摘要
本文的基本命题是:控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的基本框架应该是原则性规定与具体规范相结合。首先,控制股东行为的原则性规定应该适用诚实信用原则,而不能是信义义务原则;其次,应该围绕诚实信用原则,结合中国的实际情况对控制股东侵害少数股东利益行为的典型形式规定具体化的规则。在规制之中,我们应该考虑中国国有控制股东的特殊之处,并且研究控制股东义务的权利主体对诉讼形式的选择以及权利主体的模糊与权利形式的融合问题,同时明确对控制股东滥用控制权的救济方式。
首先,为了建立完善的控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制体系,应该明确规定控制股东对非控制股东承担义务的原则——诚实信用原则。当前中国学者基本上认为有关控制股东义务制度方面,中国应该引入信义义务原则,尤其认为这是解决中国上市公司中控制股东滥用控制权侵害上市公司和少数股东的良方,甚至有学者对中国证券法的修订中没有明确规定控制股东应该承担信义义务而感到遗憾。但笔者认为这一观点值得商榷。有关控制股东义务的原则性规定,在世界范围内主要有以下几种立法模式:美国普通法上的信义义务原则、美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外、德国的诚实信用原则等。因此,中国未来立法应该从更广阔的世界范围的角度来分析和探讨自身应该借鉴的规则。在美国,对控制股东滥用控制权行为的限制最早是采用从英国移植过来的股东压迫规则。而信义义务原则是不存在股东压迫规则的州的美国法官为了救济受到侵害的少数股东而创造的规则,它产生的背景是信义义务适用范围飞速扩展的时期,而且更多是为了救济而引发的。从本质上来看,信义义务并不适合股东之间的关系,早期法院在创造该项规则时所阐述的封闭式公司与合伙之间的相似性是封闭式公司股东承担信义义务的理由也并不准确,实际上合伙与公司之间还是区别大于类似之处的。控制股东信义义务规则的发展也印证了笔者的观点。在现代,美国法官在使用信义义务原则时将其等同于股东压迫,因此实际上信义义务规则已经完全“变质”,空有外壳而毫无实际内容。美国法官之所以仍然使用这一表述,更多是因为路径依赖和表述上的习惯。而美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外、德国的诚实信用原则等,都是成文法上的原则,实际上都可以作为中国立法所借鉴的目标。但是,由于英美法系不注重法律体系的完备,因此美国成文法上的股东压迫原则、英国成文法上的不公平侵害原则、因公平和正义而解散公司原则、Foss规则的例外等是一些竞合性的原则。而唯独诚实信用原则是一项单一的原则,再加上中国立法一直采用大陆法系传统,诚实信用原则也早就在《民法通则》中做出过规定。因此,从使用上来看,这一原则更为司法界所熟悉。而如果使用股东压迫、不公平侵害等术语,则必须对这些术语进行解释,而且也不容易融入到现有的法律体系之中。综上,笔者建议未来中国立法采用诚实信用原则。
其次,在具体规则的设计上,为了加强法律的可操作性,应该尽量针对常见的控制股东侵害少数股东的行为做出具体规定,防止法官在处理案件时自由裁量权过大,保证法律的严肃性和连贯性。笔者认为,控制股东侵害少数股东的典型行为包括解除少数股东雇佣、关联交易、控制权转让、挤出合并、表决权的变化、拒绝宣告盈余、破产、自愿解散等。
再次,在规制之中,我们应该考虑中国国有控制股东的特殊之处。中国是国有经济占主导地位的社会主义国家,论述控制股东义务这一话题就不得不研究国有控制股东。在本文中,笔者将分析国有控制股东与私人控制股东和法人控制股东的义务是否存在区别。笔者认为,在企业集团中,承认企业集团的整体利益可以更好的实现集约化经营,符合经济发展的规律,因此可以承认法人控制股东为了企业集团的整体利益,在一定程度上做出损害子公司利益的行为的合理性,因此,我们应该承认法人控制股东与自然人控制股东义务是不同的。至于国有控制股东,可以允许其在一定条件下追求社会公共利益,同时,在关联交易的认定上也应该适用特殊的规则,即国有公司之间进行的交易不一定是关联交易,而国家控股的企业之间不能仅因为同受国家控股而具有关联关系。
最后,我们应该明确控制股东义务的不同权利主体和与之相对应的诉讼形式,以及权利主体的模糊与诉讼形式的融合问题,并明确对控制股东滥用控制权的救济方式。如果控制股东主要侵害的是公司的利益,其他股东只是间接地受到了侵害,则公司应该作为诉讼的原告,其他股东只能通过派生诉讼来寻求救济。而如果控制股东主要侵害的是其他股东,则其他股东可以作为原告向法院提起直接诉讼。在封闭式公司中,如果不存在多重诉讼的风险,也不存在侵害公司债权人利益的可能,并且不会影响其他股东寻求救济的份额,则法院为了方便诉讼,可以允许将只能通过派生诉讼提起的案件通过直接诉讼的方式来进行审理,这就是与控制股东义务的权利主体的模糊相对应的诉讼形式的融合问题。对于控制股东侵害少数股东利益的行为,法官可以授予其认为合适的一切救济形式,包括但不限于解散公司;开除;买出;履行、禁止、改变或取消公司的行为或者其股东、董事、管理者的行为或任何行动中的当事人的行为;取消或改变公司章程大纲或章程细则中的任何条款;免除董事或管理者职务;任命董事或管理者;对争议的事项进行账目清理;任命管理人(custodian)来管理经营和公司事务;任命临时董事(享有正当选举的董事所具有的权利、权力和职责,期限和条件由法院来规定):分配盈余;授予损害赔偿。
围绕上述主题,笔者对文章的结构做出如下安排:
本文除绪论和结论以外,包括五章。
第一章介绍了中国控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的基本框架。这是文章的总论部分,提出了本章的基本主题。在本部分中,笔者首先介绍了中国控制股东滥用控制权的现状,并进而分析了现行法律对控制股东行为的规范及其存在的问题。随后,笔者论证了控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的移植中需要考虑的因素。最后,基于上述的分析笔者得出中国对于控制股东行为的法律规范体系应该采用何种框架的结论。
从第二章开始,笔者具体论证控制股东行为的法律规范体系的基本框架。第二章和第三章论述法律规范体系中的基本原则,第四章论述法律规范体系中的具体规定,而第五章则分析控制股东违反义务行为的诉讼和救济方式,这些内容构成完整的控制股东滥用控制权行为的法律规制的框架。
The dissertation is based on such a fundamental proposition that the legal regimes regarding controlling shareholders' liability should include principle rules and concrete norms.Firstly,the principle of good faith rather than fiduciary duty should be adopted as the general principle relevant to controlling shareholders' liabilities.Secondly,specific rules should be established according to China's current situation in order to restrict controlling shareholders' behavior which is unfavorable to minority shareholders.The special characters of controlling shareholders in China should be considered,and the research concerning to whom controlling shareholder's duty is owned as well as the amalgamation of direct action and derivative action should be carried on.Furthermore, relieves for minority shareholders against breach of majority shareholder's liabilities should be stipulated.
In the first place,to establish an advanced legal regime regarding controlling shareholders' obligations,State must demonstrably enact the principle of good faith.Currently,most Chinese scholars insist that the principle of controlling shareholders'fiduciary duty should be adopted to regulate controlling shareholders'liabilities,and emphasize that this principle is particularly an effective prescription for resolving the issue of behavior of abuse by controlling shareholders of listed corporations,some scholars even claim that it is regretful that there is no rule of controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty under the Securities Act of 2005.However,I opposes to this opinion.Generally,there are all together six legislative models in the world concerning principle of controlling shareholders' liability,namely the following ones——the principle of fiduciary duty under common law in the US,the principle of shareholder oppression under statute law in the US,the principle of unfair prejudice under statute law of the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up under statute law of the United Kingdom,the exceptions to the rule set up in Foss v.Harbottle under statute law of the United Kingdom,and the principle of good faith under statute law in Germany.China should choose among all these principles the best suitable one to transplant after considering the circumstances.In the United States,the regulations of shareholder oppression for restricting controlling shareholder's behavior was transplanted from the Great Kingdom.Fiduciary duty was introduced by judges of the states which did not have the rule of shareholder oppression to relieve those minority shareholders having been infringed by controlling shareholders' behavior,thus was relief-oriented when then fiduciary duty was spreading fast and becoming a fashionable vocabulary. In essence,fiduciary duty does not suit the relationship of shareholders, so the opinion that the relationship of shareholders in a close corporation is similar to that of a partnership is not accurate.In fact,there are more differences than similarities between these two kinds of enterprises, which demonstrated by the development of rule of controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty.Nowadays,the US judges equate the principle of controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty to that of shareholder oppression when applying it,thus the principle of controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty has been exuviated to be a mere shell without any practical contents.The reason why the US judges stick to this term is mostly because of path dependence and custom in expression. Except fiduciary duty,other rules,such as rule of shareholder oppression in the US,rule of unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up in the United Kingdom,rule of exceptions to the rule in Foss v.Harbottle in the United Kingdom,rule of good faith in Germany are all statutory rules,and can be the object for China to transplant from.But,due to less attention to consistency of legal system, rule of shareholder oppression in the US,rule of unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom,rule of just and equitable winding up in the United Kingdom,rule of exceptions to the rule in Foss v.Harbottle in the United Kingdom are competing principles except the principle of good faith which is an solo one.Moreover,China has been adhering to the statutory law system,and principle of good faith has already been adopted under General Principles of Civil Law.Therefore,this term is both familiar to jurists and convenient to apply.To sum up,I firmly proposes that the principle of good faith should be adopted under The Corporation Law.
In the second place,during the process of putting paper rules into action,the state should do its best to embody rules as specific as possible on controlling shareholder's acts,so as to improve the application of legal rules and to restrict the discretion of judges in verdicting actions about controlling shareholder's abusing of rights.In my opinion,the aforementioned typical types of controlling shareholder's infringing minority shareholder include dismissing minority shareholder from being director or officer,related transaction,combination to squeeze out(or freeze out)minority shareholder,diversification of voting rights,rejecting to declare surplus,pushing corporation into the situation of bankruptcy, voluntary dissolution and so on.
In the third place,the special characters of controlling shareholders in China should be considered.China is a socialist country with national economy occupying dominant status,thus the issue of the duties of controlling shareholders of state-owned companies should be taken into consideration.In this dissertation,I want to analyze whether there are any differences between the duties of controlling shareholder of sate-owned corporations and those of private-owned corporations.I endeavor to say that in corporate groups,we should accept the group's separate interests from its members corporations to improve the whole group's economic profit.Thus,to some extent,it can be considered as reasonable if the controlling shareholder' behavior,which damages the interests of the subsidiary companies,is to seek the whole group's interest.As far as concerning controlling shareholder of state-owned corporations,they can be exempted from duties if their behavior is for pursuing profit maximization and seeking maximization of the public interest.They can also be exempted from duties in certain circumstances in related transactions.
Finally,the state must definitely constitute rules about forms of action, namely direct action or derivative action,and regulate the amalgamation of action forms as well as relief ways.Generally,where the controlling shareholder damages the interest of the corporation directly,the corporation is the appropriate plaintiff,while where the controlling shareholder damages the minority shareholder directly,the minority shareholder is the appropriate plaintiff.However,in the case of a closely held corporation,the court in its discretion may consider an action raising derivative claims as a direct action,exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions,and order an individual recovery,if it finds that to do so will not(ⅰ) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions(multiple actions),(ⅱ) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation,or(ⅲ) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.As for the behavior of controlling shareholder's abusing of rights,the court can grant any relief that it thinks fit,including but not being limited to dissolution of corporations, expulsion,buy-out,to appoint a custodian,to appoint a provisional director,or to order a sale of one shareholder's stock to the other shareholders to declare dividend and grant compensation.
As far as all above concerned,the article is arranged as followings:
This dissertation is composed of five chapters besides the prolegomenon and the conclusion.
The first chapter is mainly about the legal regime regarding controlling shareholder's liability in China.In this chapter,I firstly introduce the current situation of the behavior of abuse by controlling shareholders and analyze current rules concerning controlling sharehoders'behavior.Then,I conclude which frame China should establish in legal system of controlling shareholders' liability on the basis of above analysis.
From the second chapter on,I recommend specifically the particular issues of legal system about controlling shareholders' liability.The general principle is discussed in the second and the third chapter,and the specific rules is discussed in the forth chapter.In the fifth chapter,the method of actions and relief modes will be discussed.All these five chapters constitute the complete legal structure of controlling shareholders' behavior.
引文
1 习龙生:《控制股东的义务和责任研究》,法律出版社 2006年版。汤欣等著:《控制股东法律规制比较研究》,法律出版社 2006年版。邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学 2005年博士学位论文。
2 汤欣等著:《控制股东法律规制比较研究》,法律出版社 2006年版。
3 例如邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学2005年博士学位论文。汤欣:《控制股东的受信义务:法律移植的视角》,清华大学工作论文,2006年7月4日稿。朱慈蕴、郑博恩:《论控制股东的义务》,载《政治与法律》2002年第2期。王保树、杨继:《论股份公司控制股东的义务与责任》,载《法学》2002年第2期。
4 例如习龙生:《控制股东的义务和责任研究》,法律出版社 2006年版,第4-5页。.王丹:《股份公司控制股东“诚信义务”考辨——境外公司法的变革及其对中国公司法的影响》,载王保树主编:《全球竞争体制下的公司法改革》,社会科学文献出版社 2003年版。.朱慈蕴、郑博恩:《论控制股东的义务》,载《政治与法律》2002年第2期。王保树、杨继:《论股份公司控制股东的义务与责任》,载《法学》2002年第2期等。
1 例如汤欣等著:《控制股东法律规制比较研究》,法律出版社 2006年版,第10页。
2 例如:邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学2005年博士学位论文,第18-21页。
3 例如邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学2005年博士学位论文。汤欣:《控制股东的受信义务:法律移植的视角》,清华大学工作论文,2006年7月4日稿等。
1 See Larry Cat(?) Backer,Comparative Corporate Law:United States,European Union,China and Japan Cases and Materials,Carolina Academic Press,2002,P1305.
2 L.S.Sealy,'Fiduciary Relationship'[1962]CLJ 69,73.
3 对有限责任公司控制股东义务的研究的代表性成果包括甘培忠的《有限责任公司小股东利益保护的法学思考,以及邓小明的《控制股东义务法律制度研究》。
1 习龙生:《控制股东的义务和责任研究》,法律出版社 2006年版,第4-5页。
1 傅利英:《我国上市公司治理中控股股东侵权行为及法律规范研究》,载《华东理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2004年第3期。
2 参见“关于对四川托普软件投资股份有限公司违反证券法律法规行为的处罚决定”(证监罚字[2005]30号),http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n776436/n805010/n825200/3309454.html.
1 参见 http://news3.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-05/27/content_6158669.htm,访问时间2007年12月1日。
1 朱羿锟:《公司控制权配置论——制度与效率分析》,经济管理出版社 2001年版,第27页,32页。转引自邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学 2005年博士学位论文,第14页。
1 参见高西庆、施婷婷:《上市公司收购中的若干法律问题》,载中国证监会法律部编:《证券市场专家谈》,第111页。转引自王丹:《股份公司控制股东“诚信义务”考辨——境外公司法的变革及其对中国公司法的影响》,载王保树主编:《全球竞争体制下的公司法改革》,社会科学文献出版社 2003年版。
1 高鸿钧:《法律移植:隐喻、范式与全球化时代的新趋向》,载《中国社会科学》2007年第4期。
2 卡恩·弗伦德,贺卫方译:《比较法与法律移植》,载《比较法研究》1990年第3期。转引自高鸿钧:《法律移植:隐喻、范式与全球化时代的新趋向》,载《中国社会科学》2007年第4期。
1 黄金兰:《法律移植的自治模式、殖民模式与综合模式》,载《厦门大学法律评论》第12辑,厦门大学出版社 2006年12月版,第1-35页。
1 信春鹰:《法律移植的理论与实践》,载《北方法学》2007年第3期。
1 See MODEL BUS.CORP.ACT §8.01(b)(2002).
2 参见崔延花译:《日本公司法典》,中国政法大学出版社 2006年版。
3 参见王保树主编:《中国公司法修改草案建议稿》,社会科学文献出版社 2004年版,第216-217页。
1 See Paula J.Dalley,The Law of Partner Expulsions:Fiduciary Duty and Good Faith,21 Cardozo L.Rev.181,189-92(1999).
2 See Harry G.Henn & John R.Alexander,Laws of Corporations,§207(3d ed.1983).
3 Donahue,328 N.E.2d at 515-16.
4 对公司管理者所面对的有些宽松的信义义务的少有的讨论,see Eric Talley,Taking the "I" Out of “Team”:Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties,24 J.Corp.L.1001,1008-09(1999).
5 See Aronson v.Lewis,473 A.2d 805,812(Del.1984).比较Wilkes v.Springside Nursing Home,Inc.案(353N.E.2d 657,663(Mass.1976)),在该案中,判决 Donahue案的同一法院,在一年以后,判决认为控制股东“必须有一定的空间来操作确立公司的商业政策”,因此在保证其行为具有合法的商业目的的时候,没有违反对少数股东的信义义务。
6 See,e.g.,Del.Gen.Corp.Law §144(Rev.1974).
7 See Daniel S.Kleinberger,Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations,16Wm.Mitchell L.Rev.1143,1145(1990);see also Thomas A.Smith,The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law:A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty,98 Mich.L.Rev.214,243-46(1999).
1 See generally Frank H.Easterbrook & Daniel R.Fischel,Close Corporations and Agency Costs,38 Stan.L.Rev.271.273-77(1986).
2 再一次,评论者似乎假设所有的公司符合这两种分类中的一种,这不仅没有确认公司之间的变化,而且没有确认在相似规模的公司中投资者需要和期待的公司变化。
3 See Paul N.Cox,Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers,Directors,and Controlling Shareholders,60 Temple L.Q.47,63-78(1987).
4 See Donahue v.Rodd Electrotype Co.,328 N.E.2d 505,515(Mass.1975);Ribstein & Sargent,supra note 66,at 610-11(comments of Gordon Smith).
5 See Donahue,328 N.E.2d at 514-15;Frank H.Easterbrook & Daniel R.Fischel,Close Corporations and Agency Costs,38 Stan.L.Rev.271,275(1986);J.A.C.Hethefington & Michael P.Dooley,Illiquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,63 Va.L.Rev.1(1977),at 3-4,6.
6 See Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,53 Vand.L.Rev.749,823-25(2000);J.A.C.Hetherington & Michael P.Dooley,Iiliquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,63 Va.L.Rev.1(1977),at 39-43.
7 See Paul N.Cox,Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers,Directors,and Controlling Shareholders,60 Temple L.Q. 47(19871,at 60-61.
1 See Frank H.Easterbrook & Daniel R.Fischel,Corporate Control Transactions,91 Yale L.J.698,698(1982).
2 See,e.g.,Victor Brudney,Corporate Governance,Agency Costs,and the Rhetoric of Contract,85 Colum.L.Rev.1403,1420-27(1985);James A.Fanto,Braking the Merger Momentum:Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers,49 Buff.L.Rev.249,265-84(20011;William W.Bratton,Jr.,The New Economic Theory of the Finn:Critical Perspectives from History,in A Reader on the Law of the Business Enterprise 117,153-58(Sally Wheeler ed.,1994);Caroline Bradley,Corporate Control:Markets and Rules,in A Reader on the Law of the Business Enterprise,180,181-87(Sally Wheeler ed.,1994).
3 对潜在的合并者而言确认管理不良的封闭式公司是更为困难的。因此,此类合并的信息成本可能是非常高的。
4 See Victor Bruduey,Corporate Governance,Agency Costs,and the Rhetoric of Contract,85 Colum.L.Rev.1403,1425-26(19851.But see John C.Coffee,Jr.,Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance,84 Colum.L.Rev.1145,1153-54(1984).
5 See Paul N.Cox,Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers,Directors,and Controlling Shareholders,60 Temple L.Q.47,60(1987).
6 See Douglas K.Moll,Reasonable Expectations v.Implied-in-Fact Contracts:Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?,42 B.C.L.Rev.989,1071-73(2001);Robert A.Ragazzo,Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,77 Wash.U.L.Q.1099,1108-18(19991;Sandra K.Miller,What Buy-Out Rights,Fiduciary Duties,and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?,38 Harv.J.on Legis.413,416-17(2001).
1 See Shannon Wells Stevenson,The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties,51 Duke L.J.1139,1144(2002).
2 See Shelly Branch et al.,Sweet Deal:Hershey Foods Is Considering A Plan to Put Itself Up for Sale,Wall St.J.,July 25,2002,at A1;David Bank,Loading Up:Should Foundations Rely on One Stock,or Diversify?,Wall St.J.,Feb.14,2002,at C1;David Bank,H-P Paints Foundation Opposing Merger as Risk-Averse Due to Grant Obligations,Wall St.J.,Dec.11,2001,at A4.
3 See Shannon Wells Stevenson,The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties,51 Duke L.J.1139,1154-64(2002).
4 See Nixon v.Blackwell,626 A.2d 1366,1380-81(Del.1993).
5 See Sandra K.Miller,What Buy-Out Rights,Fiduciary Duties,and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?,38 Harv.J.on Legis.413,437-39(2001);Victor Brudney,Corporate Governance,Agency Costs,and the Rhetoric of Contract,85 Colum.L.Rev.1403,1411-20(1985);J.A.C.Hetherington & Michael P.Dooley,Illiquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,63 Va.L.Rev.1(1977),at 36-39.
6 See Victor Brudney,Corporate Governance,Agency Costs,and the Rhetoric of Contract,85 Colum.L.Rev.1403,1418 n.35(1985);Melvin Aron Eisenberg,The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 Stan.L.Rev.211,213-25,251-53(1995).
7 See Shannon Wells Stevenson,The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties,51 Duke L.J.1139,1143,1144-46,1149(2002);J.A.C.Hetherington & Michael P.Dooley,llliquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,63 Va.L.Rev.1(1977),at 36-39.
8 See Sandra K.Miller,What Buy-Out Rights,Fiduciary Duties,and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?,38 Harv.J.on Legis.413,437-39(2001).Miller还主张少数股东通常缺乏谈判能力来对控制股东施加限制。See-id.
9 这一主张可因多种理由被质疑。See Frank H.Easterbrook & Daniel R.Fischel.Close Corporations and Agency Costs,38 Stan.L.Rev.271,284-286(1986).
1 董事会的权力由公司章程细则创立,而不是委任,因为(公司)关系的受益人不能独立的行为。See Harry G.Henn & John R.Alexander,Laws of Corporations§207(3d ed.1983).
2 See Mary Siegel,The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders,24 Del.J.Corp.L.27,36(1999).
3 虽然股东通过选举董事间接控制公司政策,像其他股东投票一样,法律将选择董事视为股票所有权的行使行为。在投票的时候,股东是代表自身行为的,因此他们不受信义义务的约束。即使那些处于信义关系的人,在他们互相对立行为时(例如在谈判薪酬之时),也被认为受不同的标准约束。See Restatement(Second)of Agency §390,392(1958).在此类案件中的该规则一般要求全面披露所有的重要事实。See also Amanda K.Esquibel,The Finality of Buyout Agreements in the Close Corporation Context:What Recourse Remains for Aggrieved Sellers?,53 Rutgers L.Rev.865,905-906(2001).
4 See Cedric Kushner Promotions,Ltd.,v.King,553 U.S.158,163-64(2001).
5 See James D.Cox et al.,Corporations §§7.4-7.5(1997).
6 See Victor Brudney,Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law,38 B.C.L.Rev.595,618(1997).
7 Martin Peers,Viacom Managers Make a Tense Peace,Wall St.J.,Mar.21,2003,at B4.该文还报告Redstone先生同意,作为Viacom合并CBS,Inc.的一部分,,在2000年以后的三年内,不改变董事会的构成。Id.
1 See Donahue v.Rodd Electrotype Co.,328 N.E.2d 505,510(Mass.1975).
2 See Brudney,supra note 192,at 628 n.84.See generally,Jordan v.Duff,Inc.,815 F.2d 429(7th Cir.1987).
3 See Tamar Frankel,Fiduciary Law,71 Cal.L.Rev.795,810(1983).
4 See Eileen A.Scallen,Promises Broken vs.Promises Betrayed:Metaphor,Analogy,and the New Fiduciary Principle,1993 U.Ill.L.Rev.897,922(1993).
5 See Del.Gen.Corp.Law §351(2001).
6 Arthur R.Pinto,Corporate Governance:Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporation,46 Am.J.Comp.L.Supp.317,327(1998).
7 Paula J.Dalley,THE MISGUIDED DOCTRINE OF STOCKHOLDER FIDUCIARY DUTIES,33 Hofstra L.Rev.175,fall 2004,pp208-212.
1 James M.Van Vliet,Jr.& Mark D.Snider,The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,18 N.Ill.U.L.Rev.239,242(1998).
2 See,e.g.,George W.Dent,Jr.,Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances,57 Bus.Law.55,86(2001);J.Mark Meinhardt,Note,Investor Beware:Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests in Closely Held Limited Liability Organizations:Delaware Law and its Adherents,40 Washburn L.J.288,289(2001);James M.Van Vliet,Jr.& Mark D.Snider,The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,18 N.Ill.U.L.Rev.239,241-242(1998).
3 See J.Mark Meinhardt,Note,Investor Beware:Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests in Closely Held Limited Liability Organizations:Delaware Law and its Adherents,40 Washburn L.J.288,289-90(2001);Robert Ragazzo,Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,77 Wash.U.L.Q.1099,1101(1999);James M.Van Vliet,Jr.& Mark D.Snider,The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,18 N.Ill.U.L.Rev.239,242(1998);Shannon Wells Stevenson,The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporations Shareholder Duties,51 Duke L.J.1139,1148(2001).
4 See David C.Crago,Fiduciary Duties and Reasonable Expectations:Cash-Out Mergers in Close Corporations,49 Okla.L.Rev.1,1-2,9(1996);J.Mark Meinhardt,Note,Investor Beware:Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests in Closely Held Limited Liability Organizations:Delaware Law and its Adherents,40 Washburn L.J.288,295(2001);Robert Ragazzo,Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,77 Wash.U.L.Q.1099,1134(1999);Shannon Wells Stevenson,The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporations Shareholder Duties,51 Duke L.J.1139,1147-48(2001);James M.Van Vliet,Jr.& Mark D.Snider,The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,18 N.Ill.U.L.Rev.239,240(1998).比较 Robert Drumm,Note,Shareholder Duties in Closely Held Kansas Corporations After Hunt v.Data Management Resources,49 U.Kan.L.Rev.1159,1191(2001).
5 See James M.Van Vliet,Jr.& Mark D.Snider,The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,18 N.Ill.U.L.Rev.239(1998).
6 See Robert Hamilton,Cases and Materials on Corporations 482(8th ed.2003).
7 See David C.Crago,Fiduciary Duties and Reasonable Expectations:Cash-Out Mergers in Close Corporations,49 Okla.L.Rev.1,9(1996);Robert B.Thompson,The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression,48 Bus.Law.699,729(1993).See also Jeremy Nolan Hendon,Comment,Combating Legal Theft:Arguments for Shareholder/Employees Terminated from Close Corporations,77 Or.L.Rev.735,743(1998).
8 See generally Donahue v.Rodd Electrotype Co.,328 N.E.2d 505,511-12(Mass.1975);Hallahan v.Haltom Corp.,385 N.E.2d 1033,1034(Mass.App.Ct.1979);Scanolon v.W.C.Canniff& Sons,No.94-6722-C,1996Mass.Super.LEXIS 172,at ~*10(Mass.Dist.Ct.Aug.9,1996).
9 See,e.g.,Rexford Rand Corp.v.Ancel,58 F.3d 1215,127 n.1(7th Cir.1995);J.Bar H,Inc.v.Johnson,822 P.2d 849,85960(Idaho 1991).
1 See Sundbarg v.Lampert Lumber Co.,390 N.W.2d 352,357(Minn.Ct.App.1986);Daniels v.Thomas,Dean &Hoskins,Inc.,804 P.2d 359,364(Mont.1990).
2 See,e.g.,Chesterton,128 F.3d at 6;Merola v.Exergen Corp,668 N.E.2d 351,353-55(Mass.1996);Zimmerman v.Bogoff,524 N.E.2d 849,853-54(Mass.1988);Rodd,328 N.E.2d at 515 n.7;Smith v.Atlantic Properties,Inc.,422 N.E.2d 798,802(Mass.App.Ct.1981).
3 See,e.g.,Lawton v.Nyman,327 F.3d 30,38(lst Cir.2003);Slettland v.Roberts,16 P.3d 1062,1067(Mont.2000);Russell v.First York Say.Co.,352 N.W.2d 871,874(Neb.1984),rev'd on other grounds,364 N.W.2d 14(Neb.1985);Walta v.Gailegos Law Firm,P.C.,40 P.3d 449,457(N.M.Ct.App.2001).Cf.A.Teixeria & Co.v.Teixeira,699 A.2d 1383,1387(R.I.1997).
4 See Hubbard v.Tomlinson,747 N.E.2d 69,71(Ind.Ct.App.2001);McRedmond v.Estate of Marianelli,46S.W.3d 730,738-39(Tenn.Ct.App.2000);P.F.Jurgs & Co.v.O'Brien,629 A.2d 325,331(Vt.1993);cf.Helms v.Duckworth,249 F.2d 482,487(D.C.1957).
5 Compare Rosiny v.Schmidt,587 N.Y.S.2d 929(App.Div.1992) with In re Validation Review Assocs.,Inc.,646N.Y.S.2d 149,151(N.Y.App.Div.1996),rev'd on other grounds,690 N.E.2d 487(N.Y.1997).
6 See,e.g.,Wilkes v.Springside Nursing Home,Inc.,353 N.E.2d 657,662(Mass.1976);Rodd,328 N.E.2d at 515;Cain v.Cain,334 N.E.2d 650,654-55(Mass.App.Ct.1975).But see Charles W.Murdock,The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares,65 Notre Dame L.Rev.425,436(1990).
7 See,e.g.,I.P.Homeowners,Inc.v.Radtke,558 N.W.2d 582,589(Neb.Ct.App.1997);Walta v.Gallegos Law Firm,P.C.,40 P.3d 449,458-59(N.M.App.2001).
8 See Cressy v.Shannon Cont'l Corp.,378 N.E.2d 941,944-45 n.6(Ind.Ct.App.1978);A.Teixera & Co.v.Teixera,699 A.2d 1383,1387(R.I.1997).
9 See Wisehart v.Zions Bancorporation,49 P.3d 1200,1204(Colo.Ct.App.2002)(引用 Van Schaack Holdings,Ltd.v.Van Schaack案,867 P.2d 892,8897-98(Colo.1994));Hagshenas v.Gaylord,557 N.E.2d 316,323-24(Ill.App.Ct.1990);Norman v.Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms,Inc.,537 S.E.2d 248,260(N.C.Ct.App.2000);Koos v.Cent.Ohio Cellular,Inc.,641 N.E.2d 265,271(Ohio Ct.App.1994).
10 See Goode v.Ryan,489 N.E.2d 1001,1005(Mass.1986).
11 See Walta v.Gailegos Law Firm,P.C.,40 P.3d 449,457-58(N.M.App.2001);Danieis v.Thomas,Dean &Hoskins,Inc.,804 P.2d 359,366(Mont.1990).
12 See Jones v.H.F.Ahmanson & Co.,460 P.2d 464,478(Cal.1969);Morrison v.Gugle,755 N.E.2d 404,412(Ohio Ct.App.2001);Jorgenson v.Water Works,Inc.,630 N.W.2d 230,235(Wisc.Ct.App.2001).虽然乔治尼亚州有一个案例采纳平等机会规则,随后的案例似乎遵循了更为传统的公司原则。Compare Comolli v.Comolli,246 S.E.2d 278,281(Ga.1978) with Matthews v.Tele-Systems,Inc.,525 S.E.2d 413,415-16(Ga.Ct.App.1999).而且,一个法院解释其解散立法采纳了平等机会规则。See,e.g.,Powell v.MVW Holdings,Inc.,626 N.W.2d 45l,463(Minn.Ct.App.2001).
1 Nixon,626 A.2d at 1380.See also Chapin v.Benwood Found.,Inc.402 A.2d 1205(Del.Ch.1979),affd sub nom on other grounds,Harrison v.Chapin,415 A.2d 1068(Del.1980).
2 See,e.g.,Jamal v.Pirani,490 S.E.2d 140,141(Ga.1997);Hunt v.Data Mgmt.Res.,Inc.,985 P.2d 731(Kan.App.1999);Toner v.Baltimore Envelope Co.,498 A.2d 642(Md.1985).俄克拉何马州会相似地拒绝封闭式持有公司接受与法定封闭式公司同等对待原则,因为其案例法和公司立法被解释为遵循特拉华州法律。See,e.g.,Woolf v.Universal Fidelity Life lnc.Co.,849 P.2d 1093,1095(Okla.App.1992).Cf.Sundberg v.Lampert Lumber Co.,390 N.W.2d 352,356(Minn.Ct.App.1986).伊利诺斯州采用这两种方法的案例都有。Compare Sims v.Tezak,694 N.E.2d 1015,1017 n.1(Ill.1998) with Rexford Rand Corp.v.Ancel,58 E3d 1215,1217 n.1(7th Cir.1995).But see Davis v.Rondina,741 F.Supp.1115,1122-1123(S.D.N.Y.1990).See also Robert Drumm,Note,Shareholder Duties in Closely Held Kansas Corporations After Hunt v.Data Management Resources,49 U.Kan.L.Rev.II59(2001),at 1168-71.
3 对何为控制的讨论,see Mary Siegel,The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders,24 Del.J.of Corp.Law 27(1999),at 36 n.31.
4 See,e.g.,Thorpe v.CERBCO,Inc.,676 A.2d 436,441(DeE 1996);Odyssey Partners v.Fleming,735 A.2d 386(Del.Ch.1999);Jedwab v.MGM Grand Hotels,Inc.,509 A.2d 584,598(Del.Ch.1986).
5 See Hines v.Hines,934 P.2d.20,23-4(Idaho 1997);Hunt,985 P.2d at 731;Hoggett v.Brown,971 S.W.2d 472,488(Tex.App.1997);Sensormatic Sec.Corp.v.Bogansky,No.119,641,1992 Va.Cir.LEXIS 249,at ~*3(Va.Cir.Ct.Mar.27,1992).Cf.Frieler v.Reuping,Inc.,No.844502,1985 Wis.App.LEXIS 3633,at ~*5(Wis.Ct.App.Aug.21,1985).
6 See cases cited in chart col.4,app.A,pertaining to Colorado,Illinois,North Carolina,and Ohio.Cf.Jones v.H.F.Ahmanson & Co.,460 P.2d 464,471(Cal.1969).
7 See Nixon,626 A.2d at 1380.
8 See,e.g.,id.
9 特拉华州对这里不能适用的情形还有中间检验标准。See,e.g.,Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,Inc.,506 A.2d 173(Del.1985);Unocal Corp.v.Mesa Petroleum Co.,493 A.2d 946,946(Del.1985).
10 See 1 Rodman Ward,Jr.et al,Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law 151.6,at GCL-V-38(4th ed.1999).
11 See,e.g.,Berman v.Physical Medicine Assocs.,Ltd.,225 F.3d 429,434(4th Cir.2000);Clagett v.Hutchinson,583 F.2d 1259,1264(Md.1978);Hunt,985 P.2d at 732;Foster v.Blaekwell,747 So.2d 1203,1216(La.Ct.app.1999);Rosenthal v.Rosenthal,543 A.2d 348,352-53(Me.1988);Toner,498 A.2d at 642;Hoggett,971 S.W.2d at 488 n.13.Cf.Advanced Communication Design v.Follet,615 N.W.2d 285,293-94(Minn.2000).
1 See Lawton v.Nyman,327 E3d 30,38-37(1st Cir.2003);A.Teixeira & Co.v.Teixera,699 A.2d 1383,1387(R.I.1997).
2 See,e.g.,Stephenson v.Drever,947 P.2d 1301,1307-08(Cal.1997);Jones v.H.F.Ahmanson & Co.,460 P.2d 464,471(Cal.1969).
3 See Birch v.Equality Emergency Med.Group,Inc.,125 Cal.Rptr.2d 325,331-32(Cal.App.2002).
4 See,e.g.,G&N Aircraft,Inc.v.Boehm,743 N.E.2d 227,236(Ind.2001);Hubbard v.Tomlinson,747 N.E.2d 69,71(Ind.Ct.App.2001).
5 See,e.g.,Melrose v.Capitol City Motor Lodge,Inc.,705 N.E.2d 985,991(Ind.1998);Maul v.Van Keppel,714N.E.2d 707,709-11(Ind.Ct.App.1999);Krukemeir v.Krukemeir Math.& Tool Co.,551 N.E.2d 885,888-89(Ind.Ct.App.1990).
6 See Wisehart v.Zions Bancocorporation,49 P.3d 1200,1204(Colo.Ct.App.2002);Anest v.Audino,773 N.E.2d 202,210(Ill.App.Ct.2002);Freese v.Smith,428 S.E.2d 841,847(N.C.Ct.App.1993);Morrison v.Gugle,775N.E.2d 404,412(Ohio Ct.App.2001).
7 See Nelson v.Martin,958 S.W.2d 643,648-50(Tenn.1997);Hall v.Tennessee Dressed Beef Co.,957 S.W.2d 536,541(Tenn.1997).
8 阿拉巴马州、乔治亚州、密歇根州、内华达州、佛蒙特州、威斯康星州和华盛顿特区既不属于多数派规则,也不属于少数派规则。
1 See,e.g.,Corbin v.Corbin,429 F.Supp.276,280(M.D.Ga.1977);Comolli v.Comolli,246 S.E.2d 278,280-82(Ga.1978).
2 See,e.g.,Parks v.Multimedia Techs.,Inc.,520 S.E.2d 517,525(Ga.App.1999);Gardiner v.McDaniel,415S.E.2d 303,304(Ga.App.1992).
3 以前的内华达州案例表明其法院对封闭式公司股东适用合伙义务,当共同目的或股东意图表明合伙对待可以适用的话。See,e.g.,Clark v.Lubdtz,944 P.2d 861,864-65(Nev.1997).然而,内华达州对封闭式公司法施行新的条款,要求任何将封闭式公司当作合伙的协议采用书面形式,如果该协议消除董事会,该变化必须反映在公司章程中。See Nev.Rev.Stat.§78A.070(1989).这表明法院可能不能对封闭式公司适用合伙义务,除非股东打算以类似于合伙的方式运营被包括在书面协议中。
4 See James v.James,768 So.2d 356,358(Ala.2000);Galbreath v.Scott,433 So.2d 454,457(Ala.1983).
5 See P.F.Jurgs & Co.V.O'BRien,629 A.2d 325,331(Vt.1993).在Jurgs案中,法院引用Solomon v.Atlantis Dev.Inc.,516 A.2d 132,136(Vt.1986)案,该案对一家马萨诸塞州公司适用马萨诸塞州法律,并指出封闭式公司中所有股东相互之间负有真诚和忠实的义务。然而,Jurgs案法院拒绝原告的该义务被违反的请求,因为终止股东的利益符合股东间的协议。因此,并不清楚佛蒙特州法院是否在Jurgs案中打算采纳多数派原则,即所有股东相互之间负有信义义务。
6 630 N.W.2d 230(Wis.Ct.App.2001).
7 Id.at 232.
8 Id.at 235.
9 See,e.g.,McVeigh v.Grum,No.98-2559,2000 Wis.App.LEX1S,at ~*12(Wis.Ct.App.Apr.18,2000);Frieler v.Rueping Inc.,No.84,602,1985 Wis.App.LEXIS 3633,at ~*13-~*14(Wis.Ct.App.Aug.21,1985).
10 See Helms v.Duckworth,249 F.2d 482,487(D.C.Cir.1957).
11 See Egan v.McNamara,467 A.2d 733,739-40(D.C.1983).
12 See,e.g.,Jelonek v.Emergency Med.Specialists,P.C.,Nos.220,244,220,245,& 220,246,2001 Mich.App.LEXIS 2653,at ~*17-~*18(Mich.Ct.App.Aug.28,200 I);Dittrich v.Cabana Mfg.Corp.,No.185,155,1998 Mich.App.LEXIS 1480,at ~*4-~*6(Mich.Ct.App.May 12,1998).
1 See Estes v.Idea Eng'g & Fabrications,Inc.,649 N.W.2d 84,91(Mich.Ct.App.2002).
2 密歇根州、佛蒙特州和华盛顿特区对多数派规则提供的支持特别少。
3 马萨诸塞州、蒙大纳州、罗德岛州、内布拉斯加州和新墨西哥州为明确的采纳多数派规则的州。
4 马萨诸塞州、蒙大纳州、罗德岛州、内布拉斯加州、新墨西哥州、加利福尼亚州、印地安纳州、科罗拉多州、伊利诺斯州、北卡罗来纳州、俄亥俄州和田纳西州是确定的和可能的采纳多数派规则的州。
5 Mary Siegel,FIDUCIARY DUTY MYTHS IN CLOSE CORPORATE LAW,Del.J.Corp.L.377,2004.
6 See cases cited in chart col.5,app.A.
7 See,e.g.,Lux v.Environmental Warranty,Inc.,755 A.2d 936,944(Conn.App.Ct.2000);McCann v.McCann,61 P.3d 585,590(Idaho 2002);Roscnthal v.Roscnthal,543 A.2d 348,352-53(Me.1988);Lerner v.Lerner Corp.,750 A.2d 709,720-22(Md.Ct.Spec.App.2000);Derouen v.Murray,604 So.2d 1086,1090-93(Miss.1992);Jones v.Sherman,857 S.W.2d 468,472(Mo.Ct.App.1993);State cx rel.Smith v.Evans,547 S.E.2d 278,279(W.va.2001).应该指出缅因州近期施行了其压迫立法,其在2003年7月1日生效。See Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.tit.13-C,§1430(West 2001).
5 See,e.g.,Cookies Food Prods.,Inc.v.Lakes Warehousc Distrib.,Inc.,430 N.W.2d 447,451(Iowa 1988);Mueller v.Cedar Shore Resort,Inc.,643 N.W.2d 56,63(S.D.2002);Pabich v.Kellar,71 S.W.3d 500,505-06(Tex.App.2002);Wiilard ex rel.Moneta Bldg.Supply,Inc.,v.Moneta Bldg.Supply,Inc.,515 S.E.2d 277,287-88(Va.1999).
1 See,e.g.,Derouen,604 So.2d at 1090-93;Draper v.Hay,555 So.2d 1306(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990).
2 Mary Siegel,FIDUCIARY DUTY MYTHS IN CLOSE CORPORATE LAW,Del.J.Corp.L.377,2004.
3 See,e.g.,Galbreath,433 So.2d at 457;Draper,555 So.2d at 1306;Derouen,604 So.2d at 1091-93.
4 Compare Burt v.Burt Boiler Works,Inc.,360 So.2d 327,331-32(Ala.1978) with id.at 332-33.
5 Compare Alaska Plastics,Inc.,621 P.2d at 276 with Collins v.Blair,68 P.3d 1222,1230(Ala.2002).
6 Mary Siegel,FIDUCIARY DUTY MYTHS IN CLOSE CORPORATE LAW,Del.J.Corp.L.377,2004.,chart col.4,app.A.
7 See,e.g.,805 Ill.Comp.Stat.5/12.56(d)(1995);N.D.Cent.Code §10-19.1-115(4)(1985);Minn.Stat.Ann.§302A.751(West Supp.1992);Or.Rev.Stat.§60.952(4)(2001).Cf.N.C.Gen.Stat.§55-14-30(1990).
8 See,e.g.,Brooks v.Hill,717 So.2d 759,765-66(Ala.1998);Smith v.Leonard,876 S.W.2d 266,272(Ark.1994);Muellenberg v.Bikon Corp.,669 A.2d 1382,1387(N.J.1996);In re Kemp & Beatley,Inc.,473 N.E.2d 1173,1176-77(N.Y.1984);Masinter v.WEBCO Co.,262 S.E.2d 433,442(W.Va.1980);Morrow v.Prestonwold,Inc.,No.CV000445844S,2001 Conn.Super.LEXIS 3616,at *13(Conn.Super.Ct.Dec.20,2001,as amended Mar.22,2002).其他州将合理期待和违反信义义务联系在一起。 See,e.g.,Bauer v.Bauer,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 377,381-84(Cal.Ct.App.1996);Polk v.Hergert Land & Cattle Co.,5 P.3d 402,404-05(Colo.Ct.App.2000);Maschmeier v.Southside Press,Ltd.,435 N.W.2d 377,380(Iowa Ct.App.1988);Mueller v.Cedar Shore Resort,Inc.,643N.W.2d 56,63(S.D.2002);Scott v.Trans-System,Inc.,64 P.3d 1,6(Wash.2003).Cf.Allchin v.Chemic,Inc.,No.14-01-00433-CV,2002 Tex.App.LEXIS 5125,at *20-*21(Tex.App.July 18,2002).But see Douglas K.Moll,Reasonable Expectations vs Implied-in-Fact Contracts:Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed? 42 B.C.L.Rev.989,993(2001).
1 See Bauer,54 Cal.Rptr.2d at 381-84.Cf.Kiriakides。541 S.E.2d at 265-66 n.25.与提高的信义义务原则相比,指出合理期待原则是暗含的合同原则也是有趣的。Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Onoression in Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,53 Vand.L.Rev.749(2000),at 761
2 See,e.g.,Minn.Star.Ann.§302A.751(West Supp.1992);N.J.Stat.Ann.§14A:12-7(West Supp.1992);N.D.Cent.Code §10-19.1-115(1985);Pa.Star.Ann.tit.15,§1981(West 1995).
3 Minn.Stat.Ann.§302A.751(West Supp.1992);see also N.D.Cent.Code §10-19.I-115(1985).
4 See Advanced Communication Design v.Follet,615 N.W.2d 285,293-94(Minn.2000);Wessin v.Archives Corp.,592 N.W.2d 460(Minn.1999).Cf.Powell v.MVW Holdings,Inc.,626 N.W.2d 451,463-64(Minn.Ct.App.2001).
5 See,e.g.,Hayes v.Olmsted & Assocs.,21 P.3d 178,181(Or.20OI);Naito v.Naito,35 P.3d 1068,1079 n.26(Or.Ct.App.2001);Locati v..Johnson,980 P.2d 173,176(Or.Ct.App.1999).
6 See Pa.Stat.Ann.tit.15,§1767(Am.Comm.Cmt.1990).
7 只有十二个州和哥伦比亚特区没有立法提供基于压迫的解散。没有压迫立法的州是阿拉斯加州、加利福尼亚州、特拉华州、佛罗里达州、印地安纳州、堪萨斯州、肯塔基州、路易斯安那州、马萨诸塞州、俄亥俄州、俄克拉何马州、内华达州和哥伦比亚特区。See Mary Siegel,FIDUCIARY DUTY MYTHS IN CLOSE CORPORATE LAW,Del.J.Corp.L.377,2004.
8 See Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,
1 比较Tamar Frankel,Fiduciary Law,71 Cal.L.Rev.795,835(1983);id.at 814.
2 See In re Pure Resources Inc.S'holders Litig.,808 A.2d 421,434-35(Del.Ch.2002).
3 就控制权溢价代表掠夺公叫的期望而言,现存的管理者和董事的信义义务解决了该问题。一般性的公司信义义务服务于降低代理成本,但没有理由扩展该理由至股东,因为股东不引起代理问题。而且,熟练的投资者不对此种义务进行谈判的事实表明他们不具有重要的经济功能。相反,熟练的少数投资者依赖多数股东未来资本投入的需要以及声誉限制来降低掠夺风险。See David Rosenberg,Venture Capital Limited Partnerships:A Study in Freedom of Contract,2002 Colum.Bus.L.Rev.363,368-73.
4 See Tamar Frankel,Fiduciary Law,71 Cal.L.Rev.795,829-39(1983).
1 苏永钦:《私法自治中的国家强制》,载《中外法学》2001年第1期。 页。
1 刘作翔:《法律文化理论》,商务印书馆1999年版。转引自李媛:《法律移植中的本土化问题》,载《中国特色社会主义研究》2004年第3期。
1 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%201n%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp68-81.
2 See,e.g.,In re Topper,433 N.Y.S.2d 359,362(Sup.Ct.1980);Balvik v.Sylvester,411 N.W.2d 383,388(N.D.1987).
3 而且,依此种理解,修正的多数股东视角与修正的少数股东视角的功能会完全相同。
4 Wilkes v.Springside Nursing Home,Inc.,353 N.E.2d 657(Mass.1976).
1 确实,Wilkes判决中的很大篇幅完全关注多数股东决策自由裁量权的需要。
2 比较Peeples,The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation,60 NOTRE DAME L.REV.456,500(1985).(引用Wilkes,353 N.E.2d at 663).当然,马萨诸塞州以外的法院可能有不同的观点。然而,很多法院采纳了Wilkes法院的“更少的损害替代性选择”语言。See,e.g.,Solomon v.Atlantics Dev.,Inc.,516A2d 132,136(Vt.1986).因此,马萨诸寨州法院采纳更少的损害替代性选择语言的目的可能对其他管辖权地区的法院存在重大的影响。
3 Wilkes,353 N.E.2d at 663;see also Zimmerman v.Bogoff,524 N.E.2d 849,853(Mass.1988).
4 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%201n%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp81-85.
1 See,e.g.,Gimpel v.Bolstein,477 N.Y.S.2d 1014,1019(Sup.Ct.1984);Robblee v.Robblee,841 P.2d 1289,1293(Wash.Ct.App.1992);In re Kemp&Beatley,Inc.,473 N.E.2d 1173,1179(N.Y.1984);Meiseiman v.Meiselman,307 S.E.2d 551,563(N.C.1983).
1 See,.e.g.,Jenkins v.Haworth,Inc.,572 F.Supp.591,595(W.D.Mich.1983);Gallagher v.Lambert,549 N.E.2d 136(N.Y.1989).
1 See Gerard P.Tishler&Jennifer R.Searle,Merola v.Exergen Corporation:Lawful Termination of a Minority Shareholder' Employment(Absent a Legitimate Business Purpose),41 BOSTON BAR J.6,7(Jan.1997).
2 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%201n%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp85-95.
3 应该注意,公开性公司在某种程度上允许采用(至少不是直接)被设计为增加利润的方式行为。Sce,e.g.,DEL.CODE ANN.tit.8,§122(9)(1991);PA.CONS.STAT.§1502(a)(14)(1999).
4 这些限制施加于影响股东个人权利的事项,而不是与公司商业活动有关的一般性事务。
1 See,e.g.,Harris v.Mardan Bus.Sys.,Inc.,421 N.E.2d 350,352(Minn.Ct.App.1988).
2 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbiit Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%20In%20Clo se%20Coporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp96-99.
1 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%20In%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp100-102.
2 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%20In%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp103-105.
3 See,e.g.,Wilkes v.Springside Nursing Home,Inc.,353 N.E.2d 657,662(Mass.1976);Donahue v.Rodd Electrotype Co.,328 N.E.2d 505,513(Mass.1975).
1 See,e.g.,Rosenfield v.Metals Selling Corp.,643 A.2d 1253,1262 n.18(Conn.1994).
2 Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=208875&high=%20Shareholder%20Oppression%201n%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Question%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp105-109.
1 Sandra K.Miiler,Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude A Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?97 Dick.L.Rev.227,1992-1993,at 262.
2 该方法在有关故意干涉合同关系方面并非完全不同于RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS§767(1977)中采取的方法。
3 Sandra K.Miller,Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude A Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?97 Dick.L.Rev.227,1992-1993,at 263.
1 A.L.R.Library See What amounts to "oppressive" conduct under statute authorizing dissolution of corporation at suit of minority stockholders,56 A.L.R.3d 358.
2 Sandra K.Miller,Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude A Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?97 Dick.L.Rev.227,1992-1993,at 265.
1 Sandra K.Miller,Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude A Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?97 Dick.L.Rev.227,1992-1993,at 266.
2 Re Harmer(H.R.),Ltd.[1958]3 All Eng 689(CA).
1 应该指出英国公司法第210节规定,通过抱怨公司事务以对部分成员压迫的方式行使的股东申请,如果法院认定公司事务是被如此行为的,但如果清算公司会不公平的损害该部分股东的利益,虽然事实在其他情况下会正当化清算,法院可以作出其认为适当的命令,是否规制公司在未来事务的行为,或者由其他股东或公司购买股东的股份。据此,法院在Harmer案中作出命令,使得儿子控制了商业运营,并赋予父亲从公司中获得持续的重大收入的权利。
2 See Orchard v.Covelli,590F.Supp.1548,1557(W.D.Pa.1984).
3 樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第129-130页。
1 See id.§3.30.
2 See id.§3.38.
3 See id.§3.43.
4 See id.§3.53.
5 See Exadaktilos v.Cinnaminson Realty Co.,400 A.2d 554(N.J.Super.1979);see also Gimpel v.Bolstein,N.Y.S.2d 1014,1019(1984 N.Y.Sup.Ct.);John O'Neill 626 N.Y.S.2d 813(N.Y.App.Div.1995);Smith-Shrader
1 See id.§5.11.
2 See id.§5.10.
3 Sandra K.Miller,HOW SHOULD U.K.AND U.S.MINORITY SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES FOR UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL OR OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT BE REFORMED?,36 Am.Bus.L.J.579,1999.
1 741 A.2d 377(Del.Ch.1999).
2 美国法律研究院:《公司治理原则:分析与建议(上卷)》,楼建波等译,法律出版社,2006年版,第378-379页。
3 Mary Siegel,The Erosion of The Law of Controlling Shareholders,24Del.J.Corp.L,27,1999,at 80.
1(1994,DC Puerto Rico) 847 F Supp 236,reconsideration den(DC Puerto Rico) 847 F Supp 236.
2 See Reasonableness of Corporate Officer's Compensation,4 Am.Jur.Proof of Facts 2d 425.
1 对有关封闭式公司分配政策的讨论,参见O'Neal §8.08.Note,Minority Shareholder Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends,64 Harv L Rev 299;Proposals to Help the Minority Shareholder Receive Fairer Dividend Treatment from Closely Held Corporation,56 Nw U L Rev 503;Scholder,Dividends and the Minority Stockholder in a Closely Held Corporation,14 NYU L Rev 140.A.L.R.Library What amounts to "oppressive" conduct under statute authorizing dissolution of corporation at suit of minority shareholders,56 A.L.R.3d 358.
1 G & N Aircraft,Inc.v.Boehm,743 N.E.2d 227(Ind.2001).
2(1989,2d Dept) 154 AD2d 537,546 NYS2d 382.
3 178 Or.App.1,35 P.3d 1068(2001).See also Or Rev Stat 60.661(2)(b).
4 338 S.C.572,527 S.E.2d 371(Ct.App.2000).
5 246 Wis.2d 614,2001 WI App 135,630 N.W.2d 230(Ct.App.2001),review denied,2001 WI 114,634 N.W.2d 321(Wis.2001).
1 于沛霖、王海燕:《关于法律移植的内涵及形式的学理思考》,载《辽宁师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2003年第5期。
1 胡成建、聂施恒:《法律移植的基本问题研究》,载《行政与法》2003年第11期。
1 Barry AK Rider.The Comorate Dimension,Jordon Publishing Limited,1998,pp295-300
2 吴越:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社 2003年版,绪论第2页。
3 吴越:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社 2003年版,第36页。
4 吴越:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社 2003年版,第46-48页。
1 吴越:《企业集团法理研究》,法律出版社 2003年版,第51-55页。
2 范世乾:《论国家所有权主体的塑造》,载漆多俊主编:《经济法论从》(第13卷),中国方正出版社 2007年版,第474-478页。
1 李建伟:《国有独资公司前沿问题研究》,法律出版社 2002年版,第76-81页。
2 罗红波、戎殿新主编:《西欧公有企业大变革》,对外经济贸易大学出版社 2000年版,第173页。
3 徐晓松:《公司法与国有企业改革研究》,法律出版社 2000年版,第189页。
1 吴幼喜:《国家所有权是商品所有权》,载《福建学刊》1994:年第5期。
2[美]理查德·波斯纳:《法律的经济分析》(上),蒋兆康译,林毅夫校,中国大百科全书出版社 1997年版,第42页。
3[日]美浓部达吉:《公法与私法》,黄冯明译,周旋勘校,中国政法大学出版社 2003年版,109页。
4 陈旭琴:《论国家所有权的法律性质》,载《浙江大学学报》(人文社会科学版)2001年第2期。
5[日]美浓部达吉:《公法与私法》,黄冯明译,周旋勘校,中国政法大学出版社 2003年版,第44页。
6 宗寒:《国有经济读本》,经济管理出版社 2002年版,第100页。
1 外部性是经济学中的概念,指的是行为人并不对行为结果承担完全的责任或并不能享有行为所带来的全部收益的情况,也就是个人成本和收益与社会成本和收益不相等的情况。经济学中将行为人不承担完全结果的情况称为存在负外部性,而将行为人并不能享有全部收益的情况称为存在正外部性。
2 信息不对称,又称为信息偏在,是指交易双方关于交易对象的信息掌握的情况不同。在一些高科技产品或者产品瑕疵不易察觉的领域(如医院)信息不对称情况最易恶化。信息不对称会导致信任危机。因此,如果由私有资本经营这些领域,因其目标是个人利益最大化,消费者很难建立对该产品的信任,并且要花费很大的成本来监督和验证企业的诚信度,这无疑加大了交易成本。但如果由公有企业来生产该类商品,由于企业的公益性和政府的诚信保证,可以减轻消费者的疑虑,减少交易成本。因此,公有企业有可能经营的更有效率。
3[美]罗伯特·考特、托马斯·尤伦:《法和经济学》,张军译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社 1994年版,第258页。
4 路易斯·普特曼(Louis Putterman):《所有权和企业性质》,载路易斯·普特曼、兰德尔·克罗茨纳编:《企业的经济性质》,孙经纬译,上海财经大学出版社 2000年版,第480页。
5[美]哈罗德·德姆塞茨:《所有权、控制与企业》,段毅才等译,经济科学出版社 1999年版,第343页。
6 刘云升:《国家所有权面临新的挑战——评<中国物权法草案建议稿>对国家所有权制度的构建》,载《河北法学》2001年第1期。刘云升认为草案建议稿中规定的过于片面,未对国家投入企业的财产属性做全面分析,难以得出这部分国有资产在物权法上归属的结论。但笔者以为这是刘云升个人的误解。建议稿中的立法建议解释已经很明确的提到行政机关用于收益的物,属于(与私人财产相同的)收益财产,这是一种与私人财产权相同的财产,笔者完全看不出因何这种收益财产在物权法中找不到归属。而且笔者以为,将国有财产规定为公有物和公用物才是国有财产自身界定的真正回归。并且,按照公法设立的企业中的国有
1 参见史际春:《关于“恒裕”轮于1999年8月26日在南非德班被扣案的法律意见书》,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=9896,访问时间2005年1月3日。
1 Victor Joffe,David Drake,Minority Shareholders:Law,Practice and Procedure,Butterworhts,London,Edinburgh and Dublin,2000,p36-44.
2[英]A.J.博伊尔著,段威、李扬译,叶林校:《少数派股东救济措施》,北京大学出版社 2006年版,第8-9页。
3 当前,对此问题中国学者只有樊云慧有所研究。参见参见樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,第五章 少数股东个人诉讼与派生诉讼的选择,中国法制出版社 2005年版。
4 参见樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第177页。
1[1982]Ch 204,at 222-223,[1982]All ER 354.
2 Welch,Shareholder Individual and Derivative Action:Underlying Rationales and Closely held Corporation,9J.Corp.L.147(1984).转引自美国法律研究院:《公司治理原则:分析与建议(下卷)》,楼建波等译,法律出版社 2006年版,第530页。
1 Smith v.Hurd,53Mass.(12 met.)371(1847).
2[2001]1 All ER481(HL),[200112 WLR 72.
3[2001]1 All ER 481,P528.
4 E.Ferran,Litigation by Shareholders and Reflective Loss,2001,Cambridge Law Journal,p245-247.
1[2002]1 B.C.L.C.1,15 per Arden L.J.
2 樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第176-183页。
3[英]A.J.博伊尔著,段威、李扬译,叶林校:《少数派股东救济措施》,北京大学出版社 2006年版,第63页。
1 Bertozzi v.King Louie International,Inc.,430F.Supp.1166,1179-80(D.R.I.1976);Heilbrunn v.Hanover Equities Corp.,259F.Supp.936,938-39(S.D.N.Y.1966);In re TransOcean Tender Offer Securities Litigation,,455F.Supp.999,1014(N.D.Ⅲ.1978).
2 美国法律研究院:《公司治理原则:分析与建议(下卷)》,楼建波等译,法律出版社 2006年版,第536-537页。
3 参见美国法律研究院的《公司治理原则:分析与建议》§7.02(a)(4)。
1[1985]BCLC 237.
2 樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第185-186页。
3 Starbird v.Lane,203Cal.App.2d247,21Cal.Rptr.280(1962);Morris v.Elyton Land Co.,125Ala.263.28So.513(1989).
4 樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第186-187页。
1 Victor Joffe,David Drake,Minority Shareholders:Law,Practice and Procedure,Butterworhts,London,Edinburgh and Dublin,2000,p36-44.
2 樊云慧:《英国少数股东权诉讼救济制度》,中国法制出版社 2005年版,第188-191页。
3[英]A.J.博伊尔著,段威、李扬译,叶林校:《少数派股东救济措施》,北京大学出版社 2006年版,第64页。
4[1988]14 ACLR 747.
1 诉讼法学者的研究成果,主要参见肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版。
1 本案例来源于北大法宝,网址为 http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fn1&gid=117462948,访问时间2007年10月18日。
1 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第19页。
1 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第43-44页。
2 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第25-26页。
3 民事主体是指具有民事权利能力,拥有独立民事主体资格的法律主体,主要包括自然人和法人。而不具有法人资格的无权利能力社团则不具有民事主体资格。诉讼主体是指具有诉讼权利能力,能够作为民事诉讼的当事人的主体。
4 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第45页。
1 范世乾:《论法人财产权和股权的性质》,载《北京化工大学学报》2007年第2期。
2 周枬:《罗马法原论》(下),商务印书馆 1994年版,第856页。
3[意]彼得罗·彭梵得著,黄风译:《罗马法教科书》,中国政法大学出版社 1992年版,第41页。
4 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第48-49页。
1[英]梅因著,沈景一译,《古代法》,商务印书馆 1983年版,第97页。
2 江平、米健:《罗马法基础》,中国政法大学1987年版,第73-79页。转引自肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第51页。
3 当然,也有个别国家承认胎儿的民事主体资格,如《瑞士民法典》第31条规定,胎儿只要其生时尚生存,出生前即具有权利能力的条件。
4 徐晓松主编:《公司法学》,中国政法大学出版社 2006年版,第50页。
1[德]迪特尔·梅迪库斯著,邵建东译:《德国民法总论》,法律出版社2001年版,第855-857页。
2 肖建华:《民事诉讼当事人研究》,中国政法大学出版社 2002年版,第68-77页。
3 See generally F.Hodge O'Neal & Robert B.Thompson,O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Shareholders §7.08(2d ed.2001);see also 公司治理原则§7.01(d).But see Keenan v.Eshleman,2 A.2d 904,909-11(Del.1938);Simmons v.Miller,544 S.E.2d 666,674(Va.2001).
4 范世乾:《国家所有权主体的基本理论》,载沈四宝主编:《经贸法律评论(一)》,对外经济贸易大学出版社 2005年10月版。
1 Watson,235 F.2d at 236-37;Kirk,439 F.Supp.at 1149;Thomas,301 S.E.2d at 51;Caswell,362 S.E.2d at 773.Thomas和Kirk都引用Watson案中提供的理由。Watson法院解释了一般原则,即“公司的股东对欺诈和不当管理公司,因此影响股票价值的董事或管理者没有个人诉讼权利。”Watson,235 F.2d at 236-37.然而,Watson法院指出了该规则的一项例外,即“当债权人的权利不受侵害,也没有涉及其他股东时”允许直接诉讼。Id.
2 Sandra K.Miller,WHAT BUY-OUT RIGHTS,FIDUCIARY DUTIES,AND DISSOLUTION REMEDIES SHOULD APPLY IN THE CASE OF THE MINORITY OWNER OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY?,38Harv.J.on Legis.413.
3 Maki v.Estate of Ziehm,55A.D.2d454,391N.Y.S.3d705,707(3d Dep't 1977).
4 John A.Gebauer,J.D.,American Law Reports ALR6th(10 A.L.R.6th 293),Action in Own Name by Shareholder of Closely Held Corporation.
5 See W & W Equipment Co.v.Mink.568 N.E.2d 564,571(Ind.Ct.App.1991).
1 Sandra K.Miller,Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European Community:A Comparative Analysis of the German,Unitated Kingdom,and French"Close Corporation Problem",30 Cornell Int'l L.J.381,1997,at 397.
1 相关内容还可参见Sheila Buckley,Protecting Minority Shareholders,Kluwer Law International Ltd.,1996;Jennifer Powers,Shareholders' Liability,Gramham and Trotman Ltd.,1994.
2 Douglas K.Moll,Shareholder Oppression In Close Corporations:The Unanswered Question of Perspective,Vanderbilt Law Review,April 2000,last revised on January 17,2006,downed at:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmTabstract_id=208875&high=%20Sharehoider%20Oppression%201n%20Clo se%20Corporations%3A%20The%20Unanswered%20Ouestion%20of%20Perspective#PaperDownload,pp61-62.
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31.[英]梅因著,沈景一译,《古代法》,商务印书馆 1983年版。
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41.王保树主编:《中国公司法修改草案建议稿》,社会科学文献出版社 2004年版。
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2.范世乾:《论法人财产权和股权的性质》,载《北京化工大学学报》2007年第2期。
3.范世乾:《国家所有权主体的基本理论》,载沈四宝主编:《经贸法律评论(一)》,对外经济贸易大学出版社 2005年10月版。
4.邓小明:《控制股东义务法律制度研究》,清华大学2005年博士学位论文。
5.王丹:《股份公司控制股东“诚信义务”考辨——境外公司法的变革及其对中国公司法的影响》,载王保树主编:《全球竞争体制下的公司法改革》,社会科学文献出版社 2003年版。
6.王华杰:《公司控制股东诚信义务及其民事赔偿责任》,载《法律适用》2004年第10期。
7.汤欣:《控制股东的受信义务:法律移植的视角》,清华大学工作论文,2006年7月4日稿。
8.朱慈蕴、郑博恩:《论控制股东的义务》,载《政治与法律》2002年第2期。
9.王保树、杨继:《论股份公司控制股东的义务与责任》,载《法学》2002年第2期。
10.赵建国:《董事与控股股东的公司法义务比较研究》,载《法制与经济》2006年第6期。
11.许成钢、卡塔琳娜·皮斯托:《转型的大陆法法律体系中的诚信义务:从不完备法律理论得到的经验》,载吴敬琏主编:《比较》第11辑,中信出版社 2004年3月版。
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19.谢作诗:《经济学方法论》,载http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=2509。访问日期2003年12月20日。
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27.麻昌华:《死者名誉的法律保护》,载《法商研究》1996年第6期。
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29.杨立新:《公民身体权及其民法保护》,载《法律科学》1994年第6期。
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31.傅利英:《我国上市公司治理中控股股东侵权行为及法律规范研究》,载《华东理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2004年第3期。
32.胡成建、聂施恒:《法律移植的基本问题研究》,载《行政与法》2003年第11期。
33.高鸿钧:《法律移植:隐喻、范式与全球化时代的新趋向》,载《中国社会科学》2007年第4期。
34.信春鹰:《法律移植的理论与实践》,载《北方法学》2007年第3期。
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36.李媛:《法律移植中的本土化问题》,载《中国特色社会主义研究》2004年第3期。
37.于沛霖、王海燕:《关于法律移植的内涵及形式的学理思考》,载《辽宁师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2003年第5期。
38.张德美:《浅论法律移植的方式》,载《比较法研究》2000年第3期。
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