摘要
本文采用我国资本市场的数据,从理论和实证两方面研究了大股东对上市公司现金持有决策的影响,并在此基础上讨论了大股东干预下的上市公司高额现金持有所引发的管理层委托代理问题。
基于我国资本市场中大股东普遍存在这一现象,本文通过理论分析发现,大股东可能会出于自身的资金需求干预上市公司的现金持有决策,让上市公司持有超额现金为其自身潜在的资金需求服务。本文的理论分析还发现,由于大股东需要同时考虑便利性成本和价值损失成本,所以大股东持股比例和上市公司的现金持有水平之间应该是先增后减的非线性关系。
在理论分析的基础上,本文用非参数、半参数和参数回归的方法对我国上市公司2000年到2006年的现金持有数据进行了实证检验,发现上述先增后减的关系确实存在。实证数据还显示,在股权制衡度低的公司、未进行股改的公司、与银行关系较差的公司中,大股东利用上市公司现金的程度较高,大股东持股比例和上市公司现金持有水平之间的先增后减的关系更强。
本文还针对股权分置改革这一重大历史事件和上市公司现金持有水平之间的关系进行了分析,进一步佐证了大股东从自身需求出发干预上市公司现金持有决策。实证结果显示,在最终控制人为国有、股票二级市场流动性差或与银行关系好的公司中,股权分置改革很难起到减轻大股东干预上市公司现金持有决策的作用。在这个意义上来说,股权分置改革仅仅部分地缓解了大股东和其他股东之间的利益冲突。
由于大股东对上市公司现金持有决策的干预,使得我国上市公司的现金持有水平普遍较高,因此本文最后还讨论了我国上市公司高额现金持有的经济后果。通过系统研究2001年至2004年上市公司的现金持有和投资理财收益率之间的关系,本文发现上市公司管理层手中的“可操控现金”越多,委托理财收益率越低;而大股东的持股比例越高对管理层的这一非有效投资行为所产生的制约能力越强。同时,本文还发现Jensen(1986)定义的“自由现金流”并不能很好地捕捉这一现象。
Using the data from Chinese stock market, this paper investigates the influence of the large shareholder on the cash holdings of the listed companies and discusses whether the high level of cash holdings causes the agency problems of management in the listed companies.
This thesis starts with analyzing the institutional background in Chinese stock market and points out that the large shareholder has incentives to manipulate the cash holding policy of listed companies in order to meet his own liquidity demand, which means the listed companies hold more cash than the level the listed firms actually need for the potential use of the large shareholder. In our model, when the large shareholder considers the convenient cost and the damaging cost at the same time, the proportion of shares held by the large shareholder has a nonlinear inverse-U relation with the cash holdings of listed companies, which means the relation is positive where the proportion is low and negative where the proportion is high.
Then we find evidences supporting our analysis, using nonparametric, semi-parametric and parametric OLS regressions with Chinese capital market data from 2000 to 2006. And the inverse-U relation is stronger in firms with low ownership concentration, firms having not been reformed and firms with less access to bank because the liquidities of large shareholders in these firms rely on the cash of listed companies much more.
We also test whether the Split Share Structure Reform can induce the large shareholder less willing to manipulate the cash holdings of their listed companies. And we find that the firms owned by the state, with low stock liquidity and with good access to bank still have high level cash holdings, which means large shareholders of these firms are not affected by the Split Share Structure Reform significantly.
After analyzing the large shareholder’s influence on the cash holding policies of the listed companies, this thesis discusses the consequence of high level cash holdings, using the data of entrusted investment from 2001 to 2004 in Chinese listed companies. We find that the“manipulable cash”is negatively related to the return of entrusted investment, and given the amount of manipulable cash, the proportion of shares held by large stockholder is positively related to the return of entrusted investment. Our findings suggest that when managers have more manipulable cash on hand, they use the money less efficiently. Controlling shareholders have a monitoring effect on this behavior of managers. And there is no evidence supporting the Free Cash Flow hypothesis.
引文
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