关于我国可再生能源电力产业发展的激励政策研究
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摘要
可再生能源是我国重要的能源资源,能够满足我国能源需求、改善能源结构、减少环境污染。但是目前可再生能源消费量占我国能源总消耗的比重还很低,作为新兴的产业,可再生能源电力产业在发展中还存在发电价格过高、技术创新缓慢、电力入网遭受网络瓶颈主要三个方面的瓶颈。因此,建立科学的可再生能源电力产业管制体系,尤其是构建可再生能源激励性电价模式是我国可再生能源电力产业面临的重要任务。
本文侧重研究和探讨了基于激励性管制的,适用于我国可再生能源电力产业特征的价格激励政策、特许投标激励政策和标尺竞争激励政策。论文除导言外,共分五个部分:
第一章对电力产业政府管制以及管制发展方向相关理论进行考察。本章主要考察了传统的政府管制缺陷、激励性管制理论、电价管制理论。这是一项基础性工作,只有在了解前人研究成果的基础上,才能进行进一步的研究。
第二章对可再生能源电力产业属性作了分析。产业经济学的基本原理已经证明了产业的技术经济属性、市场结构属性、外部性是价格行为的重要决定因素,因此可再生能源电力产业的属性该部分是文章的研究起点。
第三章对现有的可再生能源电力产业政策及成效研究。国外实践经验证明,可再生能源电力产业发展需要政府在其中扮演重要的角色,现阶段我国可再生能源电力产业更是一个需要政府扶持和管制的特殊产业。这一部分研究国家已经出台的激励政策和管制政策,内容包括:(1)从价格管理、并网发电、公共财政政策三方面分别阐述我国促进可再生能源电力产业发展的激励政策;(2)阐述在现有的产业政策激励下,我国可再生能源电力产业的发展规模。
第四章从实践的角度阐述现行可再生能源电力产业政策对该产业的激励不足,指出可再生能源电力产业由于产品价格缺乏约束、产业科技创新不足、并网发电遭受网络瓶颈制约的影响,发展缓慢。
第五章在第四章的基础上,为促进可再生能源电力产业发展提出激励政策建议。上面几部分研究的基本结论是,可再生能源电力价格合理化对于可再生能源电力产业健康、快速发展有重要意义。因而降低可再生能源电力价格是我国发展可再生能源电力产业的政策重点。根据前文的研究,本文从三方面提出激励我国可再生能源电力产业发展的政策建议:(1)政府在对可再生能源电力价格实行补贴与费用分摊政策时,应该制定科学合理的上限标准,以建立可再生能源电力企业与政府、消费者的议价标杆;(3)政府在激励可再生能源电力科技项目创新时,通过应用特许投标制度,发挥有限的财政支出的最大的作用;(4)可再生能源电力上网时,政府不仅保证其强制性上网,还应该通过拟市场竞争的手段,运用绩效标杆方法刺激电网企业为可再生能源电力并网发电提供优质的服务与较低的接入价格。
本文有以下创新之处:
1.对可再生能源电力产业属性进行了专门研究。目前理论界对于可再生能源电力的“正外部性”已经有了比较系统的研究成果,但是针对可再生能源电力产业的“寡头垄断性”缺乏专门研究。因此本文分析了可再生能源电力产业的“寡头垄断性”,并以此为基础,试图对企业的策略性行为进行专题分析,寻找制约该产业发展形成有效竞争局面的因素。
2.设计了可再生能源电力价格上限模型用以约束过高的上网电价。现有的可再生能源电力费用分摊制度解决了可再生能源成本补偿问题,标杆电价制度给可再生能源发电企业一定的激励。但是由于缺乏对可在的能源发电价格的最高限制,部分地区出现了跑马圈地,盲目建设的局面。不仅造成资源浪费,还加重了财政支出和消费者的负担。可再生能源电力价格约束模型是对现有可再生能源电力电价分摊制度的一项重要补充。
3.应用特许投标模型激励可再生能源电力产业进行科技研发。现有的理论一味强调政府对可再生能源电力产业公共财政支出不足,却没有研究如何使有限的财政投入获得最大的收益,并且如何减少寻租、降低成本。本文将特许投标制运用到可再生能源电力的科技研发中,是对促进可再生能源电力产业科技进步的一大补充。
4.应用绩效标杆制度为可再生能源电力并网发电提供较低的接入费用。现有的理论注重研究对可再生能源电力实行强制上网,忽略了由于存在网络接入瓶颈的存在,主导企业会对可再生能源电力提供歧视的接入服务,或者收取通道费增加垄断收入。对可再生能源电力并网发电的激励性管制研究,是维持可再生能源电力产业的生存的一项重要措施。
Renewable energy is an important energy resource which meets China's energy demand, improve energy structure, reduce environmental pollution. But at present, the renewable energy consumption accounted for the proportion of total consumption in China could still be very low, as the emerging industry, renewable energy sources encountered bottlenecks in major three areas: pricing mechanisms, technological innovation, and .
This article focus on study and discussion of Price incentive policies model, Invitation to tender model , Ruler bidding competition model , which based on incentive regulation and fit to china’s renewable energy industry . Papers in addition to intructions , is devided to five sections.
According to the need of research ,chapter one makes a research on theories of government’s regulation and it’s development.This chapter discussed shortcoming of traditional government regulation, incentive regulation theory,regulation of electrics price. It is a basic task, only in understanding the basic of previous research result, in order to conduct further resesarch.
Chapter 2 as a basic research of this paper ,makes a analysis of renewable energy industry’s character. The basic principle of industry economics has proven technical and economic character, market structure character, exterior character are important determination of price behavier. So study of renewable energy industy’characters is the starting point of the article.
Chapter 3 makes a research of present policies of renewable energy electrics industry and the effectiveness of the policies. Oversea’s experiences show that government playing an important role in development of renewable energy electric power industry. At this stage , China’s renewable energy electric industry also need government support and regularion. This chapter focus on the study of incentives policies which the stat has already introduced.
This paper argues that ,when power grid company provide access service for renewable energy enterprises, need a restrain mechanism.Grid enterprises as a monopoly buyer. Seeking monopoly profits will occur strategic behavier. Renewable ernergy electric industry itself ,due to high prices, at a disadvantage in the competition. “Access fee”will make renewable energy power industry“worse”.
These few areas mentioned above , have become an important factor that block China's renewable energy electric power industry to achieve effective competition, promote industrial maturity, we must construct a reasonable and scientific control system, in complying with the general rules of industrial development, and realize renewable energy power industry dynamics controlling.Chapter 5 takes the case of renewable energy power development in China, building policy recommendations of price subsidies for renewable energy electic power system. This paper conceives a prompting model of Inviting to tender for technology of renewable energy power. And we design a medol to solving politic acts in electricity power transmission.
This paper may be innovative in the following areas:
1.Makeing a special study on electric power industry attributes of renewable energy. At present, there are some systematic researches on the "positive externalities" of the renewable power in current theories, however, lacking of specialized research on“oligarch monopoly”of the renewable power.
2.Design upper limited price of renewable energy electricity to constraints the high price of renewable energy electricity. The existing renewable energy power costing-sharing system to solve the issue of compensation for the cost of renewable energy sources.
3.Application franchise bidding model of incentives for renewable energy R & D power industries. Current theories blindly stressed that the Government of renewable energy electric power industry shortage of public expenditure, but has not studied how to make a limited financial investment to obtain maximum benefit from, and how to reduce rent-seeking and reduce costs.
4 . Application performance benchmarking system for renewable energy electricity grid to provide a lower access charges. Current theories focus on research for renewable energy electricity compulsory Internet, ignores the existence of bottlenecks in the network. The existence of dominant firms to provide renewable power would afford discriminatory services, or charge fees to increase access monopoly revenue.
本文侧重研究和探讨了基于激励性管制的,适用于我国可再生能源电力产业特征的价格激励政策、特许投标激励政策和标尺竞争激励政策。论文除导言外,共分五个部分:
第一章对电力产业政府管制以及管制发展方向相关理论进行考察。本章主要考察了传统的政府管制缺陷、激励性管制理论、电价管制理论。这是一项基础性工作,只有在了解前人研究成果的基础上,才能进行进一步的研究。
第二章对可再生能源电力产业属性作了分析。产业经济学的基本原理已经证明了产业的技术经济属性、市场结构属性、外部性是价格行为的重要决定因素,因此可再生能源电力产业的属性该部分是文章的研究起点。
第三章对现有的可再生能源电力产业政策及成效研究。国外实践经验证明,可再生能源电力产业发展需要政府在其中扮演重要的角色,现阶段我国可再生能源电力产业更是一个需要政府扶持和管制的特殊产业。这一部分研究国家已经出台的激励政策和管制政策,内容包括:(1)从价格管理、并网发电、公共财政政策三方面分别阐述我国促进可再生能源电力产业发展的激励政策;(2)阐述在现有的产业政策激励下,我国可再生能源电力产业的发展规模。
第四章从实践的角度阐述现行可再生能源电力产业政策对该产业的激励不足,指出可再生能源电力产业由于产品价格缺乏约束、产业科技创新不足、并网发电遭受网络瓶颈制约的影响,发展缓慢。
第五章在第四章的基础上,为促进可再生能源电力产业发展提出激励政策建议。上面几部分研究的基本结论是,可再生能源电力价格合理化对于可再生能源电力产业健康、快速发展有重要意义。因而降低可再生能源电力价格是我国发展可再生能源电力产业的政策重点。根据前文的研究,本文从三方面提出激励我国可再生能源电力产业发展的政策建议:(1)政府在对可再生能源电力价格实行补贴与费用分摊政策时,应该制定科学合理的上限标准,以建立可再生能源电力企业与政府、消费者的议价标杆;(3)政府在激励可再生能源电力科技项目创新时,通过应用特许投标制度,发挥有限的财政支出的最大的作用;(4)可再生能源电力上网时,政府不仅保证其强制性上网,还应该通过拟市场竞争的手段,运用绩效标杆方法刺激电网企业为可再生能源电力并网发电提供优质的服务与较低的接入价格。
本文有以下创新之处:
1.对可再生能源电力产业属性进行了专门研究。目前理论界对于可再生能源电力的“正外部性”已经有了比较系统的研究成果,但是针对可再生能源电力产业的“寡头垄断性”缺乏专门研究。因此本文分析了可再生能源电力产业的“寡头垄断性”,并以此为基础,试图对企业的策略性行为进行专题分析,寻找制约该产业发展形成有效竞争局面的因素。
2.设计了可再生能源电力价格上限模型用以约束过高的上网电价。现有的可再生能源电力费用分摊制度解决了可再生能源成本补偿问题,标杆电价制度给可再生能源发电企业一定的激励。但是由于缺乏对可在的能源发电价格的最高限制,部分地区出现了跑马圈地,盲目建设的局面。不仅造成资源浪费,还加重了财政支出和消费者的负担。可再生能源电力价格约束模型是对现有可再生能源电力电价分摊制度的一项重要补充。
3.应用特许投标模型激励可再生能源电力产业进行科技研发。现有的理论一味强调政府对可再生能源电力产业公共财政支出不足,却没有研究如何使有限的财政投入获得最大的收益,并且如何减少寻租、降低成本。本文将特许投标制运用到可再生能源电力的科技研发中,是对促进可再生能源电力产业科技进步的一大补充。
4.应用绩效标杆制度为可再生能源电力并网发电提供较低的接入费用。现有的理论注重研究对可再生能源电力实行强制上网,忽略了由于存在网络接入瓶颈的存在,主导企业会对可再生能源电力提供歧视的接入服务,或者收取通道费增加垄断收入。对可再生能源电力并网发电的激励性管制研究,是维持可再生能源电力产业的生存的一项重要措施。
Renewable energy is an important energy resource which meets China's energy demand, improve energy structure, reduce environmental pollution. But at present, the renewable energy consumption accounted for the proportion of total consumption in China could still be very low, as the emerging industry, renewable energy sources encountered bottlenecks in major three areas: pricing mechanisms, technological innovation, and .
This article focus on study and discussion of Price incentive policies model, Invitation to tender model , Ruler bidding competition model , which based on incentive regulation and fit to china’s renewable energy industry . Papers in addition to intructions , is devided to five sections.
According to the need of research ,chapter one makes a research on theories of government’s regulation and it’s development.This chapter discussed shortcoming of traditional government regulation, incentive regulation theory,regulation of electrics price. It is a basic task, only in understanding the basic of previous research result, in order to conduct further resesarch.
Chapter 2 as a basic research of this paper ,makes a analysis of renewable energy industry’s character. The basic principle of industry economics has proven technical and economic character, market structure character, exterior character are important determination of price behavier. So study of renewable energy industy’characters is the starting point of the article.
Chapter 3 makes a research of present policies of renewable energy electrics industry and the effectiveness of the policies. Oversea’s experiences show that government playing an important role in development of renewable energy electric power industry. At this stage , China’s renewable energy electric industry also need government support and regularion. This chapter focus on the study of incentives policies which the stat has already introduced.
This paper argues that ,when power grid company provide access service for renewable energy enterprises, need a restrain mechanism.Grid enterprises as a monopoly buyer. Seeking monopoly profits will occur strategic behavier. Renewable ernergy electric industry itself ,due to high prices, at a disadvantage in the competition. “Access fee”will make renewable energy power industry“worse”.
These few areas mentioned above , have become an important factor that block China's renewable energy electric power industry to achieve effective competition, promote industrial maturity, we must construct a reasonable and scientific control system, in complying with the general rules of industrial development, and realize renewable energy power industry dynamics controlling.Chapter 5 takes the case of renewable energy power development in China, building policy recommendations of price subsidies for renewable energy electic power system. This paper conceives a prompting model of Inviting to tender for technology of renewable energy power. And we design a medol to solving politic acts in electricity power transmission.
This paper may be innovative in the following areas:
1.Makeing a special study on electric power industry attributes of renewable energy. At present, there are some systematic researches on the "positive externalities" of the renewable power in current theories, however, lacking of specialized research on“oligarch monopoly”of the renewable power.
2.Design upper limited price of renewable energy electricity to constraints the high price of renewable energy electricity. The existing renewable energy power costing-sharing system to solve the issue of compensation for the cost of renewable energy sources.
3.Application franchise bidding model of incentives for renewable energy R & D power industries. Current theories blindly stressed that the Government of renewable energy electric power industry shortage of public expenditure, but has not studied how to make a limited financial investment to obtain maximum benefit from, and how to reduce rent-seeking and reduce costs.
4 . Application performance benchmarking system for renewable energy electricity grid to provide a lower access charges. Current theories focus on research for renewable energy electricity compulsory Internet, ignores the existence of bottlenecks in the network. The existence of dominant firms to provide renewable power would afford discriminatory services, or charge fees to increase access monopoly revenue.
引文
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