我国中小板上市公司过度融资问题探讨
摘要
中小板2004年5月启动至今已有7个年头了,截止到2010年底,中小板上市公司的数目已达530家,大多数都为高科技、高成长的公司,其发展十分迅速,业绩表现也都十分喜人。这从一定程度上缓解了中小企业融资难的现象。但是,部分中小板上市公司大量募集资金闲置而随意变更募集资金投向与用途、用于补充流动资金、归还银行贷款以及委托理财等,似乎告诉人们在繁荣的背后却埋藏着诸多隐患。我国中小板上市公司存在的这些过度融资问题会导致资源的浪费,易于诱发股市“泡沫”,损害股票市场的资源优化配置功能,同时导致公司经营业绩滑坡和资源配置低效,并损害投资者的利益。造成上述问题的原因有很多,包括上市公司缺乏融资理念造成过度融资,证券市场监管制度缺陷造成过度融资,中介机构功能缺失以及投资者行为不理智等造成的过度融资。这就值得我们去探讨造成我国中小板上市公司过度融资的真正原因所在,从而提出相应的措施防治过度融资现象的发生。
本文主要采用规范研究方法,对我国中小板上市公司过度融资问题进行探讨。本文写作的基本思路是：从中小板上市公司过度融资的一般理论入手,分析我国中小板上市公司存在的过度融资问题,并通过探寻我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的原因,借鉴西方国家防治上市公司过度融资经验的基础上,提出了我国防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的整体设想和具体对策建议。全文共分五章,主要内容如下：第一章是本文的引言,主要介绍本文的研究背景和意义、国内外相关文献的回顾和评述、写作思路、研究方法和基本框架。第二章是中小板上市公司过度融资的一般理论概述。主要包括中小板上市公司过度融资的基本概念,中小板上市公司融资的理论基础。第三章是我国中小板上市公司过度融现实分析。主要包括我国中小板上市公司存在随意变更募集资金投向、闲置资金补充流动资金、闲置资金归还银行贷款以及委托理财等过度融资问题,以及造成我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的原因分析,包括上市公司缺乏融资成本意识、过度追求规模扩张、公司治理中的三类财务冲突等内在原因,以及资本结构失衡、证券监管制度缺陷、中介机构缺乏融资约束力、投资者行为及结构不合理等外在原因。第四章是美韩德三国防治上市公司过度融资的经验及教训借鉴。主要介绍了美国和韩国对上市公司过度融资行为的防治经验以及德国新市场防治上市公司过度融资的失败教训,提出了我国借鉴美韩德三国防治过度融资行为的看法,具体包括：树立保护投资者利益的经营理念、建立做市商与竞价相结合的交易制度、建立完善的信息披露制度、强化监管机制、加大监管力度以及建立健全并实行严格的退市制度。第五章为防治我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的建议。主要包括防治我国中小板上市公司过度融资的整体设想和防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的具体建议。
本文认为防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的主要对策有：①树立中小板上市公司理性融资理念,优化融资结构降低中小板上市公司利益相关者的三类冲突；②健全资本市场结构、完善证券市场监管机制,具体有：改进新股发行制度、完善相关法律法规、健全市场退市机制；③增强中介机构的融资约束力,包括引入信用评级制度、增强中介机构责任以及强化中介机构监管；④加强投资者教育,树立理性融资理念,同时加大机构投资者的建设力度。
Since launched in May2004, SME has been seven years.530listed companies have financed in the SME market until the end of2010. Most of all are high-tech; high growths companies, and develop very rapidly. The performance is also very gratifying. To a certain extent, it eases the financing difficulties of small-medium-sized enterprises. However, over financing behavior of listed companies caused part of the financing funds misappropriated and idle, add liquidity, repayment of bank loans and trust management. It seems to us that many hidden dangers have been buried behind this prosperity. The problem of over finance of listed companies on SME resulted in excessive waste of resources, are easy to induce the stock market "bubble", damage the resource allocation and optimization function of the stock market, caused operating results landslides and resources allocation inefficient, and harmed the interests of investors. Many reasons contributed to this problem, such as over finance caused by the concept defects of listed companies, over finance caused by the regulatory system defects of securities markets, over finance caused by functional defects of intermediaries and encouraged by investor behavior. It is worth to us to explore the real reason for causing over financing behavior of listed companies, and to seek solutions to fight the irrational behavior.
This paper mainly uses standard methods to investigate over financing issue of listed companies on SME in China. The basic thought of writing is starting from the general theory of over finance of the listed companies on SME, and then anglicizing over financing performance of listed companies on SME. This article explores the over financing causes of the listed companies on SME in our country, then learns the experiences from control over finance of listed companies in Western counties, and the raised the overall ideas and specific measures proposed of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies. This paper is divided into five chapters, whose main contents are as follows:the first chapter is the introduction, and mainly introduces the research background, research significance, review and comments of the relevant literature, writing ideas, research methods and the basic framework. The second chapter is overview of the general theory about over financing of listed companies on SME, which mainly includes the basic concept agreement and over financing theory of listed companies on SME. The third chapter is practical analysis of over finance of listed companies on SME in China, which mainly includes financing founds be changed arbitrarily, adding liquidity, repayment of bank loans and trust management problems of over financing behavior of listed companies on SME in China and the reason analysis of over financing behavior of listed companies on SME, including lacking of financing cost-conscious, excessive pursuit of scale expansion, three types of conflict of stakeholders, imbalance between capital structure, the securities regulatory system defects, lack of intermediaries financing binding and investor behavior and the structure irrational. The fourth chapter is experience and failure reference of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies in U.S, Korea and Germany. It mainly introduces controlling experiences of over financing behavior of listed companies in U.S and Korea, as well as the failure of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies in Germany, and views over learning from proposed prevention experience, specifically including establishing a business philosophy to protect the interests of investors, establishing trading system of market makers and bid a combination, establishing and improving the information disclosure system, strengthening the regulatory mechanism of increased supervision, and establishing a sound and a strict delisting system. The fifth chapter is controlling proposals of over finance of listed companies on SME in China, including overall vision and specific proposals to control over financing behavior of listed companies on SME in China.
Through the research above, the countermeasures of controlling over the over financing behavior of listed companies on SME are as follows:①We should establish rational financing concepts, optimize the financing structure, and reduce the three types of conflicts of stakeholders in listed companies on SME;②We should improve the capital market structure and improve the regulatory mechanism of the securities market, specifically including improving IPO system, improving relevant laws and regulations, and improving a sound and a strict delisting system;③We should improve the functioning of intermediary to enhance the constraints of the financing of listed companies, including the introduction of the credit rating system, enhancing the responsibility of intermediaries and strengthening the supervision of intermediaries;④We should strengthen investor education,establish a rational concept of financing, and increase efforts to building the institutional investors.
本文主要采用规范研究方法,对我国中小板上市公司过度融资问题进行探讨。本文写作的基本思路是：从中小板上市公司过度融资的一般理论入手,分析我国中小板上市公司存在的过度融资问题,并通过探寻我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的原因,借鉴西方国家防治上市公司过度融资经验的基础上,提出了我国防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的整体设想和具体对策建议。全文共分五章,主要内容如下：第一章是本文的引言,主要介绍本文的研究背景和意义、国内外相关文献的回顾和评述、写作思路、研究方法和基本框架。第二章是中小板上市公司过度融资的一般理论概述。主要包括中小板上市公司过度融资的基本概念,中小板上市公司融资的理论基础。第三章是我国中小板上市公司过度融现实分析。主要包括我国中小板上市公司存在随意变更募集资金投向、闲置资金补充流动资金、闲置资金归还银行贷款以及委托理财等过度融资问题,以及造成我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的原因分析,包括上市公司缺乏融资成本意识、过度追求规模扩张、公司治理中的三类财务冲突等内在原因,以及资本结构失衡、证券监管制度缺陷、中介机构缺乏融资约束力、投资者行为及结构不合理等外在原因。第四章是美韩德三国防治上市公司过度融资的经验及教训借鉴。主要介绍了美国和韩国对上市公司过度融资行为的防治经验以及德国新市场防治上市公司过度融资的失败教训,提出了我国借鉴美韩德三国防治过度融资行为的看法,具体包括：树立保护投资者利益的经营理念、建立做市商与竞价相结合的交易制度、建立完善的信息披露制度、强化监管机制、加大监管力度以及建立健全并实行严格的退市制度。第五章为防治我国中小板上市公司过度融资行为的建议。主要包括防治我国中小板上市公司过度融资的整体设想和防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的具体建议。
本文认为防治中小板上市公司过度融资行为的主要对策有：①树立中小板上市公司理性融资理念,优化融资结构降低中小板上市公司利益相关者的三类冲突；②健全资本市场结构、完善证券市场监管机制,具体有：改进新股发行制度、完善相关法律法规、健全市场退市机制；③增强中介机构的融资约束力,包括引入信用评级制度、增强中介机构责任以及强化中介机构监管；④加强投资者教育,树立理性融资理念,同时加大机构投资者的建设力度。
Since launched in May2004, SME has been seven years.530listed companies have financed in the SME market until the end of2010. Most of all are high-tech; high growths companies, and develop very rapidly. The performance is also very gratifying. To a certain extent, it eases the financing difficulties of small-medium-sized enterprises. However, over financing behavior of listed companies caused part of the financing funds misappropriated and idle, add liquidity, repayment of bank loans and trust management. It seems to us that many hidden dangers have been buried behind this prosperity. The problem of over finance of listed companies on SME resulted in excessive waste of resources, are easy to induce the stock market "bubble", damage the resource allocation and optimization function of the stock market, caused operating results landslides and resources allocation inefficient, and harmed the interests of investors. Many reasons contributed to this problem, such as over finance caused by the concept defects of listed companies, over finance caused by the regulatory system defects of securities markets, over finance caused by functional defects of intermediaries and encouraged by investor behavior. It is worth to us to explore the real reason for causing over financing behavior of listed companies, and to seek solutions to fight the irrational behavior.
This paper mainly uses standard methods to investigate over financing issue of listed companies on SME in China. The basic thought of writing is starting from the general theory of over finance of the listed companies on SME, and then anglicizing over financing performance of listed companies on SME. This article explores the over financing causes of the listed companies on SME in our country, then learns the experiences from control over finance of listed companies in Western counties, and the raised the overall ideas and specific measures proposed of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies. This paper is divided into five chapters, whose main contents are as follows:the first chapter is the introduction, and mainly introduces the research background, research significance, review and comments of the relevant literature, writing ideas, research methods and the basic framework. The second chapter is overview of the general theory about over financing of listed companies on SME, which mainly includes the basic concept agreement and over financing theory of listed companies on SME. The third chapter is practical analysis of over finance of listed companies on SME in China, which mainly includes financing founds be changed arbitrarily, adding liquidity, repayment of bank loans and trust management problems of over financing behavior of listed companies on SME in China and the reason analysis of over financing behavior of listed companies on SME, including lacking of financing cost-conscious, excessive pursuit of scale expansion, three types of conflict of stakeholders, imbalance between capital structure, the securities regulatory system defects, lack of intermediaries financing binding and investor behavior and the structure irrational. The fourth chapter is experience and failure reference of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies in U.S, Korea and Germany. It mainly introduces controlling experiences of over financing behavior of listed companies in U.S and Korea, as well as the failure of controlling over financing behavior of listed companies in Germany, and views over learning from proposed prevention experience, specifically including establishing a business philosophy to protect the interests of investors, establishing trading system of market makers and bid a combination, establishing and improving the information disclosure system, strengthening the regulatory mechanism of increased supervision, and establishing a sound and a strict delisting system. The fifth chapter is controlling proposals of over finance of listed companies on SME in China, including overall vision and specific proposals to control over financing behavior of listed companies on SME in China.
Through the research above, the countermeasures of controlling over the over financing behavior of listed companies on SME are as follows:①We should establish rational financing concepts, optimize the financing structure, and reduce the three types of conflicts of stakeholders in listed companies on SME;②We should improve the capital market structure and improve the regulatory mechanism of the securities market, specifically including improving IPO system, improving relevant laws and regulations, and improving a sound and a strict delisting system;③We should improve the functioning of intermediary to enhance the constraints of the financing of listed companies, including the introduction of the credit rating system, enhancing the responsibility of intermediaries and strengthening the supervision of intermediaries;④We should strengthen investor education,establish a rational concept of financing, and increase efforts to building the institutional investors.
引文
①彭卉,曾德科.我国中小板上市公司融资行为分析.特区经济,2010(11)：124-126
①彭卉,曾德科.我国中小板上市公司融资行为分析.特区经济,2010(11)：124-126
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①俞艳波.海外创业板市场的经验及对我国的借鉴意义.产业与科技论坛,2009,8(11)：254-256.
①资料来源于NASDAQ官方网站：美国《证券交易法》
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