并购交易特征、股权结构与市场绩效研究
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摘要
中国上市公司的并购活动是在新兴转轨市场背景下发展起来的,带有鲜明的股权分置制度色彩。由于涉及到制度问题,国内有关并购的研究大都缺乏深层次分析,然而,制度变迁仍然是不容回避的。股权分置改革为市场化并购奠定了基础,积压已久的并购重组动力日益显现。后股权分置时代,上市公司并购能否创造价值?并购市场绩效受到哪些因素的影响,隐藏在并购行为背后的深层次原因是什么?这些问题都是现阶段中国资本市场发展中值得研究的重要问题。
本文基于后股权分置时代中国资本市场的制度背景,构建并购交易特征、股权结构与市场绩效的理论分析框架,探讨了并购交易特征、股权结构对收购公司市场绩效的直接影响以及二者对收购公司市场绩效的交互影响,并以2005～2007年间已完成股改上市公司发生的并购事件为研究对象,从短期和长期市场绩效差异的角度进行实证检验。
本文研究表明,已完成股改公司短期市场绩效显著为正,且高于未完成股改公司,持续性较差;但长期中遭受了显著的财富损失。收购公司采用股票支付的短期市场绩效优于现金支付;国有收购公司和第一大股东持股比例越高的收购公司并购后1年的市场绩效越差,但在更长的时间差异不显著;机构投资者持股比例对并购短期和长期市场绩效均有改善作用。国有收购公司采用股票支付方式和进行资产收购对并购短期和长期市场绩效均有改善作用,但在关联并购中的长期市场绩效较差,非国有收购公司采用股票支付方式和进行股权收购仅对短期市场绩效有改善作用;第一大股东持股比例越高的收购公司采用股票支付方式的短期市场绩效越差,而在关联并购中的长期市场绩效越好;机构投资者持股比例越高的收购公司在资产收购和关联并购中的长期市场绩效越差。
总之,中国上市公司的并购行为逐渐显现出市场化的特征,股权分置改革在对上市公司并购产生积极作用的同时,也带来了消极影响。因此,制定和完善并购法律法规、加强并购重组的信息披露以及针对不同类型股东建立分类监管体系,是促进上市公司并购健康运作的重要保障。
Background of the emerging market during economical transitional period,the developed activity of M&A of listed companies in China is characterized by the structure of share-splitting. Due to the problem of the system,the profound analysis of the M&A of listed companies are scarce in the domestic academic community.The ethos of institutional change,however,admits of no avoidance.The Share-splitting Reform laid the foundation for the marketization of M&A and the dynamical wheels of M&A becomes increasingly powerful.In the Post Share-splitting Reform Era,whether can M&A create value for listed companies? What factors will affect the performance of acquiring firms? What are the inside reasons behind M&A? These important questions are worth researching at the present stage of the developing capital market in China.
Using M&A cases of listed companies of stock markets from 2005 to 2007 as a sample, empirically examines the disparity of the market performance from the perspective of long-term and short-term,this article which is based on the system of the Chinese capital market in Era of the Post Share-splitting Reform builds the theory frame of ownership structure,the characters of M&A transaction and of the acquiring firms' performance,at the same time studies the direct influence of the ownership structure of the acquiring firms and the characters of M&A transaction on the market performance of acquiring firms,as well as the interactive effects.
This study indicates that acquiring firms could obtain statistically significant positive accumulative abnormal return(CAR) on and near the acquiring announcement day,but no significant in the whole event period due to the poor persistence;and would suffer heavy loss in long-term.For the short-term perfoarmance of acquiring firms,paying in stocks and shares better than paying in cash;the nature of state-owned and the proportion of the first largest shareholder's share-holding of the acquiring firms have significant negative effect on the long-term performance in 1 year after mergers,while this effect becomes insignificant in longer period after mergers;and with an increase of the proportion of institutional shares,the short-term perfoarmance as well as the long-term performance increase.The state-owned acquirers paying in stocks and shares and buying assets could improve the short-term performance and the long-term performance,but put up a bad show in the long-term performance of the related acquisiton;non state-owned acquiers paying in stocks and shares and acquiering stock equity could only improve the short-term perfoarmance;under the condition of paying in stocks and shares,the more proportion of the first largest shareholder,the poorer short-term performance, on the contrary,the better long-term performance in the related acquisition;the more proportions of institutional shares in acquiering firms,the poorer long-term performance in the assets acquisition and the related acquisition.
M&A of listed companies in China is being characterised more and more by the marketization.The Share-splitting Reform has certain positive significance to M&A of listed companies,however,it also brings a lot of negative influences on the related parties.Therefore, enacting and improving laws and regulations on M&A,strengthening information disclosure in M&A,establishing the different supervisory systems according to different types of share holder are important measures in promotion of the healthy development of the M&A in China.
本文基于后股权分置时代中国资本市场的制度背景,构建并购交易特征、股权结构与市场绩效的理论分析框架,探讨了并购交易特征、股权结构对收购公司市场绩效的直接影响以及二者对收购公司市场绩效的交互影响,并以2005～2007年间已完成股改上市公司发生的并购事件为研究对象,从短期和长期市场绩效差异的角度进行实证检验。
本文研究表明,已完成股改公司短期市场绩效显著为正,且高于未完成股改公司,持续性较差;但长期中遭受了显著的财富损失。收购公司采用股票支付的短期市场绩效优于现金支付;国有收购公司和第一大股东持股比例越高的收购公司并购后1年的市场绩效越差,但在更长的时间差异不显著;机构投资者持股比例对并购短期和长期市场绩效均有改善作用。国有收购公司采用股票支付方式和进行资产收购对并购短期和长期市场绩效均有改善作用,但在关联并购中的长期市场绩效较差,非国有收购公司采用股票支付方式和进行股权收购仅对短期市场绩效有改善作用;第一大股东持股比例越高的收购公司采用股票支付方式的短期市场绩效越差,而在关联并购中的长期市场绩效越好;机构投资者持股比例越高的收购公司在资产收购和关联并购中的长期市场绩效越差。
总之,中国上市公司的并购行为逐渐显现出市场化的特征,股权分置改革在对上市公司并购产生积极作用的同时,也带来了消极影响。因此,制定和完善并购法律法规、加强并购重组的信息披露以及针对不同类型股东建立分类监管体系,是促进上市公司并购健康运作的重要保障。
Background of the emerging market during economical transitional period,the developed activity of M&A of listed companies in China is characterized by the structure of share-splitting. Due to the problem of the system,the profound analysis of the M&A of listed companies are scarce in the domestic academic community.The ethos of institutional change,however,admits of no avoidance.The Share-splitting Reform laid the foundation for the marketization of M&A and the dynamical wheels of M&A becomes increasingly powerful.In the Post Share-splitting Reform Era,whether can M&A create value for listed companies? What factors will affect the performance of acquiring firms? What are the inside reasons behind M&A? These important questions are worth researching at the present stage of the developing capital market in China.
Using M&A cases of listed companies of stock markets from 2005 to 2007 as a sample, empirically examines the disparity of the market performance from the perspective of long-term and short-term,this article which is based on the system of the Chinese capital market in Era of the Post Share-splitting Reform builds the theory frame of ownership structure,the characters of M&A transaction and of the acquiring firms' performance,at the same time studies the direct influence of the ownership structure of the acquiring firms and the characters of M&A transaction on the market performance of acquiring firms,as well as the interactive effects.
This study indicates that acquiring firms could obtain statistically significant positive accumulative abnormal return(CAR) on and near the acquiring announcement day,but no significant in the whole event period due to the poor persistence;and would suffer heavy loss in long-term.For the short-term perfoarmance of acquiring firms,paying in stocks and shares better than paying in cash;the nature of state-owned and the proportion of the first largest shareholder's share-holding of the acquiring firms have significant negative effect on the long-term performance in 1 year after mergers,while this effect becomes insignificant in longer period after mergers;and with an increase of the proportion of institutional shares,the short-term perfoarmance as well as the long-term performance increase.The state-owned acquirers paying in stocks and shares and buying assets could improve the short-term performance and the long-term performance,but put up a bad show in the long-term performance of the related acquisiton;non state-owned acquiers paying in stocks and shares and acquiering stock equity could only improve the short-term perfoarmance;under the condition of paying in stocks and shares,the more proportion of the first largest shareholder,the poorer short-term performance, on the contrary,the better long-term performance in the related acquisition;the more proportions of institutional shares in acquiering firms,the poorer long-term performance in the assets acquisition and the related acquisition.
M&A of listed companies in China is being characterised more and more by the marketization.The Share-splitting Reform has certain positive significance to M&A of listed companies,however,it also brings a lot of negative influences on the related parties.Therefore, enacting and improving laws and regulations on M&A,strengthening information disclosure in M&A,establishing the different supervisory systems according to different types of share holder are important measures in promotion of the healthy development of the M&A in China.
引文
1资料来源:股权分置改革研究小组《股权分置改革的回顾与总结》,深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告,2006.12.20深证综研字第0147号。
2资料来源:中国财经报/2007年/12月/28日,第005版。
3资料来源:威斯通等(1998)《兼并、重组与公司控制》第3页。
4陈信元,原红旗(1998)在《上市公司资产重组财务会计问题研究》中提出“从重组形式上,我们认为可以分为四类:(1)上市公司股权转让(2)上市公司资产置换(3)上市公司对外兼并(4)上市公司对外转让资产”。《中国证券报》在对资产重组时间进行分类时基本采用了该分类方法。
1 数据来源:《中国证券期货统计年鉴(2008)》,2008年8月p280。
2 在理论界,根据政府在企业兼并中的不同作用,把保定和武汉两地企业兼并的不同做法分别称为“保定模式”和“武汉模式”,前者的政府干预程度明显高于后者。
3 数字来源于窦洪权主编:《企业并购理论与实务》,企业管理出版社,1994,225页。
4 延中实业是“三无概念股”的领头羊,股权极为分散,1993年9月,深圳宝安集团在上交所通过购买股票方式,收购了延中实业16.8%的上市流通股票,从而成为延中实业第一大股东。
5 2001年2月8日,财政部发布了无形资产、借款费用、租赁等3项新的会计准则,同时还对以前发布的债务重组、现金流量表、投资、非货币性交易和会计政策变更等5项会计准则作了修订并重新颁布实施。2001年12月10日,证监会发布《关于上市公司重大购买、出售、置换资产若干问题的通知》。
6 2001年2月24日,证监会指定并发布《亏损公司暂停上市和终止上市实施办法》,推出PT股和连续3年亏损的ST股将直接退市的机制。
7 1997年底中央经济工作会议中提出的“国企三年脱困,纺织业做为突破口”的会议精神进一步推动了1998年上市公司重组热潮的形成,这一次的“集体婚礼”式的重组第一次将促进产业结构调整和产业升级的任务赋予到上市公司重组中。
8 1997年下半年的一批上市公司重组,将国有股转让和无偿划拨与上市公司的彻底资产大置换结合在一起,将地方政府参与下的上市公司的行政性重组推向了极致,直接借资产重组运作实现优质资产间接上市。兰陵沉香与交运股份是这一时期较具代表性的案例,开创了一种叫做“经资产置换”的重组模式。
9 2005年10月27日,证监会修订了《证券法》,提出了部分要约收购;2005年12月31日证监会颁布《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》;2006年8月15日,发布《上市公司流通股协议转让业务办理暂行规定》;2006年9月1日修订了《上市公司收购管理办法》,明确了上市公司以非公开发行股份作为支付方式的合法性,并加强了信息披露要求;2006年11月14日,推出《企业会计准则--应用指南》,旨在提高会计信息透明度,增强外资并购吸引力,降低并购成本。
10 这六项法规分别是《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法(征求意见稿)》、《关于规范上市公司信息披露和相关各方行为的通知》、《关于在发行审核委员会中设立上市公司并购重组审核委员会的决定》、《中国证券监督管理委员会上市公司并购重组审核委员会工作规程》、《上市公司非公开发行股票实施细则》和《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第25号--上市公司非公开发行股票预案和发行情况报告书》。
11 对于采用定向增发实施整体上市的集团公司而言,其实质是上市公司作为主并公司,采用非公开发行的股份作为支付方式来换取控股股东经营性资产的并购重组行为,是一种关联并购行为。
1 早在2005年9月,国资委就在《关于上市公司股权分置改革中国有股股权管理有关问题的通知》中明确提出,要将市值纳入国资控股上市公司的考核体系。2008年5月,中国证监会发布《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》,明确提出鼓励上市公司采用市值指标考核。2008年6月,国资委提出,国有控股上市公司实施股权激励,业绩考核应包含市值增长率等能反映股东回报的指标
2 张育军:《“后股权分置时代”监管、创新与市场发展》,载于《证券市场导报》2006年第9期
3 中国证监会广东证券监督管理局:《后股权分置时期信息披露行为及监管对策》,2006年。
4 机构投资者发达的国家和地区其行业协会组织活动都异常活跃,如英国的基金经理协会、美国的共同基金联合会、日本的投资信托协会,中国香港的投资基金公会、中国台湾的证券投资顾问商业同业公会。
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2资料来源:中国财经报/2007年/12月/28日,第005版。
3资料来源:威斯通等(1998)《兼并、重组与公司控制》第3页。
4陈信元,原红旗(1998)在《上市公司资产重组财务会计问题研究》中提出“从重组形式上,我们认为可以分为四类:(1)上市公司股权转让(2)上市公司资产置换(3)上市公司对外兼并(4)上市公司对外转让资产”。《中国证券报》在对资产重组时间进行分类时基本采用了该分类方法。
1 数据来源:《中国证券期货统计年鉴(2008)》,2008年8月p280。
2 在理论界,根据政府在企业兼并中的不同作用,把保定和武汉两地企业兼并的不同做法分别称为“保定模式”和“武汉模式”,前者的政府干预程度明显高于后者。
3 数字来源于窦洪权主编:《企业并购理论与实务》,企业管理出版社,1994,225页。
4 延中实业是“三无概念股”的领头羊,股权极为分散,1993年9月,深圳宝安集团在上交所通过购买股票方式,收购了延中实业16.8%的上市流通股票,从而成为延中实业第一大股东。
5 2001年2月8日,财政部发布了无形资产、借款费用、租赁等3项新的会计准则,同时还对以前发布的债务重组、现金流量表、投资、非货币性交易和会计政策变更等5项会计准则作了修订并重新颁布实施。2001年12月10日,证监会发布《关于上市公司重大购买、出售、置换资产若干问题的通知》。
6 2001年2月24日,证监会指定并发布《亏损公司暂停上市和终止上市实施办法》,推出PT股和连续3年亏损的ST股将直接退市的机制。
7 1997年底中央经济工作会议中提出的“国企三年脱困,纺织业做为突破口”的会议精神进一步推动了1998年上市公司重组热潮的形成,这一次的“集体婚礼”式的重组第一次将促进产业结构调整和产业升级的任务赋予到上市公司重组中。
8 1997年下半年的一批上市公司重组,将国有股转让和无偿划拨与上市公司的彻底资产大置换结合在一起,将地方政府参与下的上市公司的行政性重组推向了极致,直接借资产重组运作实现优质资产间接上市。兰陵沉香与交运股份是这一时期较具代表性的案例,开创了一种叫做“经资产置换”的重组模式。
9 2005年10月27日,证监会修订了《证券法》,提出了部分要约收购;2005年12月31日证监会颁布《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》;2006年8月15日,发布《上市公司流通股协议转让业务办理暂行规定》;2006年9月1日修订了《上市公司收购管理办法》,明确了上市公司以非公开发行股份作为支付方式的合法性,并加强了信息披露要求;2006年11月14日,推出《企业会计准则--应用指南》,旨在提高会计信息透明度,增强外资并购吸引力,降低并购成本。
10 这六项法规分别是《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法(征求意见稿)》、《关于规范上市公司信息披露和相关各方行为的通知》、《关于在发行审核委员会中设立上市公司并购重组审核委员会的决定》、《中国证券监督管理委员会上市公司并购重组审核委员会工作规程》、《上市公司非公开发行股票实施细则》和《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第25号--上市公司非公开发行股票预案和发行情况报告书》。
11 对于采用定向增发实施整体上市的集团公司而言,其实质是上市公司作为主并公司,采用非公开发行的股份作为支付方式来换取控股股东经营性资产的并购重组行为,是一种关联并购行为。
1 早在2005年9月,国资委就在《关于上市公司股权分置改革中国有股股权管理有关问题的通知》中明确提出,要将市值纳入国资控股上市公司的考核体系。2008年5月,中国证监会发布《股权激励有关事项备忘录1号》,明确提出鼓励上市公司采用市值指标考核。2008年6月,国资委提出,国有控股上市公司实施股权激励,业绩考核应包含市值增长率等能反映股东回报的指标
2 张育军:《“后股权分置时代”监管、创新与市场发展》,载于《证券市场导报》2006年第9期
3 中国证监会广东证券监督管理局:《后股权分置时期信息披露行为及监管对策》,2006年。
4 机构投资者发达的国家和地区其行业协会组织活动都异常活跃,如英国的基金经理协会、美国的共同基金联合会、日本的投资信托协会,中国香港的投资基金公会、中国台湾的证券投资顾问商业同业公会。
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