外部机制还远不科学,在运行过程中往往缺乏效率,存在着弱监督层,强管理层的“内部人控制”现象,结果就导致管理层权力急剧膨胀,以致于管理层偏离或危害企业所有者利益的行为比比皆是。这样在我国上市公司内外部治理机制尚不健全的背景下,这些上市公司的高管变更现象到底多大程度上反映了我国公司的治理效率?这些高管变更事件的发生是否真的利于改善我国上市公司的治理质量?这些问题值得我们去仔细探究。
这样本文以中国上市公司为研究对象,对高管变更与公司治理机制之间的相关关系进行了较为系统的研究。本文剖析了影响我国上市公司高级管理人员变更的内外治理因素,通过考察公司治理变量与公司高管变更之间的关系来检验高管变更是否真正以企业绩效为参考标准,检验高管变更是否真正促进了公司绩效的改善,建立了一个从公司治理角度研究上市公司高管变更问题的完整框架。在对相关研究结论进行充分的原因分析基础上,对如何通过高管变更来改善中国上市公司的公司治理质量提出了相关的政策建议。本文的研究内容大致可以归纳为如下:
1.本文首先从公司治理的角度来系统述评国内外关于高管变更的研究内容,梳理出了国内外公司治理与高管变更关系的总体研究思路和框架。国内外学者大致从以下方面展开对高管变更专题研究的:公司绩效、公司的股权结构、董事会与监事会治理状况、企业外部的治理机制(如债权治理)、高管自身的人口特征(如年龄、教育程度等)、继任高管的来源、高管变更引起的股东财富效应、高管变更前后的公司财务包装行为以及高管团队的整体任职关联性等。
2.运用管理学和经济学的相关理论对高管变更现象进行了理论分析。这些基本理论包括交易费用理论、产权理论、委托代理理论、人力资本理论、超产权论以及企业家理论等。通过各相关理论的回顾,本文认为,高管变更是企业委托人设计的针对企业代理人的一种极端的激励约束手段。在现代企业“两权”分离状态下,企业委托人与代理人签订契约,将企业委托给代理人来经营管理。该契约的稳定性是以契约双方都能够取得自己的期望效用为前提的,当代理人的经营管理行为偏离委托人的预期效用时,委托人将会采取一系列的激励约束措施来纠正代理人的“偏离”委托人利益的行为。当代理人的经营管理行为严重损害了委托人的利益时,委托人将会采取对代理人来说最为严重的惩罚措施,即更换当前的高管人员,这是委托人维护自身利益的最后的也是最极端的手段。
3.在对相关公司治理理论进行归纳、提炼消化和吸收的基础上,本文勾勒出从公司治理视角对高管变更进行规范研究的分析框架。当其它激励机制不能有效地发挥作用时,企业所有者将会对高管实施控制权约束,即解除在位高管的经营管理控制权。一旦发生管理控制权转移,原高管将失去所有的与企业管理职位有关的收益,并且其声誉、人力资本市场价值都将遭受严重损失。这些损失威胁就构成了对在位高管的有效激励约束。所以高管变更从本质上讲是通过实现管理控制权的转移而对高管实施激励约束的方法。
4.基于当前关于高管变更的理论研究不足的现状,本文以高管变更过程中的委托人(企业)和代理人(高管)为博弈参与主体,建立了一个二阶段动态博弈模型,描述了在高管变更过程中两参与主体的博弈过程,并对不同情况下的博弈进行了求解。本文认为,高管变更是公司治理两大主体间互相博弈的最终结果。这是因为从企业的所有者与经营管理人签订雇佣合同一刻起,两大主体之间就展开了一个两阶段的动态博弈。维系这种博弈关系的基础是双方对不同博弈阶段中的成本与收益的比较判断。委托人会通过该比较结果来实施对代理人的激励方案,而代理人会根据此结果来决定其工作努力程度和自身能力的提升。
该博弈模型提出了一个新的概念—预期能力,企业通过一个阶段的观察,会修正对高管能力的认识,形成对高管能力新的预期,这种行动可以削弱非系统风险的影响,降低变动激励风险成本,提高变动激励系数,这在一定程度上解释了现实中公司绩效—高管报酬间的敏感性较低的原因。同时模型还指出,高管的能力和努力程度对企业业绩的影响具有相互替代性,低能高管可以通过增加努力程度避免被解雇,而高能力的高管也可能因为不努力而被解雇,在信息不对称假设下,这种机制提供了一种激励方式,该模型通过条件概率修正的方式为这种现象提供了数理形式的描述和解释。
相对已有的高管变更模型,本文的博弈模型中包含了外部市场条件变化对解雇决策和激励设计的影响,博弈分析过程表明,当企业预期行业业绩下降或高管机会保留效用上升时,解雇高能力高管的概率会大大降低,同时变动激励系数会提高;而当企业预期行业业绩上升或高管的机会保留效用下降时,解雇低能高管的可能性会增强。当前企业中广泛使用的委托代理形式是违约金契约,但是极少文献能合理地解释为什么违约金契约的形式而不是其他契约形式成为委托代理关系的选择。本文讨论了三种契约模式(竞争式、限制式和违约金式)下的动态博弈过程,通过求解结果的比较分析,阐明了违约金模式相对于其他两种模式存在的优势,为其现实存在的合理性提供了一个较为有效的解释。
5.对我国上市公司近年来发生的高管变更事件进行了统计分析,包括这些上市公司高管人员的变更数量、原因、高管年龄以及继任高管人员的来源、职务独立性等相关资料。通过这些统计分析,将为我国上市公司高管人员变更的现状提供一些基本的描述,为本文的实证研究奠定研究资料方面的基础。
6.在前文理论分析的基础上,运用最新的上市公司数据资料,系统地实证研究分析了未发生大股东更换的上市公司的公司绩效、公司治理结构特征与主要高管变更之间的关系。其中公司治理结构特征包括股权结构、董事会与监事会治理特征以及债权人治理变量等。所得出的相关结论为:公司绩效是导致上市公司发生强制性高管变更的重要原因,上市公司的董事会还远远没有发挥其应有的治理效能,相反监事会却在相当程度上发挥了其监督作用,债权人治理功能也得到了初步的发挥。最后在对该结论进行原因分析的基础上给出了相关的政策建议。
7.以近年来发生控股权转移的上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了控股权转移、公司绩效与主要高管变更之间的关系。研究结果表明公司绩效的低劣性是导致上市公司控股权转移和高管变更的重要因素。控股股东的持股比与控股权转移成负相关关系。这是因为控股股东持股比越大,控股权转让协议就越难以达成。在对结论进行深度原因分析的基础上提出了相关的建议。
8.本文突破了国内外学者在研究高管变更时往往将高管仅仅限定在董事长和总经理两个职位的事实局限,而将上市公司中整个高管团队成员的变更与公司治理机制之间的关联性纳入到本文的研究内容,即不仅研究主要高管的职位变更而且还研究了一般高管的变更现象。从主要高管(董事长和总经理)与一般高管之间所存在的任职关联性角度出发,本文以主要高管(董事长和总经理)的变更类型(强制变更和常规变更)为分类依据,实证研究了主要高管的变更对整个高管团队任职稳定性所产生的影响,结论认为我国上市公司的主要高管与一般高管之间存在较强的任职关联性,但主要高管变更对高管团队任职稳定性的影响变量和影响程度将因主要高管的变更类型而异。最后本文针对如何最小化这种主要高管变更所给高管团队任职稳定性带来的负面影响提出了具体的政策建议。从这一点来讲,本文的研究将为改善提高我国上市公司高管层整体管理效能提供了实践性较强的研究证据、结论和对策。
Turnover of top managers is an important content of corporate governance, and is a result that firm inner and outside governance mechanisms combinedly act. Just as Jensen & Warner (1988) said: "turnover of firm top managers is a key index understanding the variable restraining manager and judging the efficiency of corporate governance mechanism ". Effective corporate governance mechanism could be able to in time replace managers of low-grade achievement, but replace them with manager having higher management ability. In recent years, as Chinese bond market scales gradually, large amount of turnover events of top managers has happened. The frequently happening of top manager turnover has aroused the general public attention, especially the cause and effects of turnovers brought to firms. As the reprehensive of Chinese enterprises, the listed companies come from state-owned enterprises, having a lot of distinctive attributes, for example, they lack the main body with ultimate property right and so on. Although our firms have experienced a process of corporate system reforms for over 10 years, but the internal and external mechanism of corporate governance is still far from efficient, thus a phenomenon exists that "strong management and weak supervision". With the background of poor corporate governance, to how much extent does the turnover of top managers reflect our country's corporate governance? Is the turnover of top managers really good for improving the corporate governance quality of our country's listed companies? These issues deserve our careful exploration.
So the paper has taken Chinese listed companies as object of study, and has carried out comparatively systematic research on the relation between governance mechanism and turnover of top managers. The paper has analyzed inside and outside factors affecting the turnover of top managers, and tested whether firm performance is really the true standard by which top managers are evaluated. On the basis of carrying out a sufficient study on the causes to the relevant conclusion, the paper has brought forward pertinent policy suggestion on how to improve the governance quality of Chinese listed companies by the turnover of top managers. The main body of the paper is basically as follows:
1. Firstly the paper has systematically narrated the research content on the subject home and abroad, and has carded out the train of research thought and frame of the study. Scholars at home and abroad have basically carried out their study from the following aspects: firm performance, company's stock right structure, governance status of board of directors and board of supervisors , external governing mechanism (such as creditor's rights administers), the demographic characteristics of top managers (such as age, education level), successors' source, the effects of shareholder wealth aroused by turnover of top managers, the post stability of top management team(TMT)and financial pack behaviors and so on.
2. The paper has carried out some theoretical analysis on turnover of top manager using relevant theories of management and economics, including transaction costs theory, property right theory, human capital theory, super- property right theory etc. by the retrospect of relevant theories, the paper argues that turnover is an ultimate means designed by consignor to restrain agents. Under separation circumstances of modern enterprises "two right", the enterprise consignor and the agent sign a contract, the agent is entrusted to management control. The contract stability is based on the fact that both sides are able to get their expectation efficacy as premise. The consignor will may adopt punishing measures to fire agent while agent's management control behavior has damaged consignor's benefit gravely, this is the final measure the consignor defends its self-interest.
3. On the basis of digestion, induction and refinery to relevant theory, the main body of the paper draws the outline of the analytical framework from a perspective of corporate governance. The nature of turnover of managers is the transfer of firm management and control power between agents under the synthetic mechanism of inner and outside corporate governance. The corporate governance includes one set of excitation and restraint mechanism for manager personnel behavior, includes reward, controlling power, reputation and competitive forces of the market etc. Among them controlling power mechanism is basic, the most effective incentive mechanism. While other mechanism could not produce a marked effect effectively, or the enterprise manager is estimated that the ability is low or is not competent enough for management post, the enterprise owner will implement controlling constraint to manager, and will relieve the manager's management control power, meanwhile to hire other manager to manage the enterprise. Once the metastasis of controlling power happen, former manager will lose all relevant benefits to business administration position, whose reputation, human capital marketable value will suffer grave loss. The existence of loss makes threat to the managers. Therefore turnover of mangers is a method to stimulate and constrain mangers by realizing the transfer of the administration controlling power between managers.
4. owing to the fact that present's research about turnover of firm managers is insufficient, the paper takes consignor (enterprise) and agent (operator) as two game participates, and has built a two period game model, describing the game process of the two participants, and found solutions to the model in different conditions. The paper argues that the turnover is the final outcome of the game between the two main bodies. From the moment that two sides sign a contract of employment, the two parties have started a dynamic game process. What holds together these game participants is the judgment through comparing the cost and benefits in game stages. If the consignor regards that present manager's administration ability is far from anticipation and it may find a right candidate to replace the present one, then probability that the present manager will be changed increase. Therefore turnover of top managers is the result that both sides end the contract.
5. The paper did a statistical analysis on the current situation of turnover of top managers happening in the last few years, including relevant data such as the turnover quantity, cause, age of managers and successors' source, post independence character and so on. The analysis will provide a little fundamental description on the current situation of manager turnover in the listed companies, and provide a base of research material for later empirical study.
6. On the bases of theoretical analysis in the previous part, using the latest data of listed companies whose largest stock holder remain unchanged, the paper carried out an empirical study on the relation between firm performance、governance structure and turnover. The test result shows that firm performance is an important reason for forced turnover of top managers, board of directors do not play its right role in corporate governance, on the contrary board of supervisors has brought its supervision into play but not to a large extent, and the creditor has harnessed its preliminary function of corporate governance. Finally based on the reason analysis, the paper gives out some pertinent policy and suggestions.
7. the paper takes the listed companies whose largest stock holder have changed in recent years as research samples, and carried out an empirical study on the relation between the transfer of controlling holder、firm performance and turnover of managers. the study result indicates that firm performance is negatively related to both the transfer of controlling stock-holder and manager turnover, and the share ration of the largest holder is also negatively related to the transfer of controlling holder, the reason of which is probably that the bigger the holding share of the first largest holder holds, the more difficult the transfer agreement will be to reach. The paper finally submitted pertinent suggestion on the basis of carrying out depth analysis of causes on the conclusion.
8. On the consideration that the post of main managers and general managers may be closely connected the paper takes the listed company as research samples whose main managers have been replaced and studies the effects of main managers' turnover on the post stability of the whole top management team. The research conclusion demonstrates that different kinds of manager turnover would produce different effects on the post stability of the top management team. The paper also produces some relevant policy and suggestions finally.
引文
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