我国证券公司的公司治理研究
详细信息    本馆镜像全文|  推荐本文 |  |   获取CNKI官网全文
摘要
现代公司治理的一般理论表明超出股东范围的利益相关者才是公司治理的主体,公司治理的核心任务是对经营者的激励和约束,影响公司治理效率的因素主要包括股权结构、资本结构、产权明晰度、利益相关者的参与度以及内外治理机制的完善程度等。我国证券公司治理现状是内部治理结构和外部治理机制均不健全,而内部人控制又是我国证券公司治理问题的突出表现,其深层次的原因是国有产权模糊下的股权结构失当。美英和德日的公司治理模式的比较表明两者各有千秋,必须借鉴其优胜,结合我国证券公司的实际特点,强调债权人、员工等利益相关者参与公司治理。优化我国证券公司公司治理的措施,必须优化股权结构,优化资本结构,强化债权人、员工、客户等证券公司利益相关者参与公司治理,完善董事会、监事会以及证券公司激励机制等内部治理结构。
Corporation is an important form of enterprise system, which plays an active role on changing enterprise's operation mechanism, improving enterprise's efficiency. The problem of corporate governance has been an important and hot topic on which Chinese and foreign specialists, governmental policy-makers and entrepreneurs have been working to find the best solution. Security companies in China are great financial institutes with problem about corporate governance. As a result, the research on corporate governance of security companies in China is of great importance in both theory and practice.
    This thesis includes 5 chapters.
    Chapter 1 is an introduction of basic theories of corporate governance.
    Chapter 2, entitled "International Comparison of Corporate Governance", analyzes the competitive advantages and convergence phenomenon between America-British corporate governance model and German-Japan's.
    Chapter 3, entitled "Empirical Analyzes of Corporate Governance of Security Companies in China", analyzes status quo of corporate governance of security companies in China
    In chapter 4, the thesis casts on the phenomenon of internal control of security companies in China and finds the uncorrected stockholders' equity structure and capital structure is the basic reason resulting in the internal control.
    Last chapter is about the perfecting of corporate governance of security companies in China, including adjusting and perfecting of stockholders equity structure and capital structure, establishing and perfecting of the board of directors and establishing and perfecting of the incentive mechanism of the top management.
引文
[1] Amihud, Lev. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Finacial and Quantitative Analysis 1981(9): 42-61
    [2] Hill, Snell. The Theory of Contracts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989(3): 46-50
    [3] Berle, Means. The Market for corporate Contyol. Journal of Financial Economics, 1932(5): 57-63
    [4] Demseze, Lehn. Corporate Control and the Monitoring Role of the Stock Market. Working Paper Series, Yale school of management, 1985
    [5] 何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析.经济研究,1998(5):21-24
    [6] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效.经济研究,1999(12):32-36
    [7] Jensen M, D W Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of financial Economies, 1976(11): 111-130
    [8] Fama. Corporate Governance. Basil Blackwell Inc., 1995
    [9] Prowse S. Coporate Governance in East Asia: A Framework for Analysis.A paper for the conference on "Managing "capital flows: National and International Dimensions". Bangkok, Thailand, 1998
    [10] Tricker, R.I. Corporate Governance. GowerPublishing Company Limited 1984(6): 6-7
    [11] Monks, Robert A G, Minow Nell. Corporate Governance. Basil Blackwell Inc., 1995
    [12] Keasey, Wright. Issues in corporateaccountablity and governance. Oxford University Press, 1991
    [13] Cardbury. Corporate Finance and Corporate Gocernance. Journal of Finace, 1988, 132(3): 62~75
    [14] Kevin. The Nature the Firm. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991
    [15] 刘伟.公司(企业)法入产权与治理结构.改革,1994(4):18-24
    [16] 吴敬琏.大中型企业改革:建立现代企业制度.天津:天津人民出版社,1993
    [17] 朱天.公司治理、国企改革与制度建设.经济研究,1998(1):42-47
    
    
    [18] 吴淑琨,席酉民.公司治理与中国企业改革.北京:机械工业出版社,2001
    [19] 杨华.OCED《公司治理结构原则》的实践和经验.证券市场导报,2003(4):4-8
    [20] 费方域.什么是公司治理结构.上海经济研究,1996(5):12-15
    [21] 胡铭.公司治理结构研究.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
    [22] 费方域.企业的产权分析.上海:上海人民出版社,1998
    [23] 于东智.转轨经济中的上市公司治理.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002
    [24] 张立君.比较公司治理:一个新的视角.当代财经,2002(6):57-60
    [25] 哈特.企业、合同与财务结构.上海:上海人民出版社,2001
    [26] 孙永祥.公司治理结构:理论与实践研究.上海:上海人民出版社,2002
    [27] Fama E. Agency problems and the theory of firm. Journal of political Economy, 1998(8): 288~307
    [28] 李维安.现代公司治理研究.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002
    [29] 范文燕,刘宗华.论融资结构与治理结构的关系.财经科学,2002(5):57-61
    [30] 杨瑞龙.国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001
    [31] 杨瑞龙,周业安.企业治理结构.海口:海南出版社,1999
    [32] 马庆泉.中国证券市场发展前沿问题研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2001
    [33] 廖斌.中美证券公司法人治理结构的比较.财经科学,2003(2):107-112
    [34] 朱晔.论我国公司法人治理结构的重构.当代财经,2002(3):32-35
    [35] 张宝双.我国证券公司治理结构研究.经济问题,2003(7):40-42
    [36] 牟永宁.券商举债输血引发财务风险.经济观察报,9/8/2003
    [37] 张完定.论所有权结构的治理功能——关于国有企业所有权结构的设计.当代经济科学,2000(4):7-13
    [38] 何诚颖,袁野.证券公司资本结构与固定收益产品创新研究.证券市场导报,2003(1):42-48
    [39] 蒋健蓉.把脉:证券公司的融资症结.银行家,2003(4):102-103
    [40] 青木昌彦.转轨经济中的公司治理结构.北京:中国经济出版社,1995
    [41] 张春霖.从融资角度分析国有企业的治理结构改革.改革,1995(3):4-8
    [42] 朱晔.论我国公司法人治理结构的重构.当代财经,2002(3):32-35
    [43] 张曙光,杨彦如.券商为何首选IPO.财经界,2003(2):28-31
    [44] 曹廷求,刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率.改革,2003(1):33-37
    [45] 张绍焱,李志忠.我国券商融资问题探析.投资研究,2003(2):25-30

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700