摘要
随着中国电信行业规制的不断深入,电信行业的竞争格局已初步形成,我国电信产业目前的市场结构形成了“5+1”的寡头垄断局面。该局面的主要特征是市场结构失衡、纵向一体化经营、不同企业间市场封闭和政策进入壁垒较高等。从市场结构影响市场行为的角度来看,中国电信行业的市场竞争行为主要处于低效竞争状态,竞争手段集中于价格战和互联互通障碍,其市场行为有待加强规制。本文以构建规制下有效竞争的电信行业为目标,对电信市场结构和电信价格规制体制进行了全面而深入的研究。
论文首先分析电信行业的特征,从理论上阐述了对电信行业进行规制的必要性;随后介绍了国内外电信行业规制经验,分析了中国电信行业规制的原因,并在此基础上对中国电信规制特别是价格规制的目标提出新的看法。
其次,从有效竞争边界、地区差异、集中度等方面分析了中国电信行业市场结构,认为竞争格局失衡的原因存在于市场竞争主体数量、业务、基础资源、实力、资本结构等方面。在此基础上,本文通过频率需求和HHI推算得出,我国电信市场中同一业务应有6个以上规模相近的企业参与竞争,最少不少于4个。
再次,建立了饱和电信市场实力不对等企业的Hotelling价格竞争模型,并假设没有价格规制,通过对有无互联互通两种情况下的分析,得出对互联互通价格规制有效性的初步结论。在该价格竞争模型的基础上并具体针对中国电信行业的市场结构和价格规制等提出建议。
最后,在传统价格规制模型的基础上,分析其优缺点,建立了历史成本加成价格规制模型,使得成本确认相对容易,并降低了规制成本。在此基础上,本文还选取农村移动市场进行了价格规制的案例分析,以河南省信阳地区为典型农村市场代表,通过实地调查,总结出潜在客户对移动服务业务的价格期望值,将其与基于历史成本加成价格模型计算出来的规制价格相比较,证实了运营商若实施规制价格仍有足够的利润空间,研究为开展农村市场普遍服务进行价格规制提供了参考。并在此基础上给出了农村电信市场价格规制和运营商定价的建议。
With the constant deepening of Chinese Telecom Regulation, the competition has taken shape in Telecom Industry. The current market structure of Chinese Telecom Industry forms the situation of the "5+1" Oligopoly Monopolization. The main characteristics of this situation are structural imbalance, vertically integrated operations, market blocks among different enterprises and higher entry barriers set by government. From the point of view that market structure influences market behaviors, the market competition behaviors of Chinese Telecom Industry is now in a condition of low efficient competition, focusing on price wars and interconnectivity barriers. So the market needs to strengthen its regulatory system. The dissertation has conducted a study on the structure and price regulation of telecom industry facing on effective competition under regulation.
First, in order to demonstrate the necessity of regulation the dissertation analyzies the characteristics of Telecom Industry and the regulation experience of telecom industry in different countries. Furthermore, the reasons of regulating the Chinese telecom industry are listed and the aim of regulation especially the price regulation is explained.
Second, the dissertation analyzies the market structure of telecom industry from effective competion boundary, diversity of area and centralization level, and gets conclusions about competition pattern. Based on these, the magnitude of enterprises managing the same operation should be more than six and not less than four.
Third, the dissertation builds a Hotelling Price Competition Model of two enterprises with unequal strength in unsaturated telecom market,assuming no price regulation. Through the analysis of two cases, interconnect or not, the disseration comes to a preliminary conclusion for the effectiveness of Telecom Regulation. Based on the price competition model, some suggestions to Chinese telecom regulatory are made.
Last, based on the classical price regulation models a Historical Cost-plus Model of Price Regulation is built which can make it easy to affirm the cost. Besides this the dissertation chooses rural area as the representative to do empirical research. A market investigation in XinYang of Henan Province is carried out and the development of telecom industry in rural area is analyzed. Moreover, the expectations of telecom price of potential clients are compared with the regular prices which are based on the Historical Cost-plus Model of Price Regulation. The result shows that the telecom enterprises still can obtain enough profit even when the regular prices are put in practice. The study can offer a reference for price regulation of rural market. And some suggestions in pricing in rural telecom market are given.
引文
[1] Ahn, D. U., Nam, KC, Du, M, Jo, C. Volatile production of irradiated normal, pale soft exudative(PSE) and dark firm dry(DFD) pork with different packaging and storage, 2001, Meat Sci 57: 419-426
[2] Appelbaum, E., Lim, C. Monopoly and ex-post contestable Markets. Australian Economic Papers, 1990, 29(54): 128-140
[3] Areeda, P. Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles. Antitrust Law Journal, 1990, 58: 841-853
[4] Armstrong, Mark. Network Interconnection in Telecommunications. The Economic Journal, 1998, 108(448): 545-564
[5] Arnold, P. J. and C. Cooper. A Tale of Two Classes: the privatisation of Medway Ports. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1999, 10(2): 127-152
[6] Attari, H. Discontinuous Interest Rate Processes: An equilibrium Model for Bond Option Prices, Journals of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1999, 34(3): 293-322
[7] Baiman, S., Demski, J. Economically Optimal Evaluation and Control Systems. Journal of Accounting Research. 1980, 18: 184-220
[8] Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 27
[9] Baumol, W. J.. Minimum and maximum pricing principles for residual regulation. Eastern Economic Journal, 1979, 2: 235-248
[10] Baumol, W. J., Panzer J. C., Willig R. D. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Ltd., 1982
[11] Becker, G.. S. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, 98(3): 371-400
[12] Bortolotti, B., Juliet D' Souza, Marcella Fantini, et al. Privatization and the sources of performance improvement in the global telecommunications industry. Telecommunications Policy, 2002, 26: 243-268
[13] Br?tland, J. Contestable market theory as a regulatory framework: An Austrian postmortem. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2004, 7(3): 3-28
[14] Carlos, Lapuerta, William B. Tye. Promoting effective competition throughinterconnection policy. Telecommunications Policy, 1999, 23(2): 129-145
[15] Carter, M., Wright, Julian. Interconnection in Network Industries. Review of Industrial Organization, 1999, 14(1): 1-25
[16] Chomsky, Noam. El nuevo humanismo militar. Lecciones de Kosovo. Primera edición en espa?ol. 2002, Siglo XXI Editores S. A. de C. V. México
[17] Cremer, H., F. Gasmi, J. J. Laffont. Universal Service: An Economic Perspective [J], Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2001, 71: 5-42
[18] Debande, Oliver. Deregulating and privatizing statutory monopolies. Journal of Economics & Business, 2001, 53: 111-137
[19] Demsetz, H. Why regulate utilities?. Journal of Law an Economics, 1986, 11(1): 55-65
[20] Economides, Nicholas. working paper, Real option and the cost of the local telecommunication network, 1999
[21] Ellig, J. Endogenous change and economic theory of regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1991, 3(3): 265-274
[22] Holmstr?m, Bengt. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13(2): 324-340
[23] Hotelling, H. The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates, Ecomometreca. 1938, 6: 242-244
[24] Intven, H., Tetrault, McCarthy. Telecommunication Regulation. Handbook Module 3 Interconnection, 2000
[25] Kaserman, D. L., Mayo, J. W. An Avoided Cost Pricing Rule for Resale of Local exchange Telephone Services. Journal of Regulatory economics, 1997, 11: 91-107
[26] Kaserman, D. L., Ulrich, Marc. The Competitive effects of Resale Versus Facility-based Entry: Evidence from the Long-distance Market. Telecommunications Policy, 2002, 26: 415-424
[27] Laffont, J. J., Martimort, D. The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002
[28] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J. Competition in telecommunications Munich lectures in economics. MIT Press, 2000
[29] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J. A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1993
[30] Laffont, J. J., Rey, P., Tirole, J. Network competition: overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. Rand Journal of Economics, 1998, 29(1): 1-37
[31] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press, 1993, Cambridge, USA
[32] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J. Access Pricing and Competition. European Economic Review, 1993, 38: 1673-1710
[33] Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J. Creating competition through interconnection: theory and practice. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1996, 10: 227-256
[34] Lazear, E. P., Rosen, S. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. The Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 89(5): 841-864
[35] Littlechild, S. C. Regulation of British Telecommunications Profitability. London: HMSO, 1983
[36] McChesney, F. S. Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. Journal of Legal Studies, 1987, 16(1): 101-118
[37] Newbery, D. M., Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001
[38] Peltzman, S. Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 1976, 19(2): 211-241
[39] Posner, R. A. Theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science, 1974, 5(2): 335-358
[40] Prieger, J. E., Ramsey Pricing and Competition: The Consequences of Myopic Regulation, J. of Regulatory Economics, 1996, 10: 307-321
[41] Ramsey, F. P. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, Economic Journal, 1927, 37: 47-61
[42] Rodini, M., Michael R. Ward, Woroch Glenn A. Going mobile: substitutability between fixed and mobile access. Telecommunications Policy, 2003, 27(5-6): 457-476
[43] Schankerman, Mark. Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications. Information Economics and Policy, 1996, 8(1): 3-23
[44] Shelanski, Howard A. From sector-specific regulation to antitrust law for US telecommunications: the prospects for transition. Telecommunications Policy, 2002, 26: 335-355
[45] Shleifer, A. A theory of yardstick competition. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985, 16(3): 310-327
[46] Simpson, Seamus. Universal service issues in converging communications environments: the case of the UK. Telecommunications Policy, 2004, 28(3-4): 233-248
[47] Stigler, G.. J. The theory of economic regulation. Journal of Economics & Management Science, 1971, 2(1): 3-21
[48] Sung, N., Yong-Hun Lee. Substitution between mobile and fixed telephone. Review of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20: 367-374
[49] Ure, John. Police review: Deconstructing 3G and reconstructing telecoms. Telecommunication Policy, 2003, 27: 187-206
[50] Vogelsang, Ingo. price regulation of access to telecommunications networks. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2003, 22: 830-862
[51] Vogelsang, I., Woroch, G.. Local Telephone Service: A Complex Dance of Technology, Regulation and Competition. Industry Studies, 1998, 2nd edition: 115-137
[52] Williamson, O. E. Franchise bidding for natural monopolies-in general and with respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, 7(1): 73-104
[53] Zolnierek, J., Eisner, J., Burton, E. An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Telephone Markets. Journal of Regulatory Economis, 2001, 19(2): 143-159
[54]陈小洪,马骏.关于中国电信资费体系改革的基本看法.中国工业经济, 2001, 1: 23-31
[55]黄浩.从经济学角度看电信管制.世界电信, 2003, 1: 80-83
[56]姜正新.我国电信产业不对称双限资费规制模式.经济理论与经济管理, 2006, 3: 55-60
[57]姜正新.电信资费规制模式与方法研究.博士学位论文.吉林大学图书馆, 2006. 6
[58]金海,刘志迎.建立我国电信产业有效竞争市场结构的探讨.合肥学院学报(自然科学版), 2004, 3: 73-78
[59]肯尼斯. J.梅尔,王维译.规制及对规制的误解.中国行政管理, 1998, 4: 44-45
[60]吕薇.产业重组与竞争.北京:中国发展出版社, 2002
[61]吕志勇,陈洪民.网络竞争与双向互联:中国电信产业横向分割的绩效研究.世界经济, 2003, 8: 38-45
[62]门建辉.自然垄断行业放松管制:经验与借鉴.中国物价, 1999, 8: 45-49
[63]唐守廉,张静.电信资费及其管制.电信科学, 2000, 11: 1-4
[64]汪秋明.规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计——以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例.中国工业经济, 2006, 216(3): 38-45
[65]王俊豪.中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策.北京:商务印书馆, 2005
[66]王俊豪,鲁桐,王永利.发达国家基础设施产业的价格规制政策及其借鉴意义.世界经济与政治, 1997, 10: 30-35
[67]王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论.北京:商务印书馆, 2001
[68]王俊豪.中国政府管制体制改革研究.北京:经济科学出版社, 1999
[69]王学庆.垄断性行业的政府管制问题研究.经济研究参考, 2003, 1697(25): 2-18
[70]王学庆.垄断性行业的政府管制问题研究.管理世界, 2003, 8: 63-73
[71]奚国华,刘仲英.我国电信资费改革探索.数量经济技术经济研究, 2004, 1: 5-14
[72]夏大蔚.产业组织竞争与规制.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2002
[73]肖兴志.中国自然垄断产业规制改革模式研究.中国工业经济, 2002, 4: 20-25
[74]肖兴志.自然垄断型国企改革的战略思考.改革, 2001, 3: 47-51
[75]杨培芳.电信竞争:亟待建立社会约束机制.中兴通讯技术, 2002, 6: 30-32
[76]余晖.受管制市场里的政企同盟——以中国电信产业为例.中国工业经济, 2000, 1: 63-67
[77]余晖.管制的经济理论与过程分析.经济研究, 1994, 5: 50-54
[78]张维迎,盛洪.从电信业看中国的反垄断问题.改革, 1998, 2: 66-75
[79]张昕竹,安东尼奥·易斯塔什,等.中国规制与竞争:理论和政策.北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2000
[80]张昕竹,让·拉丰,安易斯塔什.北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2000
[81]张昕竹.用规制政策促进有效竞争.财经, 2001, 7: 80-80
[82]郑奇宝.从垄断到竞争——电信行业规制理论与实证研究.北京:人民邮电出版社, 2005
[83] [日]植草益著,朱绍文、胡欣欣译.微观规制经济学.北京:中国发展出版社, 1992
[84]周汉华.对电信法的十点建议.比较, 2004, 12: 145-161
[85]朱江.论收敛于马歇尔缓冲区的有效竞争——中外电信改革理论与实证研究.财经研究, 2003, 29(9): 56-61
[86]朱振中.竞争政策与我国电信规制改革.商业研究, 2006, 13: 119-121