论法律的概念分析
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摘要
概念分析就是找出概念的必然的本质属性,并在哲学上对这种必然属性给出成功的说明,概念分析的理论作用在于使我们更好地理解概念背后的世界本身,加深我们对世界的哲学认识。对法律的概念分析是普遍的概念分析方法针对法律这一特殊的社会现象的具体应用。
法律的概念问题往往被认为是讨论“法律是什么”,对这一问题的探讨由来已久。但是,哈特在《法律的概念》一书中转换了提问的方式,不再笼统地问“法律是什么”,而是问“法律必然是什么”、“法律与什么有着概念上的联系”。增加了“必然”和“概念”这两个关键词为法理学借鉴语言哲学的成果开辟了可能性。
在《法律的概念》中,哈特具体探讨了“强制性”和“道德性”是不是可以作为法律的必然属性,他对两者的回答都是否定的。他认为,强制性不能揭示法律与纯粹暴力的差异,作为替代,他提出的“规范性”这一法律的必然属性是可以揭示两者差异的;同时,哈特用一种表达主义的方式从哲学上说明规范性,即把规范性等同于事实性的主观认知和态度。由此得出法律的规范性与道德没有必然联系的结论。这就是“法律与道德没有必然联系”(分离命题)的根据所在。
在哈特之后,拉兹提出了权威理论来说明法律的规范性,正当性权威建立在正当的实践理由之上,因此,权威意味着具有道德正当性。拉兹认为,法律的规范性既然不能脱离权威而得到说明,那么,这意味着法律的规范性本质上是涉及价值的,而非事实性的。针对同样的问题,德沃金提出“解释性概念”,试图从哲学上来说明规范性这一法律的必然属性,“解释性概念”意味着法律具有特定目的,即正确地指导人的行为,使公共行为符合政治道德。德沃金的这一理论把规范性与道德必然地联系在一起。总之,拉兹和德沃金两人都认为法律的必然属性——规范性不能脱离道德而被说明,因此,法律与道德有着必然的联系,在他们眼中,哈特的分离命题是站不住脚的。
围绕着分离命题存在着很多这样的理论交锋,但是关于这些理论交锋的研究大多忽略了他们各自理论背后隐含着的一个根本问题,即什么是概念、什么是“必然”。概念理论是哈特及相继的所有讨论法律概念问题的学者未予明言的语言哲学背景;普遍法理学具体结论的优劣很大程度上依赖于他们背后的概念理论正确与否。概念理论不仅告诉我们“必然”、“概念”意味着什么,还可以用来分析“道德”这个概念,对道德概念的正确理解将成为我们正确回答“法律与道德关系”问题的关键所在。
本文就致力于提炼出“概念理论”这一法理学的语言哲学主线,进而深入语言哲学,推荐一种较为成功的概念理论,这就是克里普克和普特南分别独立提出的可能世界语义学,在根本上解决法律的概念问题。可能世界语义学认为,概念不等同于观念,概念处于形而上学的层面,它直接对应于世界中的对象;而观念是人类对世界的认知,具有可错性,也就是说,不是必然为真,它处于认识论的层面。可能世界语义学清楚地在语言层面上揭示出了形而上学/认识论这一重要的区分。
在可能世界语义学的对比下,我们将看到,哈特坚持了一种错误的概念理论——经验语义学,这种概念理论使得他把法律与对法律的认知混为一谈,违背了可能世界语义学中“形而上学/认识论”这一重要划分。哈特这种错误的概念分析方法导致了错误的道德概念和法律概念:表达主义的道德概念和描述的、价值无涉的法律概念。在这些错误的前提上,他坚持的“分离命题”岌岌可危。
反观拉兹和德沃金的理论,他们虽然没有明确表述自己的概念理论,但是我们可以从他们的法律理论和价值理论中看到形而上学/认识论这一关键性的划分。以此种概念理论为方法论背景,他们都坚持一种客观主义的道德观和规范性的法律概念,都承认法律与道德有着必然的、概念上的联系。
概念理论的提出不仅仅是为法理学引入了语言哲学这种研究方法,更为重要的是它还带来了如下的理论益处:(1)使我们对当代法理学中的重要争论有了更为系统的梳理和认识,明确了他们共同面对的问题,并以该问题为主线澄清了那些流行的对排他性实证主义和德沃金法理学的误解;(2)为我们提供了判断各种理论优劣的标准,可以作为普遍法理学讨论的试金石,也就是使我们认识到了哈特理论的根本缺陷是语言哲学上的缺陷,以及拉兹和德沃金的理论开辟的正确方向指向了什么样的语言哲学和道德理论。当然,深入地研究概念理论也为我们自己在法律的概念问题上做出贡献开辟了可能性。
Many debates in Anglo-American Jurisprudence focused on the concept of law.All these debates which originated from The Concept of Law(1961) by H.L.A.Hart and had been continuing to now days led to a lot of important works and theses.These subjects and studies were deemed as the most important progress of jurisprudence in almost 50 years.So-called conceptual analysis aims at finding out the nature or necessary attributes of concept and explaining these attributes philosophically.Hart proposed three recurrent issues in The Concept of Law which represented two orientations of general jurisprudence:Has law necessary connection with coercion? Has law necessary connection with morality? General jurisprudence focused on these two problems after the publishing of The Concept of Law,especially the later.
It is most important taking a successful theory of concept which can give an explanation of concept or necessity.This is the fundamentals of general jurisprudence.Possible world semantics developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam is the proper theory. According to their semantics,there is logical difference between concept and description:concepts which lie in the metaphysical level refer to the object in the world directly;but the descriptions which lie the epistemological level are the results of recognition of humanbeing.
As Hart's semantics,the empirical semantics wrongly identified the law and the knowledge of law which didn't distinguished metaphysical and epistemological these two different levels.Moreover this unsecssesful conceptual analysis led Hart to take unreasonable expressivist concept of morality and value-detached concept of law.The separation thesis is the conclusion from these concepts of morality and law.
Although Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin didn't made their theory of concept clear,we can summarize the difference between metaphysical level and epistemological level from their moral and legal theories.According to their accepted theory of concept, morality should be understood as objective and law should be understood as normative.
In a word,conceptual analysis is not only the focus of contemporary general jurisprudence,but also the main standard of measure for so many theses from all kinds of legal philosophers in this domain.
法律的概念问题往往被认为是讨论“法律是什么”,对这一问题的探讨由来已久。但是,哈特在《法律的概念》一书中转换了提问的方式,不再笼统地问“法律是什么”,而是问“法律必然是什么”、“法律与什么有着概念上的联系”。增加了“必然”和“概念”这两个关键词为法理学借鉴语言哲学的成果开辟了可能性。
在《法律的概念》中,哈特具体探讨了“强制性”和“道德性”是不是可以作为法律的必然属性,他对两者的回答都是否定的。他认为,强制性不能揭示法律与纯粹暴力的差异,作为替代,他提出的“规范性”这一法律的必然属性是可以揭示两者差异的;同时,哈特用一种表达主义的方式从哲学上说明规范性,即把规范性等同于事实性的主观认知和态度。由此得出法律的规范性与道德没有必然联系的结论。这就是“法律与道德没有必然联系”(分离命题)的根据所在。
在哈特之后,拉兹提出了权威理论来说明法律的规范性,正当性权威建立在正当的实践理由之上,因此,权威意味着具有道德正当性。拉兹认为,法律的规范性既然不能脱离权威而得到说明,那么,这意味着法律的规范性本质上是涉及价值的,而非事实性的。针对同样的问题,德沃金提出“解释性概念”,试图从哲学上来说明规范性这一法律的必然属性,“解释性概念”意味着法律具有特定目的,即正确地指导人的行为,使公共行为符合政治道德。德沃金的这一理论把规范性与道德必然地联系在一起。总之,拉兹和德沃金两人都认为法律的必然属性——规范性不能脱离道德而被说明,因此,法律与道德有着必然的联系,在他们眼中,哈特的分离命题是站不住脚的。
围绕着分离命题存在着很多这样的理论交锋,但是关于这些理论交锋的研究大多忽略了他们各自理论背后隐含着的一个根本问题,即什么是概念、什么是“必然”。概念理论是哈特及相继的所有讨论法律概念问题的学者未予明言的语言哲学背景;普遍法理学具体结论的优劣很大程度上依赖于他们背后的概念理论正确与否。概念理论不仅告诉我们“必然”、“概念”意味着什么,还可以用来分析“道德”这个概念,对道德概念的正确理解将成为我们正确回答“法律与道德关系”问题的关键所在。
本文就致力于提炼出“概念理论”这一法理学的语言哲学主线,进而深入语言哲学,推荐一种较为成功的概念理论,这就是克里普克和普特南分别独立提出的可能世界语义学,在根本上解决法律的概念问题。可能世界语义学认为,概念不等同于观念,概念处于形而上学的层面,它直接对应于世界中的对象;而观念是人类对世界的认知,具有可错性,也就是说,不是必然为真,它处于认识论的层面。可能世界语义学清楚地在语言层面上揭示出了形而上学/认识论这一重要的区分。
在可能世界语义学的对比下,我们将看到,哈特坚持了一种错误的概念理论——经验语义学,这种概念理论使得他把法律与对法律的认知混为一谈,违背了可能世界语义学中“形而上学/认识论”这一重要划分。哈特这种错误的概念分析方法导致了错误的道德概念和法律概念:表达主义的道德概念和描述的、价值无涉的法律概念。在这些错误的前提上,他坚持的“分离命题”岌岌可危。
反观拉兹和德沃金的理论,他们虽然没有明确表述自己的概念理论,但是我们可以从他们的法律理论和价值理论中看到形而上学/认识论这一关键性的划分。以此种概念理论为方法论背景,他们都坚持一种客观主义的道德观和规范性的法律概念,都承认法律与道德有着必然的、概念上的联系。
概念理论的提出不仅仅是为法理学引入了语言哲学这种研究方法,更为重要的是它还带来了如下的理论益处:(1)使我们对当代法理学中的重要争论有了更为系统的梳理和认识,明确了他们共同面对的问题,并以该问题为主线澄清了那些流行的对排他性实证主义和德沃金法理学的误解;(2)为我们提供了判断各种理论优劣的标准,可以作为普遍法理学讨论的试金石,也就是使我们认识到了哈特理论的根本缺陷是语言哲学上的缺陷,以及拉兹和德沃金的理论开辟的正确方向指向了什么样的语言哲学和道德理论。当然,深入地研究概念理论也为我们自己在法律的概念问题上做出贡献开辟了可能性。
Many debates in Anglo-American Jurisprudence focused on the concept of law.All these debates which originated from The Concept of Law(1961) by H.L.A.Hart and had been continuing to now days led to a lot of important works and theses.These subjects and studies were deemed as the most important progress of jurisprudence in almost 50 years.So-called conceptual analysis aims at finding out the nature or necessary attributes of concept and explaining these attributes philosophically.Hart proposed three recurrent issues in The Concept of Law which represented two orientations of general jurisprudence:Has law necessary connection with coercion? Has law necessary connection with morality? General jurisprudence focused on these two problems after the publishing of The Concept of Law,especially the later.
It is most important taking a successful theory of concept which can give an explanation of concept or necessity.This is the fundamentals of general jurisprudence.Possible world semantics developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam is the proper theory. According to their semantics,there is logical difference between concept and description:concepts which lie in the metaphysical level refer to the object in the world directly;but the descriptions which lie the epistemological level are the results of recognition of humanbeing.
As Hart's semantics,the empirical semantics wrongly identified the law and the knowledge of law which didn't distinguished metaphysical and epistemological these two different levels.Moreover this unsecssesful conceptual analysis led Hart to take unreasonable expressivist concept of morality and value-detached concept of law.The separation thesis is the conclusion from these concepts of morality and law.
Although Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin didn't made their theory of concept clear,we can summarize the difference between metaphysical level and epistemological level from their moral and legal theories.According to their accepted theory of concept, morality should be understood as objective and law should be understood as normative.
In a word,conceptual analysis is not only the focus of contemporary general jurisprudence,but also the main standard of measure for so many theses from all kinds of legal philosophers in this domain.
引文
1 See L.Green,General Jurisprudence,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies(2005),vol.25,pp.565-6.
2 See P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz ed.,Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour ofH.L.A.Hart,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,p.ⅴ.
3 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,pp.239-44.
4 See B.Bix,Jurisprudence." Theory and Context,4~(th),London:Sweet & Maxwell,2006,pp.91-3.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.6-13.
6 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.33-41.
7 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990,pp.154-62.
8 See G.Lamond,The Coerciveness of Law,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies(2000),vol.20.
9 See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996.
10 See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,Philosophy & Public Affairs (1988),vol.17,pp.114-6.
11 See Dennis Patterson,Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies(2006),vol.26;see also Patterson,Against a Theory of Meaning,Washington University Law Quarterly(1995),vol.73.
12 See T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,in J.Coleman(ed.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.59 ff..
13 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1996),vol.25,no.2.
14 See J.Finnis,Fundamentals of Ethics,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1983,p.56ff.
15 See Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,tran.by Anders Wedberg,N J:The Lawbook Exchange,Ltd.,1999,pp.163-5.
16 参见刘叶深:“评凯尔森的法律效力理论”,《厦门大学法律评论》(第13辑),厦门:厦门大学出版社,2007,页87-95.
17 参见朱峰:《拉兹权威命题研究》,山东大学博士学位论文,2007.
18 参见喻中:“哈特的授权规则及其本体意义”,《北京行政学院学报》,2004.4.
19 参见王彬:“论法律解释的融贯性”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
20 参见陈景辉:“原则、自由裁量和依法裁判”,《法学研究》,2006.5.
21 参见高国栋:《分析法学的日常语言分析转向》,吉林大学博士学位论文,2006;谌洪果:“通过语言体察法律现象:哈特与日常语言分析哲学”,《比较法研究》,2006.5.
22 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,p.330.
23 See MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,1981,p.34ff.
24 See Brian Bix,H.L.A.Hart and the Hcrmeneutic Turn in Legal Theory,SMU Law Review(1999),vol.52.
25 参见沈映涵:“解读描述社会学:哈特法律理论中的描述性方法的前提性分析”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
26 参见陈锐:“从外在观点到内在观点:哈特与法律实证主义的诠释学转向”,《西南民族大学学报》(人文社科版),2005.10.
27 参见马克斯·韦伯:《社会学的基本概念》,顾忠华译,杵林:广西师范大学出版社,2005.
28 See MacCormick,A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law,Valparaiso Law Review(1985),vol.20;
Frederick Schauer,Positivism as Pariah,in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on Legal Positivism,ed.by R.George,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996;
Liam Murphy,The Political Question of the Concept of Law,in Hart 's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001;
Tom Campbell,The legal Theory of Ethical Positivism,A ldershot:Dartmouth Publishing Co.,1996.
29 See J.Dickson,Evaluation andLegal Theory,Portland,Oregon:Hart Publishing,2001,pp.83-103.
30 参见谌洪果:“从命令论到规则论:奥斯丁与哈特”,《法哲学与法社会学论从》,第10期,北京:北京大学出版社,2007,页150-5.
31 参见刘东升:《实证法学的反思及规范解读》,山东大学博士学位论文,2006.
32 参见曾莉:《包容实证主义法学视野中的法律与道德关系研究》,吉林大学博士学位论文,2006.
33 参见陈景辉:《法律的界限:实证主义命题群之展开》,北京:中国政法大学出版社,2007,页198-208.
34 参见朱振:“哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂:基于分离命题的考察”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
35 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,Monist(1985),vol.68,pp.311-2.
36 See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,Oxford:Basil Blackweil,1972,pp.43-7.
37See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,p.26ff.
38See S.Kripke,,Naming and Necessity,p.47ff.
39See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,pp.60-7.
40See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,pp.35-9.
41See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",Mind,Language and Reality,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975,pp.219-22.
42See H.Putnam,Is Semantics Possible?,Mind,Language and Reality,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975,p.139.
43See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",pp.223-7.
44See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",pp.235-8.
45See T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.48ff.
46See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,pp.72-3.
47See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",p.249.
48See H.Putnam,The Meaning of "Meaning",pp.250-1.
48参见蒯因:“经验主义的两个教条”,马蒂尼奇(主编):《语言哲学》,牟博等译,北京:商务印书馆,2004,页46-50.
50参见蒯因:“经验主义的两个教条”,页60-3.
51See also H.Pumam,Possibility and Necessity,Realism and Reason,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983,pp.46-53.
52参见蒯因:《语词和对象》,陈启伟等译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,页12.
53参见蒯因:《语词和对象》,页53-9.
54See B.Leiter,Rethinking Legal Realism:Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,Texas Law Review (1997),vol.76,p.267ff.;see also Legal Realism,Hard Positivism,and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,in Coleman(ed.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.355 ff..
55See H.Putnam,Realism and Reason,p.ⅶ.
56See also H.Putnam,Possibility and Necessity,pp.63-6;see also Putnam,Realism with a Human Face,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990,pp.63-70.
57See Putnam,There is at least one a priori truth,Realism and Reason,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983,pp.100-10.
58See H.Putnam,Possibility and Necessity,pp.46-53.
59See Putnam,There is at least one a priori truth,pp.113-4.
60See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.55-9.
61See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.329-31.
1See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.16.
2See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence andPhilosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1983,pp.23-4.
3See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.133-4.
4See Karl Olivercrona,Law as Fact,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1939,p.90.
5See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.18-20;pp.54-6.
6See J.L.Austin,How to Do Things with Words,外研社/Oxford University Press,2002,pp.1-11.
7See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,pp.26-7.
8See H.L.A.Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,in Logic and Language(2~(nd) series),ed.by Anthony Flew,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,1953,p.145.
9See G.P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,ed.by P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,pp.29-30.
10See P.M.S.Hacker,Hart's Philosophy of Law,in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,ed.by P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,pp.6-7;J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.5.
11See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,pp.4-5.
12See G.P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,pp.30-1.
13See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.13-4.
14See H.L.A.Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,pp.146-55.
15See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,p.23.
16See G P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,p.36.
17See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept ofLaw,pp.14-5.
18See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.10-3.
19See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept ofLaw,pp.15-6.
20See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.123-4.
21See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.124-5.
22See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law? in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,pp.325-6.
23See J.Waldron,Vagueness in Law and Language:Some Philosophical Issues,California Law Review (1994),vol.82,pp.512-4.
24See J.Waldron,Vagueness in Law and Language:Some Philosophical Issues,pp.516-21.
25See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law? p.330.
26See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.124.
27See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.15-6.
28See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.149.着重非原文所有。
29See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,pp.31-40.
30See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.274.当然德沃金的批评不会如此简单,在第三章中我将重构“语义之刺”,这将成为对哈特理论的致命一击。
31See e.g.J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison;see also T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,both in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.6-11;pp,41-3.
32See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.103-5.
33See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.152.
36See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.79-88.
37See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.54.
38See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.54-7.
39See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,1981,pp.30-2.
40See also J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Princeton,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990,pp.50-3.
41See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
42See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.55.
43See Scott Shapiro,What is the Internal Point of View?,Fordham Law Review(2006),vol.75,pp.1158-61.
44See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.v.
45See H.L.A.Hart.The Concept of Law,pp.239-43.
46例如,布莱克(Donald Black)的法律社会学理论就属于此类,参见《法律的运作行为》,唐越、苏力译,北京:中国政法大学出版社,1994:《社会学视野中的司法》,郭星华译,北京:法律出版社,2002.
47See Scott Shapiro,What is the Internal Point of View?,p.1161.
48See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
49See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1977,p.52.
50See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,p.53;see also J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.53-5.
51See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.53-4.
52See David Lewis,Convention:A Philosophical Study,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1969.
53See Andrei Marmot,Legal Conventionalism,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law(ed.By Jules Coleman),Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.203-212.
54See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.57-8.
55See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.57-8.
56See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.255-6.
57See Kevin Toh,Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project,Legal Theory(2005),vol.11,pp.76-7;pp.112-3.
58See Kevin Toh,Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project,pp.108-10.
59See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
60See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1980,pp.11-8;see also S.Perry,Hart's Methodological Positivism,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law(ed.By Jules Coleman),Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.347-53.
61参见哈特:《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,北京:法律出版社,2006,页22-5:See also H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.176-80.
62See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
63See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.47-50.
64See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.33-4;see also MacCormick,LegalReasoning andLegal Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1978,pp.288-92.
65See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,p.38.
66参见彼得·温奇:《社会科学的观念及其与哲学的关系》,张庆熊、张缨等译,上海:上海人民出版社,2004,页90-1.
67See H.Putnam,Reason,Truth and History,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.132-7.
68See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996,pp.60-1.
69参见普特南:《事实与价值两分法的崩溃》,应奇译,北京:东方出版社,2006,页49.
70参见普特南:《事实与价值两分法的崩溃》,页47.
71See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,p.59.
*就这个问题,与冉杰先生的讨论给了我很大的帮助,特此致谢。
72See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Samantics,in J.Coleman(cal.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.73-4.
73See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.15-16.
74See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.31-35.
75See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,pp.69-79.
76See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1988),vol.17,pp.112-114.
77对哈特的不同的阐释,see T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,p.59 ff.
78See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,pp.115-116.
79更为深入的讨论,see H.Putnam,Reason,Truth and History,ch.1,ch.2.
80See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,pp.69-79.
81See Nicos Stavropoulos,HaWs Semantics,pp.93-95.
82See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity,in M.Golding and W.Edmundson(ed.),The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,2005,pp.316-317.
83See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,p.84.
84See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,p.83.
85See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.79.
86See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.151.
87See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.78-9,标准划分的标识(A、B、C)并非原文所有。
88See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.102-3,对区分标准的另一种阐述,see Benjamin Zipursky,The Model of Social Facts,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.227-8.
89See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.89-96.
90See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.99-100.
91See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.113.
92See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.104-5.
93See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.105-6.
94See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.101-2.
95See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.256.
96See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.253-5.
97See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,p.258.
98See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,p.256
99 See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,pp.265-7.
100 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.190-4.
101 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.195.
102 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.157-61.
1 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990.
2 See J.Raz,Engaging Reason:On the Theory of Value andAction,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1999;
J.Raz,The Practice of Value,Oxford:Clarendon Press,2003.
3 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,pp.54-5.着重为本文作者所加。
4 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
6 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.17-9.
7 我稍微改变了拉兹的一个例了,sce J.Raz,Agency,Reason and Good,in Engaging Reason:On the Theory of Valueand,Action,,pp.32-3.以下不注明出处的文章均源于此书。
8 See J.Raz,Agency,Reason and Good,pp.33-4.
9 这里,拉兹娴熟地运用了概念分析的方法,特别是他的“概念深度”的思想。在下一章的小结中,我们将完整展示拉兹的概念理论。
10 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,p.82.
11 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,pp.81-2.
12 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,p.88.
13 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.120-1.
14 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.123-7.
15 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,p.125,n.13.
16 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,p.113.
17 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.5.
18 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.322.
19 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.323.
20 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.324.
21 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.342.
22 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.323.
23 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.324-6.
24 See J.Raz,Incommensurability and Agency,pp.63-6.
25 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.326.
26 参见托马斯·内格尔:《人的问题》,万以详,上海:上海译文出版社,2004,页140-5.
27 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.327.
28 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.327.
29 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.338-40.
30 See J.Raz,When We are Ourselves,p.9.
31 See J.Raz,Incommensurability and Agency,pp.50-62.
32 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.346-53.
33 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.347-8.
34 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.348-51.
35 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,pp.65-6.
36 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.353.
37 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.15-6.
38 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,pp.90-4.
39 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,pp.105-8.
40 See J.Raz,When We are Ourselves,pp.11-21.
41 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.146-52;See also J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.19-33.
42 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.146-52.
See also J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.37-47.
43 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.25-7.
44 R代表reason.
45 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.27.
46 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.27-8.
47 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.39-40.
48 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.41-2.
49 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1979,pp.13-6.
50 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.184-6.
51 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.184.
52 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.45-6.
53 对于排他性理由在哪些情况下可以是能够被证立的(justified),在“正当性权威”部分将会详细讨论。
54 See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.254-5.
55 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.18-20.
56 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.35-6.
57 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.36-7.
58 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.18,n.19.
59 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.59-62.
60 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.62-4.
61 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.64-5.
62 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.74.
63 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.77.
64 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.65-9.
65 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.73.
66 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.76.
67 四种体系分别是规范嵌套体系、效力连接体系、自主性体系和制度化体系。关于前三种体系的讨论See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.111-23.
68 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.134-5,pp.141-3.
69 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.137-41.
70 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.113-4.
71 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.149-54.
72 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.160-70.
73 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.143-4,pp.170-7.
74 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.86-7.
72 A指称行动者;φ指称行为。
76 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.175.
1 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.20.
2 下文不做特殊声明的话,“权威”都是指实践权威。
3 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,Monist(1985),vol.68,p.299.
4 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.47-8.
5 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.299.
6 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.53-7.
7 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.55-6.
8 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.299.
9 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.58.
10 See J.Raz,The Problem of Authority:Revisiting the Service Conception,Minnesota Law Review (2006),vol.90,pp.1014-5.
11 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.70-80.
12 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.296.
13 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.301-4.
14 See J.Raz,The Problem of Authority:Revisiting the Service Conception,pp.1007-10.就这个问题,与沈浪先生的讨论给了我很大的帮助,特此致谢。
15 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.37.
16 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.39-40.
17 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.42-4,pp.78-102.
18 J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.65ff.
19 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.38-9.See also John Gardner,Legal Positivism:5_(1/2) Myths,The American Journal of Jurisprudence(2001 ),vol.46,p.199ff.
20 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.65-8.
21 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.146-50,pp.157-9.
22 See R.Dworkin,Thirty Years On,Harvard Law Review(2002),vol.115,p.1666.
23 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.314,pp.317-8.See also A.Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,2~(nd) ed.Portland:Hart Publishing,2005,pp.122-3.
24 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on LegalPositivism,ed.by R.Genrge,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996,p.264.
25 See A.Marmot,Interpretation and Legal Theory,p.124.
26 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,pp.265-8.
27 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,p.271.
28 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.314-5.
29 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.312-3.
30 See A.Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,p.130.
31 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,p.252.
32 参见马默对适用意图(application intention)的讨论:Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,pp.129-32.
33 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.3 14.
34 莱昂斯认为法律实证主义是明示内容命题(the explicjt content thesis),不能解释法律中隐含的内容,see D.Lyons,Moral Aspects of Legal Theory:Essays on Law,Justice and Political Responsibility,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993,pp.82-7.
35 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.237-8.
36 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.46-7.
37 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.88-94.
38 See J.Raz,About Morality and the Nature of Law,pp.11-2.
39 J.Raz,About Morality and the Nature of Law,The American Journal of Jurisprudence(2003),vol.48,pp.1-3.
40 Sec J.Raz,Can There Bca Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,p.325.
拉兹此处的“意义”与本文中的“用法”是相同的。
41 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,Archiv fur Rechts und Soziaphilosophie(1996),vol.82,p.6.
42 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Esaays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.8.
43 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.9-11.
44 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.15-19.
45 参见维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海:上海人民出版社,2001,第253-280节.
46 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,pp.1-5.
47 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.337-40.
48 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,p.4.
49 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.334-7.
50 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,Oxtbrd:Clarendon Press,p.9;see also J.Dickson,Evaluation and Legal Theory,Portland,Oregon:Hart Publishing,2001.
51 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,p.8,pp.10-1.
52 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,pp.11-8.
53 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
54 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,p.10.
55 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,pp.7-9.
56 See J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.141 ff.,p.140,n.15.
57 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,pp.9-11.
58 See J.Finnis,On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism,Notre Dame Law Review(2000),vol.75,pp.1602-3.
1 See J.Finnis,On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire,Law and Philosophy(1987),vol.6,pp.357-380.
2 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,p.413.
3 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1977,pp.22-28.
4 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,p.27.
5 See J.Raz,Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,The Yale Law Journal,vol.81,1972,p.824,n.4.
6 See J.Raz,Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,p.829 ff.;See also H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994,p.260.
7 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,2006,p.4.
8 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.35-6.
9 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1979,pp.237-44.
10 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.4.
11 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.4-5.
12 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.4-6.
13 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.5.
14 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.264,n.6.
15 See J.Coleman and B.Leiter,Determinacy,Objectivity,and Authority,in Marmor,Law and Interpretation:Essays in Legal Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995,pp.265-76.
16 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.78.
17 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1996),vol.25,no.2,p.88.
18 See R.Dworkin,A Matter of Principle,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.137-40.
19 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.101-3;pp.108-12.
20 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.26.
21 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.80-81;see also R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.94-99.
22 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.117-22.
23 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.126-7.
24 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.117-118.
26 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe it,p.132ff.
27 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,p.135.
28 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.31-33.
29 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.6.
30 See R,Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.45-46.
31 See R Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.13.
32 R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp41-42.
33 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.46.
34 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.47.
34 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.47.
36 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.v.
37 参见哈贝马斯:《交往行为理论》(第一卷),曹卫东译,上海:上海人民出版社,2004,页83-94.
38 See Dworkin,Freedom's Law:The Moral Reading of the American Constitution,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1996,pp.15-9.
39 See Dworkin,Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach,Arizona Law Review(2001 ),vol.43.
40 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.50.
41 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.52.
42 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.55-56.
43 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.56.
44 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.56.
45 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.58.
46 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.90-91.
47 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.93.
48 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.92-93.
49 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.169-70.
50 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.210ff.
51 SeeR.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.115-116,p.135.
52 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.117.
53 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.120-122.
54 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.118-119.
55 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.142-143.
56 另外参见德沃金对“准确性”价值的讨论,Dworkin.Justice in Robes,pp.172-4.
57 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.152.
58 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.160ff..
59 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.178-179.
60因此,在《法袍下的正义》中,德沃金对其他的法律理论进行重构的时候,他提到的是“准确性”、“效率性”和“整全性”三种价值,而非《法律帝国》中的“惯习论”、“实用主义”和“整全性”。其中缺少了实用主义的身影。See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.172-8.
61 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.115-8.
62 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.265.
63 See R.Dworkin,A Matter of Principle,pp.131-7.
64 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.103-108.
65 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.110-111.
66 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.407,p.400.
67 See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.1-2.
68 See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.152-3.
1 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005.
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3 See Bix,Jurisprudence:Theory and Context,4~(th) edition,London:Sweet & Maxwell,2006,pp.13-5.
4 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.15.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.3-4.
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7 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.240-2.
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朱峰,《拉兹权威命题研究》,山东大学博士学位论文,2007.
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2 See P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz ed.,Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour ofH.L.A.Hart,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,p.ⅴ.
3 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,pp.239-44.
4 See B.Bix,Jurisprudence." Theory and Context,4~(th),London:Sweet & Maxwell,2006,pp.91-3.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.6-13.
6 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.33-41.
7 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990,pp.154-62.
8 See G.Lamond,The Coerciveness of Law,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies(2000),vol.20.
9 See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996.
10 See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,Philosophy & Public Affairs (1988),vol.17,pp.114-6.
11 See Dennis Patterson,Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies(2006),vol.26;see also Patterson,Against a Theory of Meaning,Washington University Law Quarterly(1995),vol.73.
12 See T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,in J.Coleman(ed.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.59 ff..
13 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1996),vol.25,no.2.
14 See J.Finnis,Fundamentals of Ethics,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1983,p.56ff.
15 See Hans Kelsen,General Theory of Law and State,tran.by Anders Wedberg,N J:The Lawbook Exchange,Ltd.,1999,pp.163-5.
16 参见刘叶深:“评凯尔森的法律效力理论”,《厦门大学法律评论》(第13辑),厦门:厦门大学出版社,2007,页87-95.
17 参见朱峰:《拉兹权威命题研究》,山东大学博士学位论文,2007.
18 参见喻中:“哈特的授权规则及其本体意义”,《北京行政学院学报》,2004.4.
19 参见王彬:“论法律解释的融贯性”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
20 参见陈景辉:“原则、自由裁量和依法裁判”,《法学研究》,2006.5.
21 参见高国栋:《分析法学的日常语言分析转向》,吉林大学博士学位论文,2006;谌洪果:“通过语言体察法律现象:哈特与日常语言分析哲学”,《比较法研究》,2006.5.
22 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,p.330.
23 See MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,1981,p.34ff.
24 See Brian Bix,H.L.A.Hart and the Hcrmeneutic Turn in Legal Theory,SMU Law Review(1999),vol.52.
25 参见沈映涵:“解读描述社会学:哈特法律理论中的描述性方法的前提性分析”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
26 参见陈锐:“从外在观点到内在观点:哈特与法律实证主义的诠释学转向”,《西南民族大学学报》(人文社科版),2005.10.
27 参见马克斯·韦伯:《社会学的基本概念》,顾忠华译,杵林:广西师范大学出版社,2005.
28 See MacCormick,A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law,Valparaiso Law Review(1985),vol.20;
Frederick Schauer,Positivism as Pariah,in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on Legal Positivism,ed.by R.George,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996;
Liam Murphy,The Political Question of the Concept of Law,in Hart 's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001;
Tom Campbell,The legal Theory of Ethical Positivism,A ldershot:Dartmouth Publishing Co.,1996.
29 See J.Dickson,Evaluation andLegal Theory,Portland,Oregon:Hart Publishing,2001,pp.83-103.
30 参见谌洪果:“从命令论到规则论:奥斯丁与哈特”,《法哲学与法社会学论从》,第10期,北京:北京大学出版社,2007,页150-5.
31 参见刘东升:《实证法学的反思及规范解读》,山东大学博士学位论文,2006.
32 参见曾莉:《包容实证主义法学视野中的法律与道德关系研究》,吉林大学博士学位论文,2006.
33 参见陈景辉:《法律的界限:实证主义命题群之展开》,北京:中国政法大学出版社,2007,页198-208.
34 参见朱振:“哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂:基于分离命题的考察”,《法制与社会发展》,2007.5.
35 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,Monist(1985),vol.68,pp.311-2.
36 See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,Oxford:Basil Blackweil,1972,pp.43-7.
37See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,p.26ff.
38See S.Kripke,,Naming and Necessity,p.47ff.
39See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,pp.60-7.
40See S.Kripke,Naming and Necessity,pp.35-9.
41See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",Mind,Language and Reality,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975,pp.219-22.
42See H.Putnam,Is Semantics Possible?,Mind,Language and Reality,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975,p.139.
43See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",pp.223-7.
44See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",pp.235-8.
45See T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.48ff.
46See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,pp.72-3.
47See H.Putnam,The Meaning of"Meaning",p.249.
48See H.Putnam,The Meaning of "Meaning",pp.250-1.
48参见蒯因:“经验主义的两个教条”,马蒂尼奇(主编):《语言哲学》,牟博等译,北京:商务印书馆,2004,页46-50.
50参见蒯因:“经验主义的两个教条”,页60-3.
51See also H.Pumam,Possibility and Necessity,Realism and Reason,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983,pp.46-53.
52参见蒯因:《语词和对象》,陈启伟等译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005,页12.
53参见蒯因:《语词和对象》,页53-9.
54See B.Leiter,Rethinking Legal Realism:Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,Texas Law Review (1997),vol.76,p.267ff.;see also Legal Realism,Hard Positivism,and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,in Coleman(ed.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.355 ff..
55See H.Putnam,Realism and Reason,p.ⅶ.
56See also H.Putnam,Possibility and Necessity,pp.63-6;see also Putnam,Realism with a Human Face,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990,pp.63-70.
57See Putnam,There is at least one a priori truth,Realism and Reason,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983,pp.100-10.
58See H.Putnam,Possibility and Necessity,pp.46-53.
59See Putnam,There is at least one a priori truth,pp.113-4.
60See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.55-9.
61See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.329-31.
1See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.16.
2See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence andPhilosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1983,pp.23-4.
3See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.133-4.
4See Karl Olivercrona,Law as Fact,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1939,p.90.
5See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.18-20;pp.54-6.
6See J.L.Austin,How to Do Things with Words,外研社/Oxford University Press,2002,pp.1-11.
7See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,pp.26-7.
8See H.L.A.Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,in Logic and Language(2~(nd) series),ed.by Anthony Flew,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,1953,p.145.
9See G.P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,ed.by P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,pp.29-30.
10See P.M.S.Hacker,Hart's Philosophy of Law,in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,ed.by P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1977,pp.6-7;J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.5.
11See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,pp.4-5.
12See G.P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,pp.30-1.
13See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.13-4.
14See H.L.A.Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,pp.146-55.
15See H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,p.23.
16See G P.Baker,Defeasibility and Meaning,p.36.
17See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept ofLaw,pp.14-5.
18See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.10-3.
19See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept ofLaw,pp.15-6.
20See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.123-4.
21See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.124-5.
22See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law? in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,pp.325-6.
23See J.Waldron,Vagueness in Law and Language:Some Philosophical Issues,California Law Review (1994),vol.82,pp.512-4.
24See J.Waldron,Vagueness in Law and Language:Some Philosophical Issues,pp.516-21.
25See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law? p.330.
26See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.124.
27See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.15-6.
28See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.149.着重非原文所有。
29See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,pp.31-40.
30See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.274.当然德沃金的批评不会如此简单,在第三章中我将重构“语义之刺”,这将成为对哈特理论的致命一击。
31See e.g.J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison;see also T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,both in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.6-11;pp,41-3.
32See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.103-5.
33See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.152.
36See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.79-88.
37See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.54.
38See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.54-7.
39See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,Stanford,California:Stanford University Press,1981,pp.30-2.
40See also J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Princeton,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990,pp.50-3.
41See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
42See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.55.
43See Scott Shapiro,What is the Internal Point of View?,Fordham Law Review(2006),vol.75,pp.1158-61.
44See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.v.
45See H.L.A.Hart.The Concept of Law,pp.239-43.
46例如,布莱克(Donald Black)的法律社会学理论就属于此类,参见《法律的运作行为》,唐越、苏力译,北京:中国政法大学出版社,1994:《社会学视野中的司法》,郭星华译,北京:法律出版社,2002.
47See Scott Shapiro,What is the Internal Point of View?,p.1161.
48See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
49See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1977,p.52.
50See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,p.53;see also J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.53-5.
51See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.53-4.
52See David Lewis,Convention:A Philosophical Study,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1969.
53See Andrei Marmot,Legal Conventionalism,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law(ed.By Jules Coleman),Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.203-212.
54See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.57-8.
55See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.57-8.
56See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.255-6.
57See Kevin Toh,Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project,Legal Theory(2005),vol.11,pp.76-7;pp.112-3.
58See Kevin Toh,Hart's Expressivism and His Benthamite Project,pp.108-10.
59See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
60See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1980,pp.11-8;see also S.Perry,Hart's Methodological Positivism,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law(ed.By Jules Coleman),Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.347-53.
61参见哈特:《法律、自由与道德》,支振锋译,北京:法律出版社,2006,页22-5:See also H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.176-80.
62See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
63See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.47-50.
64See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.33-4;see also MacCormick,LegalReasoning andLegal Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1978,pp.288-92.
65See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,p.38.
66参见彼得·温奇:《社会科学的观念及其与哲学的关系》,张庆熊、张缨等译,上海:上海人民出版社,2004,页90-1.
67See H.Putnam,Reason,Truth and History,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.132-7.
68See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996,pp.60-1.
69参见普特南:《事实与价值两分法的崩溃》,应奇译,北京:东方出版社,2006,页49.
70参见普特南:《事实与价值两分法的崩溃》,页47.
71See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity in Law,p.59.
*就这个问题,与冉杰先生的讨论给了我很大的帮助,特此致谢。
72See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Samantics,in J.Coleman(cal.),Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.73-4.
73See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.15-16.
74See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.31-35.
75See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,pp.69-79.
76See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1988),vol.17,pp.112-114.
77对哈特的不同的阐释,see T.Endicott,Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting,p.59 ff.
78See D.Brink,Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,pp.115-116.
79更为深入的讨论,see H.Putnam,Reason,Truth and History,ch.1,ch.2.
80See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,pp.69-79.
81See Nicos Stavropoulos,HaWs Semantics,pp.93-95.
82See N.Stavropoulos,Objectivity,in M.Golding and W.Edmundson(ed.),The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,2005,pp.316-317.
83See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,p.84.
84See Nicos Stavropoulos,Hart's Semantics,p.83.
85See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.79.
86See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.151.
87See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.78-9,标准划分的标识(A、B、C)并非原文所有。
88See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.102-3,对区分标准的另一种阐述,see Benjamin Zipursky,The Model of Social Facts,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,pp.227-8.
89See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.89-96.
90See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.99-100.
91See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.113.
92See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.104-5.
93See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.105-6.
94See N.MacCormick,H.L.A.Hart,pp.101-2.
95See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.256.
96See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.253-5.
97See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,p.258.
98See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,p.256
99 See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,p.256,pp.265-7.
100 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.190-4.
101 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.195.
102 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.157-61.
1 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1990.
2 See J.Raz,Engaging Reason:On the Theory of Value andAction,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1999;
J.Raz,The Practice of Value,Oxford:Clarendon Press,2003.
3 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,pp.54-5.着重为本文作者所加。
4 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.56.
6 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.17-9.
7 我稍微改变了拉兹的一个例了,sce J.Raz,Agency,Reason and Good,in Engaging Reason:On the Theory of Valueand,Action,,pp.32-3.以下不注明出处的文章均源于此书。
8 See J.Raz,Agency,Reason and Good,pp.33-4.
9 这里,拉兹娴熟地运用了概念分析的方法,特别是他的“概念深度”的思想。在下一章的小结中,我们将完整展示拉兹的概念理论。
10 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,p.82.
11 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,pp.81-2.
12 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,p.88.
13 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.120-1.
14 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.123-7.
15 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,p.125,n.13.
16 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,p.113.
17 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.5.
18 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.322.
19 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.323.
20 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.324.
21 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.342.
22 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.323.
23 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.324-6.
24 See J.Raz,Incommensurability and Agency,pp.63-6.
25 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.326.
26 参见托马斯·内格尔:《人的问题》,万以详,上海:上海译文出版社,2004,页140-5.
27 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.327.
28 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.327.
29 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.338-40.
30 See J.Raz,When We are Ourselves,p.9.
31 See J.Raz,Incommensurability and Agency,pp.50-62.
32 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.346-53.
33 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.347-8.
34 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.348-51.
35 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:On Rationality and the Justification of Reason,pp.65-6.
36 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.353.
37 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.15-6.
38 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,pp.90-4.
39 See J.Raz,Explaining Normativity:Reason and the Will,pp.105-8.
40 See J.Raz,When We are Ourselves,pp.11-21.
41 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.146-52;See also J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.19-33.
42 See J.Raz,Notes on Value and Objectivity,pp.146-52.
See also J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.37-47.
43 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.25-7.
44 R代表reason.
45 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.27.
46 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.27-8.
47 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.39-40.
48 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.41-2.
49 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1979,pp.13-6.
50 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.184-6.
51 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.184.
52 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.45-6.
53 对于排他性理由在哪些情况下可以是能够被证立的(justified),在“正当性权威”部分将会详细讨论。
54 See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.254-5.
55 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.18-20.
56 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.35-6.
57 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.36-7.
58 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.18,n.19.
59 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.59-62.
60 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.62-4.
61 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.64-5.
62 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.74.
63 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.77.
64 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.65-9.
65 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.73.
66 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.76.
67 四种体系分别是规范嵌套体系、效力连接体系、自主性体系和制度化体系。关于前三种体系的讨论See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.111-23.
68 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.134-5,pp.141-3.
69 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.137-41.
70 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.113-4.
71 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.149-54.
72 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.160-70.
73 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,pp.143-4,pp.170-7.
74 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.86-7.
72 A指称行动者;φ指称行为。
76 See J.Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,p.175.
1 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.20.
2 下文不做特殊声明的话,“权威”都是指实践权威。
3 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,Monist(1985),vol.68,p.299.
4 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.47-8.
5 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.299.
6 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.53-7.
7 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.55-6.
8 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.299.
9 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,p.58.
10 See J.Raz,The Problem of Authority:Revisiting the Service Conception,Minnesota Law Review (2006),vol.90,pp.1014-5.
11 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.70-80.
12 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.296.
13 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.301-4.
14 See J.Raz,The Problem of Authority:Revisiting the Service Conception,pp.1007-10.就这个问题,与沈浪先生的讨论给了我很大的帮助,特此致谢。
15 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.37.
16 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.39-40.
17 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.42-4,pp.78-102.
18 J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.65ff.
19 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.38-9.See also John Gardner,Legal Positivism:5_(1/2) Myths,The American Journal of Jurisprudence(2001 ),vol.46,p.199ff.
20 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.65-8.
21 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.146-50,pp.157-9.
22 See R.Dworkin,Thirty Years On,Harvard Law Review(2002),vol.115,p.1666.
23 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.314,pp.317-8.See also A.Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,2~(nd) ed.Portland:Hart Publishing,2005,pp.122-3.
24 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on LegalPositivism,ed.by R.Genrge,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1996,p.264.
25 See A.Marmot,Interpretation and Legal Theory,p.124.
26 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,pp.265-8.
27 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,p.271.
28 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.314-5.
29 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,pp.312-3.
30 See A.Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,p.130.
31 See J.Raz,Intention in Interpretation,p.252.
32 参见马默对适用意图(application intention)的讨论:Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory,pp.129-32.
33 See J.Raz,Authority,Law and Morality,p.3 14.
34 莱昂斯认为法律实证主义是明示内容命题(the explicjt content thesis),不能解释法律中隐含的内容,see D.Lyons,Moral Aspects of Legal Theory:Essays on Law,Justice and Political Responsibility,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993,pp.82-7.
35 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,pp.237-8.
36 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.46-7.
37 See J.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,pp.88-94.
38 See J.Raz,About Morality and the Nature of Law,pp.11-2.
39 J.Raz,About Morality and the Nature of Law,The American Journal of Jurisprudence(2003),vol.48,pp.1-3.
40 Sec J.Raz,Can There Bca Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005,p.325.
拉兹此处的“意义”与本文中的“用法”是相同的。
41 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,Archiv fur Rechts und Soziaphilosophie(1996),vol.82,p.6.
42 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,in Hart's Postscript:Esaays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law,ed.by J.Coleman,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001,p.8.
43 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.9-11.
44 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,pp.15-19.
45 参见维特根斯坦:《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海:上海人民出版社,2001,第253-280节.
46 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,pp.1-5.
47 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.337-40.
48 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,p.4.
49 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,pp.334-7.
50 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,Oxtbrd:Clarendon Press,p.9;see also J.Dickson,Evaluation and Legal Theory,Portland,Oregon:Hart Publishing,2001.
51 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,p.8,pp.10-1.
52 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,pp.11-8.
53 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.198.
54 See J.Raz,Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law:A Partial Comparison,p.10.
55 See J.Raz,On the Nature of Law,pp.7-9.
56 See J.Raz,The Practice of Value,pp.141 ff.,p.140,n.15.
57 See J.Finnis,Natural Law and Natural Rights,pp.9-11.
58 See J.Finnis,On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism,Notre Dame Law Review(2000),vol.75,pp.1602-3.
1 See J.Finnis,On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire,Law and Philosophy(1987),vol.6,pp.357-380.
2 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,p.413.
3 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1977,pp.22-28.
4 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,p.27.
5 See J.Raz,Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,The Yale Law Journal,vol.81,1972,p.824,n.4.
6 See J.Raz,Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,p.829 ff.;See also H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994,p.260.
7 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,2006,p.4.
8 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.35-6.
9 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1979,pp.237-44.
10 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.4.
11 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.4-5.
12 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.4-6.
13 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.5.
14 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,p.264,n.6.
15 See J.Coleman and B.Leiter,Determinacy,Objectivity,and Authority,in Marmor,Law and Interpretation:Essays in Legal Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995,pp.265-76.
16 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.78.
17 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,Philosophy & Public Affairs(1996),vol.25,no.2,p.88.
18 See R.Dworkin,A Matter of Principle,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.137-40.
19 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.101-3;pp.108-12.
20 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.26.
21 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.80-81;see also R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.94-99.
22 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.117-22.
23 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.126-7.
24 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,pp.117-118.
26 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe it,p.132ff.
27 See R.Dworkin,Objectivity and Truth:You'd Better Believe It,p.135.
28 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.31-33.
29 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.6.
30 See R,Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.45-46.
31 See R Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.13.
32 R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp41-42.
33 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.46.
34 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.47.
34 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.47.
36 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,p.v.
37 参见哈贝马斯:《交往行为理论》(第一卷),曹卫东译,上海:上海人民出版社,2004,页83-94.
38 See Dworkin,Freedom's Law:The Moral Reading of the American Constitution,Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1996,pp.15-9.
39 See Dworkin,Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach,Arizona Law Review(2001 ),vol.43.
40 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.50.
41 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.52.
42 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.55-56.
43 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.56.
44 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.56.
45 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.58.
46 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.90-91.
47 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.93.
48 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.92-93.
49 See R.Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.169-70.
50 See J.Raz,The Authority of Law:Essays on Law and Morality,p.210ff.
51 SeeR.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.115-116,p.135.
52 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.117.
53 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.120-122.
54 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.118-119.
55 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.142-143.
56 另外参见德沃金对“准确性”价值的讨论,Dworkin.Justice in Robes,pp.172-4.
57 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.152.
58 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.160ff..
59 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.178-179.
60因此,在《法袍下的正义》中,德沃金对其他的法律理论进行重构的时候,他提到的是“准确性”、“效率性”和“整全性”三种价值,而非《法律帝国》中的“惯习论”、“实用主义”和“整全性”。其中缺少了实用主义的身影。See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.172-8.
61 See R.Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,pp.115-8.
62 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.265.
63 See R.Dworkin,A Matter of Principle,pp.131-7.
64 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.103-108.
65 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,pp.110-111.
66 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,p.407,p.400.
67 See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.1-2.
68 See Dworkin,Justice in Robes,pp.152-3.
1 See J.Raz,Can There Be a Theory of Law?,in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,ed.by M.Golding and W.Edmundson,Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2005.
2 See R.Dworkin,Law's Empire,Oxford:Hart Publishing,1998,pp.90-6.
3 See Bix,Jurisprudence:Theory and Context,4~(th) edition,London:Sweet & Maxwell,2006,pp.13-5.
4 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1961,p.15.
5 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.3-4.
6 这一点被越来越多的国外学者认识到,see L.Green,General Jurisprudence,OxfordJournal of Legal Studies,vol.25(2005);see also Brian Bix,Raz on Necessity,Law and Philosophy(2003),vol.22,pp.537-59.
7 See H.L.A.Hart,The Concept of Law,pp.240-2.
1 参见哈贝马斯:《在事实与规范之间:关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论》,童世骏译,北京:三联书店,2003,页1.
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