摘要
近年来,在全球化快速发展的进程中,国际贸易与投资领域以下三个现象尤为突出：一、跨国公司主导的全球价值链分工下,世界FDI和中间品贸易迅速发展；二、FDI与中间品贸易的区域分布不平衡;三、国家和地区间的契约实施制度存在很大差异。基于以上现象,我们可总结出FDI与中间品贸易的特征：契约制度优越的地区往往吸引更多的投资,更多的中间品贸易。在世界已成为“地球村”的今天,各国的经济紧密相连,吸引外资与参与国际外包活动对一国特别是发展中国家的经济至关重要。那么,国际投资和中间品贸易为何会表现出上述特征?我们知道,当代国际垂直专业化生产(或产品内分工)是由跨国公司主导的。因此,弄清这一特征的关键在于理解跨国公司的生产组织模式决策问题。这一决策问题包括两方面：一是组织边界决策,即经典的"make or buy"的问题：对于所需的中间投入品,企业是选择将其外包出去,从别的企业购买,还是采用垂直一体化的方式从企业内部生产?二是区位决策,即企业选择到什么地方寻找外包合作伙伴,或投资垂直一体化生产。
传统理论对该问题的解释较为乏力。因为：首先,传统的经济学理论抽象了企业的生产过程,认为企业是一个“黑匣子”；其次,传统的贸易理论也抽象了企业生产的组织模式问题,假定产品的全部生产过程都在一国内部,按照比较优势的原则进行,或者即使涉及到中间品的分析,也只是将最终品分解为具有不同要素密集度的中间品,然后在比较优势的框架下分析这些中间品的生产将如何分布在具有不同资源禀赋的国家。最后,传统的经济和贸易理论都隐含着完全契约的假设,认为合作双方的企业只要签订了契约,就一定能完全按照双方意愿执行,并未考虑契约摩擦等因素对企业的影响。
20世纪80至90年代诞生的不完全契约理论为我们提供了一个分析该问题的思路。为解释这个问题,本文基于不完全契约理论建立了数理模型,并使用跨国面板数据和中国省际面板数据对数理模型的主要结论进行了验证。
本文基于不完全契约理论,分别从产权(GHM)和交易成本(TEE)的视角建立了南-北两国开放经济的理论模型,基于跨国公司的生产组织模式选择问题,重点分析南方国家契约实施制度的进步对其承接北方企业离岸生产的影响。此外,在TCE框架中,我们还分别从跨国公司在南方国家生产的倾向和产量两方面分析了不完全契约对南方国家承接中间品生产的影响。
本文理论部分的主要结论有：一、资本密集型产品的生产相对倾向于采取一体化的形式,而劳动密集型的产品往往采用外包形式组织生产。二、南方国家的契约实施制度的改善能促进其承接国际外包或吸引FDI,且对于契约密集度越高的行业促进作用越明显。三、南方国家契约实施制度的进步能增加北方国家的企业在南方国家离岸生产的倾向,从而促进南方国家承接离岸生产,且这一作用对于契约密集度越大的产品生产行业具有越明显的效果。四、南方国家契约实施制度的进步能增加南方国家企业的中间品产量。五、南方国家工资水平的降低能促进北方国家的企业在南方国家的离岸生产,且对于契约密集度越大的产品生产行业,其促进效果越明显。
在理论分析的基础上,本文分别运用跨国数据和中国省际面板数据进行了对契约实施制度与FDI和国际外包的关系进行了实证分析。
基于跨国样本数据的实证结果显示：一、契约实施制度对FDI有着显著且稳健的促进作用,契约制度系数的符号和显著性不随衡量指标的变化而产生明显变化,在控制了内生性等问题后该结论仍然成立。二、为进一步考察契约实施制度对FDI不同水平处的影响,我们还使用了分位数回归方法,结果显示,契约实施制度对高分位数水平处的FDI促进作用更为明显。
基于中国省际面板数据的实证结果显示：一、总体上看,对于FDI和外包,契约实施效率的进步都有显著且稳健的促进作用；衡量经济规模和市场厚度的GDP对FDI和外包的促进作用也很显著；较低的工资水平和完善的基础设施对FDI和外包有一定的促进作用,但这个效果并不稳健。二、从FDI和外包的不同分位处来看,在其水平越高的分位处,契约实施效率的促进作用越强,而GDP、工资水平和基础设施的作用都有所减弱,其中工资水平和基础设施的系数在0.75和0.9分位处已经不显著。这说明随着地区经济发展,当FDI和外包达到一定水平时,只有“制度红利”能进一步促进其发展,而像“人口红利”和基础设施等“硬实力”的作用已经变得十分微弱。
In recent years, in the process of rapid development of globalization, there are exist many, especially the following three phenomena in the field of international trade and investment:First, in the global value chain dominated by multinational companies, world FDI and the trade of intermediate goods had been developed rapidly; Second, FDI and intermediate regional imbalances in the distribution of goods trade; Third, the contract implementation systems between countries and regions are very different. Based on the above phenomena, we summed up the characteristics of FDI and intermediate goods trade:the superior contract system tend to attract more investment and more trade in intermediate goods. Today's world has become a "global village", the economy among countries are closely linked to each other, and foreign investment and participation in international outsourcing are very important for every countries'economy, especially for developing countries'. So, why the international investment and intermediate goods trade will exhibit the above characteristics? We know that, contemporary international vertical specialization (or division of labor within the product) is dominated by multinational corporations. Therefore, to clarify this feature lies in the understanding of multinational production organization mode decision problem. This decision problem consists of two aspects: First, organizational boundaries decision-making, that is, the classic "make or buy": For the desired intermediate inputs, companies choose to outsource from other companies (to buy) or make them itself through vertical integration? The second, Location decisions, that is, companies have to choose a place looking for outsourcing partner, or investment vertically to integrated production.
Traditional theory is relatively weak for interoperating the problem:First of all, the traditional economic theory abstract of the production process of the enterprise, saw the enterprise as a "black box"; Secondly, the traditional trade theory abstract production organization mode, assume that the entire production process happens in just one country, in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage, or even if it comes to the analysis of intermediate goods, it is only decomposes the final products of some intermediate goods with different factor intensity, then it will be analyzed in the framework of comparative advantage that how the production of these intermediate goods distributed in countries with different resource endowments. Finally, both the traditional economic and trade theory implies the assumption of complete contract, and that both companies that had signed the contract will be able to fully perform in accordance with the parties' intentions. They did not consider the contract friction's impact on businesses.
Bora in the20th century,80-90years, incomplete contract theory provides us with the idea of an analysis of the problem. To explain this problem, this paper established a mathematical model based on incomplete contract theory, and tested the main conclusions of the mathematical model by using the multinational panel data and inter-provincial panel data of China.
In this article, based on incomplete contract theory, we established a South-North bilateral open economy theoretical model from the perspective of property rights theory (GHM) and transaction costs theory (TCE). By the analysis of the multinational production organization mode selection, we focus on the effect of the progress of the contract implementation system in southern countries on its undertaking of northern enterprises'offshore production. In addition, in the TCE framework, we also divided the effect of the progress of the contract implementation system in southern countries into "extended marginal" and "intensive margin".
The main conclusions of the theoretical part of this article are as follows:First, a capital-intensive production tend to take the form of integration, when production of labor-intensive products often takes the form of outsourcing organization. Second, the improvement of contractual delivery system of the southern countries can promote the undertaking of international outsourcing or FDI, and the promotion is stronger for the industry of higher contract intensity. Third, the progress of contract implementation system in southern countries can increase the tendency of the enterprises in northern countries to shore in the southern countries, which is the extended marginal; and the effect is stronger in higher contract intensity industry. Fourth, the progress of the contract the implementation system in southern countries is able to increase the intermediate goods production enterprises, which is the intensive margin. Fifth, the reduction of the wage level of southern countries can promote the offshore production of the northern enterprises in southern countries, and the promotion is more obvious for the greater contract intensity industries.
On the basis of theoretical analysis, respectively, using cross-country data and inter-provincial panel data, we make an empirical analysis for the relationship between contract implementation system and FDI or international outsourcing.
The empirical results based on multinational sample are:First, contract implementation system has a significant and symbolic effect in promoting FDI, and the conclusion still holds after controlling of the endogenous and other potential problems. Second, to further examine the contract implement system'effect on different levels of FDI, we also use quantile regression. And the results show that the effect of contract implement system on promoting the higher level of FDI is more obvious.
The empirical results based on China's inter-provincial panel data are that:1. Overall, contract implementation efficiency progress has a significant and robust role in promoting FDI and outsourcing; As a measure of economies of scale and the market thickness, GDP's role in promoting FDI and outsourcing is also very significant; lower wage levels and sound infrastructure also work on FDI and outsourcing, but this effect is not robust.2. View from different levels of FDI and outsourcing, the higher of those levels, the stronger of sub-contract effective's role plays, but the weaker of GDP, wage levels and infrastructure's role paly. This shows that with the regional economic development, FDI and outsourcing have reached a certain level, only "bonus system" works, and the role of "hard power" like the "demographic dividend" and infrastructure has become very weak.
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